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Touching	the	Future:	A	Feminist	Theology	of	Eschatological	Bodies		
by	Emily	Pennington	
	
Abstract	
This	thesis	reclaims	the	eschatological	future	in	light	of	and	for	feminist	theology.		It	is	
mindful	 of	 critiques	 which	 expose	 the	 patriarchal,	 androcentric,	 and	 futuristic	
tendencies	of	 traditional	 eschatological	 thought.	 	Themes	are	detected	amongst	 these	
critiques	 that	 pertain	 to	 the	 process,	 content,	 and	 time	 of	 eschatology:	 feminist	
theologians	have	proposed	that	traditional	models	of	eschatology	present	the	process	
as	known	and	controlled	by	God	alone;	the	content	as	fleshless	and	static;	and	the	time	
as	 dislocated	 from	 present	 realities	 and	 concerns.	 	 Feminist	 theologians	 respond	 by	
attending	to	and	affirming	the	complexities	and	significance	of	present	embodiments.		
Three	aspects	of	existence	that	are	typically	associated	with	women	emerge	as	integral	
to	this	pursuit;	namely	embodied	relationality,	fluidity,	and	sensuality.		I	detect	in	these	
responses	 both	 potentials	 and	 problems.	 	 Reclaiming	 aspects	 of	 existence	 that	 have	
been	excluded	from	and	therefore	devalued	by	eschatology,	specifically	because	of	their	
association	 with	 women,	 is	 affirmed	 as	 a	 necessary	 and	 important	 contribution.		
However,	 I	 note	 that	 the	 overwhelming	 (if	 understandable)	 reluctance	 amongst	
feminist	theologians	to	speak	of	eschatological	finality,	or	to	grasp	at	specificity	about	
the	future,	prevents	us	from	hoping	for	fulfilled	experiences	of	these	aspects,	and	robs	
all	of	creation	of	a	usable	and	hopeful	future.		The	eschatological	future	is	ultimately	left	
in	the	hands	of	patriarchy.		I	attempt,	therefore,	to	reconstruct	the	process,	content,	and	
time	 of	 eschatology	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 not	 only	 affirms	 embodied	 relationality,	
fluidity,	 and	 sensuality,	 but	 also	 offers	 new	 and	 beneficial	ways	 to	 think	 about	 these	
values.	 	My	thesis	 is	thus	firmly	rooted	in	present	feminist	perspectives	on,	and	some	
women’s	 experiences	 of,	 embodiment.	 	 What	 is	 more,	 it	 converses	 with	 these	 by	
negotiating	 some	 ways	 in	 which	 a	 reconstructed	 eschatology	 can	 be	 open	 to	 and	
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changed	by	 our	 present	 existences,	 even	 as	 it	 is	 able	 to	 inform	and	direct	 them.	 	My	
ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 uncover	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future	 a	 way	 in	 which	 to	 take	 and	
transform	 patriarchal	 constructions	 of	 female	 bodies	 in	 order	 to	 uncover	 a	 real	 and	
present	hope	for	all	bodies.		
~	6	~	
 
Introduction	
Introduction	
Christian	 constructions	 of	 the	 eschatological	 future	 are	 both	 worthy	 and	 in	 need	 of	
attention.1		They	are	worthy	as	they	quest	after	and	seek	to	discover	“the	ultimate	end	
of	 humanity	 and	 of	 creation”	 (Karras,	 2006,	 243).	 	 In	 contemplating	 such	 ultimacy,	
eschatological	 assertions	 make	 claims	 about	 God’s	 intended	 “end”	 for	 creation.			
Considerations	 of	 this	 “end”	 have	 meandered	 around	 various	 landmarks,	 such	 as	
hermeneutical	perceptions	of	the	full	and	final	reign	of	God,	Platonic	constructions	of	a	
spiritualised	life,	and	the	dialectical	emphasis	on	the	unknown	“not	yet”	of	eschatology	
(Phan,	 2005,	 174‐5).	 	On	 these	 and	other	 landmarks,	 Christianity	has	 tended	 to	 craft	
eschatology	into	an	existence	which	is	actualised	by	God,	populated	by	spiritual	bodies,	
and	located	primarily	in	the	future.		Such	an	eschatology	is	not	only	unsatisfactory	but	
dangerous,	 for	 it	 lends	 itself	 to	and	upholds	a	 theology	of	God	which	 is	patriarchal,	 a	
theology	 of	 creation	 which	 is	 androcentric,	 and	 a	 theology	 of	 hope	 which	 is	 forever	
delayed.	 	 The	 eschatological	 future	 thus	 needs	 attention	 as	 it	 has	 used	 its	 own	
constructions	of	male	and	female	bodies	to	assign	ultimate,	divine	worth	to	the	former	
and	inconsequence	or	iniquity	to	the	latter.	
	
Many	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 recognised	 this	 and	 have	 responded	 by	 constructing	
theologies	which	aim	to	centralise	and	contribute	to	the	liberation	of	women’s	bodies	
from	systemic,	patriarchal	oppression.		In	relation	to	eschatology,	this	has	often	meant	
affirming	God’s	proximity	 to	 and	 involvement	 in	 relationships	with	 fluid	 and	 sensual	
embodied	 beings,	 through	 which	 a	 better	 future	 may	 be	 realised	 in	 pragmatic	 and	
cooperative	ways.		The	focus,	though,	overwhelmingly	is	on	the	present	and,	given	the	
																																																													
1	 I	 refer	 here,	 and	 throughout	 my	 thesis,	 to	 the	 “eschatological	 future”,	 rather	 than	 simply	
“eschatology”,	 as	 many	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 offered	 reconstructions	 of	 eschatology	 in	
relation	to	the	present.	 	As	will	become	clear,	much	less	attention	has	been	paid	to	rethinking	
futurist	 dimensions	 of	 eschatology,	 or	 its	 sense	 of	 finality	 and	 ultimacy,	 hence	 my	 choice	 of	
language	and	the	originality	of	my	contribution. 
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problems	noted	with	 traditional	 constructions	of	 eschatology,	 this	 is	 understandable.		
Nevertheless,	 a	 predominantly	 presentist	 stance	 overlooks	 the	 chance	 for	 the	 values	
noted	 to	 be	 experienced	 in	 the	 fullness	 of	 intimacy	 and	 dynamism	 which	 are	 only	
partially	experienced	now.	 	Moreover,	the	attempts	to	realise	liberation	are	limited	in	
both	hope	and	scope,	restricted	as	they	are	to	that	which	is	achievable	in	the	here	and	
now.	 	Even	 feminist	 theologians	who	do	appreciate	a	 sense	of	 eschatological	 futurity,	
such	 as	 Letty	 Russell	 and	 Rosemary	 Radford	 Ruether,	 are	 nevertheless	 cautious	 in	
specifying	 what	 such	 an	 existence	 may	 look	 like.	 	 Striving	 for	 such	 specificity	 can,	
however,	 be	 extremely	 beneficial:	 if	 based	 on	 feminist	 appreciations	 of	 embodied	
relationality,	 fluidity,	and	sensuality,	 eschatology	can	offer	 the	ultimate	affirmation	of	
and	hope	for	the	full	experience	of	these.			
	
Still,	bearing	in	mind	Audre	Lorde’s	cautionary	statement	that	“the	master’s	tools	will	
never	 dismantle	 the	 master’s	 house”	 (1984,	 112),	 the	 tools	 of	 this	 trade	 must	 be	
carefully	 selected	 and	 mindfully	 used.	 	 M.	 Shawn	 Copeland,	 reading	 Letty	 Russell,	
claims	 that	 the	 master’s	 house	 is	 actually	 “set	 against”	 God’s	 house,	 and	 that	 this	
presents	 us	 with	 “two	 ends	 for	 our	 choosing”	 (1999,	 39).	 	 Copeland	 continues	 by	
expounding	 Russell’s	 call,	 explaining	 that	 the	 master’s	 house	 signifies	 the	
“institutionalization	of	heterosexist	white	racist	supremacy”	whereas	the	household	of	
God	is	comprised	“of	forgiveness	and	restoration,	of	gladness	and	festivity”	(1999,	39).		
Thus,	 in	 the	 context	of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 propose	 that	we	 strive	 to	discover	 the	 tools	 that	
feminist	theologians	have	used	to	dismantle	the	master’s	eschatological	house,	in	order	
to	unearth	ways	 in	which	we	can	contribute	 to	 the	rebuilding	of	God’s	eschatological	
house.		Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	such	dismantling	should	serve	the	purposes	of	
rebuilding:	 Ada	 Maria	 Isasi‐Díaz	 explains	 that	 she	 "denounces	 and	 deconstructs"	 in	
order	to	"find"	and	"salvage"	that	which	can	help	to	“move	ahead”	(2004a,	342).		In	this	
way,	I	am	sympathetic	to	the	feminist	theologians	who	seek	to	rebuild	the	house	from	
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within	 in	order	 that	 the	house	may	become	a	home	of	 liberation	 and	not	 a	prison	of	
oppression.			
	
That	 eschatology	 has	 so	 dutifully	 served	 patriarchal	 theology	 means	 that	 it	 is	 an	
appropriate	 place	 from	 which	 to	 start	 this	 task.	 	 At	 present,	 constructions	 of	 the	
eschatological	 future	 are	 largely	 unhelpful	 and	 damaging	 for	 feminist	 theology,	 thus	
they	warrant	not	only	critique	but	reconstruction.	 	By	attending	to	the	ways	in	which	
feminist	 theologians	 have	 dismantled	 and	 rebuilt	 the	 foundations	 and	 features	 of	
traditional	Christian	models	of	eschatology,	and	using	these	to	conceive	of	a	new	model,	
eschatology	 may	 emerge	 as	 an	 archetype	 of	 shifting	 loyalties:	 reflecting	 God’s	
commitment	to	liberating	creation	in	all	of	its	particularity	and	diversity,	rather	than	a	
patriarchally‐defined	 eschatology	 which	 liberates	 only	 those	 associated	 with	 its	
androcentric	 values.	 	 	 This	 thesis	does	not,	 then,	 take	 the	 same	approach	 as	 thinkers	
such	as	Susan	Frank	Parsons,	Sarah	Coakley,	Valerie	Karras,	and	Janet	Martin	Soskice.		
The	details	of	these	thinkers’	approaches	will	be	extrapolated	momentarily	therefore	a	
summary	is	sufficient	at	this	point.		Parsons,	Coakley,	Karras	and	Soskice	share	a	desire	
to	re‐read	the	tradition	 in	order	 to	recover	valuable	and	beneficial	elements	 in	 it;	my	
own	approach,	for	reasons	that	will	be	stated	shortly,	begins	with	feminist	explorations	
and	affirmations	of	female	bodies	in	order	to	construct	a	new	model	of	the	eschaton.	
	
Eschatology	and	Embodiment	
Tools	of	Dismantling,	Tools	of	Rebuilding	
Many	 feminist	 theorists	 and	 theologians	undertake	 similarly	 critical	 constructions	by	
exposing	the	ways	in	which	patriarchal	thought	has	overlooked	and	denigrated	female	
bodies.		Speaking	more	widely	of	the	unacknowledged	biases	of	academic	theory,	Rosi	
Braidotti	notes	that	the	“knowing	subject”	has	been	deemed	to	be	“universal,	neutral,	
and	consequently	 gender‐free”	 (1993,	6).	 	Debold,	Tolman,	 and	Mikel	Brown	support	
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this	observation	and	note	how	Western	culture	“authorizes	as	knowledge	the	products	
of	a	mind	abstracted	from	material	reality	–	of	the	body,	of	human	relationship,	of	the	
particulars	 of	 people’s	 lives”	 (1996,	 86).	 	 Feminist	 thinkers	 have	 addressed	 such	
systemic	devaluations	of	female	bodies	by	re‐centering	them,	acknowledging	that	“The	
first	 and	 foremost	 of	 locations	 in	 one’s	 reality	 is	 one’s	 own	 embodiment”	 (Braidotti,	
1993,	7).		In	relation	to	feminist	theology	this	has	meant	recognising	that	“universality	
and	 impartiality	are	 inadequate	principles	of	moral	 reasoning”	 (Fiorenza,	1991,	103).		
Instead,	 the	 particularities	 and	 complexities	 of	 embodied	 lives	 and	 experiences	 are	
centralised	 as	 the	 primary	 authorities	 in	 theologising;	 they	 are	 the	 inescapable	
locations	from	which	we	theorise	thus	to	deny	or	discredit	them	is	disingenuous	and,	
ultimately,	impossible.	
	
Continuing	with	 this	method	of	dismantling	and	 rebuilding	 the	 foundations	of	 theory	
and	 theology,	my	 own	 thesis	 begins	 by	 outlining	 feminist	 expositions	 of	 the	ways	 in	
which	 traditional	 eschatology	 has	 imbued	 female	 bodies	 with	 harmful	 meaning.	 	 By	
engaging	with	feminist	theological	literature,	it	will	show	how	patriarchal	theology	has	
constructed	 eschatology	 on	 traits	 it	 has	 identified	with	male	 bodies:	 namely	 power‐
over,	 stability,	 and	 control.	 	 Accordingly,	 it	 has	 projected	 the	 perceived	 opposites	 of	
these	onto	female	bodies:	they	are	deemed	to	be	more	relational,	 fluid,	and	sensuous.		
In	 short,	more	 embodied.	 	 This	 understanding	 of	 embodiment	 has	 also	 been	 used	 to	
frame	the	female	body	as	a	form	that	is	 inherently	and	thoroughly	material.	 	Through	
this,	patriarchal	theology	has	imaged	the	female	body	as	being	closer	to	nature	and,	in	
its	dualistic	logic,	further	from	the	divine	than	the	male	body.		Given	such	constructions,	
some	 feminist	 theologians	 claim	 that	 essentialised	 definitions	 of	 gender	 have	 been	
utilised	 by	 patriarchal	 theology	 to	 present	 a	 model	 of	 eschatology	 that	 excludes,	
devalues,	 and	 demonises	 female	 bodies.	 	 Commenting	 on	 such	 essentialism,	 Jones	
(2000,	30)	notes	that:	
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The	historic	problem	with	these	binaries	[…]	is	not	that	male	and	female	were	
distinguished,	 but	 that	 the	 masculine	 was	 valued	 over	 the	 feminine.	 	 In	
response	 [feminist	 essentialists]	 argue	 that	 present‐day	 feminists	 need	 to	
celebrate	and	perhaps	even	privilege	feminine	distinctiveness.	
	
Although	this	thesis	does	not	claim	to	be	a	work	in	“feminist	essentialism”	and	does	not	
uphold	a	belief	that	“male”	and	“female”	bodies	are	distinct	and	oppositional	categories,	
it	does	detect	a	need	to	“celebrate	and	perhaps	privilege”	that	which	has	been	identified	
with	female	bodies.			
	
I	 take	 this	 a	 step	 further	 by	 claiming	 that	 certain	 traits	 assigned	 to,	 and	 some	
experiences	 of,	 women	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 revelatory	 for	 all	 of	 creation.	 	 Nicola	 Slee	
expresses	 a	 similar	 perspective,	 wherein	 she	 purports	 to	 “hold	 up	 the	 holiness	 of	
ordinary	 women’s	 and	 girl’s	 lives,	 to	 say	 that	 their	 lives	 are	 sacred,	 worthy	 of	
painstaking	study,	that	their	lives	are	revelatory	of	God”	(2013,	17).		Slee	names	this	as	
a	form	of	“strategic	feminism”	(2013,	17);	this	is	a	strategy	I	similarly	employ,	as	I	value	
traits	which	exclusively	have	been	assigned	 to	 female	bodies	out	of	concern	 for	all	of	
creation.	 	 I	 do	 this	by	attending	 to	 feminist	 theological	 appraisals	of	 the	 traits	noted,	
and	 also	 to	 ways	 in	 which	 some	women	 have	 experienced	 them.	 	Whilst	 this	 thesis	
recognises	 that	 not	 all	 women	 experience	 their	 bodies	 as	 relational,	 fluid,	 and/or	
sensuous,	 the	 fact	 that	 some	women	 do,	 coupled	with	 the	 denigration	 of	 all	women	
through	the	association,	means	that	listening	to	and	valuing	them	is	necessary.2		This	is	
strategic	 as	 it	 uses	 these	 two	 foundations	 in	order,	 to	use	 Jones’s	definition,	 to	make	
calculated	 decisions	 “about	 which	 universals	 or	 essentials	 might	 work	 in	 a	 given	
context	and	which	might	 fail”,	 and	subsequently	 to	 “craft	ones	 that	are	emancipatory	
and	life‐giving”	(2000,	44).		This	thesis	claims,	then,	that	the	traits	noted	here	are	more	
“emancipatory	and	life‐giving”	for	all	of	creation	than	those	traditionally	identified	with	
male	bodies.			
																																																													
2	This	does	not	mean	 that	non‐experiences,	or	difficult	experiences,	of	embodied	relationality,	
fluidity,	 and	 sensuality	 are	 overlooked;	 time	 is	 taken	 in	 each	 chapter	 to	 attend	 to	 various	
perspectives	on	these.	 
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Grosz	 applauds	 such	 moves,	 arguing	 that	 they	 display	 “feminism’s	 ability	 to	 use	
patriarchy	 and	 phallocratism	 against	 themselves,	 its	 ability	 to	 take	 up	 positions	
ostensibly	opposed	to	 feminism	and	to	use	 them	for	 feminist	goals”	(1994,	95).3	 	The	
goal	for	this	thesis	is	to	propose	a	“modest	universal”	(cf.	Mount	Shoop,	2010,	26)	of	all	
eschatological	existences	by	centralising	traits	that	patriarchal	theology	has	identified	
with	 female	bodies.	 	This	 is	not,	however,	a	universal	 that	reproduces	 the	patriarchal	
privileging	 of	 one	 experience.	 	 Indeed,	 Mount	 Shoop	 writes	 that	 it	 is	 only	 when	
experiences	are	absolved	of	the	“necessity	[…]	to	yield	ultimate	truth”	that	the	integrity	
and	“truth‐bearing	qualities”	of	those	experiences	are	honoured	(2010,	7).		This	thesis,	
then,	proposes	an	eschatological	openness	 that	embraces	and	 is	 shaped	by	particular	
experiences	 of	 embodied	 relationality,	 fluidity	 and	 sensuality.	 	 It	 attends	 to	 some	
women’s	experiences	of	these	in	order	to	affirm	and	celebrate	the	truths	that	they	bear.	
	
This	 primary	 focus	 on	 framings	 of	 female	 bodies	 shapes	 the	way	 this	 thesis	 engages	
with	the	Bible	and	the	Christian	tradition.	 	Whilst	seeking	to	contribute	a	new	way	of	
thinking	 about	 eschatology,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 thesis	 that	 seeks	 to	 reform	 or	 revise	 the	
tradition;	it	does	not	return	to	the	tradition	in	order	to	repair	or	rescue	it.		This	is	not	to	
discredit	 such	 approaches,	 though.	 	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 thinkers	
who	find	merit	in	such	a	methodology.		Susan	Frank	Parsons,	for	instance,	consistently	
engages	with	 traditional	 thinkers	 in	 order	 to	 uncover	 their	meanings	 and	 intentions	
against,	 it	 seems,	 misunderstandings	 or	 misrepresentations.	 	 With	 reference	 to	
Aristotle’s	 and	 Aquinas’s	 theories	 on	 natural	 law,	 she	 calls	 for	 a	 “revaluation”	 of	 the	
																																																													
3	 In	 some	 ways,	 this	 echoes	 Luce	 Irigaray’s	 use	 of	 mimesis	 to	 claim	 that	 women	 must	
deliberately	 assume	 certain	 roles	 in	 order	 to	 “convert	 a	 form	 of	 subordination	 into	 an	
affirmation,	and	thus	begin	to	thwart	it”	(1985,	76).		This	resurfaces	in	Chapter	Four,	wherein	I	
consider	some	ways	in	which	patriarchy	has	subordinated	women	in	the	quest	for	self‐love,	and	
Irigaray’s	 suggestions	 as	 to	 how	 women	 can	 affirm	 their	 own	 love	 and	 so	 thwart	 this	
subordination. 
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ways	in	which	such	concepts	are	applied	to	new	situations.		In	appreciation	of	this	task,	
she	writes	(2001,	374)	that:	
feminists	have	gone	to	some	lengths	to	argue	that	concepts	stated	as	principles	
or	first	premises	of	ethical	syllogisms	were	not	intended	by	either	Aristotle	or	
Aquinas	to	stand	for	timeless	ideals,	and	thus	that	one	can	change	a	great	many	
of	 the	details	of	 their	reference	while	staying	within	 the	broad	region	of	 their	
meaning.	
	
For	Parsons,	this	means	that	these	thinkers’	statements	about	women	can	“be	revalued	
and	reused	in	a	different	context”	(2001,	374).		Janet	Martin	Soskice	similarly	examines	
the	 intentions	 or	 “motives”	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	 certain	 doctrines.	 	 Writing	 of	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 the	 Trinity	 and	 “its	 reliance	 on	 Greek	 philosophical	
categories”,	she	argues	that	“we	should	not	confuse	the	means	with	the	motives	for	its	
formulation”.		Although	constructed	using	Greek	philosophy,	Soskice	contends	that	the	
motives	 for	 the	 formulation	of	 this	particular	doctrine	were	“pastoral	and	apologetic”	
(2002,	136),	thus	suggesting	that	despite	appearances	and	a	variety	of	interpretations,	
the	utilisation	of	Hellenistic	philosophy	had	noble	intentions.		Both	Parsons	and	Soskice	
are	 not	 here	 seeking	 to	 defend	 traditional	 thinkers	 or	 concepts	 in	 light	 of	 feminist	
critiques	but	rather	to	revalue	them	in	order	that	their	efficacy	be	revealed.	
	
Indeed,	 Parsons	 clearly	 states	 such	 a	 concern	 in	 her	 article	 “Paradise	 and	 the	
Groundlessness	of	Ethics”.		Here,	she	speaks	of	the	exploration	of	what	it	is	for	human	
beings	to	“be	 in	time”	and	implies	a	need	to	be	 in	touch	“with	ourselves	as	places	 for	
receiving”.	 	Considering	such	notions,	Parsons	observes	that	she	“must	study	Aquinas	
more	closely	to	indicate	something	of	this	in	what	he	says”	(2002a,	25).		For	Parsons,	a	
return	to	the	tradition	and	an	approach	that	writes	“out	of	a	critical	faithfulness	to	the	
Christian	tradition”	(2002b,	114)	is	necessary	in	order	that	feminism	discover	“ways	of	
revision”	 that	 push	 orthodoxy	 “out	 to,	 and	 beyond	 the	 edges	 of	 its	 domain”	 (2002b,	
114).	 	This	 is,	 then,	a	critical	reading	of	 the	tradition	that	both	highlights	problematic	
elements	and	also	rescues	beneficial	ones.	
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Such	an	approach	is	similarly	utilised	by	Sarah	Coakley,	as	is	immediately	evident	in	the	
titles	 of	 some	 of	 her	 works:	 “Re‐thinking	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa:	 Introduction	 	 ‐	 Gender,	
Trinitarian	 Analogies,	 and	 the	 Pedagogy	 of	 The	 Song”	 (2002);	 “Introduction	 –	 Re‐
thinking	Dionysus	the	Areopagite”	(2008);	and	“Prayer,	Politics	and	the	Trinity:	Vying	
Models	 of	 Authority	 in	 Third	 –	 Fourth‐Century	 Debates	 on	 Prayer	 and	 ‘Orthodoxy’”	
(2013).	 	 The	 first	 two	 texts	 respond	 to	 renewed	 interest	 in	 the	 thinkers	 noted,	 and	
attempt	to	find	reasons	for	valuations	of	the	them;	the	latter	seeks	to	“bring	the	themes	
of	 prayer,	 authority	 and	 politics	 together	 in	 a	 fresh	 way	 that	 has	 both	 historical	
instantiation	 and	 –	 I	 trust	 –	 some	 continuing	 systematic	 theological	 interest”	 (2013,	
379).	 	 Thus,	 Coakley	 engages	 with	 the	 tradition	 not	 only	 to	 uncover	 support	 for	
particular	theories	but	also	to	highlight	their	current	relevance.	
	
Valerie	Karras	takes	this	approach	a	step	further	by	arguing	that	classical	thinkers,	such	
as	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	may	in	fact	be	more	beneficial	than	feminist	thinkers.		Speaking	of	
Gregory’s	understanding	of	the	Trinity,	she	reads	his	emphasis	on	the	irreplaceability	
of	the	“Father”	title	to	be	indicative	of	relationship.		As	such,	she	writes	that	“Ironically,	
then,	 the	 traditional	 names	 [for	 the	 Trinity]	 are	 more	 feminist,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
interpersonal	relationality,	 than	 the	 feminist	names”	 (2002,	248).	 	Her	method,	much	
like	those	already	noted,	is	one	of	“recovery”	which	reads	for	and,	as	we	have	just	seen,	
sometimes	against,	present‐day	feminist	concerns.		Karras,	although	differing	from	the	
thinkers	noted	by	recovering	the	voices	of	the	early	Christian	East,	nonetheless	shares	a	
conviction	that	traditional	thinkers	have	just	as	much,	if	not	more,	to	say	that	is	of	value	
than	more	contemporary	thinkers.		
	
Commenting	 on	 Coakley	 but	 seemingly	 applicable	 to	 all	 the	 thinkers	 noted	 here,	
Abraham	 observes	 the	 contention	 that	 feminists	 must	 begin	 their	 theological	
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reflections	 by	 engaging	 with	 “classical	 orthodoxy”.	 	 In	 a	 move	 that	 is	 perhaps	 more	
appreciative	of	feminist	theology	than	Karras,	Abraham	observes	that	such	a	grounding	
can	 support	 feminist	 theology,	 particularly	 in	 its	 attempts	 to	 “integrate	 ethics	 and	
metaphysics”.	 	 She	writes	 that	 “Encounter	with	 classical	orthodoxy	 in	prayer	purifies	
and	purges	[feminist’s]	impulse	to	create	God	in	their	own	image	and	likeness”	(2014,	
584).	 	 It	seems,	then,	that	an	engagement	with	the	tradition,	 in	addition	to	rescuing	it	
from	charges	of	irrelevance		and	incompetence,	also	rescues	feminist	theologians	from	
egoism	and	self‐interest.	
	
These	works	 of	 recovery	 are	 helpful	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 go	 some	way	 to	 offering	
ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 constructions	 of	 doctrine	 and	 the	 perspectives	 of	 classical	
thinkers	 that	 are	 more	 palatable,	 and	 at	 times	 beneficial,	 to	 feminist	 theological	
concerns.	 	However,	 I	 detect	 some	problems	 in	 these	 approaches	which	 cause	me	 to	
pursue	a	different	path.		Firstly,	the	notion	that	feminist	theologians	may	need	classical	
orthodoxy	 to	 temper	 their	 theological	 constructions,	as	 implied	by	 the	 last	quotation,	
problematically	 conveys	 the	 idea	 that	 women	 can	 only	 speak,	 can	 only	 have	 their	
“truth‐bearing	qualities”	(Mount	Shoop,	2010,	7)	honoured,	if	they	are	grounded	in	the	
malestream	 tradition.	 	 	This	potentially	discredits	 the	value	and	 integrity	of	women’s	
experiences	and	the	voices	of	feminist	theologians.		It	may	also	discount	the	notion	that	
feminist	 voices	 can	 be	 as	 authoritative	 and	 revelatory	 as	 classical	 ones.	 	 Although	
exercising	 a	 hermeneutics	 of	 suspicion	 in	 her	 engagement	 with	 thinkers	 such	 as	
McFague,	and	evidently	engaging	with	classical	thinkers,	Parsons	(2002b,	123)	herself	
appreciates	the	need	for:		
the	reclamation	of	what	feminists	take	to	be	ultimate	value,	and	for	women	to	
be	able	to	know	this,	to	speak	of	this,	and	to	bring	this	alive	in	their	activities	in	
the	world.		
	
I	propose	the	reclamation	and,	to	use	the	language	of	the	thinkers	noted,	the	recovery	
and	revaluing	of	 “what	 feminists	 take	 to	be	ultimate	value”,	namely	characterisations	
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and	experiences	of	 female	bodies,	primarily	because	these	are	deemed	to	be	as,	 if	not	
more,	 beneficial	 than	 classical	 voices.	 	 Indeed,	 my	 strategic	 approach	 to	 these	
characterisations	and	experiences	is	here	mirrored	in	the	literature	I	choose	to	engage	
with:	 feminist	 perspectives	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 just	 as,	 if	 not	 more,	 authoritative	 and	
revelatory	as	classical	texts	for	their	often	hard‐learned,	critical	awareness	of	their	own	
bisases	and	locatedness	and	their	consistent	attention	to	experiences	of	female	bodies.		
The	truths	that	these	thinkers	bear	are	thus	more	self‐aware,	both	of	their	locatedness	
and	of	embodiment;	they	are,	therefore,	more	useful.	
	
An	associated	problem	is	that	approaches	which	re‐read	the	tradition,	whilst	certainly	
able	 to	 uncover	 favourable	 and	 valuable	 notions,	 cannot	 change	 the	 experiences	 of	
women	who	have	been	hurt	by	elements	of	such	thought,	and	the	ways	in	which	certain	
feminist	theologians	have	felt	and	interpreted	the	texts.		We	remember	Parson’s	claim	
that	Aristotle’s	and	Aquinas’s	statements	concerning	the	“nature	of	women”	can	be	re‐
read	 and	 revalued	 (2001,	 374),	 and	we	may	 ask	whether	 this	 overlooks	 the	ways	 in	
which	such	statements	have	underpinned	dangerous	framings	of	women.		We	may	also	
wonder	whether	 rescuing	 the	 intentions	and	motives	of	 these	 thinkers	 can	alter	 this.		
Indeed,	I	would	go	so	far	as	to	claim	that	such	rescue	missions	should	not	be	our	focus.		
There	 exists	 a	much	more	 pertinent	 need:	 to	 hear	 the	 voices	 of	 feminist	 theologians	
who	expose	the	real	and	potential	dangers	of	traditional	formulations	of	doctrine.		The	
question	 should	 not	 be	 whether	 feminist	 theologians	 interpret	 traditional	 thinkers	
correctly,	 nor	 should	 the	 purpose	 be	 to	 show	 them	 how	 to	 read	 correctly.	 	 Such	
inferences	 potentially	 suggest	 that	 feminist	 theologians	 who	 find	 traditional	 texts	
problematic	 are	 simply	 flawed	 in	 their	 reading	practices.	 	Not	 only	 is	 this	 somewhat	
insulting,	it	also	delegitimises	the	problems	and	pains	that	have	been	encountered	and	
experienced,	 and	 dismisses	 the	 problematic	 elements	 of	 the	 texts	 with	 which	 they	
engage.	 	 Instead,	 our	 focus	 should	 be	 on	why	 certain	 feminist	 theologians	 take	 issue	
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with	particular	concepts,	doctrines,	or	perspectives,	and	how	they	go	about	 imagining	
more	 beneficial,	 though	 no	 less	 critical,	 constructions.	 	 	 Such	 an	 approach	 both	
appreciates	 the	 voices	 of	 feminist	 theologians	 and	 uses	 them	 to	 think	 in	 new	 ways	
about	God	and	creation.	
	
Indeed,	 despite	 the	 potential	 for	 recovering	 a	 sense	 of	 embodiment	 in	 classical	
constructions	of	 eschatology	 (evident	 in	Parsons’	 reading	of	Augustine’s	emphasis	on	
the	co‐existence	of	the	spiritual	and	the	material	in	paradise	(2002a,	19)),	no	amount	of	
re‐reading	 will	 alter	 the	 fact	 that	 traditional	 accounts	 entirely	 overlook	 women’s	
experiences	of	their	bodies.		Such	experiences	are	simply	not	present,	and	returning	to	
classical	texts	will	not	make	them	so.		Only	an	approach	that	takes	feminist	contentions	
seriously,	 and	values	 their	 affirmations	of	 female	bodies,	will	 be	 able	 to	 construct	 an	
eschatology	 that	 both	 listens	 and	 speaks	 to	 lives	 as	 they	 are	 presently	 experienced.		
Thus,	 feminist	 theological	 critiques	of	 eschatology	 and	 appraisals	 of	 embodiment	 are	
made	central	and	are	used	as	the	base	criteria	for	my	own	constructions.		This	is	not	to	
say	that	traditional	formulations	must	be	dismissed	as	unhelpful	to	this	task,	but	it	is	to	
claim	that	they	should	not	be	our	primary	focus	or	our	initial	grounding.			
	
This	 thesis,	 then,	 does	 not	 explore	 what	 traditional	 eschatologies	 say	 about	
embodiment	but	rather	seeks	to	construct	an	eschatology	that	can	affirm	embodiment,	
in	light	of	the	critiques	and	constructions	of	feminist	theologians.		It	seeks	to	contribute	
a	creative	 imagining	of	 a	more	beneficial	 future	 than	we	are	presently	offered	by	 the	
tradition,	as	understood	by	feminist	theologians.		In	order	to	do	this,	it	takes	seriously	
and	utilises	 the	many	 and	 varied	ways	 in	which	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 rethought	
God	 and	 revalued	 creation.	 	 It	 is	 thus	 firmly	 rooted	 in	 feminist	 perceptions	 and	
reconstructions	of	eschatology,	and	uses	feminist	valuations	of	embodied	relationality,	
 
 
~	17	~	
 
fluidity,	and	sensuality	to	develop	a	specific	model	of	the	process,	content,	and	time	of	
the	eschaton.		
	
Indeed,	 some	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 sources	 of	 the	Bible	 and	 the	
tradition	 can	 only	 be	 retained	 if	 they	 are	 examined	 for	 their	 efficacy	 against	 the	
overarching	 concern	 to	 affirm	 women’s	 bodies.	 	 Beneficial	 to	 this	 is	 a	 methodology	
which	reads	for	the	purpose	of	liberation.	 	Letty	Russell	is	especially	helpful	here:	her	
hermeneutical	 approach	 attends	 to	 concrete	 experiences	 of	 life;	 in	 particular	 to	 the	
lives	of	those	who	“cry	out	for	deliverance;	not	simply	with	those	of	the	‘non‐believer’	
but	 with	 those	 of	 the	 ‘non‐person’”	 (1980,	 105).	 	 Russell	 proposes	 that	 these	
experiences	 should	 then	 be	 used	 to	 question	 the	 Bible;	 an	 approach	 supported	 by	
Elisabeth	Schüssler	Fiorenza’s	appraisal	of	the	Bible	on	the	basis	of	the	extent	to	which	
it	fosters	women’s	liberation	(1995,	32).		Fiorenza	writes	that:	
the	 revelatory	 canon	 for	 theological	 evaluation	of	 androcentric	 traditions	 and	
their	subsequent	interpretations	cannot	be	derived	from	the	Bible	itself	but	can	
only	 be	 formulated	 in	 and	 through	 women’s	 struggle	 for	 liberation	 from	 all	
patriarchal	oppression.	
	
Engagement	with	the	Bible,	then,	must	begin	with	a	concern	for	women’s	bodies	if	it	is	
to	be	extrapolated	from	its	oppressive	origins	and	interpretations.		Indeed,	we	will	see	
throughout	this	thesis	that	these	tools	or	sources	can	function	as	sources	of	affirmation	
for	the	values	associated	with	female	bodies	in	relation	to	the	eschaton.		Alike	my	aims	
for	eschatology,	 attending	 to	 the	Bible	 is	worthwhile	 in	order	 to	 loosen	 the	hold	 that	
patriarchal	theology	has	over	it	and	to	reveal	its	ability	to	support,	rather	than	thwart,	
liberation.	 	 In	 starting	 from	 values	 associated	with	women’s	 bodies,	 then,	 I	 read	 the	
Bible	with	a	concern	to	recover	and	reconfigure	affirmations	of	female	bodies,	and	I	use	
the	Bible	to	further	develop	these	into	specific,	meaningful,	and	liberating	models	of	the	
eschatological	future.			
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Despite	 reading	 the	 Bible	 and	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 through	 these	 lenses,	 there	 are	
certain	 themes	within	 the	 tradition	 that	 I	 have	 chosen	not	 to	pay	 especial	 or	 explicit	
attention	to	in	this	thesis.		This	pertains,	for	example,	to	ideas	surrounding	Christology,	
final	 judgement,	 and	 the	 parousia.	 	 Valerie	 Karras,	 though,	 contends	 that	 it	 is	
impossible,	for	her,	“to	discuss	eschatology	without	discussing	Trinitarian	theology	and	
Christology,	or	theology,	properly	speaking”	(2002,	245).	 	We	remember	that	Karras’s	
understanding	of	“theology,	properly	speaking”	is	that	which	begins	with	discussion	of	
who	God	 is	 and,	more	 specifically,	with	perspectives	 on	 this	 from	 the	 early	Christian	
East	 (see	Karras,	 2002,	 249).	 	 Again,	my	 starting	point	 differs	 in	 that	 I	 root	 both	my	
explorations	 and	 constructions	 in	 feminist	 perspectives	 on,	 and	 some	 women’s	
experiences	 of,	 embodiment.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 specific	 focus	 of	 my	 thesis	 is	 on	 the	
finality	and	ultimacy	of	the	eschaton	in	relation	to	this	basis;	such	finality	and	ultimacy	
is	deemed	to	be	most	problematic,	and	to	have	received	little	attention	in	terms	of	being	
rethought	in	more	beneficial	ways.		Thus,	whilst	other	doctrines	and	constructions	are	
certainly	worthy	of	attention,	they	are	not	my	primary	focus	here.		As	will	become	clear,	
though,	certain	themes	and	values	that	emerge	in	relation	to	feminist	challenges	to	and	
reconstructions	of	Christology,	 final	 judgement,	and	 the	parousia	will	 inform	my	own	
constructions.		I	frame	these	in	terms	of	the	process,	content,	and	time	of	the	eschaton	
as	opposed	to	using	doctrinal	or	traditional	language,	as	I	feel	that	these	categorisations	
speak	more	accurately	and	pointedly	to	the	problems	and	potentials	for	rethinking	the	
eschatological	future.			
	
More	 specifically,	 themes	 of	 Christology	 and	 the	 Incarnation	 are,	 without	 doubt,	
connected	 to	 discussions	 and	 constructions	 of	 eschatology.	 	 Accordingly,	 feminist	
perspectives	 on	 these	 are	 explored	 in	 Chapter	 One.	 	 As	 Chapter	 One	 will,	 however,	
elucidate,	these	will	not	be	central	to	my	constructions	of	a	new	model	of	the	eschaton,	
given	 the	 specificity	 of	my	 focus.	 	 The	 values	 upheld	 by	 certain	 feminist	 readings	 of	
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these,	such	as	eros,	dunamis,	and	embodied	relational	power	will,	though,	be	significant	
and	utilised.		Similarly,	this	thesis	will	not	explicitly	engage	with	questions	concerning	
final	judgement,	or	heaven	and	hell,	out	of	a	concern	to	attend	primarily	to	experiences	
of	embodiment	in	relation	to	the	eschaton.		Still,	problematic	elements	of	such	thought,	
particularly	with	regards	 to	 their	potential	promotion	of	separation	and	violence,	are	
noted	 in	Chapter	One.	 	Moreover,	Chapter	Two’s	emphasis	on	 the	universal	nature	of	
the	 future	 implicitly	 addresses	 these	 concerns.4	 	 One	 final	 aspect	 of	 eschatological	
discussion	warrants	 qualification	 for	 its	 inexplicit	 presence	 here;	 namely,	 discussion	
surrounding	the	parousia	or	second	coming	of	Christ.		Moltmann’s	and	Keller’s	notions	
of	 there	being	a	 time	when	God	and	creation	will	dwell	 in	and	with	one	another	(see	
Moltmann,	 1981,	 102;	 2010,	 79;	 and	Keller	 2003a,	 215),	 share	 similar	 sentiments	 to	
constructions	of	the	parousia.	 	Their	understandings	are	given	precedence	on	account	
of	the	relationality	that	they	centralise,	and	their	emphasis	on	the	mutual	realisation	of	
such	a	future	(in)dwelling.		Thus,	to	reiterate,	themes	and	values	upheld	and	utilised	by	
feminist	 theologians	 in	 relation	 to	 Christology,	 final	 judgement,	 and	 the	parousia	 are	
similarly	valued	and	used	here,	but	specific	doctrinal	or	traditional	terminology	is	not.		
This	 is	 due	 to	 a	 desire	 to	 speak	 more	 directly	 and	 accurately	 to	 the	 problems	 and	
potentials	with	the	eschatological	future,	and	not	to	focus	on	reforming	or	rescuing	the	
tradition,	for	reasons	noted	earlier.	
	
Having	thus	identified	the	tools	as	being	an	attentiveness	to	framings	and	experiences	
of	 women’s	 bodies,	 and	 from	 this,	 an	 engagement	 with	 the	 Bible	 and	 the	 Christian	
tradition,	 we	 may	 now	 consider	 the	 method	 by	 which	 these	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	
rebuilding	of	eschatology.		Letty	Russell’s	articulation	of	eschatological	“contradiction”	
and	 “affirmation”	 is	 helpful	 here.	 	 Russell’s	 starting	 point	 is	 “eschatological	
																																																													
4	A	more	thorough	examination	of	these	elements	of	eschatological	and	soteriological	doctrine	
can	be	found	in	my	undergraduate	dissertation,	entitled	“In	the	End	–	Hell?		A	Reassessment	of	
the	Christian	Doctrine	of	Hell	and	Alternative	Eschatologies”	(2008).	
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hermeneutics”,	or	 reading	 the	Bible	as	and	by	 “beginning	 from	 the	other	 end”	 (1980,	
104).		Upon	this	basis	she	discerns	and	affirms	God’s	“promised	future”	(1980,	105)	as	
intending	and	helping	humanity	to	“become	human”;	that	is,	to	become	loving,	gracious,	
and	merciful	 (1982a,	 38).	 	 	 From	 this	 she	 claims	we	 can	 “contradict”	 experiences	 of	
oppression	insomuch	as	they	stand	in	contrast	to	“God’s	goal	and	purpose	for	life	and	
creation”	(1980,	104).	 	In	essence,	this	means	stating	what	should	not	have	been,	what	
will	not	be	 in	the	 future,	and	therefore	what	should	not	be	now.	 	For	Russell,	 then,	 the	
relationship	between	contradiction	and	affirmation	is	cyclical:	contradictions	both	feed	
and	are	fed	by	affirmations	concerning	the	intentions	of	God.	
	
However,	whilst	Russell	makes	 eschatology	 central	 and	 thereby	names	 some	 specific	
affirmations	 and	 contradictions,	 I	 feel	 that	 more	 must	 be	 said	 and	 done	 with	
eschatology.	 	 Russell	 herself	 would	 caution	 against	 such	 attempts:	 sceptical	 of	
“conclusions”	 or	 “final	 principles”	 for	 their	 alignment	with	 stasis,	 she	 instead	 affirms	
the	 processual	 nature	 of	 “clues”	 and	 questions	 (1979a,	 53).	 	 This	 she	 balances	 with	
trust	in	God’s	promises,	and	subsequently	claims	that	we	should	be	“willing	to	live	with	
a	 poverty	 of	 knowledge	 about	 our	 future	 because	 of	 that	 trust”	 (1979a,	 165).	 	 In	
contrast,	 I	 contend	 that	 acceptance	 of	 such	 poverty	 is	 unhelpful	 and	 unnecessary	 as	
eschatology	 has	 been	 constructed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 its	 “conclusions”	 and	 “final	
principles”	have	specified	and	justified	the	denigration	of	female	bodies.		There	is,	then,	
a	real	need	to	craft	a	specific	model	of	eschatological	embodiment	that	challenges	these	
constructions.	 	 “Eschatological	 embodiment”	 here	 refers	 to	 eschatological	 existences	
that	are	thoroughly	and	authentically	material,	 the	details	of	which	will	be	developed	
throughout	this	thesis.		This	does	not	reject	spiritual	dimensions	of	embodiment,	but	it	
does	reject	the	tradition’s	notion	that	eschatological	existences	are	comprised	solely	of	
spiritual,	immaterial	bodies.			This	model	strives	not	only	to	contradict	the	devaluation	
of	female	bodies	and	affirm	their	value,	but	also	to	envision	a	future	wherein	that	which	
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was	 used	 to	 devalue	 them	 is	 instead	 used	 to	 celebrate	 them.	 	 Such	 moves	 towards	
construction	are	appreciated	by	Grace	Jantzen,	who	claims	that	without	them,	“we	stay	
at	the	same	old	level	as	those	whom	we	critique:	we	do	not	change	the	ground”	(1998,	
25).		In	the	words	of	Isasi‐Díaz,	we	thus	need	to	“flesh	out	the	shape	of	the	kind	of	new	
heaven	and	 the	new	earth	 for	which	 justice‐seeking	people	hunger	and	 thirst”	 (1999,	
229).	 	 Somewhat	paradoxically,	 then,	 I	 use	Russell’s	 own	explorations	 to	 counter	her	
agnosticism,	as	I	argue	that	we	have	within	our	hands	sufficient	material	from	which	to	
build	a	specific	image	of	the	eschatological	future,	which	can	in	turn	inform	our	moves	
to	effect	change	now.5		Grasping	at	this	marks	the	originality	of	my	contribution,	as	I	not	
only	 seek	 to	 specify	 the	 eschatological	 future,	 but	 I	 seek	 to	 do	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
attributes	aligned	with	female	bodies.	 	This	is	believed	to	be	a	concrete	and	legitimate	
basis	 from	which	 to	 construct	 a	 new	understanding	 and	 experience	 of	 eschatological	
embodiment.			
	
Along	 these	 lines,	we	may	 employ	 two	 interconnected	practices:	 attentiveness	 to	 the	
past	and	prophecy	of	the	future.		In	terms	of	attentiveness	to	the	past,	I	suggest	we	call	
to	memory	the	ways	in	which	women’s	bodies	have	been	abused	and	devalued.		These	
remembrances	can	whet	our	appetite	for	and	help	us	to	pursue	an	eschatology	which	
satiates	 the	desire	 for	an	alternative	 reality.	 	To	borrow	again	 from	 Isasi‐Díaz,	 this	 is	
one	way	 of	 “actively	 remembering	what	 I	 do	 not	want	 the	 future	 to	 be	 like”	 (2004a,	
342).	 	 In	 looking	back	to	and	contradicting	what	should	not	have	been	we	can	foresee	
and	 construct	 what	 should	 be.	 	 These	 constructions	 need	 not	 be	 fuelled	 solely	 by	
negation,	though;	if	they	were,	nothing	new	would	be	imaginable	but,	as	I	have	argued,	
something	new	must	be	possible.		More	specifically,	a	new	model	of	eschatology	must	be	
conceivable	if	we	are	to	challenge	harmful	models	and	construct	beneficial	ones.		Grace	
																																																													
5	This	does	not	mean	that	fluidity	is	usurped	by	a	more	specific,	stable	model	of	the	future	but	
rather	 fluidity	 is	deemed	to	endure	and	abound	within	 the	stability	of	God’s	embrace,	as	 later	
chapters	will	elaborate.	 
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Jantzen	again	supports	 this	methodological	approach;	she	writes	 that	“the	negative	 is	
not	enough”,	and	that	upon	this	realisation	we	should	“desire	to	bring	about	something	
new,	out	of	overflowing	abundance,	not	out	of	 lack”	(2009,	54).	 	Bodies	overflow	and	
abound	 with	 copious	 images	 and	 experiences	 that	 can	 help	 to	 construct	 something	
new.	 	 Attending	 to	 some	 feminist	 appraisals	 and	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	
embodiment	in	particular	can	highlight	that	they	are	just	as	worthy	in	the	eschaton,	and	
just	as	able	to	speak	meaningfully	about	it.6			
	
Elizabeth	 Johnson	 provides	 support	 for	 such	 an	 approach,	 as	 she	 offers	 an	 inspired	
alteration	of	 Irenaeus’s	expression	Gloria	Dei	vivens	homo.	 	 Instead,	 Johnson	proposes	
Gloria	 Dei	 vivens	mulier,	 by	 which	 she	 means	 that	 “the	 glory	 of	 God	 is	 women,	 all	
women,	every	woman	everywhere,	fully	alive”	(2002,	15).	 	God’s	glory	is	dimmed,	she	
claims,	 by	 the	 violation	 of	 women	 but	 it	 is	 increased	 by	 women’s	 experiences	 of	
flourishing	which	 “anticipate	 that	new	heaven	and	new	earth	where	 the	glory	of	God	
will	be	unfathomably	 justified”	(2002,	15).	 	The	full	 flourishing	of	women’s	bodies,	as	
much	as	any	other	bodies	within	creation,	thus	images	God	and	God’s	glory	as	realised	
in	 the	eschaton.	 	 In	addition	 to	 this	 capacity	 to	 reflect	God’s	glory,	 I	 also	suggest	 that	
God’s	tangible	presence,	and	God’s	tactile	perception	of	and	response	to	creation,	can	
be	reflected	and	constructed	in	relation	to	women’s	embodied	sufferings.		This	is	not	to	
divinise	or	justify	such	sufferings	but	rather	to	appreciate	the	real	impact	they	have	on	
women’s	 embodied	 lives	 and	 indeed	 on	 the	 life	 of	 God.	 	 Again,	 this	 signifies	 my	
appreciation	of	the	complex	particularities	of	personal	experiences.		Women’s	bodies	in	
																																																													
6	The	newness	of	this	lies	not	in	the	assumption	that	women’s	experiences	of	embodiment	are	
intrinsically	distinct	 from	men’s	and	thus	able	to	speak	something	that	men	cannot,	but	 in	the	
awareness	that	eschatology	has	not	appreciated	and	has	actively	discredited	certain	aspects	of	
existence	through	aligning	them	with	women’s	bodies.	 	As	Nicola	Slee	writes,	attending	to	the	
experiences	of	women	rather	than	men	does	not	deny	men’s	realities	or	the	ways	in	which	men	
and	women	 interact,	nor	does	 it	 “suggest	 that	what	 is	said	about	women’s	 lives	may	not	have	
some	relevance	for	men”.	 	Rather,	she	claims,	 it	 is	“to	engage	 in	the	process	of	reclamation,	of	
naming,	 of	 making	 visible	 women’s	 lives,	 needs	 and	 experiences,	 in	 a	 way	 which	 is	 simply	
normative	 for	 men”	 (1985,	 234‐235).	 	 By	 attending	 not	 only	 to	 feminist	 affirmations	 of	
embodiment,	 then,	 but	 also	 to	 some	 women’s	 lived	 experiences	 of	 embodiment,	 I	 conduct	 a	
dual‐layered	challenge	to	this. 
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all	of	their	beauty	but	no	less	in	their	tragedy	will	thus	emerge	as	important	both	to	and	
in	eschatology.			
	
Such	attention	to	remembrance	and	prophecy	signifies	the	dialogical	view	of	the	past,	
present,	 and	 future	which	 I	will	 consistently	 allude	 to.	 	 This	 approach	 finds	 support,	
again,	from	Letty	Russell;	in	her	I	discover	one	of	the	few	overtly	sympathetic	feminist	
voices	to	eschatology,	as	may	already	be	evident.		Russell	sees	it	as	imperative	that	we	
begin	 our	 theological	 reflection	 from	 the	 future,	 as	 this	 is	 the	 place	 that	 is	 most	
indicative	 of	 God’s	 intentions	 for	 creation	 (1980,	 104).	 	 Hence	 her	 emphasis	 on	
“beginning	 from	 the	other	 end”	 and	her	 allusions	 to	 remembering	 the	 future	 (1979a,	
157).	 	 Although	 the	 primary	 focus	 for	 Russell	 is	 the	 future,	 her	 thoughts	 about	 this	
future	are	enabled	by	the	experience	and	knowledge	that	is	garnered	from	the	past	and	
the	present.	 	Even	though,	for	Russell,	this	culminates	in	agnosticism,	I	propose	that	it	
can	actually	enable	an	historical	and	contextual	interpretation	of	the	future,	rather	than	
one	 detached	 from	 reality	 and	 restricted	 to	 a	 spiritual,	 ethereal	 sphere.	 	 This	
emphasises	 the	 interconnectivity	 of	 all	 existences,	 and	 is	 manifest	 in	 the	 model	 of	
contradiction,	 affirmation,	 and	 construction	 as	 they	 utilise	 and	 call	 upon	 past	
remembrances,	present	realities,	and	future	existences.7		
	
The	Task	Ahead	
Before	such	constructive	moves	are	made,	however,	 I	open	 the	discussion	 in	Chapter	
One	 by	 taking	 seriously	 and	 thoroughly	 surveying	 the	 objections	 raised	 by	 feminist	
theologians	 against	 traditional	 models	 of	 eschatology.	 	 I	 begin	 my	 explorations	 by	
outlining	 some	 of	 the	 nuances	 of	 their	 critiques;	 these	 are	 distinct	 and	 diverse,	 but	
																																																													
7	Making	assertions	about	what	should	not	be	and	what	should	or	will	be,	and	constructing	from	
these	 bases,	 feeds	 into	 all	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis.	 	 However,	 it	 is	most	 explicitly	 employed	 in	
Chapter	Three	in	order	to	speak	clearly	about	the	content	of	the	eschatological	future.		Therein,	
such	a	methodological	 approach	 is	 deemed	 to	be	particularly	 relevant	 for	 speaking	 about	 the	
tradition	 but,	 more	 so,	 for	 speaking	 about	 our	 very	 existences	 and	 their	 nature	 in	 the	
eschatological	future. 
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some	shared	concerns	are	detectable.	 	Eschatology	is	problematised	in	relation	to	the	
claims	 it	makes	 about	 the	 “process”	 by	which	 eschatology	will	 be	brought	 about,	 the	
“content”	 of	 such	 a	 future,	 and	 the	 “time”	 in	which	 this	 process	 and	 content	will	 be	
realised.	 	 Respectively,	 eschatology	 is	 challenged	 for	 promoting	 an	 omnipotent,	
incorporeal,	 non‐relational	God;	 a	 static	 existence;	 and	 a	delayed	hope	 for	 liberation.		
Chapter	One	follows	this	categorisation	by	charting	the	various	contributing	voices	to	
exposing	 these	 problems,	 alongside	 outlining	 feminist	 theological	 responses	 to	 them.		
These	 responses	 focus	 on	 re‐imaging	 God	 as	 embodied	 and	 relational;	 revaluing	
changeable,	material	bodies;	and	redirecting	hope	to	the	present.			
	
The	 resultant	 chapters	 emerge	 out	 of	 these	 contributions	 and	mark	my	 constructive	
attempts	to	add	to	the	discussion.8		Chapter	Two	begins	this	by	responding	to	feminist	
theological	 critiques	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process	 and	 using	 their	 appreciations	 of	
embodied	 relationality	 in	 order	 to	 posit	 that	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 eschaton	 is	
realised	is	relational.	 	I	use	this	to	rethink	divine	power	and	so	argue	that	a	relational	
power	 can	 lovingly	 and	 respectfully	 draw	 all	 into	 the	 full	 experience	 of	 relational	
freedom.		This,	along	with	feminist	critiques	of	the	content	of	the	eschatological	future,	
draws	me	into	Chapter	Three	whereby	I	consider	what	the	existence	we	will	experience	
in	 the	eschaton	may	 look	 like.	 	Central	 to	 this	 is	an	appreciation	of	 embodied	change	
and	fluidity	(again,	in	line	with	many	feminist	theological	perspectives),	and	I	negotiate	
the	 possibility	 of	 these	 not	 only	 being	 affirmed	 but	 positively	 abounding	 in	 the	
eschaton.	 	 Both	 Chapter	 Two’s	 and	 Chapter	 Three’s	 reconstructions	 then	 feed	 into	
Chapter	 Four’s	 considerations	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	we	may	 live	 such	 a	 future	 now.		
																																																													
8	It	should	be	noted	that	feminist	approaches	to	traditional	constructions	of	the	process,	content,	
and	time	of	eschatology	tend	not	only	to	deconstruct	but	also	reconstruct	them,	as	was	alluded	
to	earlier	in	this	chapter.		Given	that	such	contributions	already	exist,	my	own	constructions	do	
not	 spend	 time	 on	 deconstructing	 traditional	 approaches;	 this	 has	 been	 and	 is	 already	 being	
done	 within	 feminist	 scholarship.	 	 I	 seek	 a	 new	 approach	 which,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
deconstructions	 that	 will	 be	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 One,	 contributes	 to	 and	 develops	 their	
constructive	moves. 
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Buttressed	 by	 feminist	 theological	 emphases	 on	 present	 life,	 I	 contend	 that	 the	
eschatological	 future	can	have	a	dynamic	and	beneficial	relationship	with	 the	present	
as	it	can	both	inform	and	be	shaped	by	present	lives.		As	noted,	each	of	the	respective	
foci	 of	 these	 chapters	 emerges	 out	 of	 the	 problems	 and	 potentials	 I	 detect	 within	
feminist	theological	literature	on	eschatology,	an	assessment	of	which	forms	the	basis	
for	Chapter	One.	
	
Eschatology	from	Bodies	
Chapters	One	and	Two:	Relational	Bodies	
More	specifically,	Chapter	One	firstly	attends	to	the	process	of	 the	 future	actuation	of	
eschatological	existence.		To	reiterate,	this	is	problematised	for	it	is	deemed	to	promote	
dependence	 on	 an	 omnipotent,	 omniscient	 God	 who	 will	 finally	 bring	 about	 the	
eschaton	 on	 behalf	 of	 creation.	 	 This	 is	 coupled	 with	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 Christian	
tradition's	 insistence	on	a	 timeless	God	who	 is	 in	ultimate	control	of	 the	 trajectory	of	
creation.	 	Such	an	understanding	rests	on	the	assumption	that	God	wholly	transcends	
creaturely	existence;	God	creates,	knows,	and	effects	the	end,	but	is	not	affected	by	or	
authentically	involved	in	the	experiences	of	creation.		This	makes	claims	about	God	that	
many	 feminist	 theologians	 (in	 line	with	many	 process	 philosophers	 and	 theologians)	
find	at	best	unpalatable	and	at	worst	dangerous.		Catherine	Keller,	for	example,	exposes	
the	 historical	 and	 potential	 ways	 in	 which	 eschatological	 or	 apocalyptic	 visions,	
particularly	of	perfect	and	complete	endings,	have	served	and	may	in	the	future	serve	
colonial	agendas.			She	problematizes	the	association	of	apocalypse	with	a	discoverable	
and	 possessable	 utopia,	 for	 this	 has	 led	 to	 the	 discovery,	 possession,	 and	 even	
penetration	of	the	“motherland	and	mother	earth,	the	Whore	of	Babylon	and	the	Virgin	
Jerusalem”	(1996a,	127).		Such	moves	rely	on	an	image	of	God	as	one	who	has	already	
created	the	“end”	and	has	therefore	made	it	open	to	conquest	(Keller,	1996a,	159).		The	
gendered	nature	of	this	suggests	that	eschatology	has	legitimised	the	pillaging	of	female	
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bodies	and	the	feminised	earth	by	framing	such	pillaging	as	noble	utopic	pursuits;	the	
realisation	of	an	accessible	paradisiacal	landscape.	
	
A	 cacophony	 of	 other	 problems	 emerges	 if	 God	 has	 already	 created	 the	 “end”;	 if	 the	
process	 is	 always	 already	 complete.	 	 Such	 a	 God	 neither	 needs	 nor	 desires	 to	 be	
affected	by	creation,	for	the	“end”	is	fixed	and	will	be	brought	about	by	God	alone.		The	
lives	of	creation	are	thus	inconsequential.		Moreover,	the	stasis	and	“alreadyness”	of	the	
eschaton	 mean	 that	 God	 cannot	 be	 affected	 by	 creation;	 this	 is	 buttressed	 by	 the	
historic	emphasis	on	God	as	 impassible	and	 incorporeal.	 	Accordingly,	and	as	already	
noted,	 the	 lives	 of	 those	members	 of	 creation	who	 are	most	 aligned	with	materiality	
and	 the	 capacities	 to	 relate	 and	 to	 feel	 are	 thus	made	 inimical	 to	 divine,	 and	 indeed	
eternal	 life	 (Ruether,	 1998a,	 138).	 	 Furthermore,	 if	 brought	 about	 by	 God	 alone,	
creation	is	absolved	of	agency	and	God	is	assigned	all	and	ultimate	agency.9		The	lives	of	
creation	 are	 thus	 bound	 to	 dependence.	 	 Such	 an	 understanding	 has	 been	 used	 to	
encourage	creation	to	simply,	and	passively,	await	future	liberation.		God	emerges	here	
as	one	who	has	the	power	to	end	oppression	but	will	only	use	this	power	in	the	final	
time	of	the	eschatological	future.		Traditional	models	of	eschatology	thus	depict	God	as	
callous	 and	 careless.	 	 As	 Catherine	 Keller	writes:	 “Cast	 in	 the	 role	 of	 the	 controlling	
providence	of	our	world,	God	fails	horribly”	(1995,	198).10		God	is	either	too	distant	or	
too	 delayed	 in	 realising	 this	 “providence”.	 	 Each	 of	 these	 problems	 contribute	 to	 a	
judgement	 of	 traditional	 understandings	 of	 eschatology	 as	 relying	 too	 heavily	 on	
depictions	of	God	 as	 aloof,	 controlling,	 incorporeal,	 and	 impassible.	 	 Such	 a	God,	 it	 is	
claimed,	cannot	be,	and	thwarts	any	attempts	to	affirm	being,	relational.	
	
																																																													
9	There	 are	 complexities	 to	be	noted	with	 appraisals	of	 agency,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
observations	made	in	some	theologies	of	disability.		These	are	thoroughly	attended	to	in	Chapter	
Two. 
10	The	nuances	and	particular	details	of	 these	 critiques	will	be	 extrapolated	 in	more	depth	 in	
Chapter	One. 
 
 
~	27	~	
 
There	is,	then,	a	felt	need	amongst	many	feminist	theologians	to	reconstruct	God	as	one	
who	 is	 relationally	 involved	 with	 creation.	 	 Elizabeth	 Johnson	 explains	 that	 such	
reconstructions	should	be	the	central	and	primary	task	of	 theology	 for	they	underpin	
any	moves	 to	overcome	dualistic	 structures	and	ensure	 “the	 flourishing	of	all	people,	
children	 as	 well	 as	 men,	 and	 the	 earth	 and	 all	 its	 creatures”	 (2002,	 69).	 	 These	
affirmations	 militate	 against	 depicting	 creation	 as	 passive	 and	 dependent	 by	
emphasising	creaturely	responsibility,	in	which	creation	joins	with	God	in	the	struggle	
to	realise	redemption.		Embodiment	is	central	to	this,	for	it	is	argued	that	God	can	only	
relate	 to	 embodied	 beings	 if	 God	 understands	 embodied	 beings,	 and	 God	 can	 only	
understand	 embodied	 beings	 if	 God	 has	 experience	 of	 embodiment;	 of	 “immediate	
sensations	as	well	as	direct	knowledge”	(Jantzen,	1984a,	83).		God	thus	relates	by	being	
intimately	 involved	 with	 and	 affected	 by	 creaturely	 embodiments.	 	 Moreover,	 we	
remember	that	there	is	a	need	for	theology	to	affirm	bodies	given	the	constructions	of	
women	as	more	embodied	than	men.		The	affirmation	of	embodied	lives,	particularly	as	
they	are	experienced	by	women,	 is	 thus	seen	as	authoritative	 in	making	claims	about	
God’s	embodiment.		These	claims	are	rooted	in	the	conviction	that	it	is	in	the	material	
particularities	 of	 life	 that	 God	 reveals	 Godself.	 	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 the	 focus	 for	 many	
feminist	 theologians	 is	 not	 on	 trying	 to	make	 eschatology	 “fit”	with	 relationality,	 but	
rather	on	re‐imaging	God’s	already	present,	processual	relationships	with	creation.			
	
However,	I	find	myself	dissatisfied	with	the	results	of	these	re‐imaginings	and	it	is	this	
dissatisfaction	 that	 grounds	my	 constructive	 efforts	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	 	 	 I	 align	myself	
here	with	Lee	(2007,	408)	who	argues	that:			
An	 adequate	 Christian	 theology	must	 rethink	 its	 eschatology	 and	 doctrine	 of	
God,	 and	 demonstrate	 the	 compatibility	 between	 eschatological	 belief	 in	 God	
and	affirmation	of	the	world.	
	
Theology	cannot	be	content	with	only	rethinking	God’s	relationship	with	the	world	as	it	
presently	is,	but	must	also	attempt	to	rethink	God’s	relationship	with	the	world	as	it	will	
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be,	 for	 the	 latter	 affects	 perceptions	 of	 the	 former.	 	 Feminist	 theologians	 have	
significantly	 and	 invaluably	 rethought	 the	 doctrine	 of	 God,	 but	 there	 has	 been	 little	
progression	 from	 this	 to	 sufficiently	 rethinking	 the	 eschatological	 future.	 	 As	 such,	
humanity’s	anxieties	and	hopes	have	not	fully	been	appreciated,	and	we	have	been	left	
with	an	incomplete	image	of	both	God	and	creation.11		Chapter	Two	thus	contends	that	
the	above‐noted	feminist	perspectives	are	limited	in	their	ability	to	be	empowering,	for	
both	God	and	creation,	as	any	final	transformation	of	present	experiences	of	pain	and	
suffering	 is	 made	 impossible;	 bodies	 are	 never	 free	 from	 pain	 and	 relationships	 are	
therefore	 always	 tinged	 with	 sorrow.	 	 Relationality	 is	 thus	 ever‐incomplete	 for	
relational	intimacy	with	oneself,	with	others,	and	with	God	(and	therefore	also	for	God)	
is	 never	 fully	 realised.	 	Miller	 alludes	 to	 a	 similar	 perspective	 as	 she	writes	 that	 “To	
accept	lack	and	loss	as	the	last	words	is	not	only	to	give	up	on	divinity	but	also	to	give	
up	on	the	full	fruits	of	struggle,	as	if	we	already	know	the	outcome”	(2009,	82).		Against	
the	trend	of	much,	though	evidently	not	all,	feminist	thought,	the	degree	to	which	a	final	
“end”	is	incompatible	with	a	loving	and	relational	God	is	here	challenged.			
	
Appreciating	both	the	necessity	and	 insufficiency	of	attempts	 to	re‐image	God,	 then,	 I	
construct	 an	 alternative	 understanding	 of	 God	 that	 is	 built	 on,	 but	 is	more	 than,	 the	
concrete	 foundations	of	 embodied	relationality.	 	This	God	 is	 intimately	 related	 to	but	
also	 ultimately	 able	 to	 do	 something	 for	 creation;	 able	 to	 offer	 the	 ultimate	
contradiction	 to	 anything	 that	 would	 hinder	 full	 experiences	 of	 embodied	
																																																													
11	Anxiety	over	the	future	should	not	be	underestimated:	Isasi‐Díaz	notes	the	debilitating	force	
of	such	fear	and	thus	writes	that	“We	can	mitigate	our	fear	of	an	unknown	future	by	insisting	on	
particulars,	 by	 having	 a	 concrete	 vision	 of	 the	 future”	 (1993,	 22).	 	 This	 is	 precisely	 what	 I	
attempt	to	do	in	this	thesis. 
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relationality.12		Indeed,	it	is	only	an	embodied	and	relational	God	who	is	capable	of	this,	
because	as	Mount	Shoop	notes,	God	can	only	affect	embodied	beings	if	God	engages	in	
“embodied	 proximity”	 to	 and	 intimacy	with	 creation	 (Mount	 Shoop,	 2010,	 37).	 	 This	
chapter,	then,	contends	that	if	God	is	a	God	of	relation	then	God	must	also	be	a	God	of	
the	eschaton	if	such	relationality	 is	 to	be	experienced	in	a	 full,	unhindered	manner.	 	 I	
also	argue	that	God	can	only	be	for	creation	if	God	is	with	creation;	that	God	can	only	be	
a	God	of	the	eschaton	if	God	is	a	God	of	relation.		Key	to	my	remodelling	here	is	a	notion	
of	 divine	 embrace	 which	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 both	 intimate	 and	 spacious,	 and	 thus	
capable	of	both	understanding	and	honouring	the	particularities	of	creation.	 	 In	using	
relationality	to	construct,	rather	than	critique,	eschatology,	then,	I	argue	for	a	God	who	
is	 even	more	 committed	 to	 and	 involved	 with	 creation	 than	 many	 present	 feminist	
theologies	allow	for.					
	
Chapters	One	and	Three:	Enduring,	Transformed	Bodies	
This	relational	and	embodied	commitment	and	involvement	which	is	claimed	for	God	in	
Chapter	Two	lays	the	groundwork	for	assertions	concerning	the	content	of	eschatology	
in	 Chapter	 Three.	 	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 God’s	 commitment	 to	 embodied	 relationality	
requires	 the	 full	 and	 final	 experience	 of	 that	 embodied	 relationality.	 	 From	 this	 it	 is	
claimed,	 in	 Chapter	 Three,	 that	 if	 bodies	 can	 indeed	 endure	 in	 the	 future,	 then	
embodied	 change	 must	 also	 endure.	 	 This	 Chapter,	 however,	 responds	 to	 a	 slightly	
different	 (though	 not	 unrelated)	 set	 of	 assumptions	 made	 in	 the	 Christian	 tradition	
than	Chapter	Two.		Assertions	made	about	the	content	of	the	eschatological	future	are	
exposed	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 as	 discrediting	 embodied	 relationships,	 in	 a	 similar	
																																																													
12	There	will	of	course	be	some	who	would	find	my	responses	unsatisfactory.		Catherine	Keller,	
for	 example,	 might	 suggest	 that	 “full	 experiences	 of	 embodied	 relationality”	 would	 here	 be	
hindered	by	God’s	overriding	of	 creaturely	agency	 (2003,	422),	whilst	Elizabeth	 Johnson	may	
raise	the	critique	that	“Benevolent	patriarchy	is	still	patriarchy”	(2002,	34).		Such	contestations	
serve	 as	 reminders	 that	 any	 remodelling	 of	 eschatology	 cannot	 consist	 of	 God	 overriding	
creaturely	agency,	and	Chapter	Two	negotiates	the	ways	in	which	creaturely	freedom	and	divine	
intention	may	co‐exist	in	the	co‐creation	of	the	eschaton. 
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way	to	assertions	made	about	the	process	of	the	future.		With	regards	to	the	content	of	
the	 eschatological	 future,	 though,	 it	 is	 by	 making	 embodiment,	 particularly	 its	
characterisation	in	terms	of	female	fluidity,	absent	or	drastically	altered.			
	
Emerging	from	the	problems	noted	with	the	process	of	eschatology,	then,	Chapter	One	
notes	 that	 the	 content	 of	 eschatology	 is	 also	 critiqued	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 for	
privileging	 a	 static	 existence,	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 disembodiment	 or	 spiritual	
embodiment.	 	 Rosemary	 Radford	 Ruether,	 for	 instance,	 argues	 that	 the	 Christian	
tradition,	 though	 not	 solely	 defined	 by	 Platonic	 influence,	 has	 tended	 to	 be	
unquestioningly	 proud	 and	protective	 of	 it.	 	 This	 influence	 has	 impacted	 eschatology	
and	 enabled	 it	 to	 be	 constructed	 into	 a	 form	 of	 spiritual	 abstraction:	 both	 alien	 and	
superior	 to	 the	 present	 realities	 of	 earthly,	 embodied	 life.	 	 She	 writes	 that	 the	
construction	of	“man”	as	akin	to	the	status	of	God,	“outside	of	and	above	nature”,	has	
served	images	of	the	 future	as	a	triumph	over	the	material,	“a	flight	of	the	mind	from	
nature	and	body	to	a	spiritual	(disembodied)	realm”.		Consequently,	“visible	and	bodily	
existence”	 is	 “objectified	 as	 inferior”	 (Ruether,	 2002,	 67).	 	 Such	 assumptions	 depict	
eschatology	 as	 a	 home	 for	 the	 soul	 and	 haven	 for	 the	 mind,	 thus	 making	 present	
embodied	 existences	mere	 temporary	habitats;	 inherently	 inferior	 to	 the	 intellectual,	
spiritual	 ultimacy	 of	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Given	 the	 patriarchal	 association	 of	 women	with	
materiality,	 traditional	 images	 of	 eschatology	 are	 thus	 exposed	 as	 proposing	 the	
expulsion	 of	 women	 from	 eschatological	 existence.	 	 The	 specific	 and	 varied	
perspectives	on	this	are	expounded	in	Chapter	One,	alongside	an	appreciation	 for	the	
importance	of	theologies	which	value	bodies.			
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 latter,	 many	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 placed	 importance	 on	
accepting	the	limitations	of	embodied	life.		Indeed,	Jantzen	writes	that	“The	acceptance	
of	life	is	an	acceptance	of	limits”	(1998,	154).		Embodied	limitations	are	here	deemed	to	
 
 
~	31	~	
 
be	characteristic	of	the	content	of	life;	neither	evils	to	be	escaped	nor	hindrances	to	be	
overcome.	 	Whereas	 Jantzen	 lists	 certain	enjoyable	activities	 (such	as	 smelling	roses)	
that	would	 be	 impossible	without	 a	 body	 (1984a,	 106),	 Carol	 Christ	 communicates	 a	
sense	of	reconciliation	with	some	more	difficult	aspects	of	embodied	life;	namely	pain	
and	death.		She	writes	that	“Dying	is	part	of	living.		If	we	can	accept	our	dying	or	that	of	
others	 and	 not	 fear	 it,	 then	we	 can	 enjoy	whatever	 time	 is	 left	 as	much	 as	 possible”	
(2003,	124).		Such	perspectives	typify	much	feminist	thought	on	the	nature	and	value	of	
bodily	 lives,	and	are	explored	thoroughly	in	Chapter	One.	 	Appreciation	is	also	shown	
for	diverse	and	nuanced	dimensions	of	these	perspectives;	Jantzen,	for	example,	makes	
bodies	 central	 but	 also	 argues	 for	 their	 transcendence.	 	 By	 this	 she	 means	 that	
personhood,	 consisting	 of	 both	 the	 physical	 and	 the	 non‐physical,	 is	 primary	 (1984a,	
128)	 and	 that	 all	 constituent	 parts	 of	 the	 person	 strive	 towards	 a	 horizon	 of	
transcendence,	which	is	“openness	to	meaning	and	reality”	(1984a,	125).		Carol	Christ	
envisages	 a	 future	of	 full	participation	 in	 the	materiality	of	 the	world,	 rather	 than	an	
escape	 from	 it	 (2003,	 133)	whereby	 the	 death	 of	 bodies	 does	 not	 correlate	with	 the	
cessation	of	existences	but	rather	with	their	retention	in	the	body	and	memory	of	God	
(2003,	 139).	 	 	 There	 is	 some	 sense,	 then,	 in	which	 bodies	 are	 affirmed	 both	 as	 they	
presently	are	and	as	they	will	be	in	the	future.	
	
Despite	 these	 allusions	 to	 some	 sense	 of	 futurity	 for	 bodies,	 I	 find	 them	 to	 be	
insufficient	 for	 they	 either	 lack	 specificity	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 future‐bodies,	 or	
they	 remain	 suspicious	 of	 bodies	 being	 experienced	 differently	 in	 the	 eschatological	
future.		Similar	to	the	motivations	behind	Chapter	Two,	I	respond	in	Chapter	Three	by	
arguing	that	any	adequate	and	beneficial	theology	of	embodiment	needs	eschatology	in	
order	that	all	embodiments	are	fully	affirmed,	honoured,	and	experienced.		I	explicitly	
employ	 the	method	 of	 contradiction,	 affirmation,	 and	 construction	 in	 this	 chapter	 in	
order	to	develop	understandings	of	endurance	and	transformation.			Constructions	are	
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framed	in	relation	to	the	association	of	women’s	bodies	with	change;	embodied	change	
is	 affirmed	 as	 one	 feature	 of	 existence	 which	 must	 endure	 in	 the	 future	 lest	 the	
eschaton	continue	to	perpetuate	a	patriarchal	model	of	future	existence.		Reference	to	
such	“endurance”	then	allows	room	to	speak	of	“transformation”	as	I	assert	that	there	
are	 aspects	of	 existence	 that	will	not	 endure.	 	 I	 consider	 and	attempt	 to	 construct	 an	
existence	where	 anything	 that	 jeopardises	 the	 integrity	 of	 bodies	 and	 their	 ability	 to	
flourish	fully	is	contradicted.		Contradiction	is	thus	named	as	the	contradiction	of	death,	
which	rests	on	an	affirmation	of	embodied	life	and,	more	specifically,	an	embodied	life	
that	is	transformed	in	order	that	it	is	experienced	in	full	and	abundant	dynamism.			
	
The	 feasibility	of	a	 future	where	change	endures	but	death	does	not	warrants	careful	
consideration,	 as	 death	 has	 often	 been	 associated	 with	 change	 and	 both	 have	 been	
united	in	their	application	to	women.	 	Grace	Jantzen’s	work	is,	again,	helpful	here,	for	
she	writes	in	praise	of	life	in	order	to	counteract	not	death,	per	se,	but	rather	religion’s	
preoccupation	with	it:	
If	humans	are	 to	 find	meaning	 in	 a	 life	which	moves	 inexorably	 to	death,	one	
strategy	 for	 dealing	 with	 anxiety	 is	 to	 postulate	 immortality	 and	 a	 God	 who	
guarantees	it,	especially	[…]	if	that	God	also	authorizes	mastery	over	that	which	
reminds	of	mortality:	women,	bodiliness,	and	the	earth	to	which	we	all	return	
(Jantzen,	1998,	131).13		
	
Jantzen	thus	centralises	life	and	natality	in	order	to	remedy	what	she	perceives	to	be	an	
inordinate	 focus	 on	 (im)mortality.	 	 This	 framing	 of	 life	 in	 relation	 to	 natality,	 which	
Jantzen	describes	as	“a	love	of	life”	(1998,	152),	is	universal	inasmuch	as	it	recognises	
natality	 as	 a	 “fundamental	 human	 condition”	 (1998,	 144;	 cf.	 Samuelsson,	 2009,	 76),	
given	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 are	 all	 birthed.	 	 Rather	 than	 a	 masculinist	 escape	 from	 the	
embodied	 life	 that	patriarchy	has	 associated	with	women,	 then,	 Jantzen	promotes	 an	
affirmation	of	life	specifically	as	it	originates	in	the	female	body	(Jantzen,	2010,	133;	cf.	
Johnson,	2002,	234)	for	the	purpose	of	cultivating	the	flourishing	and	interconnectivity	
																																																													
13	 Again	we	 detect	 here	 the	 intertwining	 concerns	 and	 simultaneous	 need	 to	 reimage	God	 in	
order	to	reconstruct	eschatology. 
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of	 all	 (1998,	 161).	 	 Each	 of	 these	 dimensions	 of	 Jantzen’s	work	 feeds	my	 own,	 as	 in	
Chapter	 Three	 I	 consider	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	 birthing	 and	 non‐birthing.		
However,	whilst	Jantzen	argues	that	she	does	not	deny	or	trivialize	death	(1998,	152)	
she	 does	 posit	 a	 re‐orientation	 toward	 “life	 in	 this	 world”	 (1998,	 168).	 	 I	 offer	 an	
alternative	 perspective	 which	 does	 take	 time	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 realities	 of	 death,	 but	
again	 conducts	 this	 with	 an	 eschatological	 focus	 on	 life.	 	 Thus,	 I	 use	 some	women’s	
experiences	 of	 birthing	 and	 non‐birthing	 as	 a	 theological	 lens	 through	 which	 to	
interpret	the	resurrection	narratives	in	order	to	construct	a	hopeful	reading	of	both	the	
tomb	and	the	womb;	both	are	seen	to	be	embraced	in	God’s	body	and	to	embrace	God’s	
body.	 	 I	 therefore	 present	 various	 experiences	 of	 birthing,	 both	 joyous	 and	 tragic,	 as	
being	 indicative	 of	 the	 divine	 intention	 for	 and	 involvement	 in	 the	 eschatological	
transformation	 of	 death	 into	 fully	 flourishing	 life.	 	 It	 is	 thus	 argued	 that	 change	 can	
endure	within	 transformed	eschatological	 life,	as	opposed	to	 it	being	 indicative	of	 the	
move	 from	 life	 to	 death.	 	 The	 alternative	 I	 offer	 does	 not,	 however,	 focus	 on	
eschatological	 life	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 “life	 in	 this	 world”,	 but	 rather	 frames	 it	 as	 an	
existence	which	can	help	us	to	live	in	this	world.14			
				
Eschatology	for	Bodies		
Chapters	One	and	Four:	Present	Bodies	
It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 my	 final	 chapter	 turns,	 most	 directly,	 to	 the	 present.		
Attendance	 to	 present	 existences	 is	 both	 a	 central	 concern	 for	 feminist	 theology	 and	
markedly	 absent	 in	much	 eschatological	 thought,	 thus	 I	 seek	 to	 affirm	 the	 former	 by	
reconstructing	 the	 latter.	 	A	 lack	of	 concern	 for	 the	present	 in	 traditional	 concepts	of	
eschatology	is	attributable	to	the	dislocation	of	hope	to	a	forever	future.	 	The	“time”	of	
																																																													
14	This	both/and	of	 the	 future	and	 the	present	 signifies	another	way	 in	which	 Jantzen’s	work	
substantiates	 the	 attempts	 I	 make	 here,	 as	 she	 was	 consistently	 committed	 to	 exposing	 and	
challenging	the	gender‐assumptions	made	by	traditional	dualistic	frameworks	(see	Healing	our	
Brokenness,	 2010).	 	 This	 also	 echoes	 the	 justification	 given	 for	 centralising	 relationality	 in	
Chapter	Two	with	a	concern	to	overcome	dualistic	structures	and	cultivate	flourishing.	 
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the	 future	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 one	which	 is	 perpetually	 promised	 but	 never	 presently	 and	
effectively	tangible.		The	crux	of	the	critique	from	feminist	theologians,	as	Chapter	One	
explores,	is	that	those	who	presently	experience	oppression	need	help	now	and	not	in	
some	 distant	 future.	 	 As	 Ivone	 Gebara	 writes,	 “It	 is	 now	 that	 something	 good	 must	
happen	 in	 my	 life,	 now	 that	 my	 distress	 must	 be	 allayed,	 now	 that	 the	 pleasure	 of	
feeling	loved	and	respected	must	take	flesh	in	my	flesh”	(2002,	127).15	 	 In	addition	to	
this,	 such	 a	 future	 is	 exposed	 by	 many	 feminist	 theologians	 as	 being	 the	 tool	 of	 a	
particularly	patriarchal	oppression	as	it	has	been	used	to	convince	the	oppressed,	who	
so	 often	 are	women,	 to	 endure	 suffering.	 	 Citing	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 character	 of	
Celie	in	Alice	Walker’s	novel	The	Color	Purple,	Karen	Baker‐Fletcher	notes	that	“instead	
of	fighting	back	or	trying	to	get	out,	[she]	resorted	to	dreaming	of	heaven”	(1998,	121).		
Whilst	the	comfort	provided	by	such	a	perspective	is	noted,	time	is	taken	to	outline	the	
danger	of	a	future	that	delays	hope	and	encourages	submission	to	suffering.		In	such	a	
model,	suffering	is	seen	as	both	a	noble	précis	to	future	existence	and	an	impermanent	
state	of	being.	 	The	endurance	of	pain	is	seen	to	form	the	soul	and	diminish	the	body;	
again,	 the	 former	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 permanent	 and	 superior,	 and	 the	 latter	 a	 mere	
hindrance.	 	 Liberation	 theologians	 have	 long	 critiqued	 this	 model,	 and	 feminist	
liberation	 theologians	 in	 particular	 are	 vociferous	 in	 their	 desires	 to	 dismantle	 it.			
Prominent	here	are	the	voices	of	womanist	and	mujerista	theologians,	who	emphasise	
the	need	to	relocate	and	redirect	focus	to	the	present.		Isasi‐Díaz,	for	example,	calls	for	
a	theology	of	liberation	that	is	feasible,	focussed,	and	organized	(2004a,	348;	344).		The	
emphasis	 amongst	 feminist	 theologians	 in	 response	 to	 traditional	 models	 of	
eschatology	is	consistently	and	unswervingly	on	the	present,	then.		Whereas	responses	
to	 problems	with	 the	 process	 and	 content	 of	 eschatology	 focussed	 on	 the	 present	 in	
order	 to	 affirm	 divine	 and	 creaturely	 embodied	 limitations,	 the	 focus	 here	 is	 on	
																																																													
15	Again,	an	intertwining	of	problems	is	noted,	for	a	similar	critique	was	raised	in	relation	to	the	
process	of	eschatology	whereby	a	God	who	knows	and	has	already	created	the	end	was	deemed	
to	 be	 aligned	with	 a	 God	who	 can	 alleviate	 suffering	 but	 does	 not	 do	 so	 now.	 	 Chapter	 Two	
answers	this	challenge	by,	as	noted,	emphasising	the	relational	realisation	of	the	end. 
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attending	 to	 the	 practicalities	 of	 achieving	 liberation	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now,	 however	
limited	this	may	be.	
			
Theologians	 who	 attend	 to	 these	 issues	 are	 perhaps	 the	 most	 sympathetic	 feminist	
voices	 to	 an	 eschatological	 perspective,	 for	 there	 is	 a	 hope	 that	 presently	 limited	
liberation	will	be	fully	realised	in	the	future.	 	 Indeed,	Isasi‐Díaz	couples	her	emphasis	
on	feasibility	with	an	appraisal	of	desire	and	hope	(2004a,	348)	and	Gebara	writes	that	
“We	 are	 not	 using	 hope	 to	 bet	 on	 the	 future	without	 trying	 to	 taste	 in	 the	 present	 a	
certain	possibility	of	what	one	hopes	for	in	the	future”	(2002,	127).		There	is,	then,	an	
intertwining	 of	 present‐practice	 and	 future‐hope	 for	 these	 thinkers,	 as	 that	which	 is	
strived	for	in	the	present	is	empowered	by	a	hope	that	it	will	be	experienced	in	full	in	
the	future.		The	Kingdom	or	“kin‐dom”	of	God	is	thus	redirected	to	the	here	and	now	by	
feminist	 liberation	 theologians.16	 	 	 Even	 these	 perspectives,	 though,	 falter	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 specifying	 “what	 one	 hopes	 for	 in	 the	 future”.	 	 Although	 there	 is	 a	 definite	
sense	of	hope	for	liberation	and	justice	and	these	are	given	importance,	the	particular	
ways	 in	which	 they	may	be	achieved	and	 the	 characteristic	nature	of	 their	 fulfilment	
are	lacking.		Having	spent	time	in	Chapters	Two	and	Three	attempting	to	achieve	such	
specificity	by	naming	eschatology	as	a	relational	process	and	a	changing	content,	I	thus	
move	 in	Chapter	Four	 to	exploring	some	ways	 in	which	such	a	 future	can	 impact	 the	
present.	 	 This	 further	 locates	 my	 constructive	 efforts	 amongst	 feminist	 theological	
voices,	as	I	am	sensitive	to	the	critique	that	traditional	eschatologies	express	a	lack	of	
concern	for	the	present.		Furthermore,	I	have	a	real	desire	that	my	constructions	not	be	
																																																													
16	The	term	“kin‐dom”	is	proposed	by	Isasi‐Díaz	to	counteract	the	language	of	“Kingdom”.	 	She	
posits	kin‐dom	to	emphasise	mutuality	and	responsibility	(2004b,	53).		Similarly,	Fiorenza	uses	
the	Greek	term	basileia	to	emphasise	discipleship	 in	 the	present	and	the	“alternative	world	of	
justice	and	well‐being	intended	by	the	life‐giving	power	of	G‐d”	(1993,	12).		Both	seek	to	address	
the	notion	that	“God	as	king	is	 in	his	kingdom	–	which	is	not	of	this	earth	–	and	we	remain	in	
another	place,	 far	 from	his	dwelling”	 (McFague,	1987,	65).	 	 	 	 Some	sources	 I	 refer	 to	over	 the	
course	of	 the	 following	 chapters	will	make	 reference	 to	 “kingdom”,	 so	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	
here	 my	 agreement	 with	 McFague’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 “kingdom”	 and	 my	
appreciation	of	these	proposed	alternatives.				 
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dislocated	 from	 the	 present	 but	 rather	 offer	 a	 meaningful	 and	 novel	 way	 for	 us	 to	
anticipate	 and	 create	 a	 relational	 and	 fluid	 embodied	 eschatology.	 	 Again,	 then,	 I	
propose	 a	 dialogical	 relationship	 between	 the	 past,	 present,	 and	 future,	whereby	 the	
future	is	constructed	on	the	basis	of	contradicting	or	affirming	what	has	been	and	what	
is.	 	 These	 constructions	 can	 then	 return	 us	 to	 the	 present	 as	we	 seek	 to	 live	 now	 in	
ways	that	realise	the	eschaton.		Elizabeth	Johnson	(2002,	64)	would	appear	to	support	
such	a	move,	as	she	writes:			
Lament	 over	 women’s	 suffering	 and	 celebration	 of	 women’s	 creative	 agency	
couple	with	hope	for	a	future	that	will	be	more	beneficial.		The	energy	released	
by	 this	 turning	 sustains	 practical	 efforts	 for	 change	 of	 structures	 and	
consciousnesses	here	and	now.	
	
Having	both	lamented	and	celebrated	perspectives	on	and	experiences	of	female	bodies	
in	 Chapters	 One,	 Two	 and	 Three,	 Chapter	 Four	 seeks	 to	 fulfil	 Johnson’s	 assertion	 by	
suggesting	some	values	and	practices	that	may	help	us	make	present	the	eschatological	
future	 that	 has	 been	 constructed.	 	 These	 values	 and	 practices	 can	 certainly	 be	made	
manifest	without	reference	to	the	eschaton,	but	my	contention	is	that	the	unequivocal	
and	specific	affirmation	of	embodied	relationality	and	fluidity	in	the	eschaton	can	cast	
an	informative	lens	back	to	us	and	so	help	us	embody	them	in	a	specific	way.			
	
The	 practice	 of	 touch	 emerges	 from	 these	 chapters	 as	 an	 incontrovertibly	 embodied	
way	of	both	celebrating	and	lamenting	relational	and	changing	embodiments.		Touch	is	
further	 presented	 as	 appropriate,	 particularly	 for	 a	 feminist	 reconstruction	 of	
eschatology,	because	the	sensuality	of	tactility	is	another	feature	of	existence	that	has	
been	 aligned	 with	 women	 and	 subsequently	 maligned.	 	 It	 was	 noted	 earlier	 how	
epistemology	 and	 embodiment	 have	 traditionally	 been	 dichotomised;	 in	 contrast	 I	
claim	that	affirming	bodies	through	touch	can	remedy	such	distortions	and	value	tactile	
communication	 and	 understanding.	 	 Furthermore,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 neglecting	 the	
experience	 of	 and	 ability	 to	 feel	 and	 touch,	 or	 depicting	 them	 as	 inferior	 and	
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inconsequential	features	of	existence,	only	serves	to	further	invalidate	embodied	life.		It	
is	in	response	to	such	suspicion	of	sensuality	that	Isasi‐Díaz	(2004a,	349)	claims:	
Only	 our	 insistence	 on	 regaining	 our	 pleasureloving	 selves	 will	 allow	 us	 to	
become	fully	incarnated,	to	value	our	bodyselves,	to	embrace	our	sexuality,	and	
to	pay	attention,	appreciate	and	liberate	our	desires	for	our	own	life	of	fullness	
of	life‐liberation.		
	
Thus,	attending	to	and	affirming	touch	enables	the	embrace	and	liberation	of	embodied	
lives.		In	relation	and	addition	to	this,	and	most	crucially	for	this	chapter,	touch	is	also	
seen	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 embodying,	 most	 tangibly	 and	 intimately,	 an	 embodied	
eschaton.17	 	Given	my	argument	 for	 the	dialogical	 relationship	of	 the	present	and	 the	
future,	though,	the	eschaton	is	also	deemed	to	be	able	to	inform	such	practices.	 	Thus,	
practice	 and	 touch	 are	 united	 in	 this	 chapter	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 embodied	
eschaton.	
		
In	 addition	 to	 this,	 touch	 is	made	 central	 for	 it	 also	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 embody	 an	
embodied	eschaton	simply	by	affirming	the	existence	and	significance	of	bodily	life.		In	
short,	 tactility	 cannot	 be	 practised	 without	 bodies.	 	 The	 exploration	 goes	 further,	
though,	 and	 asserts	 that	 touch,	when	 appropriately	 negotiated,	 can	 also	 embody	 the	
eschaton	in	radical	and	novel	ways	by	developing	our	capacities	to	be	in	touch	with	our	
own	and	each	other’s	bodies	in	loving	and	life‐affirming	ways.		In	this	way,	touch	can	be	
empowering.		A	crucial	corollary	to	this	assertion	must,	however	be	an	appreciation	of	
the	ways	in	which	touch	has	and	may	be	fraught	with	problems;	when	touch	has	been	
and	is	hurtful.		I	propose	a	tactile	practice	which	can	mediate	and	facilitate	our	care	and	
grief	 for	hurting	bodies	 and	also	which	can	embody	 the	power	of	 soothing,	palliative	
touch.		Again,	the	simple	fact	of	being	tangibly	present	to	another	is	affirmed	here.	 	In	
addition	to	this,	the	chapter	also	claims	that	such	touch	can	acknowledge	the	reality	of	
pain	 and	 anticipate	 a	 future	where	 bodily	 pains	 are	 transformed.	 	 I	 suggest	 that	we	
																																																													
17	 My	 references	 to	 an	 “embodied	 eschaton”	 do	 not	 express	 an	 homogenous	 and	 singular	
embodiment	in	the	eschaton,	but	rather	an	eschaton	where	all	are	embodied	in	different	ways. 
 
 
~	38	~	
 
attend	to	these	instances	and	experiences	of	hurt	and	pain	and	challenge	them	not	only	
by	naming	them	as	anti‐eschatological	but	also	by	constructing	a	practice	of	touch	that	
is	sensitive	to	such	experiences.		I	will	also,	then,	note	the	need	for	spaces	in	touching,	
even	places	where	touch	is	 inappropriate.	 	 In	conjunction	with	this	I	will	suggest	that	
an	eschatological	affirmation	of	relational	and	changing	embodiments	informs	us	of	the	
need	 to	 provide	 space	 to	 let	 others	 be	 in	 their	 own	 embodied	 particularity.	 	 Such	
“spacing”	will	 be	 said	 to	mirror	 the	 spacious	 embrace	 of	 God,	 thus	 enabling	 it	 to	 be	
practised	in	both	hope	and	trust	that	ourselves	and	others	will	experience	a	future	of	
bodily	 reconciliation	where	 touch	 is	 empowering	 and	 communicative,	 and	 no	 longer	
hurtful	or	abusive.			
	
Self‐touch	will	be	presented	as	a	corollary	to	achieving	this.	 	Self‐touch,	 in	addition	to	
being	valued	for	its	capacity	to	develop	self‐love,	is	affirmed	as	one	way	in	which	touch	
can	be	practised	when	abusive	touch	has	been	experienced;	when	the	touch	of	others	
may	be	too	painful.	 	This	 is	claimed	particularly	 in	relation	to	women	as,	 like	with	so	
many	other	values	and	experiences	reclaimed	here,	self‐love	is	something	that	has	been	
consistently	 denied	 to	women.	 	 Female	 bodies	 lovingly	 touching	 themselves	 (Rivera,	
2007,	97)	are	affirmed	as	appropriate	and	powerful	manifestations	of	an	eschatology	
that	affirms	our	embodiments.	 	This,	coupled	with	attention	to	touching	our	own	and	
each	other’s	hurting	bodies,	 leads	me	 to	speak	of	a	hope	 in	God’s	 loving	 touch	which	
cannot	 hurt.	 	 Far	 from	 ending	 on	 a	 pessimistic	 tone,	 then,	 I	 suggest	 that	 this	 final	
consideration	 can	 be	 infused	with	 hope	by	 looking	 to	 a	 future	 in	which	 tangible	 and	
sentient	 embodied	 beings	 can	 once	 again	 and	 even	 more	 so	 live	 as	 dynamically	
relational	beings.			
	
Conclusion	
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In	 summary,	 the	 eschatological	 future	 contains	 both	 problems	 and	 potentials	 for	 the	
affirmation	of	bodies	generally,	and	women’s	bodies	specifically.		Categorised	in	terms	
of	 “process”,	 “content”,	 and	 “time”,	 eschatology	 is	 problematized	 for	 respectively	
promoting	 a	 non‐relational	 God,	 a	 static	 existence,	 and	 a	 delayed	 hope.	 	 It	 is	 now	
appropriate	to	explore	these	problems	in	more	depth,	alongside	offering	a	substantial	
exploration	 of	 the	 responses	 that	 such	 problems	 have	 evoked	 from	 feminist	
theologians.	 	 As	 noted,	 these	 responses	 have	 focused	 on	 reclaiming	 and	 naming	 the	
affirmation	 of	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	 sensuality	 as	 they	 are	 presently,	 albeit	
limitedly,	experienced.	 	By	beginning	with	such	an	 investigation	I	will	 then	be	able	to	
ground	 and	 situate	 my	 own	 attempts	 at	 constructing	 a	 feminist	 theology	 of	
eschatological	bodies.		
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1.	Feminist	Theology	and	Eschatology	
Introduction	
Eschatology	has	thus	far	been	outlined	as	containing	both	problems	and	possibilities	in	
relation	to	perceptions	of	women’s	experiences	of	embodiment.		The	possibilities	I	will	
attempt	to	fulfil	in	chapters	Two,	Three,	and	Four	are	informed	by	feminist	theologians’	
appraisals,	 and	 women’s	 present	 experiences	 of	 their	 bodies.	 	 The	 need	 for	 such	
affirmations	 arises	 out	 of	 feminist	 theologians’	 expositions	 of	 the	 patriarchal	
devaluation	 of	 characteristics	 and	 experiences	 associated	 with	 women’s	 bodies.		
Traditional	 constructions	 of	 the	 eschatological	 future	 are	 deemed,	 by	many	 feminist	
theologians,	 to	 concretise	 such	 devaluation.	 	 This	 chapter,	 then,	 assesses	 both	 the	
problems	 and	 responses	 that	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 exposed	 and	 proposed.	 	 In	
order	 to	 do	 this	 I	 will	 conduct	 a	 survey	 of	 feminist	 theological	 perspectives	 on	 the	
process,	 content,	 and	 time	 of	 eschatology.	 	 These	 categorisations	 encapsulate	 some	
central	 themes	 in	 feminist	 readings	 of	 traditional	 understandings	 of	 eschatology;	
namely	power	and	relationality,	change	and	death,	and	the	relationship	of	the	future	to	
the	 present.	 	Moreover,	 constructions	 of	 the	 process	 underpin	models	 of	 the	 content	
and	assumptions	about	the	time;	problems	in	the	 latter	two	aspects	are	drawn	out	of	
problems	 identified	 in	 the	 former.	 	 Thus	 the	most	 substantial	 exploration	 is	 directed	
towards	discussions	concerning	the	process	of	realising	the	eschaton.			
	
For	 each	 of	 these	 three	 themes	 I	 will	 firstly	 outline	 the	 problems	 as	 perceived	 and	
exposed	 by	 feminist	 theologians.	 	 This	 is	 undertaken	with	 an	 awareness	 that	 certain	
traditional	 constructions	 may	 unintentionally	 be	 problematic	 for	 women.	 	 Yet,	 as	
Fiorenza	writes,	 “all	 theology,	willingly	or	not,	 is	by	definition	always	engaged	 for	or	
against	the	oppressed”	(1995,	6).	 	Vuola	adds	to	this	that	whilst	many	may	claim	that	
theology	 has	 not	 denied	 full	 humanity	 to	 women,	 a	 careful	 study	 of	 the	 tradition’s	
history	reveals	that	“women	(and	other	Others)	have	been	defined	as	less	or	different	
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from	 the	 authentic	 imago	dei	 that	 only	 (free)	men	normatively	present”	 (2002,	 116).		
Willingly	 or	 not,	 then,	 traditional	 eschatology	 has	 largely	 been	 engaged	 in	 theorising	
against	women’s	embodied	lives.		Thus	my	concern	for	this	chapter,	and	indeed	for	my	
thesis,	 is	 not	with	whether	 the	 feminist	 theological	 critiques	 of	 traditional	 views	 are	
correct	or	accurate.		More	pertinent	is	how	these	views	have	been	received	by	feminist	
theologians	 and	 the	 legacy	 left	 by	 such	 interpretations.	 	 It	 is	 this	 that	 the	 feminist	
theologians	 in	 this	 chapter	are	often	critiquing	and	similarly	 that	 to	which	 I	 respond.		
This	chapter,	 then,	aims	 to	explore	 feminist	 theological	approaches	 to	eschatology	by	
attending	to	both	critiques	and	reconstructions	of	traditional	notions	of	eschatology.		In	
so	doing,	I	seek	to	uncover	the	problematic	elements	that	my	own	eschatological	model	
must	 avoid	 or	 rethink,	 and	 also	 to	 discover	 some	perspectives	 that	 hold	 potential	 to	
help	develop	a	new	understanding	of	the	eschatological	future.	
	
Process:	Eschatology	and	Omnipotence	
The	 first	 major	 theme	 I	 detect	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 a	 consideration	 of	 traditional	
constructions	of	the	process	of	eschatology.		Essentially,	this	pertains	to	how	the	end	is	
deemed	 to	 be	 brought	 about	 and	 what	 type	 of	 God	 may	 do	 this.	 	 The	 theologians	
included	here	all	engage	with	different	formulations	of	this	process;	most	prominently,	
though,	 their	 attention	 is	directed	 toward	 traditional	Christian	understandings	of	 the	
eschatological	 process	 as	 one	 of	 rescue	 or	 conquest.	 	What	will	 become	 clear	 is	 that	
feminist	readings	of	traditional	models	of	the	eschatological	process	highlight	how	this	
underpins	traditional	understandings	of	both	the	content	and	the	time	of	the	eschaton;	
hence	their	primacy	in	this	assessment.		The	thinkers	I	will	engage	with	share	a	concern	
that	 traditional	 theological	 models	 of	 the	 actuation	 of	 the	 eschaton	 rest	 on	 the	
construction	 of	 God	 as	 omnipotent.	 	 Connected	 to	 this	 are	 concerns	 surrounding	 the	
presentation	of	God	as	omniscient,	 impassible,	 incorporeal,	 and	 immutable.	 	 Feminist	
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perceptions	of	the	problems	with	these	constructions	will	thus	be	explored	here,	as	will	
their	responses.			
	
Problem:	Eschatology	is	Realised	by	God	Alone	
The	 first	 problem	 that	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 identified	 with	 the	 eschatological	
process	is	that	it	constructs	divine	power	as	omnipotence,	understood	as	power	which	
is	exerted	over	creation	in	a	unilateral	expression	of	dominance.	 	Feminist	theological	
and	philosophical	explorations	of	divine	omnipotence	are	often	informed	by	the	work	
of	process	philosophers	Alfred	North	Whitehead	and	Charles	Hartshorne.	 	Hartshorne	
in	 particular	 helps	 us	 to	 see	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 divine	 omnipotence	 to	
eschatology,	as	he	writes	that	“The	omnipotence	of	God	has	been	valued	as	a	guarantee	
of	the	victory	of	good	over	evil”	(2001,	109).		This	battle	between	good	and	evil	is	often	
constructed	 as	 a	 cosmic	 and	 spiritual	 battle,	 and	 one	 which	 will	 culminate	 in	 the	
apocalyptic	 end‐time.	 	 Assessing	 the	 omnipotence	 of	 God	 from	 an	 eschatological	
perspective	is	thus	appropriate,	for	such	a	God	infers	an	eschatology	of	conquests	and	
crusades,	and	eschatology	 in	 its	 traditional	constructions	relies	on	such	a	God.	 	Given	
the	 focus	 of	 my	 thesis,	 though,	 the	 thinkers	 who	 are	 most	 relevant	 here	 are	 those	
whose	 assessments	 of	 omnipotence	 are	 consistently	 and	 explicitly	 undertaken	 in	
relation	 to	 both	 feminist	 theology	 and	 the	 process	 of	 actuating	 the	 eschaton;	
contributions	offered	by	Christ,	Keller,	and	Brock	are	arguably	the	most	extensive	and	
relevant.18			
	
																																																													
18	It	should	be	noted	that	Keller	also	offers	a	significant	and	substantial	challenge	to	creatio	ex	
nihilo	in	her	book	The	Face	of	the	Deep:	A	Theology	of	Becoming	(2003a)	which	upholds	many	of	
the	critiques	made	in	other	similar	works	and	also	adds	to	them	a	model	of	creation	from	the	
depths	 of	 an	 ever‐existent	 chaos	 (2003a,	 19).	 	 This	 “creation	 from	 the	 depths”	 is	 helpful	 in	
considering	 an	 eschatology	 “from	 the	 depths”,	 and	 is	 much	 akin	 to	 Moltmann’s	 model	 of	 an	
eschatological	 divine‐creation	 interpenetration	 (2004,	 158),	which	will	 be	 utilised	 in	 Chapter	
Two. 
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Carol	Christ’s	 interrogation	of	omnipotence,	most	evident	 in	her	2003	work	She	Who	
Changes:	Re‐Imagining	 the	Divine	 in	 the	World,	 makes	 reference	 to	 the	 future,	 but	 is	
primarily	 concerned	 with	 challenging	 and	 reconfiguring	 gendered	 constructions	 of	
divine	 power.	 	 Christ	 has	 dedicated	 a	 vast	 amount	 of	 her	 work	 to	 challenging	 the	
Christian	tradition’s	preservation	and	promotion	of	a	doctrine	of	divine	omnipotence.		
Her	 recent	 article	 entitled	 “Goddess	with	 Us:	 Is	 a	 Relational	 God	 Powerful	 Enough?”	
(2013)	indicates	the	enduring	relevance	of	the	discussion.		Most	significant,	though,	as	
noted,	 is	 Christ’s	 2003	 work	 She	Who	 Changes.	 	 In	 this	 text,	 Christ	 expresses	 both	
sensitivity	 to	 the	desire	 for	 an	omnipotent	God	 and	 a	 substantial	 challenge	 to	 such	 a	
God.		Christ	acknowledges	that	“We	want	to	believe	that	there	is	some	time	when	good	
will	be	rewarded	and	evil	will	be	punished”;	a	time	when	all	things	will	be	made	well	
(2003,	 37).	 	 Christ	 suggests	 that	 such	 a	 desire	 is,	 however,	 a	 type	 of	 psychological	
anaesthetic	 which,	 though	 comforting,	 ultimately	 thwarts	 freedom	 and	 relationality	
(2003,	37;	40).		Relationality	cannot	co‐exist	with	an	omnipotent	God,	Christ	contends,	
because	such	a	God	 is	 too	 far	 removed	 from	and	disregarding	of	creation	 (2003,	86).		
Christ	suggests	that	this	connotes	a	God	who	cares	 little	for	creation,	and	as	such	is	a	
God	with	whom	we	would	be	wary,	if	not	incapable,	of	forming	relationships.			
	
In	 line	 with	 this,	 Christ	 infers	 that	 an	 omnipotent	 God	 is	 one	 whose	 perfection	 is	
defined	 by	 non‐relationality	 and,	 she	 contends,	 this	 frames	 our	 own	 perfection	 as	
becoming	“as	independent	of	relationships	as	possible”	(2003,	35).		She	further	writes	
that	 the	 traditional	 image	 of	 God	 is	 one	who	 is	 “related	 to	 none”.	 	 Christ	 notes	 that	
process	philosophy	asks	“how	[this	God]	could	possibly	become	an	object	of	worship”	
(2003,	86),	and	she	adds	to	this	that	such	a	God	cannot	possibly	care	for	creation,	thus	
she	enquires,	“why	should	we	care	about	him?”	(2003,	86).		For	Christ,	then,	models	of	
divine	 omnipotence	 imply	 that	 the	 future	 is	 one	 in	which	we	will	 become	perfect	 by	
becoming	non‐relational.			
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This	 seems	 a	 legitimate	 critique:	 if	 God	 holds	 all	 power	 then	 creation	 is	 bound	 to	
dependence	 and	 obedience,	 neither	 of	 which	 forms	 acceptable	 bases	 for	 healthy	
relationships.		This	is	further	problematised	by	the	observation	that,	in	addition	to	the	
unfeasibility	of	creation	relating	to	an	omnipotent	God,	an	omnipotent	God	on	account	
of	 “his”	 very	 omnipotence	 cannot	 be	 a	 relational	 God.	 	 Jantzen	 notes	 the	 sentiment	
within	 the	Christian	 tradition	 that	 “most	 of	 our	 sensations	 are	 too	 trivial	 to	 apply	 to	
God”	 (1984a,	 82),	 with	 Porter	 attributing	 such	 notions	 to	 the	 dualistic	 separation	 of	
transcendence	 and	 human	 existence	which,	 she	writes	 “has	 kept	 God	 apart	 from	 the	
ordinary,	earthly,	everyday	matters	of	life”	(2013,	98‐99).		Experiences	of	relationality	
are	thus	paralleled	with	triviality	and	removed	from	divinity;	perhaps,	Christ	posits,	on	
account	 of	 their	 concurrent	parallel	with	women	 (2003,	 92).	 	 In	 such	 a	 construction,	
God	 is	 relationally	 and	 existentially	 superior	 to	 creation,	 ultimately	 transcending	 the	
trivialities	 of	 personhood	 framed	 particularly	 in	 terms	 traditionally	 associated	 with	
women.			
	
Rita	 Nakashima	 Brock,	 in	 her	 1995	 text	 Journeys	 by	Heart,	helps	 to	 advance	 Christ’s	
exploration	 of	 power	 and	 relationality.	 	 She	 writes	 that	 when	 power	 is	 viewed	 as	
something	to	be	possessed	by	an	individual	then	relational	or	“connecting”	power	and	
vulnerability	 “will	 be	 seen	 as	 threats	 to,	 rather	 than	 enhancements	 of	 selves”	 (1995,	
33).	Grace	Jantzen	takes	this	critique	further	and	implies	that	underpinning	all	of	these	
assumptions	 concerning	 divine	 power	 and	 knowledge	 lies	 a	 doctrine	 of	 divine	
incorporeality	 (1984a,	 28).	 	 Whereas	 problems	 with	 omnipotence	 and	 omniscience	
emerge	 as	 most	 explicit	 in	 the	 critiques	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process,	 we	must	 also	
interrogate	inferences	made	in	the	tradition	to	divine	incorporeality.	 	As	Jantzen	later	
writes,	“It	is	the	disembodied	nature	of	the	(nevertheless	masculine!)	divine	which	has	
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served	 as	 the	 lynchpin	 of	 the	 western	 masculinist	 symbolic”	 (Jantzen,	 1998,	 269).		
Christ	(2003,	47)	adds	weight	to	this	contention,	and	writes	that:	
In	 traditional	 western	 thinking,	 change	 is	 given	 an	 exclusively	 negative	
evaluation	 […]	 Since	 the	 body	 is	 the	 location	 of	 death	 and	 decay,	 the	 human	
body	and	all	bodies	were	found	lacking.	
	
Thus	it	has	been	deemed	inappropriate	to	speak	of	an	embodied	God	as	to	do	so	would	
be	to	assign	the	transience	and	limitations	of	death	and	decay	to	God’s	being.		This	is	an	
issue	that	concerns	feminist	theologians	in	particular	because,	as	Christ	notes,	“Women	
have	 been	 the	 scapegoats	 in	 much	 traditional	 thinking	 about	 change	 and	 the	 body”	
(2003,	 48),	 with	 women’s	 bodies	 becoming	 the	 location	 of	 the	 vilification	 of	 the	
material.		In	such	a	construction,	God’s	knowledge	of	and	relationships	with	creation	do	
not	 require,	 and	 are	 even	 hindered	 by,	 corporeality	 and	 materiality:	 this	 only	
perpetuates	 the	 idea	 that	 femininity	 is	 incompatible	 with,	 and	 even	 jeopardises	
divinity.			
	
Jantzen	claims	that	such	a	view	is	inconsistent.		She	writes	that	“it	would	be	mistaken	to	
suppose	that	being	disembodied	would	be	complete	freedom	from	limitation”,	as	that	
which	exists	without	a	body	is	unable	to	partake	in	embodied	activities.		An	incorporeal	
being,	Jantzen	argues,	“could	not	climb	trees,	sniff	roses,	or	embrace	friends”	and	such	a	
being	is	therefore,	according	to	Jantzen,	limited	(1984a,	106).	 	Thus,	to	claim	that	God	
can	only	know	all	there	is	to	know	by	existing	without	a	body	is	illogical,	as	embodied	
experience	and	knowledge	remains	exterior	and	unintelligible	to	such	a	being.		To	then	
claim	that	we	can	relate	to	such	a	being	only	compounds	the	problem.		Jantzen	(1984a,	
34)	concurs,	arguing	that:	
the	notion	that	an	invisible	entity,	in	no	way	perceivable	by	the	senses,	is	more	
accessible	to	knowledge	than	a	material	object	of	which	we	can	have	sense	data	
sounds	foreign	to	our	ears.	
	
The	 contention	 made	 here	 is	 that	 bodies	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	
creation,	thus	to	suggest	that	God	is	disembodied	yet	somehow	capable	of	knowing	and	
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relating	to	creation	 is	unfeasible.	 Incorporeality,	 then,	rooted	 in	and	supporting	God’s	
omnipotence	 and	 omniscience,	 is	 exposed	 by	 Jantzen	 as	 inappropriate,	
incomprehensible,	 and	 ultimately	 impossible	 to	 assign	 to	 a	 God	 who	 properly	
appreciates	and	experiences	relationships	with	creation.	
	
Feminist	 theologians	 have	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 traditional	 presentation	 of	 God’s	
omnipotent	 control	 over	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 future	 thwarts	 creaturely	 freedom.		
Indeed,	Carol	Christ	 implies	 that	a	 controlled	 future	 is	 always	an	already	determined	
future.		She	writes	that	“It	makes	sense	to	say	that	God	knows	the	future	only	if	it	is	also	
assumed	 that	 God	 creates	 it	 in	 every	 detail”	 (2003,	 39).	 	 An	 omnipotent	 God	 is	 thus	
always,	 for	 Christ,	 an	 omniscient	 God.	 	 Christ’s	 major	 contention	 with	 this	 is	 that	 it	
ultimately	and	totally	compromises	human	freedom;	she	writes	that	“In	this	case,	there	
is	 again	no	 room	 for	human	 freedom”	 (2003,	39).	 	Grace	 Jantzen	concurs	with	Christ	
and	writes	 that	 a	 future	which	 is	 already	actual	 and	known	 in	God	 “raises	 enormous	
questions	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 genuine	 human	 freedom	 and	 creativity”,	 for	 our	
choices	and	their	results	emerge	as	strictly	predestined	(1984a,	53‐54).			Creativity	and	
novelty	are	understood	by	Jantzen,	then,	to	be	thwarted	by	a	God	who	always	already	
knows	their	inspiration	and	intention.		In	response	to	such	contestations,	Christ	claims	
that	 the	 reality	 and	 necessity	 of	 human	 freedom	 cannot	 but	mean	 that	 the	 future	 is	
unknown	to	God:	“Because	individuals	really	are	free,	the	future	of	the	world	cannot	be	
known,	not	even	by	Goddess/God”	(2003,	195).		Christ	uses	Charles	Hartshorne’s	“zero	
policy”	to	interrogate	divine	power,	deducing	that	if	God	holds	all	power	then	creation	
holds	none	(2013);	similarly,	if	God	holds	all	knowledge	then	creation	holds	none	and,	
accordingly,	creation	thus	has	no	freedom	meaning	that	God	possesses	all	freedom.		In	
order	 for	 creation	 to	 have	 freedom,	 in	 Christ’s	 understanding,	 both	God’s	 power	 and	
knowledge	cannot	be	absolute;	as	such,	God	cannot	feasibly	control	or	know	the	future.		
This	 means	 that	 the	 future	 is	 undetermined;	 hence	 the	 resistance	 amongst	 many	
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feminist	theologians	in	attempting	to	speak	in	any	definite	manner	about	the	nature	of	
the	future.19		
	
Catherine	Keller’s	critique,	as	articulated	in	“Why	Apocalypse,	Now?”	mostly	focuses	on	
the	 suggestion	 that	 eschatology	 offers	 a	 “final	 solution”,	 to	 be	 realised	 by	 God	 alone	
(1992,	187‐8).		Similar	to	Christ,	the	crux	of	Keller’s	critique	rests	on	assumptions	made	
in	the	tradition	pertaining	to	God’s	control	over	the	process	of	actualising	the	eschaton.		
Keller’s	contributions	are	invaluable	to	my	own,	as	will	become	clear;	most	significant	
here,	though,	is	her	book	Apocalypse	Now	and	Then:	A	Feminist	Guide	to	the	End	of	the	
World	 (1996a),	 and	 her	 articles	 “Why	 Apocalypse,	 Now?”	 (1992)	 and	 “Power	 Lines”	
(1995).		In	these	offerings,		Keller	makes	the	connection	between	omnipotence	and	the	
future	more	explicit,	as	she	draws	parallels	between	omnipotence	and	the	reliance	on	
divinely	actuated	final	solutions.		This	is	said	to	be	problematic	for	two	reasons:	God	is	
imaged	as	holding	all	of	the	power	to	effect	the	eschaton,	and	this	power	is	very	often	
framed	as	being	exercised	 in	a	partisan	 fashion.	 	When	God’s	eschatological	power	 is	
framed	as	partisan,	as	favouring	a	select	group	of	people	who	will	ultimately	inherit	the	
Kingdom	or	be	 saved	 in	 the	end,	 then	 the	oppression	of	one	group	by	another,	more	
powerful	 one,	 is	 given	 divine	 credence.	 	 Indeed,	 Keller	 notes	 that	 the	 classical,	
patriarchal	 God	 “carries	 with	 it	 the	 central	 image	 of	 liberation	 as	 something	
accomplished	by	a	 ‘Holy	Warrior’”	who	ultimately	separates	the	evil	 from	the	good	in	
the	“endtime	mythos	of	the	final	solution”	(1992,	187‐8).		Grace	Jantzen	adds	weight	to	
this	critique,	noting	that	“in	the	century	[of]	Auschwitz	we	should	in	any	case	view	the	
very	 idea	 of	 ‘final	 solutions’	with	 grave	 suspicion”	 (1998,	 221).	 	 The	 critique	we	 can	
discern	 from	 these	 perspectives	 is	 that	 the	 eschatological	 separation	 of	 people	 into	
“good”	and	“evil”,	or	“saved”	and	“damned”,	by	the	“Holy	Warrior”	God,	whose	power	
																																																													
19	 Concerns	 surrounding	 freedom	 are	 of	 particular	 import	 for	 feminist	 theologians,	 who	
highlight	the	tradition’s	construction	of	 freedom	as	a	male	prerogative.	 	Such	perspectives	are	
explored	and	responded	to	in	Chapter	Two	of	this	thesis. 
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for	creation	is	partisan	and	is	thus	measured	by	exerting	power	over	another	group	of	
people,	legitimises	the	violent	actions	of	those	who	believe	themselves	to	be	members	
of	 the	 favoured	 group	 against	 those	 constructed	 as	wicked	 and	wanting.	 	Whilst	 one	
group	may	perceive	God’s	power	as	benevolent,	then,	eschatology	is	charged	here	with	
ignoring	the	other	perspective	from	which	such	power	is	experienced	as	oppressive.20			
	
Keller	has	further	noted	that	in	addition	to	traditional	models	of	eschatology	relying	on	
an	 omnipotent	 God,	 such	 a	 God	 actually	 requires	 eschatology.	 	 Charting	 the	
development	of	eschatological	thought,	Keller	notes	that,	 initially,	eschatology	did	not	
refer	 to	 a	 “final	 divine	 intervention”	 but	 rather	 to	 “a	 historical	 transformation,	when	
right	 relations	 reign	 once	 more,	 labor	 is	 not	 exploited,	 and	 people	 ripen	 like	 their	
grapevines”	(1996b,	86).	 	However,	 in	the	books	of	Isaiah	and	Daniel,	Keller	detects	a	
shift	 from	this	“historical	 transformation”	 to	a	 transformation	of	history	wherein	God	
will	fulfil	God’s	promises	by	finally	ending	“history	itself”	(1996b,	86).		Keller	attributes	
this	change	in	thought	to	a	sense	of	disappointment,	which	helps	to	explain	her	critique	
of	omnipotence.		She	argues	that	disappointment	in	God	would	be	perceived	as	a	failure	
of	God	were	God	not	“hedged	around	by	all	sorts	of	untestable	eschatological	promises”	
(1995,	198).	 	By	deferring	 the	 fulfilment	of	God’s	promises	 to	a	 future‐time,	 theology	
has	 “disguised”	 God’s	 failures	 (Keller,	 1995,	 190)	 by	 appealing	 to	 a	 divine	 plan	 or	
intention	which	will	finally	overcome	all	pain	and	suffering.	 	Theology	is	thus	accused	
of	 moulding	 eschatology	 into	 a	 panic‐room	 for	 God,	 so	 that	 when	 God	 does	 not	 act,	
when	God’s	power	is	seemingly	absent,	God	is	protected.		Carol	Christ	supports	Keller’s	
case,	writing	that	“Any	God	who	could	have	stopped	the	holocaust	should	have	done	it”	
(2003,	97).	 	A	God	who	holds	the	power	to	realise	the	eschatological	cessation	of	pain	
																																																													
20	 In	 light	 of	 these	 critiques,	 it	 would	 seem	 feasible	 for	 feminist	 theologians	 to	 favour	 more	
egalitarian	models	of	 the	 future;	universal	 salvation,	 for	 instance.	 	However,	problems	remain	
with	 these	 models,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 framings	 of	 divine	 power	 and	 human	
responsibility.		Nevertheless,	I	detect	in	them	beneficial	elements	that	are	capable	of	responding	
to	the	problems	noted	here,	and	so	I	thoroughly	assess	them	in	Chapter	Two	of	this	thesis. 
 
 
~	49	~	
 
and	suffering,	but	does	not	fully	exercise	this	power	now,	is	stripped	of	eschatological	
protection	by	Christ	and	Keller	and	exposed	as	one	who	either	controls	the	process	but	
does	 not	 care	 for	 creation,	 or	 who	 does	 care	 for	 creation	 but	 does	 not	 control	 the	
process.		Keller	and	Christ	favour	the	latter	response,	as	will	be	outlined	shortly.		Given	
the	problems	noted	with	eschatology	thus	far,	a	 trend	is	clearly	beginning	to	emerge:	
feminist	theologians	are	evidently	suspicious	about	the	eschaton	and	prefer	instead	to	
attend	 to	 the	 concerns	 and	needs	 of	 present	 life	 (a	 perspective	 that	will	 be	 explored	
later	in	this	chapter).	 	In	short,	it	seems	that	a	God	who	has	power	over	suffering	and	
death	should	exercise	that	power	now	and	not	only,	or	only	fully,	in	the	eschatological	
future.21			
	
In	addition	to	these	problematic	models	of	God	depicted	by	the	eschatological	process,	
Keller	also	detects	further	problems	for	creation.		The	notion	of	a	God	who	assures	final	
solutions	promotes,	Keller	argues,	a	 twofold	submission	and	subscription	 to	systemic	
oppression.		She	writes	that	“To	leave	the	future	to	God	means	in	fact	to	leave	it	to	the	
overpowering	 systemic	 forces”	 (1992,	 193),	 for	 it	 inspires	 only	 complacency	 and	
reticence	 in	 the	 face	of	oppressive	powers.	 	 If	 the	process	of	realising	the	eschaton	 is	
under	the	control	of	God	alone	then	we	have	no	choice	but	to	“leave	it	to	God”	for	we	
hold	no	power	to	realise	that	future	ourselves.		Any	power	we	do	exercise	must	either	
be	subordinated	to	God’s	intentions	or	ineffective	in	thwarting	them.		In	this	model	of	
eschatology,	 creation	 is	 necessarily	 constructed	 as	 inescapably	 dependent	 on	 God.		
These	 are	 particularly	 gendered	 concerns,	 as	 Keller	 notes	 that	 “Patriarchal	 power	
apotheosizes	 itself	 primordially	 in	 its	 construction	 of	 divine	 power”	 (1995,	 193).		
Models	of	divine	power	 that	 rest	on	divine	 independence	and	dominance	 thus	 justify	
and	 glorify	 the	 same	 pursuits	 of	 power	 in	 patriarchy,	 and	 add	 further	 credence	 to	 a	
construction	and	promotion	of	women	as	passive	and	dependent.			
																																																													
21	In	attempting	to	construct	an	alternative	model	of	the	eschatological	process,	then,	part	of	my	
task	will	be	to	reconcile	an	eschatological	God	with	a	loving	God. 
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Problem:	Eschatology	is	Realised	by	God	through	Jesus	
Rita	Nakashima	Brock’s	explorations	 in	 Journeys	by	Heart	(1995),	alongside	her	work	
with	 Rebecca	 Ann	 Parker	 in	 Saving	 Paradise	 (2008),	 provide	 lucid	 and	 extensive	
contributions	to	this	discussion.		Brock	and	Parker	observe	how	constructions	of	divine	
power	 validated	 historical	 and	 violent	 pursuits	 of	 a	 utopic	 paradise,	 and	 they	 make	
reference	 to	 such	 sentiments	 and	 actions	 in	 the	 Pilgrim’s	 notions	 of	 the	 New	World	
(2008,	340).		Keller	similarly	notes	Columbus’s	documentation	of	his	conquests	and	his	
inference	 to	 their	 divine	 sanctification	 and	 revelation	 (1996a,	 159‐160).	 	 These	
allusions	 to	 divine	 sanctification	 of	 violent	 conquests	 benefit	 from	 a	 model	 of	 God	
whose	 power	 operates	 in	 a	 violent,	 conquering	manner.	 	 Furthermore,	 these	 actions	
appear	to	depict	the	eschatological	process,	that	is,	the	realisation	of	paradise,	utopia,	
or	apocalypse,	as	being	achieved	through	these	violent	and	conquering	actions.		In	light	
of	 this,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	divine	possession	of	 ultimate	power	 also	 condones,	 if	 not	
encourages,	 the	 possession	 of	 people,	 and	more	 specifically	 those	 defined	 as	 “other”	
who,	 most	 consistently,	 are	 women.	 	 Brock	 detects	 such	 actions	 of	 overpowering	 in	
traditional	constructions	of	salvation	and	atonement.	 	Jesus,	Brock	observes,	was	seen	
to	have	“faced	his	enemies	alone”	 in	a	battle	of	 independent	powers,	with	God’s	 total	
and	final	power	ultimately	conquering	“sin	and	death”	(1995,	91).		Traditional	models	
of	 salvation	 and	 atonement,	 in	 Brock’s	 understanding,	 thus	 emphasise	 unilateral	 and	
paternalistic	power.		
	
Grace	 Jantzen	 agrees	 that	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 has	 presented	 Jesus	 as	 a	 figure	 of	
heroism	 (1998,	 160).	 	 This	 is	 identified	 as	 a	 problematic	 construction	 for	 numerous	
reasons	by	a	number	of	feminist	theologians.		Similar	to	the	critiques	posed	in	relation	
to	 the	 independence	 and	 dominance	 of	 God	 in	 actuating	 the	 eschaton,	 objection	 is	
raised	to	the	presentation	of	Jesus	as	the	one	protagonist	in	realising	salvation.		Jantzen	
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further	explains	that	“Once	again,	the	picture	of	a	heroic	figure	swooping	in	to	rescue	
the	damsel	in	distress	is	all	too	reminiscent	of	familiar	male	fantasies”	(1998,	163).		So	
not	only	do	feminist	theologians	assert	that	the	tradition	presents	Jesus	as	independent	
in	 his	 salvific	 action,	 but	 they	 also	 claim	 that	 this	 action	 is	 deemed	 to	 hinge	 on	 his	
incarnation	 as	 a	 male‐hero.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 heroic	 male	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 rescuing	 a	
passive	and	patient	female	victim.			
	
Susan	Faludi	helps	us	to	place	these	considerations	into	present‐day	events.		Her	book,	
The	 Terror	 Dream:	 Fear	 and	 Fantasy	 in	 Post‐9/11	 America	 (2008)	 assesses	 various	
depictions	of	women	as	passive	and	submissive	victims.	 	She	notes	the	persistence	of	
such	 thought	 in	 popular	media	 and	 current	 events	 by	 explaining	 the	 “rescue	 drama”	
evident	 in	 reports	 concerning	 the	events	of	 September	11th	2001.	 	 She	notes	 that	 the	
predominant	narrative	circulating	at	 the	time	was	one	that	wanted	women	to	remain	
victims	in	order	to	reinforce	notions	of	the	ideal	masculine	saviour	(2008,	177;	cf.	44).		
This	narrative	was	present	in	stories	such	as	those	concerning	Private	Jessica	Lynch,	a	
soldier	 captured	 in	 Iraq	 who	 performed	 heroic	 feats	 but	 whose	 heroism,	 Faludi	
observes,	“fell	uncomfortably	outside	of	the	girl‐in‐need‐of‐rescue	script”	(2008,	174).		
Hence	 the	ensuing	misrepresentation	of	Lynch	not	as	a	 soldier	and	certainly	not	as	a	
hero	herself,	but	rather	as	“Precious	Little	 Jessi”:	 “a	helpless	white	girl	snatched	from	
the	 jaws	 of	 evil	 by	 heroic	 soldiers”	 (2008,	 166).	 	 Such	 emphasis	 on	 rescue	 and	
victimisation,	 Faludi	 argues,	 runs	 the	 risk	of	 emphasising	 the	 victorious	 and	glorious	
rescue	by	demanding	that	“women	be	saved	from	more	and	more	gruesome	violation	
to	 prove	 their	 saviour’s	 valor”	 (2008,	 262).	 	 Indeed,	 Lynch	 was	 said	 to	 have	 been	
subjected	 to	 abuse	 even	 from	 the	 hospital	 workers	 who,	 Lynch	 later	 revealed,	 were	
“wonderful”	and	attentive	in	their	care	of	her	(Faludi,	2008,	171).	 	These	perspectives	
imply	 that	 the	 “rescue”	motif	 not	 only	perpetuates	patriarchal	 notions	of	 a	 powerful,	
male	 hero	 but	 that	 it	 also	 posits	 women	 as	 passive	 and	 patient	 victims	 whose	
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victimhood	 may	 be	 intensified	 by	 increasing	 levels	 of	 violation,	 and	 vilification	 of	
others,	in	order	to	exaggerate	the	man’s	heroism.			
	
Rosemary	 Radford	 Ruether	 presents	 further	 concerns	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 unique	
male	saviour.		Echoing	Daly	and	her	argument	that	“when	God	is	male,	the	male	is	God”	
(Daly,	 1973,	 19),	 Ruether	 expounds	Aquinas’	 view	 that	women	 cannot	 represent	 the	
full	 imago	 Dei	 (Aquinas,	 1948,	 472;	 Ruether,	 1998b,	 84),	 noting	 that	 such	 an	
understanding	implies	that	“Just	as	Christ	had	to	be	incarnated	in	the	male,	so	only	the	
male	can	represent	Christ”	(Ruether,	2002,	106).			When	Jesus’	maleness	is	understood	
in	such	a	way,	maleness	in	general	is	elevated	to	a	level	of	superiority	over	femaleness.		
As	 Daly	 observes,	 “The	 idea	 of	 a	 unique	 male	 saviour	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 more	
legitimation	of	male	superiority”	(1973,	71).		Imaging	Jesus	as	uniquely	and	essentially	
male	in	his	salvific	role,	it	is	argued,	suggests	that	the	male	body	is	the	only	one	worthy	
and	able	to	both	receive	God	incarnate	and	to	reflect	the	image	of	God	(cf.	Brock,	1995,	
56).	 	 The	male	 is	 thus	made	 the	 sole	possessor	of	 the	power	 to	 realise	 the	 eschaton.		
This	 produces	 a	 dualistic	 system	 in	 which	 maleness	 is	 aligned	 with	 action	 and	
femaleness	with	passivity.		The	eschatological	reliance	on	the	salvific	actions	of	Jesus	is	
understood	by	feminist	theologians	to	compound	such	dualisms.	
	
Depictions	of	 Jesus	as	the	sole	actor	 in	the	realisation	of	the	eschatological	process	of	
salvation	are	further	problematised	by	considerations	of	what	effects	this	process.		This	
area	 of	 discussion	 has	 benefited	 from	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 attention	 in	 the	 feminist	
theological	sphere.		Brock’s	contribution	is	again	indispensible	here;	she	argues	that	the	
images	of	God	and	Jesus	that	traditional	models	of	atonement	present	are	grounded	in,	
and	therefore	justify,	abusive	structures.		She	draws	parallels	between	the	omnipotent	
father	and	 the	suffering	son,	and	 the	“fusion”	 that	she	detects	 in	abusive	parent‐child	
relationships	(1995,	56).			Jesus’s	heroism	is	thus	précised	by	his	submissive	suffering;	
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the	former	depicted	as	being	enabled	by	an	omnipotent	God,	the	latter	as	required	by	
such	a	God.		According	to	Brock,	dependence		both	on	a	God	who	exercises	more	power	
than	us	and	on	a	 Jesus	who	experiences	more	suffering	than	us	ultimately	diminishes	
our	 own	 power	 and	 frames	 our	 own	 suffering	 as	 insignificant	 (1995,	 56).	 	 	 This	 is	
symptomatic	of	Christianity	 in	general,	Brock	contends,	which	has	upheld	patriarchal	
familial	structures	and	in	so	doing	“has	ignored	the	suffering	of	women	and	children	in	
its	very	center”	(1995,	3).	 	When	the	process	of	eschatology	hinges	on	Jesus’	suffering	
and	subsequent	heroic	victory,	both	in	the	service	of	an	omnipotent	God,	then	our	own	
experiences	 of	 suffering,	 along	 with	 our	 power	 to	 challenge	 these	 sufferings,	 are	
understood	to	be	lessened.			
	
Indeed,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 if	 Jesus’	 self‐sacrificial,	 obedient,	 and	 submissive	 death	 is	
understood	 to	 be	 integral	 to	 salvation	 then	 such	 “qualities”	 are	 glorified	 and	
recommended.	 	 Brock	 and	 Parker	 note	 such	 sentiments	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Bernard	 of	
Clairvaux	who,	they	claim,	thought	“killing,	dying,	and	suffering	were	spiritual	modes	of	
communion	 with	 Jesus”	 (2008,	 287).	 	 This	 is	 further	 problematised	 by	 feminist	
readings	 of	 the	 tradition	 as	 inferring	 that	 submission	 to	 this	 “killing,	 dying,	 and	
suffering”	 was	 the	 appropriate	 posture	 of	 women.	 	 Alongside	 her	 work	 with	 Brock,	
Rebecca	 Ann	 Parker	 has	 joined	 with	 Joanne	 Carlson	 Brown	 to	 elucidate	 this	 matter	
further.	 	 Their	 article,	 “For	 God	 So	 Loved	 the	 World?”	 (1989),	 provides	 a	
comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 the	 numerous	 problems	 with	 traditional	 atonement	
theologies.		They	surmise	that	women	have,	in	both	church	and	society,	“been	assigned	
the	 suffering‐servant	 role”	 which	 is	 made	 all	 the	 more	 dangerous	 by	 its	 parallel	
assignation	 to	 Jesus	and	 the	supposed	redemptive	nature	of	his	 submissive	suffering.		
They	 deduce	 that	 “if	 we	 define	 an	 instance	 of	 suffering	 as	 positive	 or	 necessary	 for	
salvation,	 we	 are	 persuaded	 to	 endure	 it”	 (1989).	 	 Locating	 salvation	 in	 the	 atoning	
death	of	 Jesus,	 then,	 for	Brown	and	Parker,	 advocates	a	model	of	 suffering	as	 salvific	
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that	is	a	particular	concern	for	feminist	theologians	given	the	identification	of	women	
as	 the	 “suffering‐servant”.	 	 Ruether	 (1998c,	 61)	 substantiates	 such	 observations	 and	
writes:	
Salvation	 does	 not	 liberate	women	 from	male	 domination	 here	 on	 earth,	 but	
teaches	 them	 to	 redouble	 their	 submission	 to	 their	 earthly	 lords	 […]	 to	
anticipate	that	heavenly	state	in	which	redeeming	grace	empowers	us	to	submit	
our	wills	to	the	will	of	God.		Before	God	all	Christians	are	as	women.	
	
Ruether’s	contention	is	that	the	ideal	Christian	is	imaged	as	being	submissive,	and	this	
is	often	associated	with	femininity.		From	this	it	is	inferred	that	repression	of	oneself	is	
integral	 to	 heavenly	 existence;	 in	 assessing	 thoughts	 concerning	 the	 content	 of	 the	
eschaton,	 we	 will	 see	 that	 this	 is	 a	 recurrent	 theme	 in	 the	 discussion.	 	 Such	 a	
perspective	potentially	provides	divine	justification	for	earthly	relations	characterised	
by	 structures	 of	 domination	 and	 oppression,	 because	 it	 imbues	 suffering	 and	
submission	with	redemptive	power	thus	suggesting	that	punishment	and	violence	are	
sanctioned,	 even	demanded,	by	God.	 	 Indeed,	when	one	 considers	 this	 sanctioning	of	
submission	 alongside	 Ray’s	 observation	 that	 women	 are	 so	 often	 the	 victims	 of	
oppression	 and	 abuse	 (1998,	 58),	 the	 dangers	 of	 promoting	 submission	 and	 self‐
sacrifice	are	amplified.			
	
Althaus‐Reid	and	Isherwood	(2007,	91)	offer	yet	more	support	for	perspectives	such	as	
Brown	 and	 Parker’s,	 even	 advancing	 their	 case	 by	 being	 explicit	 about	 the	 specific	
dangers	of	atonement	theologies	for	women.		They	observe	that:	
By	 ritualizing	 the	 suffering	 and	 death	 of	 Jesus	 into	 a	 salvific	 act	 Christian	
theology	 has	 disempowered	 the	 oppressed	 and	 abused	 and	 therefore	
encourages	the	cycle	of	abuse.		It	appears	that	while	we	continue	to	think	of	the	
death	 of	 Jesus	 as	 salvific	 by	 its	 very	 nature,	 instead	 of	 an	 outrageous	 act	 of	
public	torture	and	social	control,	we	put	the	lives	of	women	at	risk.	
	
Again,	Brock	offers	confirmation	of	such	a	perspective	by	claiming	that	Jesus’	death	and	
resurrection	 was	 depoliticised	 and	 made	 spiritual:	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 “battle”	 being	
between	 unilateral	 powers,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	 this	 “battle”	 is	 consigned	 to	 a	 spiritual	
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realm.		As	such,	action	against	oppression	is	dislocated	to	another	realm.22		It	is	for	this	
reason	that	Brock	writes,	“Only	a	transcendent	deity	can	save	us,	for	all	human	power	
has	 failed”	 (1995,	91).	 	Given	 the	 feminist	 theological	critiques	of	presentations	of	an	
omnipotent	God	 thus	 far	 explored,	 it	 seems	human	power	was	destined	 to	 fail.	 	 This	
leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	death	of	 Jesus	and	its	ensuing	model	of	heroic	rescue	
cannot	 be	 upheld	 as	 the	 method	 of	 actuating	 either	 salvation,	 atonement,	 or	 the	
eschatological	 future.	 	 Feminist	 theologians	 have	 highlighted	 that	 this	 not	 only	
diminishes	the	horrific	nature	of	Jesus’	own	death,	but	that	it	also	holds	the	potential	to	
oppress	 and	 disempower	 women	 on	 account	 of	 the	 feminisation	 of	 submissive	
suffering	and	the	spiritualisation	of	a	transcendent,	omnipotent	deity.	
	
In	 light	 of	 such	 critiques,	 it	 seems	 legitimate	 for	 feminist	 theologians	 to	 question	
whether	a	unique,	male,	heroic	 Jesus	should	have	any	place	 in	 theology.	 	Ruether,	 for	
example,	questions	whether	a	male	saviour	can	save	women	(1998b,	81).		Ruether	asks	
this	 in	 response	 to	 the	 argument	 proposed	 by	 Gregory	 of	 Nazianzus,	 who	 although	
arguing	 for	 the	humanity	 (as	opposed	 to	masculinity)	of	 Jesus	asserts	 that	 “what	has	
not	 been	 assumed	has	 not	 been	healed”	 (as	 cited	 by	Carbine,	 2006,	 91),	 and	 as	 such	
highlights	by	default	the	problems	with	positing	a	male	saviour	as	the	saviour	of	both	
men	and	women.		Lisa	Isherwood	in	her	book	Introducing	Feminist	Christologies	further	
explains	the	consequence	of	such	thinking,	noting	that	“If	Christ	could	not	experience	
being	 female,	 then	 the	 question	was	 raised	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 female	 state	 could	 be	
redeemed”	 (2001,	 15).	 	 If	 Jesus	 only	 assumed	 maleness,	 and	 only	 saved	 what	 he	
assumed,	 then	Ruether	 and	 Isherwood	 are	 right	 to	 question	 how	 and	where	women	
figure	in	such	an	understanding	of	salvation.			
	
																																																													
22	The	nature	of	this	“realm”	and	its	location	in	the	future	are	concepts	that	will	thoroughly	be	
addressed	later	in	this	chapter. 
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Recalling	 the	work	of	Mary	Daly,	we	can	see	 that	 she	has	provided	perhaps	 the	most	
radical	challenge	to	this	formulation	of	Jesus,	rejecting	as	she	does	the	maleness	of	God	
that	 is	 made	 manifest	 in	 Jesus	 and	 perpetuated	 by	 patriarchal	 theology.	 	 Daly	
problematises	 the	 particularity	 of	 Jesus,	 questioning	what	meaning	 passages	 such	 as	
Galatians	3.28	 can	 truly	have:	 if	 all	 are	made	 “one	 in	Christ	 Jesus”,	 but	 Jesus	 is	male,	
then	this	oneness,	Daly	suggests,	is	in	fact	maleness	(1973,	5).		The	problem	arises,	for	
Daly,	 when	 the	 particular	 (male)	 person	 of	 Jesus	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 imbued	 with	
divine	power	to	save	both	male	and	female.	 	Again,	this	hints	at	the	superiority	of	the	
male	over	 the	 female	whilst	also	suggesting	that	 inclusivity	may	 in	 fact	be	a	guise	 for	
androcentrism	by	way	 of	 including	 or	 transforming	 all	 of	 creation	 into	 that	which	 is	
male.23	 	 Daphne	 Hampson,	 in	 her	 book	 Christian	 Contradictions:	 The	 Structures	 of	
Lutheran	and	Catholic	Thought,	adds	further	justification	to	the	rejection	of	Jesus	as	the	
one‐time	 unique	 saviour	 of	 humankind.	 	 She	 attributes	 her	 rejection	 to	 post‐
Enlightenment	thinking,	claiming	that	advances	in	knowledge	render	such	particularity	
“untenable”	(2001,	289).		She	goes	on	to	argue	that	living	in	a	globalised,	multicultural	
world	renders	Christ’s	salvific	uniqueness	“impossible”	(2001,	292).	 	So	for	Hampson,	
belief	in	Jesus’	particularity	is	epistemologically	untenable	and	culturally	unimaginable.		
Moreover,	 she	 deems	 the	 particularity	 of	 Jesus	 to	 be	 inseparable	 from	 Christianity	
(2001,	292),	and	yet	 if	 this	particularity	 is	as	 irreversibly	problematic	as	Daly	 insists,	
then	not	only	is	the	meaning	of	Jesus	for	women	questioned,	but	so	too	is	Christianity	in	
its	entirety.			
	
																																																													
23	This	will	resurface	in	the	suggestion	(to	be	developed	later	in	this	chapter)	that	an	incorporeal	
heavenly	existence	is	far	from	an	egalitarian	existence,	and	potentially	only	validates	that	which	
is	associated	with	the	male.		Such	a	critique	of	inclusivity	will	also	be	an	important	consideration	
for	my	thesis,	as	I	intend	to	respond	to	the	oppressive	constructions	of	the	eschatological	future,	
and	 indeed	 of	 salvation,	 that	 have	 been	 noted	 here	 by	 exploring	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
construct	a	feminist	eschatology	that	benefits	from	the	inclusive	model	of	universal	salvation,	or	
whether	 such	 inclusivity	 necessarily	 leads	 to	 homogenising,	 even	masculinising,	 existences	 in	
the	way	suggested	by	Daly. 
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Still	 more	 problems	 with	 traditional	 understandings	 of	 salvation	 are	 presented	 by	
womanist	 theologians.	 	 Of	 primary	 concern	 here	 is	 the	 notion	 that	 Jesus	 actualises	
salvation	 on	 behalf	 of	 humanity.	 	 Afforded	 particular	 attention	 here	 is	 the	
substitutionary	 theory	 of	 atonement	 which	 envisions	 Jesus	 as	 taking	 a	 punishment	
upon	 himself	 that	 rightly	 belongs	 to	 humanity.	 	 Delores	Williams’s	 text	 Sisters	 in	 the	
Wilderness:	The	Challenge	of	Womanist	God‐Talk	(1993)	is	crucial	here.		Williams	brings	
to	light	the	experiences	and	perspectives	of	some	African‐American	women,	and	draws	
parallels	between	 concepts	of	 substitutionary	atonement	 and	 some	African‐American	
women’s	experiences	of	 forced	surrogacy.	 	She	notes	 that	 for	many	African‐American	
women	 the	 experience	 of	 surrogacy	was	 one	 in	which	 “slave	women	were	 forced	 to	
stand	 in	 place	 of	 white	 women	 and	 provide	 sexual	 pleasure	 for	 white	 male	 slave	
owners”	 (Williams,	 1993,	 67).	 	 These	 African‐American	 women,	 then,	 were	 made	
substitutes	for	white	women	just	as	Jesus,	in	substitutionary	models	of	atonement,	was	
given	as	a	substitute	for	humanity.24		As	such,	Williams’s	contention	is	that	this	image	of	
Jesus	is	far	from	salvific	and	instead	potentially	justifies	such	abuse	of	women.		In	light	
of	 this,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 any	 model	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process	 understood	 as	
atonement,	 here	 framed	 as	 the	 substitutionary	 necessity	 of	 Jesus’	 death,	 offers	
justification	 for	 the	 particular	 oppression	 experienced	 by	 some	 African‐American	
women.	
	
Throughout	 this	 assessment,	 inference	 has	 been	 made	 to	 feminist	 perspectives	 that	
critique	the	framing	of	divine	power	as	a	power	which	overcomes	sin	and	death.		This	
signifies	 an	 aspect	 of	 feminist	 receptions	 of	 traditional	 constructions	 of	 the	
eschatological	 process	 which	 lead	 into	 later	 engagements	 with	 constructions	 of	 the	
content	 of	 eschatology,	 though	 a	 brief	 exploration	 is	 also	 relevant	 here.	 Brock	
																																																													
24	Womanist	perspectives,	along	with	other	liberation	perspectives	from	women,	such	as	those	
from	mujerista	theologians,	are	also	crucial	in	thinking	about	the	time	of	the	eschaton,	thus	they	
will	be	thoroughly	engaged	with	and	explored	later	in	this	chapter. 
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challenges	the	very	features	of	life	that	Jesus	is	purported	to	overcome;	namely,	sin	and	
death.	 	She	writes	 that	“The	death	of	 Jesus	becomes	a	way	to	 life	 that	 transcends	our	
maternal	birth	by	rebirth	through	the	father’s	grace”	(1995,	90).		The	salvific	process	is	
here	understood	to	be	one	which	remedies	the	material	and	maternal	birth	through	the	
spiritual	 and	 paternal	 death	 and	 re‐birth	 of	 Jesus.	 	 Mary	 Daly	 offers	 a	 similar	 view,	
arguing	that	such	an	understanding	of	eternal	 life,	when	coupled	with	 the	patriarchal	
insistence	on	God	being	named	as	“father”	(1973,	13),	suggests	an	exit	from	the	mother	
and	a	return	to	the	father	(1973,	24).		This	infers	that	the	power	of	birthing	that	some	
women	experience	 is	usurped	by	humanity’s	protological	origin	 in	and	eschatological	
destination	to	God	as	male	and	father	(cf.	Zappone,	1991,	125;	Samuelsson,	2009,	76).		
Still,	 Jantzen	 again	 provides	 the	most	 insightful	 voice	 in	 the	 discussion;	 she	 explains	
that	 “It	 is	 only	 by	 this	 rebirth,	which	 redoes	 or	 undoes	 the	maternal	 birth,	 that	 it	 is	
possible	to	be	a	 ‘child	of	God,’	to	become	divine”	(1998,	143).	 	Jantzen	here	highlights	
how	the	notion	of	being	“born	again”	has	the	potential	to	continue	the	appropriation	of	
maternal	 birth	 by	 suggesting	 again	 that	 one	must	 partake	 in	 a	 process	 of	 departure	
from	one’s	origins	in	a	female	body	to	a	recreation	in	the	salvific	male	body	of	Jesus.			
	
Jantzen	 further	 suggests	 that	 the	 emphasis	 that	 is	 placed	 on	 Jesus	 conquering	 death	
perpetuates	 the	 historically	 male	 experience	 of	 mastering	 death.	 	 She	 expounds	 the	
dangers	of	this	for	women,	noting	that	if	 fear	of	or	fascination	with	death	leads	to	the	
desire	to	master	it	then	it	will	also	lead	to	the	desire	to	master	all	that	it	believes	to	be	
reminders	of	death:	“women,	bodiliness,	and	the	earth	to	which	we	all	return”	(Jantzen,	
1998,	 131).	 	 Graham	 observes	 that	 such	 an	 imaginary	 “valorizes	 invulnerability,	
detachment,	 disembodied	 reason	 and	 longs	 for	 immortality”	 (2009a,	 5)	 and,	 as	 Sjoo	
(1992,	12)	further	explains:	
Men	 who	 see	 birth	 as	 an	 obscenity	 and	 loathe	 having	 been	 born	 of	 a	 mere	
mortal	woman,	and	therefore	become	subject	to	illness,	old	age	and	death,	also	
see	death	as	an	enemy	to	be	overcome.	
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Sjoo,	 then,	 links	birth	with	death	 in	 such	a	way	 that	exposes	 the	patriarchal	 fear	and	
hatred	of	both.		Jantzen	too	suggests	that	the	association	of	women	with	life	is	used	to	
similarly	 associate	 her	with	 death.	 	 She	notes	 that	 such	 attitudes	may	 also	 provide	 a	
justification	for	acts	of	dominance	(1998,	132):	if	women’s	changing	bodies	are	deemed	
to	 emphasise	 or	 remind	 one	 of	 finitude	 and	 temporality,	 and	 patriarchal	 theology	
desires	to	overcome	that	which	 is	 finite	and	temporal,	 then	the	dangers	of	 traditional	
understandings	 of	 eschatology	 for	 women	 are	 obvious.	 	 Understanding	 the	
eschatological	process	as	one	of	salvation	from	sin	and	death	thus	inherits	problematic	
allusions	to	the	divine	overpowering	and	conquest	of	women’s	bodies.25			
	
A	further	critique	related	to	divine	omnipotence	is	nestled	within	the	critiques	already	
noted;	 namely,	 that	 the	 eschatological	 process	 is	 one	 that	 is	 already	 known	 to	 God.		
Whether	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 already	 created	 utopia	 or	 an	 already	 completed	
salvation,	the	future’s	“alreadyness”	necessarily	implies	that	it	is	fully	determined,	and	
therefore	fully	known	by	God.		The	powers	to	create	and	to	know	have	been	shown	to	
be	 rooted	 in	 models	 of	 divine	 incorporeality,	 which	 have	 been	 understood	 to	 be	
concomitant	 with	 depictions	 of	 God	 as	 impassible	 and	 immutable.	 	 Each	 of	 these	
definitions	has	been	challenged	by	the	feminist	theologians	noted,	primarily	on	account	
of	their	diminution	of	freedom	and	relationality.		Accordingly,	these	latter	two	features	
emerge	as	integral	aspects	of	feminist	responses	and	reconstructions.	
	
Feminist	Response:	Divine	Power	is	Involved	and	Intimate	
Quite	 appropriately,	 the	 feminist	 theologians	who	were	 identified	 above	 as	 exposing	
the	problems	with	 the	eschatological	 framing	of	God’s	omnipotence	are	also	 the	ones	
who	offer	responses	and	reconstructions	of	God.		In	short,	emphasis	is	placed	on	God’s	
																																																													
25	This	is	not	to	say	that	any	reference	to	the	overcoming	of	sin	and	death	is	impossible.		As	will	
be	explored	shortly,	womanist	theologians	offer	an	alternative	perspective.	 	What	is	clear	thus	
far,	 however,	 is	 that	 any	 rethinking	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process	 must	 not	 uphold	 the	
patriarchal	unification	and	vilification	of	women’s	bodies	and	finite	creation.			 
 
 
~	60	~	
 
intimate	 involvement	 in	 the	world.	 	 	 For	Christ,	Keller,	 and	 Jantzen	 there	 is	 a	 shared	
emphasis	on	God’s	presence	to	created	beings.		Brock	adds	another	dimension	to	these	
contributions	 by	 locating	 God’s	 power	 in	 community.	 	 Other	 voices	 also	 emerge	 as	
beneficial	 here:	 Mary	 Grey	 and	 Rosemary	 Radford	 Ruether,	 for	 instance,	 who	 both	
emphasise	 creaturely	 responsibility;	 and	 Sallie	 McFague	 who,	 along	 with	 Jantzen,	
presents	a	model	of	the	world	as	God’s	body.	 	Each	of	these	thinkers	seeks	to	remedy	
traditional	 allusions	 to	 a	 distant	 and	 disaffected	 God	 by	 constructing	 a	 God	 who	
authentically	 relates	 to	 genuinely	 free	 creatures.	 	 Sallie	McFague,	 for	 instance,	 claims	
that	a	relational	God	is	a	thoroughly	theological	concept.		God	as	Trinity,	she	writes,	“is	
about	relationship,	about	God	with	us	 in	every	way,	at	every	 level,	 in	every	moment”	
(2001,	144).		Relationality	then,	for	McFague,	is	a	significant	part	of	the	nature	of	God.		
She	 has	 thus	 sought	 to	 reclaim	 the	 centrality	 of	 relationality,	 and	 elsewhere	 she	
observes	that:	
We	 are	 all,	men	 and	mountains,	 children	 and	 caterpillars,	women	 and	wheat,	
intrinsically,	 internally,	and	thoroughly	relational	 to	the	core.	 	We	humans	are	
not	 solitary	 individuals	 who	 have	 occasional	 relations	 (when	 we	 feel	 like	 it)	
with	other	people,	the	natural	world,	and	God	(1997,	8).	
	
In	 addition	 to	 highlighting	 the	 centrality	 of	 relationality	 in	 God,	 then,	 McFague	 also	
argues	 that	 it	 typifies	creation.	 	 In	concurrence	with	 this,	Marjorie	Suchocki	surmises	
that	relationality	is	“fundamental	to	all	existence”	(1983).		Relationality	is	thus	seen	to	
be	 intrinsic	 to	 both	 God	 and	 creation,	 such	 that	 its	 reclamation	 is	 seen	 to	 provide	 a	
more	 complete	 understanding	 of	 both.	 	 Moreover,	 it	 mitigates	 the	 devaluation	 of	
women,	given	 the	 traditional	 connection	made	between	women	and	relationality	and	
the	trivialisation	of	both.	
	
In	line	with	this,	Carol	Christ	has	based	her	reconfiguring	of	God	on	a	similar	appraisal	
of	 relationality,	 claiming	 that	 “Goddess/God	 is	 the	most	 related	 of	 all	 beings”	 (2003,	
46).	 	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 Christ	 does	 not	 frame	 God’s	 power	 as	 identical	 to	
creaturely	power.	 	 In	positing	Goddess/God	as	 the	“most	related	of	all	beings”,	Christ	
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retains	 some	 level	 of	 distinction	 between	 God	 and	 creation.	 	 That	 God’s	 power	 is	
necessarily	and	unequivocally	relational,	though,	means	that	for	Christ,	this	distinction	
is	not	constructed	on	the	basis	of	God’s	ability	to	fix	or	force	creation	(2003,	52	and	90).		
Rather,	divine	power	is	understood	by	Christ	to	be	manifest	in	divine	presence,	which,	
she	contends,	is	both	persuasive	and	sympathetic.		Christ	writes	that	Goddess/God	has	
the	 power	 to	 transform	 suffering,	 for	 example,	 “through	 understanding	 it	 and	
attempting	 to	 persuade	 the	 individual	 not	 to	 cause	 unnecessary	 suffering	 to	 others”	
(2003,	 134).	 	 Thus	 for	 Christ,	 God’s	 presence	 is	 God’s	 power,	 and	 this	 intimacy	 and	
immediacy	is	capable	of	transforming	suffering	not	through	solving	or	eradicating	it	but	
by	feeling	its	effects	and	coaxing	one	away	from	its	causes.		However,	Brock	(1995,	34),	
with	Keller	in	agreement	(1995,	197)	exposes	a	problem	with	this,	for	she	notes	that:	
Persuasion	 is	 the	 most	 reliable	 form	 of	 power	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	
possessor	because	it	runs	the	least	risk	of	arousing	opposition	from	the	power	
subject.		Nonetheless,	persuasion	still	connotes	possession	of	power	by	an	actor	
who	attempts	to	get	his	or	her	own	way.	
	
Persuasion	thus	appears	to	be	an	unacceptable	framing	of	divine	power	for	it	casts	God	
as	 one	 who	 operates	 through	 manipulation	 and	 deceit	 in	 a	 unilateral	 expression	 of	
control	 and	 oppression.	 	 It	 seems	 that	 Christ	 would	 actually	 also	 reject	 this	
understanding	 of	 divine	 power,	 though,	 for	 in	 a	 recent	 article	 she	 expounds	 and	
concurs	with	Charles	Hartshorne’s	rejection	of	coercion.		She	writes	that	“The	power	of	
a	 relational	 God	 is	 not	 the	 power	 to	 coerce,	 but	 the	 power	 to	 inspire	 or	 persuade	
individuals	 to	 act	 in	 their	 own	 best	 interests	 and	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 other	
individuals	 in	 the	universe”	 (2013).	 	Given	her	 framing	of	divine	power	as	 relational,	
Christ	must,	then,	mean	something	other	than	coercion	in	her	reference	to	persuasion.		
Persuasion	 may,	 for	 Christ,	 mean	 a	 conversational	 negotiation	 in	 which	 the	 divine	
attempts	to	convince	beings‐in‐relation	toward	certain	actions	and	away	from	others.		
This	 is	 a	 power	 which	 operates	 by	 entering	 into	 relationships	 with	 creation,	 not	 to	
determine	their	actions	but	rather	to	influence	and	inspire	them.			
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Christ	makes	it	clear	that	this	should	not,	however,	be	understood	to	pertain	to	divine	
self‐curtailment;	that	is,	the	curtailing	of	a	limitless	power	in	order	to	relate	to	creation.		
Rather,	 she	 suggests	 that	 divine	 power	 is	 actually,	 in	 essence,	 limited	 power	 as	 it	 is	
always	 relational.	 	 Christ	 writes	 that	 “Goddess	 cannot	 be	 omnipotent,	 because	 an	
omnipotent	Goddess	 logically	 cannot	be	 in	 relationship	 to	other	 individuals	who	also	
have	 a	 degree	 of	 freedom	 and	 power”	 (2013).	 	 Thus,	 Christ	 outrightly	 rejects	 any	
allusions	 to	 omnipotence	 in	 God,	 even	 if	 that	 omnipotence	 is	 curtailed	 in	 favour	 of	
relationships.	 	 She	 argues	 that	 omnipotence	 is	 neither	 appropriate	 nor	 possible	 to	
assign	 to	 a	 God	 who	 is	 relational.	 	 Moreover,	 this	 relationality	 does	 not	 need	
omnipotence;	it	is	not	a	relationality	that	seeks	to	do	all	for	or	know	all	about	the	one	to	
whom	 it	 relates.	 	 Rather,	 Christ	 centralises	 presence,	 which	 she	 frames	 as	 divine	
intimacy	 with	 creation.	 	 As	 such,	 Christ	 upholds	 (though	 modifies)	 a	 model	 of	
omnipresence	whilst	rejecting	depictions	of	omnipotence	and	omniscience.26		
	
Many	 feminist	 theologians	 view	 divine	 omnipresence	 as	 being	 indicative	 of	 God’s	
involvement	 in	 and	with	 creation.	 	 As	 noted,	 both	 Grace	 Jantzen	 and	 Sallie	McFague	
offer	a	construction	of	the	world	as	God’s	body	in	order	to	illustrate	this.		In	her	1988	
article	 “The	World	 as	 God’s	 Body”,	 McFague	 presents	 three	 defining	 features	 of	 this	
metaphor:	firstly,	she	claims	that	it	affirms	embodiment,	even	though	God’s	body	is	not	
deemed	to	be	identical	to	ours.		Rather,	she	writes,	“The	world	is	the	bodily	presence,	a	
sacrament	of	the	invisible	God”	(1988,	672).		Presence	is	again	emphasised,	and	this	is	
understood	to	be	mediated	by	and	manifest	in	God’s	incarnation	in	the	world.		This	has	
implications	 for	 how	 divine	 knowledge	 is	 conceived	 of:	 Jantzen	 frames	 divine	
knowledge	 as	 intimate	 understanding	 (1984a,	 83),	 and	 this	 is	 here	 shown	 to	 be	
predicated	 not	 only	 on	 God’s	 presence	 to	 creation,	 but	 on	 a	 specifically	 embodied	
																																																													
26	There	is	yet	more	support	provided	for	a	modification	of	the	doctrine	of	divine	omnipresence	
from	thinkers	such	as	Soskice,	Suchocki,	and	Jantzen.		Each	see	a	model	of	relational	presence	as	
being	capable	of	speaking	more	authentically	and	accurately	about	God.	 	The	views	of	each	of	
these	thinkers	will	be	addressed	more	critically	and	substantially	in	Chapter	Two. 
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presence.	 	 In	 confirmation	 of	 the	 concern	 in	 the	 wider	 feminist	 arena	 to	 affirm	
embodied	experiences	in	epistemology,	as	noted	in	the	Introduction,	God	in	this	model	
emerges	 as	 one	 whose	 epistemology	 hinges	 on	 an	 embodied,	 experiential,	 and	
relational	closeness	to	creation.27			
	
McFague’s	second	definition	 is	concerned	with	 the	practicality	of	salvation;	she	notes	
that	a	God	who	is	embodied	in	the	world	calls	us	to	care	for	both	bodies	and	the	world.		
“Salvation”,	she	claims,	“would	be	a	social,	political	and	economic	matter	and	not	just	a	
matter	 of	 the	 spirit’s	 eternal	 existence”	 (1988,	 672).	 	 God’s	 embodied	 presence	 to	
creation	thus	propagates	a	pragmatic	model	of	salvation,	wherein	creation	is	called	to	
act	responsibly	and	ethically	for	that	body.		This	leads	to	McFague’s	third	point,	which	
emphasises	the	vulnerability	of	God	and	a	degree	of	divine	dependence	on	creation.		In	
being	embodied	in	the	world,	McFague	contends	that	God	is	“at	risk”	insomuch	as	the	
destruction	of	 the	world	at	creation’s	own	hands	 threatens	 to	destroy	God’s	very	self	
(1988,	 672).	 	 Here,	McFague	 echoes	 Jantzen’s	 contention	 that	 the	 annihilation	 of	 the	
world	 is	 synonymous	 with	 God’s	 own	 annihilation	 (1984a,	 143).	 	 Again,	 this	 has	
implications	 for	 constructions	 of	 the	 eschaton	 as	 characterised	 by	 an	 other‐worldly	
existence,	as	will	be	explored	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter.		What	also	seems	to	be	
emphasised	here,	 though,	 is	 the	 framing	of	God	as	one	whose	existence	 in	 the	world,	
indeed	 as	 the	 world,	 depends	 on	 creation	 to	 care	 for	 that	 world	 and	 prevent	 its	
destruction.28			
																																																													
27	 Perhaps	 surprisingly,	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 model,	 like	 the	 traditional	 models,	 again	 raises	
questions	of	human	freedom.		Jantzen	acknowledges	this,	and	concedes	that	“If	the	universe	is	
God’s	body,	and	we	are	parts	of	the	universe	then	we	are	part	of	God’s	body.		But	how	then	can	
we	 still	 be	 ourselves	 –	 persons	 with	 freedom?”	 (1984a,	 150).	 	 Essentially,	 Jantzen	 is	 here	
recognising	 that	 if	 the	 world	 is	 God’s	 self‐expression	 then	 we	 too	 are	 God’s	 self‐expression.		
Moreover,	 our	 seemingly	 free	 self‐expressions	 are	 also	 actually	 only	 God’s	 self‐expressions.		
Jantzen	claims	that	this	may	be	an	unsolvable	problem,	but	that	it	is	not	a	new	problem;	in	short,	
she	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 no	 more	 problematic	 than	 the	 traditional	 models	 that	 were	 previously	
interrogated.		However,	I	will	explore	in	Chapter	Two	whether	a	greater	sense	of	divine‐creation	
distinctiveness	can	be	more	successful	at	overcoming	this	problem.	
28	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	McFague	 does	 not	 deem	 such	 destruction	 or	 annihilation	 to	 be	 an	
actual	possibility	for,	she	contends,	“God	is	not	in	our	power	to	destroy”	(1988,	672).		Jantzen	is	
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Jantzen	and	Keller	both	refer	to	a	process	of	“becoming”	divine	in	order	to	signify	this	
dependence.	 	 Jantzen,	 in	 God’s	World,	 God’s	 Body	 (1984a)	 posits	 “becoming”	 as	 the	
antithesis	 to	 “Being”,	 with	 the	 latter	 being	 paralleled	 with	 divine	 immutability,	
indestructability,	and	immateriality.	 	Being,	then,	she	claims,	“is	immune	not	just	from	
the	ravages	of	 time	but	 from	time	 itself”	 (1984a,	25).	 	Thus,	a	God	who	already	 is	all	
that	 God	 will	 ever	 be,	 rather	 than	 a	 God	 who	 becomes	 what	 God	 will	 be,	 is	 again	
identified	with	patriarchal	 constructions	of	 divine	disassociation	 and	disaffectedness.		
Jantzen’s	later	work,	Becoming	Divine:	Towards	a	Feminist	Philosophy	of	Religion	(1998)	
develops	her	model	of	divine	becoming	which,	in	contrast	to	understandings	of	divine	
Being,	refers	to	a	“feeling	and	responsive”	divine	(Jantzen,	1998,	257).	 	Dependence	is	
thus	 understood	 to	 be,	 in	 fact,	 interdependence,	 such	 that	 the	 process	 of	 becoming	
divine	is	one	of	mutuality	between	creation	and	the	divine.		Keller	elucidates	this,	and	
writes	 that	 “the	 divine	 and	 the	world	 form	 the	 conditions	 of	 each	 other’s	 becoming”	
(2003a,	227).		This	suggests	that	as	we	become	divine,	the	divine	becomes	more	lucid	
and	accessible;	essentially,	more	real.		Jantzen	refers	to	this	as	the	divine	being	brought	
to	life	through	our	efforts	to	become	divine	(1998,	275).		Thus,	the	divine	is	not	a	being	
who	always	already	exists,	but	rather	one	whose	existence	depends	on	our	own.29	
	
																																																																																																																																																																												
helpful	in	elucidating	the	possible	reasoning	behind	McFague’s	response,	as	she	claims	that,	just	
as	human	beings	are	not	fully	definable	or	describable	by	their	physiology,	“neither	would	the	
postulate	 that	 God’s	 body	 is	 the	 universe	 mean	 that	 God	 is	 fully	 describable	 in	 exclusively	
physical	 terms”	(1984a,	127).	 	A	distinction	between	God	and	creation	 is	noted	but	this	 is	not	
elaborated	 on.	 	 Although	 all	 metaphors	 are	 only	 partially	 descriptive,	 as	 McFague	 herself	
acknowledges	(1988,	671),	this	acknowledgement	could	propel	us	to	seek	more	ways	to	specify	
the	nature	of	God	and	the	divine‐creation	relation.		A	rethinking	of	God	and	creation	in	relation	
to	 the	 eschatological	 process	may	 facilitate	 such	 specificity,	 and	 I	will	 explore	 this	 in	Chapter	
Two.			
29	Such	notions	of	a	parallel	actuation	of	divine	and	creaturely	becoming	inform	Chapter	Two	as	
I	seek	to	specify	the	process	of	the	eschaton	as	one	which	frees	both	God	and	creation.		I	divert	
from	 Jantzen	and	Keller,	 though,	 in	claiming	 that	 if	God	 is	 to	be	something	other	 than	a	mere	
projection	 (as	 I	 shortly	 perceive	 these	 perspectives	 to	 claim),	 then	 this	 process	 cannot	 be	 an	
entirely	mutual	process.	 
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Jantzen	 seeks	 to	 specify	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 divine	 becoming	 by	 appealing	 to	 Luce	
Irigaray’s	notion	of	an	aspirational	or	ideal	horizon	of	divinity	(Jantzen,	1998,	12).		Like	
Irigaray,	Jantzen	observes	that	this	horizon	has	been	constructed	solely	on	male	terms	
(1998,	14).	 	 Irigaray	herself	further	infers	that	such	androcentrism	constructs	women	
as	serving	the	self‐love	of	men	(1993a,	63)	or	depending	on	men	for	their	own	self‐love	
(1993a,	 65).30	 	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 divine	 horizon	 on	 solely	male	 terms	 is	 thus,	
again,	 critiqued	 for	 promoting	 a	 feminised	 model	 of	 servitude	 and	 dependence.	 	 In	
response,	 Jantzen	 proposes	 a	 divine	 horizon	 comprised	 of	 “our	 best	 and	 deepest	
aspirations,	so	that	we	are	drawn	forward	to	realize	them”	(1998,	92).		The	focus	here,	
for	 Jantzen,	 is	 on	 reclaiming	 attributes	 that	 have	 been	 abstracted	 from	 divinity,	
primarily	on	account	of	 them	being	associated	with	women	(1998,	91).	 	 Jantzen	 thus	
takes	 the	 model	 of	 the	 world	 as	 God’s	 body	 further	 than	 McFague;	 whereas,	 for	
McFague,	God	depended	on	creation	in	order	to	care	for	the	world,	Jantzen	posits	even	
the	very	existence	of	the	divine	as	being	dependent	on	creation.					
	
This	 remodelling,	whilst	 explicitly	 contradicting	 traditional	models	 of	God,	 ultimately	
appears	to	frame	God	as	little	more	than	an	object	of	self‐projection.		Jantzen’s	earlier	
work	seems	to	retain	more	of	a	distinction	between	God	and	creation	than	in	Becoming	
Divine;	in	God’s	World,	God’s	Body,	Jantzen	claims	that	“God	can	cope	with	more	than	we	
can”	 (1984a,	 84),	 and	 also	 that	 “as	 creator	 and	 sustainer,	 no	 creature	 exists	 or	 has	
autonomy	except	 from	 [God]”	 (1984a,	153).	 	Here,	 it	 seems	 that	 Jantzen	understands	
God	as	the	creator	rather	than	the	creation	of	self‐projection,	as	suggested	in	Becoming	
Divine.				Thus,	Jantzen’s	earlier	work	appears	to	uphold	a	distinction	between	God	and	
creation.		This	is	a	necessary	retention,	for	without	this	distinction	the	destruction	that	
McFague	 and,	 in	 her	 earlier	 work,	 Jantzen,	 posited	 as	 impossible	 becomes	 not	 only	
																																																													
30	Irigaray	here	posits	that	female	self‐love	has	been	made	elusive	by	traditional	constructions	
of	 God.	 	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 examine	 both	 God	 and	 self‐love,	 then.	 	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	
reconstruction	of	God	pursued	in	Chapter	Two	enables	a	rethinking	of	self‐love,	which	will	be	a	
feature	of	Chapter	Four.	 
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possible	 but	 probable.	 	 God	 is	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 do	 anything	 other	 than	 what	 we	
ourselves	are	able	to	do,	and	so	becomes	merely	the	receptacle	for	our	destructive	or	
sustaining	 behaviours;	 suffering	 the	 former	 and	 appreciating	 the	 latter.	 	 	 Moreover,	
whilst	 this	 model’s	 focus	 on	 aspirations	 encourages	 us	 to	 think	 of	 the	 future,	 the	
actualisation	of	this	future	is	ever‐elusive,	as	the	language	of	“horizon”	indeed	implies.			
	
Despite	 these	 challenges,	 the	 remodelling	 of	 God	 as	 embodied	 in	 the	 world	 remains	
beneficial.	 	Not	only	does	 it	 address	 traditional	models	of	God	by	emphasising	divine	
presence	 and	 relationality,	 but	 it	 also	 critiques	 the	 diminution	 of	 creaturely	 freedom	
and	responsibility.	 	This	was	 implied	 in	 the	 third	aspect	of	McFague’s	model,	and	she	
elaborates	 by	 claiming	 that	 “The	 model	 of	 the	 world	 as	 God’s	 body	 encourages	
responsibility	 and	 care	 for	 the	 vulnerable	 and	 oppressed”	 (1988,	 673),	 just	 as	 in	 1	
Corinthians	 12.12‐31	 care	 is	 promoted	 for	 the	 “weaker”,	 “less	 honourable”,	 and	 “less	
respectable”	members	of	the	body.		Indeed,	if	the	world	is	God’s	body	then	all	members	
of	creation	warrant	and	are	worthy	of	care,	especially	the	“vulnerable	and	oppressed”.		
This	 is	 a	valuable	contribution	as	 it	not	only	depicts	God’s	presence	 in	 the	world	but	
also	signifies	divinely‐inspired	action	in	and	responsibility	for	the	world.			
	
Feminist	Response:	Redemption	through	Community	
One	 way	 in	 which	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 sought	 to	 articulate	 creaturely	
responsibility	is	by	reconstructing	redemption.		Traditional	formulations	of	redemption	
carry	many	 of	 the	 same	 problems	 as	 traditional	 understandings	 of	 eschatology,	 and	
Mary	Grey	acknowledges	 that	redemption	has	overtones	of	guilt	and	self‐negation	on	
account	 of	 its	 supposed	explanation	 in	 atonement	doctrines	 (1989,	1).	 	Nevertheless,	
feminist	 theologians	have	sought	 to	 “re‐image”	redemption	and	“redress	 injustices	by	
suggesting	 alternative	 ways	 of	 understanding	 the	 power	 that	 saves	 and	 heals	 us”	
(Goudey,	1990,	673).	 	Grey,	 for	 example,	 claims	 that	 redemption	 can	be	 rethought	 in	
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terms	of	the	goal,	process,	and	method	of	achieving	wholeness	amongst	and	unity	with	
all	of	creation	(1989,	4).31		That	this	is	understood	to	be	a	process	which	includes	and	is	
for	all	of	creation	(as	opposed	to	being	the	one‐time	action	of	God	through	Jesus)	infers	
a	sense	of	community	and	interconnectivity.			
	
Rosemary	 Radford	 Ruether’s	 model	 of	 redemption	 similarly	 emphasises	 community.		
Her	article	“Redemptive	Community	in	Christianity”	claims	that	the	task	of	redemption	
is	to	remove	the	restrictions	of	androcentrism	and	work	toward	a	vision	of	 liberation	
and	 reconciliation	 that	 is	 “extended	 to	 the	 community	of	 created	being	around	us	on	
which	humans	interdepend	for	their	survival”	(1991,	229).	 	Thus,	 for	Ruether,	shared	
responsibility	 and	 interdependence	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 process	 of	 redemption.		
Emphasising	responsibility,	 in	this	understanding,	reclaims	true	community,	 the	basis	
of	which,	Mary	Grey	contends,	is	the	relational	interconnectedness	of	humanity	and	the	
earth	 (1989,	 40).	 	 Moreover,	 Grey	 claims	 that	 both	 humanity	 and	 the	 earth	 share	 a	
hunger	for	redemption	(Grey,	1989,	39)	which	is	constantly	faced	with	the	possibility	of	
fulfilment,	as	“God	is	always	offering	redemptive	possibilities	to	the	world”	(Grey,	1989,	
35).	 	 These	 possibilities,	 according	 to	 Grey,	 are	 only	 realised	 and	made	manifest	 by	
creation’s	 active	 response,	 thus	 again	 signifying	 God’s	 dependence	 on	 creation:	 if	
creation	 fails	 to	 respond,	 the	 possibilities	 for	 redemption	 remain	 only	 possibilities	
(Grey,	1989,	35).		Redemption	in	Grey’s	understanding,	then,	cannot	hinge	on	“waiting	
for	 better	 things	 in	 another	 world,”	 or	 indeed	 from	 another	 world,	 because	 this	
removes	the	need	for	shared	responsibility	for	healing	and	“building	right	relation	here	
and	now”	(Grey,	1989,	89).	 	One	way	 in	which	 feminist	 theologians	have	destabilised	
traditional	understandings	of	redemption,	then,	is	by	prioritising	shared	and	communal	
responsibility.			
	
																																																													
31	 Grey	 incorporates	 an	 ecological	 consciousness	with	her	 understanding	 of	 redemption,	 thus	
she	is	also	beneficial	to	this	chapter’s	later	considerations	of	the	content	of	the	eschaton. 
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Rita	Nakashima	Brock	also	frames	redemptions	in	terms	of	the	concurrent	experience	
of	 community	 and	 interconnectivity.	 	 This	 “reveals	 erotic	 power”	 (1995,	 62)	 which,	
Brock	 claims,	 is	 not	 only	 divine	 but	 is	 the	 very	 “Heart	 of	 the	Universe”	 (1995,	 46).32		
This	 echoes	 readings	 of	 the	 world	 as	 God’s	 body	 and	 adds	 that,	 alongside	
interdependence,	 interconnection	is	not	only	integral	to	God	but	is	 indicative	of	God’s	
power.		Moreover,	that	this	interconnection	is	understood	to	occur	both	within	Godself	
and	 between	 God	 and	 creation	 means	 that	 divine	 power	 is	 here	 framed	 as	 shared	
power,	 as	 previously	 inferred	 by	 Grey.	 	 Power,	 in	 this	 understanding,	 is	 not	 to	 be	
possessed	 and	 used	 but	 rather	 generated	 in	 relationships.	 	 Brock’s	 reading	 of	 the	
haemorrhaging	woman’s	receipt	of	power	in	Mark	5.25‐34,	for	instance,	suggests	that	
she	does	 not	 see	 Jesus	 creating	or	 controlling	 such	power	but	 rather	 as	 sharing	 and,	
indeed,	being	created	by	it	(1995,	52).33		In	line	with	this,	she	claims	that	power	“must	
reside	in	connectedness	and	not	in	single	individuals”	(1995,	52).	 	Mercedes	develops	
this	by	reading	“Christ”	as	“chrism”,	and	explaining	that	“Christ”	refers	to	the	“anointed	
one”	whilst	 “chrism”	 speaks	 of	 the	 “anointing	 process”.	 	 This	 is	 a	 process,	Mercedes	
claims,	 that	 “always	requires	community”	 for	 it	 consists	of	 something	being	 “done	by	
one	to	another”	and,	she	continues,	“the	process	is	ongoing,	never	freezing	static	on	one	
body	 as	 the	 once‐and‐for‐all	 body	 of	 Christ”	 (2014,	 234).	 	 Heyward	 similarly	 frames	
redemptive	power	as	connectedness,	and	infers	that	such	power	is	key	to	realising	not	
only	creaturely	redemption	but	the	very	redemption	of	God	(1989,	18).		This	echoes	the	
earlier	presentations	of	God’s	dependence	on	creation	and	helps	 to	highlight	another	
																																																													
32	Understandings	of	erotic	power	can	assist	us	in	radically	rethinking	the	powers	which	effect	
the	 realisation	of	 the	eschaton,	 and	are	engaged	with	 in	more	depth	 in	Chapter	Two,	where	 I	
rethink	divine	power	in	relationships,	and	Chapter	Four	where	I	consider	how	we	may	embody	
erotic	power	in	our	present	relations. 
33	Brock	is	paying	particular	attention	here	to	Mark	5.27‐30	in	which	the	haemorrhaging	woman	
“had	heard	about	 Jesus,	 and	came	up	behind	him	 in	 the	crowd	and	 touched	his	 cloak,	 for	 she	
said,	‘If	I	but	touch	his	clothes,	I	will	be	made	well.’		Immediately	her	haemorrhage	stopped;	and	
she	felt	in	her	body	that	she	was	healed	of	her	disease.		Immediately	aware	that	power	had	gone	
forth	from	him,	Jesus	turned	about	in	the	crowd	and	said,	‘Who	touched	my	clothes?’”. 
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key	aspect	of	these	remodellings	of	God,	namely	the	rejection	of	any	divinely‐actuated	
finality.		Heyward	(1989,	92)	writes	that:	
We	 do	 not	 move	 toward	 a	 final,	 static,	 resolution	 of	 our	 relational	 fears	 and	
tensions.	 	To	the	contrary,	our	power	draws	us	 into	our	beginnings	–	 into	 the	
heart	of	our	creation/creativity,	into	our	relatedness.	
	
For	 these	 theologians,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 interconnectivity	 and	 interdependence	 in	 the	
divine‐creation	relation	means	that	worth	is	placed	in	the	ever‐processual	experience	
of	 entire	 communities,	 and	 not	 just	 one	 individual,	 developing	 and	 sustaining	
relationships	of	erotic	power.			
			
It	is	evident	that	thinkers	such	as	Brock	are	not	denying	the	importance	of	Jesus;	rather,	
Brock	 is	 here	 reinterpreting	 his	 importance	 in	 light	 of	 her	 understanding	 of	 erotic	
power.	 	The	 implication	of	such	reframings	of	power	 is	 that	the	 image	of	 Jesus	as	the	
unique	saviour	is	rejected.		As	such,	Jesus’	maleness	is	no	longer	deemed	problematic	as	
it	is	not	the	sole	receptacle	of	or	agent	for	redemption.	 	Instead	redemptive	activity	is	
flung	 wide	 open	 for	 the	 participation	 of	 all.	 	 Again,	 the	 emphasis	 is	 on	 creaturely	
responsibility.		In	a	similar	vein,	and	in	continuation	of	her	remodelling	of	the	world	as	
God’s	body,	Sallie	McFague	reinterprets	the	incarnation	by	emphasising	its	communal	
and	cosmic	occurrence.		That	is,	she	deems	the	incarnation	to	be	God’s	presence	in	the	
entire	universe	as	opposed	to	one	being	alone	(1987,	62).		In	light	of	this,	she	questions	
(1987,	70):	
What	if	[…]	the	‘resurrection	of	the	body’	were	not	seen	as	the	resurrection	of	
particular	 bodies	 that	 ascend,	 beginning	with	 Jesus	 of	 Nazareth,	 into	 another	
world,	but	as	God’s	promise	to	be	with	us	always	in	God’s	body,	our	world?	
	
McFague’s	vision,	then,	is	of	a	resurrection	to	“our	world”	(much	like	Ruether’s	idea	of	
metanoia	or	conversion	to	hoping	in	and	for	this	world	(2002,	313‐315),	which	will	be	
explored	momentarily)	with	emphasis	on	God’s	commitment	to	and	inseparability	from	
the	earth.		These	contributions	are	particularly	helpful	as	they	retain	Jesus’	significance	
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whilst	offering	solutions	to	problematic	constructions	of	his	singular	role	in	achieving	
salvation.			
	
Human	 activity	 is	 here	 honoured,	 as	 these	 feminist	 theologians	 envision	 an	 endless	
future	that	is	infinitely	open	to	the	influences	of	creation,	as	opposed	to	it	being	closed	
and	 already	 created	 by	 an	 omnipotent	 God.	 	 Christ	 (2003,	 195)	 achieves	 this	 by	
emphasising	 human	 effort,	 and	 God’s	 sustenance	 of	 and	 support	 for	 that	 effort.		
Whereas	traditional	perspectives	appeared	to	preserve	God’s	knowledge	of	the	future	
by	suggesting	 that	 creation	has	no	way	of	affecting	 that	 future,	Christ	here	maintains	
that	humans	do	impact	the	future	and	therefore	God	cannot	fully	know	the	future.		The	
future	 is	 here	 envisioned	 as	 a	world	 createable	 by	 humans	working	with	 the	 divine.		
Such	 an	 articulation	 is	 typical	 of	 many	 feminist	 perspectives	 on	 redemption,	 hence	
Christ’s	claim	that	process	thought	is	most	compatible	with	the	“feminist	vision”	(2003,	
40).		Indeed,	emphasising	creaturely	responsibility	is	deemed	to	be	necessary	in	order	
to	 counteract	 the	previous	 ideas	of	God	 realising	 the	eschatological	process	 alone.	 	A	
God	who	is	involved	in	creation,	then,	suggests	a	God	who	can	only	achieve	redemption	
through	 the	 cooperation	 of	 creation.	 	 These	 contributions	 succeed	 in	 emphasising	
human	 responsibility	 for	 redemption	 and	 thus	 serve	 to	 remedy	 the	 passivity	 or	
acquiescence	 that	 was	 detected	 with	 proposals	 for	 an	 already	 created	 and	 known	
future	that	is	assured	by	an	omnipotent	and	omniscient	God	through	the	heroic	death	
of	Jesus.			
	
Although	 many	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 rejected	 the	 centrality	 of	 Jesus,	 as	 noted,	
there	are	some	who	instead	seek	to	reimagine	what	his	centrality	 in	redemption	may	
mean.		Delores	Williams,	for	example,	still	sees	salvation	as	being	realised	by	Jesus	but	
claims	this	 is	achieved	through	“Jesus’	 life	of	resistance	and	by	the	survival	strategies	
he	used	to	help	people	survive”	(1993,	164).	 	She	goes	on	to	specify	 that	 Jesus’	 life	 is	
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salvific	 and	 informs	 our	 own	 salvation	 through	 relationality;	 that	 is,	 through	 living	
“peacefully,	productively	and	abundantly	in	relationship”	(1993,	167).	 	This	signals	an	
important	 aspect	 of	 the	 discussion;	 namely,	 that	 despite	 the	 problems	 noted	 with	
traditional	understandings	of	Jesus,	many	women	have	nevertheless	found	him	to	be	a	
liberating	figure.	 	 It	 is	evident,	 then,	that	not	all	 feminist	theologians	wish	to	discount	
the	unique	significance	of	Jesus.			
	
Indeed,	 in	 addition	 to	 centralising	 Jesus’	 life,	 further	 examples	 highlight	 some	 of	 the	
ways	in	which	Jesus’	suffering	and	death	have	been	rethought	by	feminist	theologians.			
Particularly	relevant	here	are	rethinkings	of	kenosis.	 	Although,	as	Chau	rightly	notes,	
“certain	feminists	seem	to	find	kenosis	abhorrent	since	it	appears	to	be	a	concession	to,	
perhaps	even	collusion	with,	the	sinful	reality	of	the	world”	(2012,	9),	there	are	some	
who	 attempt	 to	 think	 differently.	 	 Indeed,	 Webb	 notes	 that	 whilst	 thinkers	 such	 as	
Mercedes,	 Farley,	 and	 Copeland	 retain	 the	 conviction	 that	 Jesus’	 death	 was	 not	
necessary,	they	also	see	in	his	suffering	a	God	who	“meets	us	where	we	are”	in	such	a	
way	that	restores	us	and	orients	us	to	others	(2012,	199).		Coakley’s	contributions	are	
also	significant	here,	for	she	views	kenosis	in	terms	of	“a	regular	and	willed	practice	of	
ceding	and	responding	to	the	divine”	(2003,	27).		Coakley	sees	silent	prayer	as	the	most	
vibrant	manifestation	of	this,	as	it	embodies	the	kind	of	“power	and	vulnerability”	that	
gives	 space	 “for	 God	 to	 be	 God”	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 enables	 us	 to	 be	 “properly	
‘empowered’”	(2003,	27).		Allowing	God	to	be	God,	in	this	understanding,	is	not	a	state	
of	submission	to	a	dominant	being,	for	God	is	understood	in	similar	terms.		Mercedes,	
for	instance,	speaks	of	the	self‐giving	power	of	God	in	terms	of	God’s	power	“for	us”	(as	
cited	 by	 Webb,	 2012,	 199)	 whilst	 Papanikolaou	 argues	 that	 kenosis	 refers	 to	 the	
reciprocity	 of	 self‐giving	 that	 constitutes	 the	 “relations	 between	 the	 persons	 of	 the	
Trinity”	(2003,	47).		Thus,	a	kenotic	relationship	with	the	divine	infers	an	openness	to	a	
God	who	is	both	reciprocally	open	to	us	and	inherently	open	within	Godself.		For	these	
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thinkers,	 then,	kenosis	 is	not	understood	to	be	 the	obliteration	of	 the	self	 in	 favour	of	
the	other,	or	the	complete	depletion	of	the	self	at	the	behest	of	the	other.		Rather,	it	is	
framed	 as	 an	 act	 of	 being	 open,	 vulnerable,	 and	 self‐giving	 toward	 another	 who	
responds	with	reciprocity.	Papanikolaou	(2003,	58‐59)	expresses	a	similar	perspective,	
writing	that:	
Kenosis	is	not	primarily	self‐sacrifice,	but	a	state	of	being	that	liberates	eros,	the	
desire	to	be	in	relation	with	the	other.		It	is	a	precondition	for	relations	of	love	
and	freedom,	the	only	context	in	which	the	self	is	truly	given.	
	
Kenosis	 is	 thus	 understood	 to	 be	 a	 loving	 act	 of	 relationality	 that	 empowers	 and	
restores	 all	 within	 that	 relationship.	 	 Jesus’	 death,	 then,	 is	 not	 kenotic	 in	 a	 sense	 of	
submitting	to	overwhelming	forces	of	oppression;	rather,	it	is	an	openness	to	sharing	in	
the	experiences	and	indeed	the	sufferings	of	others	 in	ways	that	are	as	empathetic	as	
they	are	empowering.					
	
Baudzej	offers	yet	more	support	for	reinterpreting	Jesus’	significance,	and	puts	forward	
a	 consistent	 case	 for	 both	 the	 historic	 and	 contemporary	 significance	 of	 Jesus	 for	
women.		She	traces	this	from	medieval	theology	which,	it	is	claimed,	emphasised	Jesus’	
bodiliness	as	opposed	to	his	maleness	(2008,	77),	right	up	to	her	own	view	that	Jesus	in	
fact	 refused	 to	 partake	 in	 relationships	 of	 dominance	 and	 submission,	 and	 instead	
challenged	male	supremacy	 (2008,	84).	 	Understandings	of	kenosis	again	resurface	 in	
such	 readings:	 Ruether,	 for	 instance,	 suggests	 that	 Jesus’	 maleness	 can	 be	
comprehended	 as	 the	 “kenosis	 of	 patriarchy”	 (2002,	 136‐137).	 	 This	 is	 rooted	 in	
Ruether’s	 observation	 that	 Jesus	 proclaimed	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 social	 order,	 “a	 new	
reality	 in	 which	 hierarchy	 and	 dominance	 are	 overcome	 as	 principles	 of	 social	
relations”	 (2002,	 136).	 	 Thus,	 for	 Ruether,	 Jesus	 indicates	 the	 self‐emptying	 of	
patriarchy	 by	 embodying	 maleness	 and	 proceeding	 to	 usurp	 or	 “strip	 off”	 the	
“traditional	 masculine	 imagery”	 of	 messiahship	 (Ruether,	 2002,	 135).	 	 Burrows	
observes	that	this	is	not	a	new	perspective:	reading	Bernard	of	Clairvaux,	she	notes	his	
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point	that	“God’s	‘erotic	power’	which	we	meet	in	the	passionate	encounter	with	Jesus	
our	‘tender	lover’	requires	of	men	a	gender	inversion”	(1998,	489).		Of	course,	there	are	
questions	to	be	asked	here	concerning	how	gender	is	being	defined,	but	for	now	we	can	
see	 that	 moves	 were	 and	 are	 being	 made	 to	 rethink	 the	 significance	 of	 Jesus	 with	
regards	 to	gender.	 	 Indeed,	Althaus‐Reid	and	 Isherwood	observe	a	 similar	attitude	 in	
some	Indian	women,	explaining	that	“It	is	the	Christ	who	as	a	male,	acted	against	‘male	
culture’	who	gives	hope	to	many	women	in	India”	(2007,	83)	and	moreover	that	“Jesus	
is	the	male	advocate	par	excellence	and	his	gender	is	less	of	a	problem	than	his	colonial	
crown”	(2007,	84).		This	is	not	to	say	that	Jesus’	maleness	has	not	been	a	problem,	but	
that	different	issues	arise	for	these	Indian	women.		This	suggests	both	another	problem	
(that	 is,	 the	 westernised	 construction	 of	 Jesus)	 and	 a	 potential	 solution	 to	 the	
problematising	 of	 Jesus’	 maleness	 (that	 is,	 understanding	 his	 maleness	 to	 be	
subversive).	 	 Each	 of	 the	 perspectives	 noted	 here	 highlight	 that	 feminist	 theologians	
have	found	cause	and	confirmation	for	a	rethinking	of	Christology	in	terms	of	embodied	
relationality	and	vitality,	and	bodily	integrity	in	the	face	of	injustice	or	oppression.		In	
this	sense,	they	can	offer	sustenance	and	support	for	a	rethinking	of	eschatology	along	
similar	lines.		
	
An	emphasis	on	incarnation	is	thus	crucial	to	these	thinkers'	understandings	of	 Jesus,	
and	 the	 embodiment	 of	 Christ	 in	 the	 subversive	 actions	 of	 Jesus	 are	 seen	 to	 be	
indicative,	 if	 not	 paradigmatic,	 of	 the	 impotence	 of	 patriarchy	 and	 the	 centrality	 of	
relational	 embodiments.	 	 We	 can	 detect	 a	 similar	 perspective	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Lisa	
Isherwood,	who	speaks	of	a	“radical	incarnation”	that	is	founded	on	empowerment	and	
dunamis.		Isherwood	(2010a,	166)	writes	that:	
This	is	the	concept	spoken	of	by	Jesus	in	the	gospels	when	he	rejects	‘authority	
over’	and	urges	those	who	come	after	him	to	claim	their	empowerment	to	live	
in	vulnerability,	mutuality	and	relationality.	
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For	Isherwood,	then,	Jesus	displays	what	it	means	to	live	lives	that	are	empowered	and	
empowering;	 this,	 Isherwood	 argues,	 conveys	 the	 “profound	 reality”	 of	 redemptive	
relationality	 (2010a,	165).	 	 	Such	a	view	 is	similarly	evident	 in	many	other	 liberation	
theologies,	 for	whom	 the	 incarnation	models	ways	 of	 living	 that	 are	 concerned	with	
relationality	 and	 justice.	 	Nichole	R.	 Phillips,	 for	 instance,	 claims	 that	 the	 incarnation	
“reflects	 the	shape	of	and	embodies	 the	spirit	of	humanity”.	 	Reading	Wendy	Farley’s	
assertion	that	the	incarnation	“awakens	us	to	the	power	of	the	human	form”	to	bear	the	
divine,	Phillips	notes	 that	humanity	 can	 “astoundingly	 and	 ably	 carry	on	 the	work	of	
Kingdom	building	through	service	to	neighbors	and	friends”	(2011,	345).		For	Phillips,	
then,	the	incarnation	necessarily	has	eschatological	connotations	and	implications,	and	
can	reveal	to	us	the	ways	in	which	we	may	make	this	“Kingdom”	or	this	future	a	reality	
now.	
	
However,	 such	perspectives	 are	not	 representative	of	 all	 considerations	of	 Jesus,	 and	
despite	 their	 merits	 they	 continue	 to	 be	 problematic.	 	 Firstly,	 as	 Irigaray	 notes,	 an	
emphasis	on	bodiliness	cannot	escape	the	fact	that	this	“is	always	sexually	specific”	(as	
cited	 by	 Jantzen,	 1998,	 16)	 so	 if	 one	 is	 genuinely	 to	 appreciate	 Jesus’	 bodiliness	 one	
must	 necessarily	 recognise	 his	maleness,	meaning	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 former	 cannot	
quell	the	problems	of	the	latter.	 	Even	if	Jesus’	maleness	is	seen	to	be	subversive,	this	
nevertheless	potentially	implies	that	only	a	male	can	subvert	patriarchy.		Indeed,	whilst	
the	 perspectives	 offered	 by	 Althaus‐Reid	 and	 Isherwood	 must	 be	 appreciated	 and	
respected,	it	is	nevertheless	important	to	be	aware	that	attaching	saving	significance	to	
Jesus’	maleness,	even	if	in	a	subversive	manner,	potentially	perpetuates	the	patriarchal	
construction	 of	 the	male	 as	 superior.	 	 As	 such,	Williams’s	 earlier	 noted	 contribution,	
which	 retains	 the	 locating	 of	 salvation	 in	 Jesus,	 returns	 us	 to	 some	 of	 the	 problems	
noted	 concerning	 the	 construction	 of	 divine	 power	 as	 singular	 and	 unilateral,	 thus	
suggesting	 that	 perspectives	 which	 appreciate	 but	 decentralise	 Jesus	 may	 be	 more	
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beneficial.	 	 Amongst	 these	 perspectives,	Mercedes’	 view	 is	 especially	 creative,	 as	 she	
retains	 the	 particularity	 of	 Christ	 without	 restricting	 this	 to	 the	 one	 person	 of	 Jesus	
(2014,	236).		As	noted,	she	interprets	Christ	as	“chrism”	and	writes	that:	
While	chrism	always	marks	particular	skin	in	particular	times	and	places,	and	
indeed	 sanctifies	 those	 historical	 particularities,	 those	 bodies	 and	 contexts	
cannot	 claim	 a	 uniqueness	 as	 the	 Christ	 without	 closing	 down	 the	 ongoing	
vivacity	of	Christ’s	movement	 in	 the	world,	of	 the	power	chrism’s	momentum	
and	transfer.	
	
Again,	 this	 highlights	 how	 perspectives	 that	 decentralise	 Jesus	 whilst	 retaining	
Christological	 values	 may	 be	 the	 most	 successful	 at	 communicating	 a	 relational	
understanding	of	both	creation	and	 the	divine	and,	 indeed,	creation’s	participation	 in	
divine	life.		Williams	does	show,	though,	that	it	is	possible	to	hold	together	an	emphasis	
on	connection	and	relationship	with	a	sense	of	God	having	a	degree	of	power	to	assure	
or	realise	 these.	 	 	As	such,	she	will	be	helpful	 to	my	constructive	attempts	 in	Chapter	
Two.	
	
Locating	this	Thesis	
Whether	 or	 not	 feminist	 theologians	 choose	 to	 centralise	 Jesus,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 their	
Christologies	contain	much	of	benefit	to	this	thesis.		Their	various	emphases	on	shared	
power	 and	 responsibility,	 embodied	 relationality	 and	 vitality,	 and,	 God’s	kenotic	 love	
for	 creation,	 are	 all	 values	 that	 this	 thesis	 finds	 merit	 in	 and	 will	 similarly	 seek	 to	
uphold.		Moreover,	it	will	develop	them,	particularly	in	Chapter	Two,	in	order	to	rethink	
the	process	of	the	eschaton	as	one	that	is	actuated	through	divine‐creation	relations	of	
erotic	power.		Thus,	the	values	communicated	by	rethinking	Christ	as	capable	of	being	
incarnate	 in	 all	 of	 creation	 through	 the	 elements	 noted	 are	 of	 benefit	 to	 this	 thesis’s	
remodelling	 of	 eschatology	 on	 the	 bases	 of	 embodied	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	
sensuality.				
	
 
 
~	76	~	
 
This	 thesis	 will	 not,	 however,	 engage	 specifically	 or	 explicitly	 with	 feminist	
reformulations	of	Christology	in	Chapter	Two,	primarily	out	of	a	concern	that	models	of	
God	 in	particular,	although	of	course	not	separable	from	understandings	of	Christ,	are	
most	 problematic	 in	 and	 for	 understandings	 of	 eschatology.34	 	 Indeed,	 despite	 the	
evident	merits	 of	 the	 views	 noted,	 it	 is	 also	 apparent	 that	 feminist	 theologians	 have	
made	 little	 attempt	 to	 use	 their	 remodellings	 of	 God	 to	 reconfigure	 eschatology.	 	 A	
relational	 God	 and	 eschatological	 finality	 and	 futurity	 have,	 on	 the	 whole,	 been	
understood	 to	 be	 mutually‐exclusive.	 	 There	 is,	 for	 example,	 limited	 exploration	 of	
whether	 God	 can	 have	 more	 power	 than	 creation	 without	 this	 being	 exercised	 in	
patriarchal	manners	and	without	this	amounting	to	God	possessing	all	power.		Chapter	
Two,	then,	will	attempt	to	hold	divine‐creaturely	relationality	together	with	a	sense	of	
eschatological	finality,	and	thus	contribute	a	new	perspective	to	the	debate.	 	I	will	use	
feminist	theological	responses	that	emphasise	both	God’s	 intimate	involvement	in	the	
world	 and	 creaturely	 responsibility	 and	 freedom	 in	 order	 to	 rethink	 eschatology.	 	Of	
course,	the	readings	of	the	incarnation	that	were	noted	earlier	can	support	such	a	task,	
and	 the	 values	 upheld	 in	 such	 readings	 will	 certainly	 be	 utilised	 in	 Chapter	 Two’s	
constructive	efforts.	
	
Indeed,	the	Christological	values	noted	are	often	used	to	remodel	the	nature	of	God,	and	
this	thesis	upholds	many	of	these	models.		Using	these	reformulations	of	divine	nature	
in	order	to	rethink	eschatology	is	deemed	to	be	a	logical	and	necessary	progression	if	
the	eschatological	process	is	to	be	successfully	extracted	from	the	hands	of	patriarchal	
theology.		Moreover,	it	is	crucial	if	women	are	to	be	able	to	conceive	of	a	future	that	no	
longer	 assigns	 them	 certain	 values	 and	 proceeds	 to	 devalue	 them	 through	 that	
																																																													
34	Nor	will	Christology	feature	explicitly	in	Chapters	Three	and	Four,	out	of	a	concern	to	focus	
clearly	and	specifically	on	creating	new	models	of	the	content	and	the	time	of	the	eschaton.		This	
is	not	to	say	that	feminist	formulations	of	Christology	are	overlooked:	some	of	the	values	upheld	
in	 these	 Christologies,	 such	 as	 the	 embodiment	 of	 erotic	 power,	 are	 utilised	 consistently	
throughout	the	thesis.		
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assignation.	 Instead,	an	eschatological	process	rethought	on	the	grounds	of	embodied	
relationality	can	value	what	has	been	associated	with	women	and	proceed	to	include	all	
of	creation	in	the	relational	process	of	realising	the	eschaton.			
	
Furthermore,	the	readings	of	erotic	power	that	were	earlier	alluded	to	are	beneficial	in	
remedying	many	of	the	problems	with	traditional	modellings	of	divine	power	as	aloof,	
unilateral,	 and	 domineering.	 	 As	 such,	 they	 inform	my	 rethinking	 of	 divine	 power	 in	
Chapter	 Two,	 wherein	 I	 will	 emphasise	 divine	 relational	 intimacy	 and	 presence.		
Furthermore,	their	ability	to	specify	the	nature	of	creaturely	responsibility	and	therein	
affirm	 interconnectedness	 and	 community	 is	 indispensible.35	 	 Thus,	 they	 are	 also	
helpful	in	informing	my	reconstruction	of	the	content	of	eschatology	in	Chapter	Three,	
and	my	thoughts	concerning	the	realisation	of	 the	eschaton	 in	 the	present	 in	Chapter	
Four.	 	 Having	 said	 this,	 McFague’s	 contribution	 helps	 us	 to	 see	 why,	 despite	 their	
importance	and	value,	the	predominantly	presentist	readings	of	relational	power	that	
typify	 the	 responses	 noted	 above	 may	 be	 insufficient.	 	 If	 all	 of	 creation	 is	 indeed	
interconnected,	 then	 McFague	 infers	 that	 the	 permanent	 loss	 of	 even	 one	 member	
becomes	“unbearable”	(1988,	673).		Although	McFague	is	here	calling	for	us	to	dwell	on	
the	specialness	of	creation	 in	order	 to	 fuel	our	action	 to	care	 for	 it,	her	assertion	can	
also	 provide	 justification	 for	 a	 rethinking	 of	 eschatology.	 	 If	 we	 are	 to	 uphold	 the	
remodelling	 of	 God	 as	 intimately	 involved	 in	 creation,	 and	 the	 reframing	 of	 divine	
power	 as	 interdependent	 and	 interconnected,	 then	 the	 permanent	 loss	 of	 any	
member(s)	 of	 creation	 would	 profoundly	 affect	 not	 only	 ourselves	 but	 also	 God.		
Moreover,	the	lack	of	an	alternative	future	for	those	members	of	creation	who	are	lost	
means	that	any	relationship	with	them	is	ultimately	 lost.	 	An	eschatology	constructed	
on	the	basis	of	divine‐creation	relation,	though,	may	be	able	to	affirm	both	the	features	
																																																													
35	There	are	some	problems	to	be	noted	with	responsibility,	though,	for	it	implies	that	we	are	all	
capable	of	contributing	to	creating	this	interconnectivity	and	community.		Critiques	of	notions	of	
contribution	are,	then,	thoroughly	addressed	in	Chapter	Two. 
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central	 to	 feminist	 theological	 reconstructions	 and	 offer	 a	 more	 full	 experience	 of	
relationality	 in	 the	 future.	 	 Before	 such	 development,	 though,	 two	 additional	 but	
associated	 problems	 must	 be	 addressed;	 namely,	 what	 the	 tradition	 has	 proposed	
concerning	what	eschatological	existence	looks	like	(the	“content”	of	the	eschatological	
future)	and	when	it	will	be	realised	(the	“time”	of	the	eschaton).	
	
Content:	Eschatology	and	Immateriality	
Assumptions	about	the	God	who	assures	the	process	of	eschatology	have	implications	
for	assertions	made	about	 the	content	of	 that	eschatology.	 	We	remember	 that	Christ	
observed	 a	 tendency	 within	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 to	 frame	 perfection	 as	 non‐
relationality	(Christ,	2003,	35).	 	Separation	from	relationships	rests	on	an	assumption	
of	 separation	 from	 bodies,	 as	 Jantzen	 inferred	 earlier.	 	 Keller	 expounds	 this,	
commenting	that	“Free	of	time,	the	self	will	again	reflect	the	image	of	God,	in	which	it	
was	created.		Or	rather,	in	which	men	were	created”	(1996a,	102).		Thus,	the	suggestion	
that	 perfection	 amounts	 to	 a	 disembodied	 experience	 of	 timelessness	 devalues	 the	
changing	 and	 temporal	 embodied	 lives	 of	all	 of	 creation.	 	Not	 only	 this,	 it	 constructs	
eschatological	 bodies	 on	 values	 associated	 with	 the	 male	 and	 so,	 again,	 frames	 the	
female	as	inferior	and	iniquitous.		In	short,	then,	it	is	argued	that	if	the	future	is	created	
by	a	disembodied	 (and	 therefore	non‐relational)	God	 then	 the	 future	which	 that	God	
creates	 will	 necessarily	 be	 corresponsive.	 	 Traditional	 models	 of	 eschatology	 are	
therefore	problematized	for	basing	their	constructions	on	the	negation	of	aspects	of	life	
which	 theology	 has	 associated	 with	 women;	 embodiment	 in	 general	 and	 its	 specific	
characterisation	 in	terms	of	material	and	temporal	 fluidity.	 	Such	negation	 is	 likewise	
used	to	devalue	the	body	of	the	earth;	feminist	theological	critiques	are	thus	directed	at	
the	devaluation	of	 both,	whilst	 responses	 seek	 to	 reclaim	 the	 two.	 	 The	model	 of	 the	
world	as	the	body	of	God	is	understandably	relevant	here	again,	then.		The	main	focus	
of	the	critiques	that	will	be	noted	here	is	the	construction	of	the	“end”	in	the	eschaton	
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and	the	depiction	of	this	as	an	end	to	embodied	and	earthen	processes	and	existences.		
Feminist	 theologians	have	responded	by	articulating	a	reclamation	and	affirmation	of	
the	embodied	processes	of	life,	particularly	as	experienced	by	women	in	their	present	
lives.			
	
Problem:	A	Static,	Spiritual	Existence	
The	most	ubiquitous	and	substantial	critique	to	be	noted	here	is	that	which	is	levelled	
against	 the	 Christian	 tradition’s	 unification	 of	 women	 and	 materiality.	 	 Rosemary	
Radford	Ruether	considers	the	patriarchal	identification	of	women	with	materiality	in	a	
particularly	eschatological	context.			Her	most	comprehensive	assessment	of	this	can	be	
found	in	her	seminal	book	Sexism	and	God‐Talk	(2002).		Here,	Ruether	benefits	greatly	
from	Sherry	B.	Ortner’s	article,	‘Is	Female	to	Male	as	Nature	is	to	Culture’	(2001,	61‐80)	
which	attempts	to	explain	the	reasons	behind	the	identification	of	women	with	nature,	
or	 matter.	 	 Ortner	 surmises	 that	 women’s	 bodies	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 “more	 involved	
more	 of	 the	 time	with	 species	 life”	 (2001,	 66)	 on	 account	 of	 their	menstruation	 and	
birthing.		Carol	Christ	(2008,	162)	substantiates	Ortner’s	claim,	noting	that:	
Because	the	body	through	which	we	are	born	into	the	changing	physical	world	
is	 female,	 it	 is	 nearly	 inevitable	 that	 femaleness	will	 become	 symbolic	 of	 the	
changing	world	and	the	body	that	must	be	transcended.		In	dualistic	visions,	the	
process	of	the	changing	female	body	including	menstruation,	pregnancy,	birth,	
nursing,	 and	 menopause	 cannot	 be	 affirmed	 as	 sacred	 or	 as	 reflecting	 the	
sacred.	
	
Thus,	 traditional	 dualistic	 thinking	 posits	 that	 the	 female	 body	which	 births	 through	
and	 into	change	 is	antithetical	 to	a	 changeless	divinity.	 	Ruether	notes,	however,	 that	
such	 reasoning	has	 not	 always	 been	 explicitly	 evident.	 	 She	 observes	 that	 in	Hebrew	
thought,	women	were	not	ontologically	 linked	with	materiality	and,	more	specifically,	
the	earth.	 	The	connection	was	made	only	(though,	for	Ruether,	not	excusably)	on	the	
basis	 of	 a	 shared	 subjugation	 (2002,	 66).	 	 She	 claims	 that	 the	 more	 explicit	
identification	 of	 the	 two	 is	 attributable	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 Greek	 thought;	 that	 is,	 the	
Platonic	dichotomisation	of	spiritual	transcendence	and	material	embodiment,	and	the	
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attribution	 of	 the	 former	 to	 the	 male	 and	 the	 latter	 to	 the	 female	 (2002,	 67).	 	 This	
solidified	 the	 identification	 of	women	with	matter,	 she	 claims,	 as	 it	made	 radical	 the	
dualism	of	male	with	spirit	and	female	with	nature	that	was	subtly	present	in	Hebrew	
thought.	 Ruether	 claims	 that	 this	 is	 a	 radical	 shift	 as	man	 came	 to	 be	 understood	 as	
partaking	in	“the	same	transcendent	status	as	God,	outside	of	and	above	nature”	(2002,	
67).	 	 Platonic	 thought,	 then,	 introduced	 the	 dualistic	 idea	 that	 the	 male	 is	 to	 be	
associated	with	 that	which	 is	 transcendent	and	spiritual	on	account	of	him	being	 the	
authentic	incarnation	of	the	soul.		The	female,	on	the	other	hand,	was	seen	to	represent	
the	 corruption	 (and	 corruptibility)	 of	 the	 soul;	 essentially,	 the	 feminisation	 and	
materialisation	 of	 the	 previously	 “authentic”	 masculinised	 soul	 (Ruether,	 1979,	 48).		
Models	 of	 divinity	 are	 thus	 said	 to	 have	 been	 constructed	 on	 the	 basis	 of,	 and	 have	
therefore	given	value	to,	only	that	which	has	been	identified	as	male.		Furthermore,	the	
inference	 made	 by	 Ruether	 is	 that	 such	 models	 make	 assertions	 about	 what	 is	 of	
ultimate	 value;	namely,	 the	endurance	of	 the	male‐defined	 soul	 at	 the	expense	of	 the	
female‐defined	body.	
	
Ruether	 later	 traces	 the	 continued	 influence	 and	 appropriation	 of	 such	 ideas	 in	
Christian	 thought,	 claiming	 that	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 for	 example,	 identified	 the	 female	
body	with	mortality,	 and	mortality	with	 that	which	 is	 “fundamentally	unnatural”	 and	
undeserving	 of	 a	 place	 in	 resurrected	 life	 (2002,	 208‐9).	 	 Furthermore,	 she	 cites	
Augustine	and	Jerome	and,	whilst	conceding	that	they	denied	male‐only	salvation,	she	
maintains	 that	 they	 were	 nevertheless	 clear	 about	 emphasising	 the	 “eschatological	
‘spiritual	body’”	 (2002,	209).	 	Thus,	Ruether	 suggests	 that	whilst	Platonic	 ideas	were	
not	used	indiscriminately	by	the	tradition	(Ruether	notes	that	the	pre‐existence	of	the	
soul	 and	 reincarnation	 were,	 on	 the	 whole,	 rejected),	 their	 influence	 on	 Christian	
thought	 is	undoubtable	(Ruether,	2008,	331).	 	Ruether	provides	a	reading	here	of	the	
dualistic	association	of	women	with	materiality	that	is	shared	by	many	other	feminist	
 
 
~	81	~	
 
theologians,	 such	 as	McCulloch	 (2002,	 21),	 Primavesi	 (1991,	 143),	 and	 Christ	 (1987,	
93).	 	Amongst	 these,	Ruether’s	perspective	 is	most	 comprehensive	as	 she	 shows	 that	
not	only	have	women	and	the	earth	been	united	by	a	shared	subjugation,	but	they	have	
also	been	exclusively	assigned	attributes	that	are	deemed	to	be	either	hindrances	to	or	
absent	 from	 transcendent	 and	 spiritual	 existence.	 	 Subsequently	 these	attributes,	 she	
suggests,	are	used	to	justify	this	subjugation,	all	in	the	name	of	prioritising	that	which	is	
identified	with	the	male.		The	consequences	of	this	for	the	earth	will	be	explored	in	the	
next	section;	for	now	it	seems	that	there	is	a	common	and	widely‐accepted	articulation	
of	 eschatology	 as	 a	 transcendent	 and	 spiritual	 existence.	 	 Ruether	 explains	 that	 such	
understandings	 suggest	 that	 female	 flesh	 is	 “inimical	 to	 eternal	 life”	 (1998a,	 138;	 cf.	
Stefaniw,	 2010,	 353	 and	 Grey,	 2009b,	 198).	 	 It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 the	 simultaneous	
patriarchal	 association	 of	 women	 with	 matter	 and	 construction	 of	 eschatology	 as	
immaterial	 locks	 women’s	 bodies	 in	 a	 patriarchal	 logic	 which	 fashions	 them	 as	
antithetical	to	eschatological	existence.	36				
	
A	more	 explicit	 but	 less	 discussed	 dimension	 of	 such	 thought	 is	 the	 implication	 that	
women	must	become	men	 (as	opposed	 to	 incorporeal,	 although	 this	 too,	 as	has	been	
seen,	potentially	denotes	maleness	alone)	in	order	to	be	saved.		Ruether	again	provides	
a	 comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 this,	 reiterating	 the	 impact	 of	 Plato’s	 concept	 of	 the	
male	being	 the	authentic	 incarnation	of	 the	 soul.	 	 In	 light	of	 this,	 she	notes	 the	more	
literal	claim	that	women’s	bodies	must	become,	 in	some	way,	 like	male	bodies	 if	 they	
are	to	claim	a	place	 in	redemption	(1979,	48).	 	Ruether	acknowledges	the	ambiguous	
																																																													
36	 Interestingly,	 Graham	 detects	 similar	 sentiments	 in	 philosophies	 of	 technology;	 namely,	 in	
“transhumanism”	which,	she	writes,	strives	to	“enhance	human	intellectual	powers	and	improve	
physical	 and	 psychological	 capabilities”	 (2006,	 164).	 	 Graham	 goes	 on	 to	 note	 that	 these	
technologies	express	a	form	of	“realized	eschatology”	wherein	“the	continuity	of	individuals	and	
the	human	species	is	equated	with	the	continuation	of	consciousness	rather	than	any	notion	of	
embodied	selfhood”	 (2006,	165).	 	This	 “secular	doctrine	of	humanity”	draws	upon	 theological	
models	 of	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 “humans	 must	 seek	 to	 overcome	 those	
elements	of	their	nature	that	are	not	divine	(mortality,	embodiment,	contingency)”	in	order	to	
achieve	true	divinity	(2006,	172).		Graham’s	observations	highlight	the	pervasive	and	enduring	
impact	 of	 the	 theological	 perspectives	 noted	 here,	 and	 they	 also	 make	 inference	 to	 why	
attending	to	embodiment	is	a	pertinent	issue. 
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nature	of	 this	concept,	explaining	 that	some	theologians	 traditionally	understood	 this	
transformation	 to	be	 a	biological	 change	 from	a	 female	body	 to	 a	male	body	 (1998a,	
138),	 whereas	 others	 imagined	 the	 curbing,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 rejection,	 of	 female	
sexuality	 as	 a	 necessary	 component	 of	women’s	 redemption	 (Ruether,	 2008,	 332;	 cf.	
1998a,	 138‐9).	 	 Regardless	 of	 such	 disagreements,	 the	 overarching	 goal	 in	 both	
understandings,	she	claims,	appears	to	be	to	make	women	more	like	the	perfected	soul,	
which,	it	is	implied,	entails	a	move	away	from	the	female	and	towards	the	male;	away	
from	matter	and	towards	spirit.		
	
Blossom	 Stefaniw’s	 article	 “Becoming	 Men,	 Staying	 Women”	 (2010)	 clarifies	 and	
confirms	 Ruether’s	 claims.	 	 She	 makes	 reference	 to	 The	 Gospel	 of	 Thomas,	 in	 which	
Jesus	 is	 said	 to	 claim	 that	 he	will	 ensure	Mary’s	 place	 in	 redemption	 by	making	 her	
male.		This	is	made	explicit	in	verse	114	which	asserts	that	“For	every	woman	who	will	
make	herself	male	will	enter	the	Kingdom	of	Heaven”.		Stefaniw	argues	that	inclusion	in	
salvation,	for	Mary,	necessarily	means	the	exclusion	of	her	sex,	such	that	“Mary	is	not	
included	or	accepted	as	a	women,	but	is	transformed	and	re‐categorized	as	a	man,	and	
then	accepted”	(2010,	344;	cf.	Isherwood,	2001,	15).		The	oppression	of	women	here	is	
twofold	as	Stefaniw	explains	that	women	were	to	be	seen	as	male	in	their	spiritual	life,	
and	 female	 in	 their	 social	 life.	 	 This	meant	 that	women	were	 required	 to	 deny	 their	
womanhood	in	order	to	partake	in	redemptive	communities,	but	simultaneously	retain	
their	 “femaleness”	 socially,	 as	 this	 pertained	 to	 the	 way	 they	 should	 be	 treated	
(Stefaniw,	2010,	348).	 	This,	of	course,	simply	reinforces	the	identification	of	the	male	
with	the	infinite	and	redemptive,	and	the	female	with	the	finite	and	corruptible.	 	Such	
contributions	 thus	 expose	 the	 tendency	 within	 traditional	 eschatological	 thought	 to	
pair	 the	 future	 with	 a	 denial	 of	 the	 female‐identified	 body.	 	 The	 suggestion	 is	 that	
eschatology’s	 reliance	 on	 such	 dualistic	 and	 essentialised	 constructions	 of	 male	 and	
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female	bodies	renders	it	meaningless.	 	It	fails	to	speak	truthfully	about	both	male	and	
female	bodies,	but	it	does	so	by	venerating	the	former	and	demeaning	the	latter.	
	
There	 are	 some	 feminist	 theologians	 who	 contend	 that	 this	 denial	 of	 female	
embodiment	 is	 manifest	 no	 more	 so	 than	 in	 the	 patriarchal	 interpretation	 and	
valorisation	 of	 virginity.	 	 Ranke‐Heinemann,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 emphasising	
Mary’s	 virginity	 “[robs]	 her	 of	 her	 motherhood”	 by	 denying	 her	 the	 embodied	
experiences	of	conceiving,	bearing,	and	birthing	(1990,	342).37		However,	it	is	not	only	
Mary’s	motherhood	which	is	deemed	to	be	discredited	by	a	disproportionate	focus	on	
her	 virginity:	 Beattie	 (1999,	 67)	 explains	 that	 the	 complexities	 of	 all	 women’s	
experiences	of	their	bodies	are	subsequently	devalued	by	this.		She	asks:	
To	what	extent	can	Mary’s	body	serve	as	a	symbolic	site	which	gives	conceptual	
expression	to	the	pain	and	pleasure	of	women’s	bodies,	when	her	own	body	is	
symbolically	 pure	 and	 inviolate	 from	 any	 association	with	 the	 normal	 bodily	
functions	of	the	female	sex?	
For	Beattie,	 then,	 patriarchal	 theology	 alienates	Mary’s	 body	 from	 all	 other	women’s	
bodies	by	attaching	purity	and	sacredness	to	her	virginal	motherhood,	and	so	placing	
impossible	 conditions	on	 the	way	 in	which	 female	bodies	 are	 to	 be	 valued.	 	 It	 is	 this	
impossibility,	 or	 inimitability,	 which	 Mary	 Daly	 claims	 has	 resulted	 in	 “all	 women	
essentially	[being]	 identified	with	Eve”	(1973,	81);	 the	consequences	of	which	will	be	
outlined	 later	 in	 this	 chapter.	 	 	 Such	 attitudes	 towards	 Mary’s	 virginity	 again	 defer	
attention	 away	 from	 any	 indicators	 of	 finitude	 and	 materiality	 in	 favour	 of	 a	
“redeemed”	state	which,	according	to	the	patriarchal	understanding,	rejects	or	ignores	
female	embodiments	and	sexualities.	 	Coupled	with	 the	perspectives	noted	earlier	by	
Ruether	 and	Stefaniw,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	acceptance	of	women	 into	 redeemed	 life,	
and	moreover	 into	 a	 future	 heavenly	 realm,	 has	 been	 understood	 as	 hinging	 on	 the	
																																																													
37	 I	 attend	 to	 this	 implied	 theft	 of	 Mary’s	 motherhood	 by	 suggesting	 an	 appraisal	 and	
appreciation	 of	 the	 interpretive	 value	 of	 some	 experiences	 of	 motherhood	 and	 birthing	 in	
Chapter	Three.		As	later	assessments	will	show,	feminist	theologians’	attempts	to	rethink	Mary	
will	also	prove	helpful	to	my	use	of	these	experiences. 
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denial	of	all	female	bodies	and	the	assumption	of	the	spiritual	and	singular	male	body.		
The	 inimitability	of	Mary	only	compounds	 the	presentation	of	 female	bodies	as	being	
inimical	to	redeemed	life.		This	highlights	the	enduring	and	pervading	justification	that	
has	 been	 provided	 for	 the	 devaluation	 of	 female	 bodies	 and	materiality	 in	 Christian	
models	of	perfect,	ultimate,	and	therefore	eschatological	existence.	
	
Some	 feminist	 theologians	 further	 claim	 that	 the	 patriarchal	 identification	 of	women	
with	 materiality	 is	 not	 only	 problematic	 on	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 but	 that	 it	 also	 has	
specific,	even	dangerous,	practical	implications	for	women’s	bodies.		Grace	Jantzen,	for	
example,	 exposes	 the	 fact	 that	 patriarchal	 theology	 united	 women	 and	 matter	 then	
proceeded	to	actively	and	violently	vilify	this	unification.		She	writes	that	“The	Church,	
having	 sown	 the	wind	 in	 its	 teaching	 about	women,	was	now	 reaping	 its	whirlwind”	
(Jantzen,	1995,	270)	with	the	witch	hunts	of	the	16th	century	being	a	prime	example	of	
this.	 	 Jantzen	 charts	 these	 attitudes	 from	 the	witch	 hunts	 to	 the	more	 contemporary	
attitude	of	 the	 “male	 scientist”	who	approaches	nature	 and	women	 in	 the	 same	way;	
that	is,	“not	with	violence,	but	with	patience	and	gallantry.		Nevertheless”	she	claims,	“it	
is	clear	that	he	will	become	the	master”	(1995,	276).	 	Attempts	to	master	and	control	
nature	and	women,	be	it	by	force	or	manipulation,	are	thus	identified	as	being	primary	
consequences	of	 the	patriarchal	association	of	women	with	matter.	 	This	mastery	has	
manifest	 itself	 in	 constructions	 of	 eschatology	 as	 the	 final	 conquest	 over	 death;	 the	
earlier‐noted	 identification	of	 female	bodies	with	mortality	and	 the	exclusion	of	both	
from	 constructions	 of	 “redeemed	 life”	 is	 again	 identified	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 as	
problematic.		Jantzen	(1998,	130),	again,	writes	that:	
The	preoccupation	with	 death	 is	matched	by	 a	 fascination	with	other	worlds,	
some	other	form	of	reality	beyond	the	uncertainties	of	this	present	life,	bound	
up	as	it	is	with	the	material	body.	
	
Jantzen	goes	on	to	explain	that	as	a	result	of	 the	 fascination	with	other	worlds,	death	
becomes	 the	 definitive	 characteristic	 of	 life	 as	 opposed	 to	 it	 being	 one	 aspect	 of	 it	
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(1998,	 132).	 	 Mortality,	 Jantzen	 argues,	 has	 been	 centralised,	 ensuring	 the	
marginalisation,	and	even	 in	some	cases	such	as	 those	noted	above,	 the	vilification	of	
life.	 	 This,	 she	 infers,	 is	 inextricably	 connected	 to	 eschatological	 ideas	 of	 an	 other‐
worldly	 afterlife.	 	 Indeed,	 even	 the	 language	 of	 “afterlife”	 seems	 to	 infer	 the	
abandonment	of	this	life.		Such	a	perspective	seems	to	be	manifest	in	Augustine’s	claim	
that	 “The	 city	 of	 God	 endures	 forever;	 in	 it	 no‐one	 is	 born	 because	 no‐one	 dies”	
(Augustine,	1950,	52).		Some	feminist	theologians	claim	that	this	apparent	rejection	of,	
or	escape	from,	mortality	warrants	a	complete	rejection	of	any	models	of	the	afterlife.		
Waschenfelder,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 “Negating	 the	 afterlife	 is	 one	more	 essential	
corrective	 to	 those	 life‐limiting	 habits	 of	 thought	 common	 to	 tradition‐centred	
Christianity”	 (2010,	 100).	 	 Whilst	 complete	 negation	 of	 an	 afterlife	 is	 an	 extreme	
standpoint	and	is	not	typical	of	all	 feminist	contributions,	there	is	substantial	support	
for	the	idea	that	a	focus	on	the	afterlife	limits	the	abundance	of	life	available	in	the	here	
and	now.			
	
Charlotte	Perkins	Gilman’s,	in	her	book	His	Religion	and	Hers,	attempts	to	find	a	reason	
for	 such	 a	 centralisation	 of	 the	 afterlife.	 	 She	 exposes	 patriarchal	 theology’s	
prioritisation	of	what	were	deemed	to	be	historically	male	experiences	of	hunting	and	
death	 over	 historically	 female	 experiences	 of	 birthing	 and	 life	 (as	 cited	 by	 Ruether,	
2002,	 197‐8).	 	 Male	 experiences,	 we	 are	 told,	 were	 saturated	 with	 death	 and	 this	
resulted	in	a	combination	of	fear	of	and	fascination	with	death	that	ultimately	led	to	the	
desire	 to	 “master”	 or	 transcend	 death.	 	 The	 challenge	 posed	 here,	 then,	 is	 that	
constructions	 of	 an	 afterlife	 centralise	 traditionally	 male	 experiences	 and	 seek	 to	
overcome	or	conquer	that	which	is	defined	as	female.			
	
Further	problems	have	been	 identified	when	 considering	 traditional	 constructions	 of	
the	 eschaton	 as	 being	 characterised	 by	 sinlessness.	 	 This	 is	 exposed	 as	 problematic	
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when	sin	and	human	depravity	are	so	often	linked	to	women’s	bodies.	 	Some	feminist	
theologians	note	that	women	are	said	to	be	included	in	the	blame	for	sin	on	account	of	
their	 connection	 to,	or	 solidarity	with,	Eve.	 	One	 feminist	 theologian	 to	have	engaged	
extensively	with	 this	 issue	 is	Lisa	 Isherwood	who	 recognises	both	 the	propensity	 for	
the	tradition	to	discredit,	and	even	demonise,	Eve	and	subsequently	all	women	(2001,	
17),	and	the	enduring	effect	of	such	constructions	(2001,	28‐9):		
Eve	raises	her	head	in	many	ways	from	some	women	referring	to	menstruation	
as	‘the	curse’	to	the	government	blaming	single	mothers	for	juvenile	crimes	and	
the	national	debt.		Women	have	been	encouraged	to	take	on	guilt,	suffering	and	
self‐sacrifice,	and	this	situation	needs	redeeming.	
Isherwood’s	reference	to	menstruation	further	highlights	how	perceptions	of	women’s	
bodies	as	changing	and	fluid	have	been	used	to	make	them	culpable	for	their	alignment	
with	 sin.	 	 For	 Isherwood,	 women	 continue	 to	 be	 imaged,	 with	 some	 even	 imaging	
themselves,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 patriarchal	 vilification	 of	 Eve.	 	 This	 internalisation	 of	
gendered	oppression	highlights	the	subtlety	of	patriarchal	oppression,	and	Isherwood	
helps	 to	expose	 the	ways	 in	which	 traditional	 constructions	of	Eve	 in	particular	have	
become	 embedded	 in	 some	 women’s	 self‐understandings.	 	 If	 these	 gendered	
understandings	 of	 sin	 are	 upheld	 and	 are	 coupled	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
resurrection	as	overcoming	such	sin,	then	the	content	of	the	eschaton	again	appears	to	
be	typified	by	a	rejection	of	that	which	is	associated	with	women.38			
	
Problem:	An	Otherworldly	Existence	
Much	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 depictions	 of	 eschatological	 existence	 have	 been	 used	 to	
devalue	women’s	bodies,	feminist	theologians	have	also	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	
traditional	models	 of	 eschatology	 also	 devalue	 the	 earth.	 	 The	 overriding	 contention	
here	is	that	the	eschatological	prioritisation	of	other‐worldly,	future‐oriented	existence	
																																																													
38	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 Chapter	 Three	will	 contend	 that	 a	 feasible	 and	 beneficial	 response	will	 not	
deny	 the	presence	of	 change	 in	women’s	bodies,	 and	 indeed	 in	all	bodies,	but	 that	 it	will	 and	
indeed	must	refuse	to	align	this	with	depravity	and	debasement.		Chapter	Three	also	challenges	
some	 inferences	made	 here	 to	 the	 tradition’s	 assignation	of	 sinfulness	 and	 the	 culpability	 for	
death	to	all	women	through	Eve. 
 
 
~	87	~	
 
detracts	 attention	 and	 concern	 away	 from	 this	 world.	 	 Whilst	 many	 feminist	
theologians,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 would	 indeed	 agree	 with	 this	 critique	 of	 the	 afterlife,	
Mary	Grey’s	contributions	in	Struggling	with	Reconciling	Hearts	and	Holding	Fast	to	Our	
Dreams	(2009a)	and	The	Outrageous	Pursuit	of	Hope	(2000)	are	particularly	pertinent	
here.		Grey’s	primary	critique	of	patriarchal	theological	concepts	of	eschatology	is	that	
their	other‐worldly	focus	conveys	the	“deadly	message”	that	“ultimately	this	earth	does	
not	matter”	(2000,	10).		Grey	does	not	over‐emphasise	the	severity	of	the	issue:	if	this	
earth	does	not	matter	then	issues	to	do	with	the	environment	are	ignored,	but	so	too	
are	 issues	 concerning	 challenging	 and	 changing	 oppressive	 structures.	 	 Looking	 to	
another	world	in	the	future	then,	for	Grey,	means	that	this	world	is	at	our	disposal	and	
our	actions	in	it	are	meaningless.		The	diminution	of	human	responsibility	arises	again.		
Moreover,	 the	 view	 that	 this	 world	 does	 not	 ultimately	 matter	 and	 a	 future	 other‐
worldly	existence	 is	 the	goal	of	humanity	necessarily,	 it	 is	argued,	 leads	 to	an	“earth‐
fleeing	 sentiment”	 whereby	 one’s	 primary	 concern	 is	 escape	 from	 the	 earth	
(Waschenfelder,	 2010,	 91).39	 	 This	 is	 contrasted	with	 appreciation	 of	 and	 respect	 for	
the	 earth,	 and	 with	 working	 towards	 the	 healing	 of	 this	 earth.	 Grey	 (2009b,	 202)	
further	explains	that:	
For	too	long	spirituality	has	been	based	on	contemptus	mundi,	escape	from	the	
world,	a	privileging	of	the	infinite	over	the	finite	and	not	on	amor	mundi,	love	of	
the	world	with	full	acceptance	of	the	demands	of	embodied	life.	
Making	the	link	with	finitude	and	embodiment,	and	recalling	patriarchal	constructions	
of	 both,	 we	 can	 see	 inferences	 here	 to	 the	 tradition’s	 simultaneous	 and	 associated	
desire	to	reject	or	escape	from	the	earth	body	and	women’s	bodies.		Irigaray	similarly	
notes	 that	 the	 “patriarchal	 order”	 is	 overly	 concerned	with	 worlds	 beyond	 this	 one;	
both	before	birth	 and	 after	death.	 	 In	 concurrence	with	Grey,	 Irigaray	 surmises	 from	
																																																													
39	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	there	is	nothing	in	the	literature	that	suggests	the	possibility	of	a	
positive	understanding	of	escape,	such	as	a	sense	of	“escapism”	offering	a	means	of	appreciating	
and	coping	in	this	world.			This	may	be	a	way	in	which	oppressed	people	can	survive	and	even	
flourish	in	the	midst	of	oppression.		Such	survival,	though	not	framed	in	terms	of	“escapism”,	is	
attended	to	later	in	this	chapter	and	resurfaces	throughout	this	thesis.	 
 
 
~	88	~	
 
this	 that	 “the	 world	 we	 have	 now”	 and,	 we	 may	 add,	 that	 which	 is	 associated	 with	
women,	is	subsequently	denied	value	(Irigaray,	1993b,	27).		As	such,	the	desire	to	flee	
from	this	present	world	is	exposed	here	as	continuing	and	confirming	the	identification	
of	 women’s	 bodies	 with	 matter	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 expulsion	 and	 exclusion	 of	
women’s	bodies	from	the	eschaton.	
	
The	effects	of	such	constructions	are	shown	to	remain	prevalent,	albeit	in	more	subtle	
ways,	in	contemporary	thought.		Some	feminist	theologians	note	and	utilise	the	rhetoric	
of	rape	and	exploitation	in	order	to	expose	the	simultaneous	abuse	of	women	and	the	
earth.	 	Meant	both	 literally	 and	metaphorically,	 these	 references	 show	 that	 gendered	
attitudes	towards	matter	are	contemporary	issues	of	crucial	importance.		They	explain	
the	 particular	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 body	 of	 the	 earth	 and	 women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	
oppressed	and	abused,	namely	though	violence	and	violation.		As	Gudmarsdottir	(2010,	
206)	observes:		
When	the	earth	is	declared	a	body,	violated	by	human	consumption	and	greed,	
powerful	 transformations	 of	 language	 take	 place.	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 symbolic	
connections	 between	 nature	 and	 women	 are	 affirmed;	 on	 the	 other	 the	
experience	of	 sexual	violence	 that	women	especially	 suffer	are	addressed	and	
intensified	to	a	cosmic	scale.	
This	links	the	destruction	of	the	earth	and	the	abuse	of	women’s	bodies	in	such	a	way	
that	 affirms	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 two	 whilst	 emphasising	 the	 severity	 and	
magnitude	of	abusive	attitudes	and	actions	towards	women.40		Reaffirming	the	value	of	
the	earth	body,	and	bodies	in	general,	and	their	equal	need	for	and	place	in	redemption	
is	 thus	 seen	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 to	 be	 key	 to	 both	 rejecting	 the	 centralisation	 of	
other‐worldly	 eschatological	 perspectives,	 and	 also	 to	 challenging	 the	 vilification	 and	
abuse	of	women’s	bodies	and	the	earth	body.41			
																																																													
40	This	speaks	to	the	need	for	theology	now	to	counteract	such	abuses.		Making	this	a	feature	of	
eschatology	will	thus	be	important	in	my	thesis. 
41	Given	these	considerations,	a	dichotomisation	of	ecology	and	eschatology	may	seem	tenable	if	
not	 inevitable.	 	 Brock	 and	 Parker,	 for	 example,	 suggest	 that	 life	 is	 sustained	 by	 “integration,	
interaction,	and	exchange	in	the	present”	and	as	such,	is	“ecological,	not	eschatological”	(2008,	
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Feminist	Response:	Affirming	Embodied	Processes	
In	 light	 of	 the	 problems	 noted	 thus	 far,	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	 many	 feminist	
theologians	wish	to	direct	their	focus	to	affirming	present,	embodied	life,	particularly	in	
relation	to	aspects	of	existence	traditionally	associated	with	women.		Given	the	shared	
subjugation	 of	 women	 and	 the	 earth,	 many	 of	 the	 contributions	 conduct	 these	
affirmations	with	a	concurrent	 focus	on	the	earth.	 	Thus,	what	 is	claimed	for	one	will	
often	 be	 claimed	 for	 the	 other,	 as	 we	 will	 see	 Anne	 Primavesi	 argue	 shortly.	 	 It	 is,	
however,	helpful	to	distinguish	particular	nuances	in	feminist	theologians’	affirmations	
of	 the	 two,	not	only	to	highlight	that	women’s	bodies	and	the	earth	body	are	distinct,	
but	 also	 to	 note	 the	 variety	 of	 perspectives	 presented	 by	 feminist	 theologians.	 	 In	
relation	 to	 the	affirmation	of	qualities	associated	with	 female	bodies,	 then,	 it	 is	again	
helpful	 to	 examine	 the	 work	 of	 Grace	 Jantzen.	 	 Jantzen	 emphasises	 the	 process	 of	
becoming,	and	citing	David	Palin,	agrees	with	him	that	“to	be	actual	and	hence	to	be	a	
concrete	 reality	 is	 to	 be	 in	 process”	 (1998,	 255).	 	 Personhood,	 for	 Jantzen,	 is	 thus	
defined	 not	 only	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 changes,	 but	 by	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 one	
changes.		This	is	in	contrast	to	the	classical	perspectives	that	some	feminist	theologians	
critique	 for	 their	 prioritisation	 of	 an	 unchanging	 eternity	 over	 a	 fluid	 and	 changing	
temporality,	as	has	been	seen.		This	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	Jantzen	rejects	ideas	of	
the	future;	on	the	contrary.		Her	emphasis	on	becoming	is	further	defined	as	becoming	
divine,	that	is,	yearning	for	and	moving	towards	a	“divine	horizon”,	which	is	understood	
to	be	“that	ideal	likeness	we	may	both	project	and	reflect”	(1998,	13).		This	was	earlier	
																																																																																																																																																																												
388),	presumably	associating	ecology	with	 that	which	 is	present	and	earthly,	and	eschatology	
with	 that	 which	 is	 future	 and	 otherworldly.	 	 Such	 a	 dichotomisation	 between	 ecology	 and	
eschatology	can,	however,	be	questioned:	consideration	may	be	given	to	whether	there	is	scope	
for	envisioning	an	eschatology	that	can	sustain	ecology.		This	will	be	an	important	question	for	
my	 thesis	 given	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 patriarchal	 theology	 has	 devalued	 materiality	 in	 its	
constructions	 of	 the	 earth	 body	 and	 female	 bodies.	 	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 a	 futurist	 vision	 of	
eschatology	is	to	be	at	all	beneficial,	as	my	thesis	will	propose,	then	it	must	avoid	the	ignorance	
of	and	disregard	 for	ecology	 that	has	been	 identified	with	some	 traditional	understandings	of	
eschatology.	
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expounded	 in	 relation	 to	 constructions	 of	 God	 but	 it	 can	 also	 inform	 our	
understandings	 of	 creation,	 as	 Jantzen	 suggests	 that	 notions	 of	 ideal	 humanity	 are	
projected	onto	the	divine	and	then	sought	to	be	reflected	through	becoming,	and	in	the	
yearning	to	become,	divine.	 	Moreover,	 Jantzen	 insists	that	this	“yearning”	should	not	
be	thought	of	as	“just	an	ineffectual	feeling”;	 instead,	she	sees	it	as	“above	all	ethical”,	
that	 is,	 an	 ethical	 response	 to	 the	 face	 of	 the	 Other	 (1998,	 236).	 	 Jantzen	 here	
understands	the	Other	to	be	other	“natals”	and	the	earth	(1998,	254;	cf.	263).42		Jantzen	
is	 clear	 in	 locating	 such	 an	Other	 in	 this	 present,	 embodied	world,	 and	 not	 in	 “some	
other	world	beyond	embodiment	or	beyond	death”	(1998,	265).		Thus,	the	future,	and	
indeed	the	divine,	is	presented	as	the	projection	of	what	we	are	now	and	the	reflection	
of	 what	 we	 yearn	 to	 be,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 thoroughly	 embodied	 and	 relational.	 	 In	
Jantzen’s	 understanding,	 the	 future	 horizon	 is	 integral	 to	 personhood,	 to	 “becoming	
divine”,	and	is	not	concerned	with	ultimate	achievement	but	with	being	fully	embedded	
in	the	embodied	processes	of	life.43			
	
Part	of	being	embedded	in	embodied	processes	means,	for	many,	an	appreciation	and	
acceptance	of	embodied	limitations,	be	they	suffering,	pain,	or	ultimately,	death.		Christ,	
for	example,	is	particularly	helpful	in	explaining	this,	arguing	that	“When	we	are	aware	
of	our	bodies,	we	are	aware	of	limitations:	we	cannot	be	everywhere	and	we	will	surely	
die”	 (1987,	97).	 	An	appreciation	of	 life,	 for	Christ,	 thus	means	 loving	 “this	 life	which	
ends	 in	 death”	 (1987,	 95).	 	 Whilst	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 equate	 to	 denying	 the	
possibility	of	life	enduring	after	death,	it	refuses	to	focus	on	such	a	possibility.		Instead,	
																																																													
42	Here,	 Jantzen	critically	employs	Levinas	to	aid	and	support	her	understanding	of	the	role	of	
the	 Other	 in	 becoming	 divine.	 	 Whilst	 acknowledging	 that	 Levinas’s	 perspective	 on	
responsibility	to	the	Other	should	be	treated	with	caution	by	feminist	philosophers	because	of	
its	potential	prioritisation	of	the	Other	at	the	expense	of	the	self,	Jantzen	makes	a	sustained	point	
of	showing	that	there	are	resources	in	the	tradition	that	can	and	do	benefit	feminist	thought	(see	
1998,	3,	107;	cf.	Isherwood,	2001,	87).	 	Whilst	I	do	not	intend	to	engage	with	such	thinkers	to	
the	 extent	 that	 Jantzen	 does,	 for	 reasons	 previously	 noted,	 she	 is	 nevertheless	 useful	 in	
illustrating	that	the	master’s	tools	can	in	fact	be	used	to	dismantle	the	master’s	house	(cf.	Lorde,	
1984,	112),	as	I	consistently	claim	throughout	my	thesis. 
43	 This	 phrase	 is	 an	 adaptation	 of	 the	 title	 of	 an	 article	 by	 Carol	 Christ:	Embodied	Embedded	
Mysticism	(2008). 
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death	 is	 interpreted	 as	 one	 of	 the	 many	 processes	 of	 a	 life	 that	 is	 unequivocally	
embodied.	 Jantzen	 (1998,	 155)	 further	 expounds	 the	 impact	 of	 this,	 claiming	 that	
rather	 than	 using	 our	 energy	 to	 “struggle	 against	 finitude,	 we	 can	 rejoice	 in	 the	
(limited)	life	we	have	as	natals	and	act	for	love	of	the	world”	(1998,	155).		Jantzen,	then,	
associates	the	acceptance	of	limitations	with	a	celebration	of	and	love	for	life,	which	is	
contrasted	with	 the	 rejection	of	 life	 that	 is	 suggested	by	a	 “struggle	 against	 finitude”.		
Carol	Christ	 is	again	in	agreement	with	Jantzen,	as	she	suggests	that	an	acceptance	of	
the	 limitations	 of	 life	 redirects	 our	 attention	 to	 the	 here	 and	now	and	 compels	 us	 to	
“enjoy	whatever	 time	 is	 left	 as	much	 as	 possible”	 (Christ,	 2003,	 124).	 	 It	 seems	 that	
death	is	both	sobering	and	encouraging:	it	reminds	us	that	we	are	indeed	limited,	but	
inspires	us	to	seek	the	best	possible	 life	within	these	limitations.	 	By	emphasising	the	
inescapability	and	even	 the	 celebration	of	 limited	 lives	 lived	 in	 limited	bodies,	whilst	
also	 not	 denying	 the	 possibility	 of	 after‐death	 existences,	 it	 seems	 that	 both	
embodiment	and	(the	possibility	of)	eschatology	are	affirmed.44	
	
Feminist	Response:	Affirming	Earthen	Cyclicity	
Before	 assessing	 feminist	 theologians’	 appraisals	 of	 earthen	 life,	we	 should	 note	 that	
some	 feminist	 theologians,	 perhaps	 out	 of	 a	 concern	 not	 to	 perpetuate	 essentialised	
understandings	 of	women’s	 bodies,	 assert	 that	 reclaiming	 the	worth	 of	 both	women	
																																																													
44	Despite	the	benefits	of	these	views,	Christ	and	Jantzen	do	not	sufficiently	attend	to	the	reasons	
and	 experiences	 of	 those	 individuals	 who	 seek	 or	 need	 some	 semblance	 of	 post‐mortem	
reconciliation	 or	 healing.	 	 This	 is	 not	 to	 discount	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 Christ	 and	 Jantzen	 are	
familiar	 with	 the	 pains	 and	 sufferings	 that	 are	 so	 often	 embroiled	 in	 death	 –	 Christ’s	
autobiographical	moments	 (see	 2003,	 90‐91),	 and	 an	 awareness	 of	 Jantzen’s	 experience	with	
and	 ultimately	 her	 death	 caused	 by	 cancer,	 illustrate	 that	 they	 know	 them	well.	 	 Christ	 and	
Jantzen’s	ability	to	neither	deny	or	become	inordinately	concerned	with	death,	but	rather	seek	
to	reconfigure	it	from	the	perspective	of	life	is	an	undoubtedly	beneficial	approach	and	one	that	
informs	 my	 own	 explorations.	 	 However,	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 focus	 on	 life	 speaking	 to	
experiences	 of	 death	 is	 underdeveloped	 here.	 	 Hurd	 detects	 a	 similar	 oversight,	 noting	 that	
Jantzen	 acknowledged	death	 but	 “effectively	 passed	 over	 the	matter,	 emphasizing	 love	 of	 life	
and	this	world	above	concern	about	our	physical	end”	(2013,	199).		Hurd	goes	on	to	suggest	that	
an	appreciation	of	natality	and	birth	can	have	bearing	for	experiences	of	death	and	dying	(2013,	
199).	 	 Similarly,	 Chapter	 Three	 responds	 to	 the	 oversight	 noted	 above,	whilst	 also	 benefiting	
from	 these	 thinkers’	 emphases	 on	 life,	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 an	 eschatology	 rooted	 in	 life,	
wherein	life	and	not	death	causes	suffering	to	end	and	flourishing	to	be	experienced	fully.		
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and	 the	 earth	 is	 not	 as	 simple	 as	 asserting	 that	 both	 are	 equal	 and	 identical	 in	 their	
value.		Gudmarsdottir	(2010,	207)	in	particular	notes	a	potential	problem	with	feminist	
theologians	continuing	to	speak	in	terms	of	the	dichotomisation	of	women	and	nature	
with	men	and	spirit.		She	explains	that:		
When	 women	 claim	 solidarity	 with	 nature	 based	 on	 a	 common	 patriarchal	
subordination,	 they	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 conveniently	 fitting	 into	 the	 patriarchal	
sister‐categories	of	women	and	nature.	
For	Gudmarsdottir,	then,	the	feminist	theologian	must	be	aware	of	and	resist	inheriting	
and	 reaffirming	 the	patriarchal	 categorisations	of	women	 and	nature.	 	However,	 it	 is	
apparent	 that	 feminist	 theologians	 are	 not,	 on	 the	 whole,	 concerned	 so	 much	 with	
resisting	the	identification	of	women	and	nature,	but	rather	with	seeking	to	challenge	
the	oppressive	reasons	for	and	results	of	this	identification.		The	motivation	for	most,	if	
not	all,	 feminist	theological	responses	to	the	association	of	women	with	nature	or	the	
earth	 is	not	 to	 reproduce	 the	dualism	and	so	 continue	 to	 justify	 the	 subordination	of	
women,	 but	 rather	 to	 reclaim	 the	 identification	 in	 order	 to	 affirm	 all	 that	 has	 been	
devalued	 by	 this	 union.	 	 We	 remember	 that	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 dualisms	
themselves	 that	are	problematic,	but	 the	 “associations	 that	are	made	and	attached	 to	
each	pair	of	 the	dichotomy”	(McCulloch,	2002,	21;	cf.	 Jones,	2000,	30).	 	Thus,	 it	 is	 the	
values	assigned	to	the	dichotomous	pairs	rather	than	the	dichotomies	themselves	that	
are	exposed	as	problematic.			
	
The	 intended	or	potential	 result	of	 feminist	 theologians’	 revaluation	of	 female	bodies	
and	 the	 earth	 body	 is	 surmised	 particularly	 well	 by	 Primavesi,	 who	 argues	 that	 the	
simultaneous	 affirmation	 of	women	 and	 nature	will	 prevent	 the	 depiction	 of	 both	 as	
inferior.		“Instead”,	she	writes,	“what	will	be	claimed	for	women	in	respect	to	God	will	
be	claimed	for	Nature	also”	(1991,	143).		The	previous	attention	paid	to	rethinking	God	
again	resurfaces	as	important,	and	Primavesi	uses	this	to	promote	a	celebration	of	that	
which	 has	 been	 historically	 demonised	 by	 patriarchy.	 	 Furthermore,	 she	 locates	 the	
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liberation	of	both	women	and	nature	in	this	connection	as	any	value,	worth,	or	meaning	
that	is	claimed	for	one	is	similarly	claimed	for	the	other.		Again,	this	does	not	mean	that	
the	specific	ways	in	which	the	two	are	valued	will	be	identical.		Rather,	because	the	two	
have	been	devalued	on	account	of	their	mutual	equation	with	fluidity	and	temporality,	
the	 affirmation	 of	 some	 of	 their	 specific	 experiences	 of	 these	 can	 pave	 the	 way	 to	
similarly	value	the	others’.45	
	
Bearing	in	mind	this	assertion	that	the	revaluation	of	qualities	associated	with	female	
bodies	 and	 the	 earth	 body	 may	 be	 similar	 but	 not	 identical,	 we	 can	 draw	 parallels	
between	Jantzen’s	affirmation	of	embodied	processes	through	reference	to	natality	and	
flourishing,	and	 feminist	 theological	responses	 to	 the	devaluation	of	 the	earth.	 	These	
responses	tend	to	 focus	on	affirming	the	cyclical,	unending,	and	ever‐changing	nature	
of	life.		Such	thinkers	again	include	Rosemary	Radford	Ruether,	who	understands	life	in	
terms	 of	 its	 constant	 renewal	 as	 opposed	 to	 its	 ultimate	 end.	 	 Far	 from	being	 a	 new	
concept,	Ruether	notes	that	such	thought	existed	in	Ancient	Near	Eastern	cultures,	who	
saw	“the	cycles	of	renewal	of	nature	as	the	key	to	the	constant	hope	for	renewed	life,	
resurrected	 from	 drought	 and	 death”	 (2002,	 203).	 	 Ruether	 confirms	 her	 alignment	
with	this	perspective	by	later	proposing	that	“bodies	and	nature	contain	the	promise	of	
continuing	 springtime,	 new	 greening	 that	 again	 and	 again	 makes	 the	 overcoming	 of	
drought	 and	 death	 possible”	 (2008,	 337).	 	 Unlike	 the	 acceptance	 of	 death	 that	 was	
detectable	 in	the	work	of	 Jantzen	and	Christ,	 then,	Ruether	seems	to	posit	cyclicity	as	
making	manifest	 the	 perpetual	 tenacity	 of	 life.	 	 However,	 reading	 further	 it	 becomes	
																																																													
45	These	 considerations	will	be	 important	 for	my	 thesis	as	 they	note	 that	 the	 identification	of	
women	with	nature	need	not	be	a	tool	of	patriarchy,	but	can	be	a	tool	to	dismantle	patriarchy	by	
re‐envisioning	 the	 identification	 in	undoubtedly	positive,	 and	even	divine,	 terms.	 	As	noted	 in	
my	Introduction,	though,	the	primary	focus	of	my	thesis	is	a	rethinking	of	eschatology	in	relation	
to	framings	and	some	experiences	of	female	bodies.		This	does	not	signify	a	neglect	of	the	earth‐
denying	 sentiments	 of	 traditional	 models	 of	 eschatology,	 but	 it	 does	 propose	 that	 affirming	
women’s	 bodies	must	 be	 primary	 as	 they	 have	 been	most	 devalued	 by	 traditional	models	 of	
eschatology.	 	 Given	 the	 assertions	made	 here,	 though,	 an	 affirmation	 of	 female	 bodies	 in	 the	
eschaton	may	also	have	positive	implications	for	the	earth	body. 
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clear	that	Ruether’s	perspective	is	in	fact	similar	to	Jantzen’s	and	Christ’s.		She	calls	for	
a	metanoia,	 or	 “conversion”	 to	 our	 material	 environment.	 	 For	 Ruether,	 this	 means	
seeing	both	change	and	death	as	“good”,	for	they	“belong	to	the	natural	limits	of	life”.		It	
is	within	 these	 limits,	 and	not	 in	some	 future	eschatological	 existence,	 that	we	are	 to	
seek	life	(2002,	313‐315).		Ruether	thus	presents	a	dual	perspective	on	death	whereby	
the	 conversion	 to	 material	 life	 both	 accepts	 the	 presence	 of	 death	 and	 continually	
overcomes	 it.	 	 Death	 is	 thus	 presented	 not	 as	 an	 evil	 to	 be	 overcome	 but	 rather	 as	
integral	to	the	perpetual	cycle	of	life	beginning	anew.46	
	
There	 exists	 within	 the	 literature	 yet	 more	 support	 for	 emphasising	 the	 processual	
nature	 of	 life,	 as	 manifest	 in	 perpetual	 seasonality	 and	 the	 endurance	 of	 embodied	
processes.		Catherine	Keller,	for	example,	has	coined	the	phrase	“timefulness”	in	order	
to	 claim	 that	 “time	 is	 of	 the	 essence”	 (1996a,	 134),	meaning	 that	 time	 is	 integral	 to	
created	 beings.	 	 Keller	 uses	 this	 to	 assert	 that	 time	 is	 inseparable	 from	materiality.		
What	is	meant	by	“time”	here	is	not	clock‐watching,	but	rather	the	passing	of	moments	
which	 is	 and	 can	 only	 ever	 be	 experienced	 in	materiality.	 	 It	 is	within	 the	 transitory	
nature	 of	 materiality	 that	 Keller	 locates	 worth.	 	 Existence	 here	 is	 characterised	 by	
perpetual	 cyclicity;	 an	 assertion	which	 Keller	 claims	 affirms	 “finitude	while	 averting	
finality.		Finitude	without	end”	(1996a,	274).		What	is	essentially	being	communicated	
here,	 then,	 is	 the	 unending	 nature	 of	 natural	 endings.	 	 	 Cyclicity	 and	 seasonality,	
comprised	of	both	life	and	death,	are	here	understood	to	be	authentic	and	inescapable	
aspects	 of	 life.	 	 Affirming	 these	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 more	 capable	 of	 honouring	 the	
																																																													
46	This	alternative	 reading	of	death	 informs	my	proposals	 in	Chapter	Three	 that	death	can	be	
transformed	by	life.		I	differ	from	Ruether,	though,	by	locating	the	fullness	and	completeness	of	
this	 in	the	eschatological	 future,	and	also	by	retaining	a	sense	in	which	we	can	experience	 this	
fullness	of	life. 
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processual	nature	of	becoming	settled	 in	our	embodiments	than	any	body‐denying	or	
body‐fleeing	eschatology.47	
	
Locating	this	Thesis	
Chapter	Three,	 then,	 emerges	out	of	 a	deficiency	 I	detect	 in	 some	of	 the	above‐noted	
perspectives.	 	 These	 deficiencies	 are	 informed	 by	 the	 value	 I	 find	 in	 feminist	
theologians’	emphases	on	embodied	 fluidity	and	 life;	 the	reluctance	amongst	 feminist	
theologians	 to	 think	 of	 these	 aspects	 being	 experienced	 in	 full	marks	 the	 core	 of	my	
critique.	 	 I	 claim,	 then,	 that	 the	attachment	 to	 continuous	process	 and,	 accordingly,	 a	
lack	 of	 any	 eschatological	 future,	 is	 only	 justifiable	 if	we	 continue	 to	 hold	 fast	 to	 the	
patriarchal	construction	of	that	future	as	disembodied	and	otherworldly.		Janet	Martin	
Soskice	is	helpful	here,	as	she	provides	an	alternative	reading	of	process	and	becoming.		
She	infers	that	a	sense	of	finality	is	actually	beneficial	to	an	emphasis	on	becoming	by	
suggesting	 that	 a	 vision	of	 ending	 is	 integral	 to	 conceiving	of	what	we	are	becoming.		
“‘What	we	will	be’”,	 she	writes,	 “is	not	separable	 from	what	we	were	made	to	be	and	
what	we	now	are”	(2007,	181).	 	This	 implies	 that	 there	 is	a	continuation,	 for	Soskice,	
between	 the	embodied	and	 changing	beings	we	presently	 are	 and	 the	beings	we	will	
become	 in	 the	 future.	 	 Moreover,	 for	 Soskice	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 a	 future	
fulfilment	carries	with	it	a	sense	of	humility	as	it	accepts	that	“we	do	not	yet	know	fully	
what	we	will	be,	because	we	do	not	yet	fully	know	the	glory	of	God.	For	now	we	have	
only	glimpses”	(2007,	183).		Similarly,	Russell	contends	that	the	glory	of	God	is	located	
in	creation	becoming	what	God	intends	creation	to	be	(1982a,	38).	 	Thus	there	is	also	
an	element	of	difference	in	Soskice	and	Russell’s	perceptions	of	the	future,	whereby	the	
beings	we	will	become	are	as	yet,	in	part,	a	mystery.	 	Locating	personhood	only	 in	the	
becoming,	then,	and	not	in	the	ultimate	being	is	somewhat	limited.		The	dual	inference	
																																																													
47	These	perspectives	help	us	to	value	the	dynamic	changes	that	are	present	within	creation;	my	
thesis	 will	 diverge	 from	 these	 views,	 though,	 as	 I	 will	 propose	 that	 these	 changes	 can	 be	
transformed	in	the	eschaton	in	such	a	way	that	dynamic	life	abounds	but	death	does	not. 
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to	continuation	and	difference	in	the	future	signals	the	possibility	of	both	appreciating	
feminist	 theological	 appraisals	 of	 process	 and	 also	 retaining	 an	 eschatological	
perspective.			
	
Chapter	Three	will	thus	seek	to	specify	the	future	alluded	to	by	Soskice	and	Russell	by	
constructing	a	model	of	eschatologically	embodied	endurance	and	transformation	that	
makes	 central	 the	 change	 and	 fluidity	 that	 has	 been	 so	 devalued	 by	 patriarchal	
constructions	 of	 female	 bodies.	 	 By	 focussing	 on	 transformation	 as	 opposed	 to	
overcoming,	 I	 will	 resist	 the	 language	 of	 conquest	 and	 allusions	 to	 dominance	 but	
retain	the	life‐affirming	perspectives	of	the	thinkers	noted.		Indeed,	we	remember	that	
Isasi‐Díaz,	whose	contributions	are	crucial	to	the	explorations	in	the	following	section,	
notes	that	we	need	to	flesh	out	“the	kind	of	new	heaven	and	the	new	earth	for	which	
justice‐seeking	people	hunger	and	thirst”	 (1999,	229).	 	Chapter	Three,	 then,	attempts	
this	“fleshing	out”,	quite	literally,	in	order	to	specify	the	ways	in	which	this	hunger	and	
this	 thirst	 for	 embodied	 justice	 may	 be	 satiated.	 	 Such	 specificity	 will	 then	 lead	 to	
Chapter	Four’s	attempts	 to	suggest	ways	we	may	 taste	 this	now,	which	speaks	 to	 the	
final	problem	noted	by	feminist	theologians:	that	of	the	time	of	the	future.	
	
Time:	Eschatology	and	Futurity	
So	 far,	we	have	 seen	 feminist	 theologians	 respond	 to	problems	with	 the	process	 and	
content	of	eschatology	by	emphasising	responsibility	and	relationality,	and	embodied	
and	 earthen	 life.	 	 There	 exists	 another	 related	 issue	 here,	 though;	 namely	 that	 in	
addition	 to	 the	problems	associated	with	 the	process	and	content	of	 eschatology,	 the	
very	 discussion	 of	 the	 process	 and	 content	 envisages	 the	 location	 of	 both	
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predominantly	 in	 the	 future.48	 	 As	 such,	 a	 trend	 that	 runs	 throughout	 feminist	
responses	is	a	focus	on	the	present,	born	out	of	a	desire	to	assuage	this	sense	of	delay.		
Attempts	are	made	to	centralise	and	specify	ways	to	achieve	liberation	in	the	here	and	
now.	 	 Integral	 to	 this	 is	 praxis,	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 resistance,	 practicality,	 and	
feasibility.		Similar	to	the	emphasis	on	embodied	and	earthen	limitations,	though,	there	
is	again	an	acceptance	that	these	moves	to	achieve	liberation	are	limited.		This	is	not,	as	
we	shall	see,	deemed	to	be	problematic	as	worth	 is	 located	 in	the	struggle	more	than	
the	achievement.		Contributions	from	feminist	liberation	theologians,	such	as	Ada	María	
Isasi‐Díaz,	are	particularly	noteworthy	here.			
	
Problem:	A	Delayed	Promise	and	Hope	
The	first	contention	to	note,	raised	by	feminist	theologians	in	relation	to	the	apparent	
futurist	leanings	of	traditional	models	of	eschatology,	is	that	they	delay	liberation	and	
have	 thus	 been	 ineffective	 in	 challenging	 oppressive	 structures.	 	 Isasi‐Díaz	 shows	 an	
appreciation	for	the	attraction	of	a	future	perspective,	noting	that	“When	the	present	is	
limiting	–	oppressive	–	one	looks	to	the	future	to	find	a	reason	for	living”	(2004b,	52).		
However,	she	writes	that	despite	the	comfort	that	such	a	perspective	may	provide,	such	
a	 model	 of	 the	 future	 actually	 signifies	 the	 tradition’s	 deferment	 of	 liberation	 to	 an	
ever‐elusive	future.		There	are	some	clear	power	dynamics	at	play	here:	the	deferment	
of	hope	and	promise	to	the	future	appears	to	be	a	luxury	afforded	to	those	who	are	in	
no	immediate	need	of	specific	and	realistic	liberation.		Indeed,	Ivone	Gebara	notes	that	
the	experience	of	poverty	and	the	need	to	fight	for	survival	can	often	prevent	the	search	
for	new	alternatives	(2010,	54).		Oppression	can,	then,	hinder	the	ability	to	think	of	the	
future;	the	reality	of	the	present,	saturated	with	suffering,	absorbs	all	attention.		When	
																																																													
48	Given	such	overlapping,	 the	discussions	 in	 this	section	are	not	as	vast	as	previous	sections;	
many	of	the	problems	have	already	been	examined,	and	responses	noted	thus	far	have	already	
attended	to	the	apparent	futurist	leanings	of	eschatology	by	emphasising	embodied	relationality	
and	 fluidity	 and	 creaturely	 responsibility	 in	 the	 present.	 	Whilst	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 repeat	
their	claims,	the	responses	already	noted	do	provide	a	substantial	basis	for	those	attended	to	in	
this	section. 
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the	 immediate	 reality	 is	 too	 painful	 and	 the	 eschatological	 promise	 too	 distant,	 the	
oppressed	are	left	in	a	liminal	space	of	“resignation	and	expectation”	(Isasi‐Díaz,	1988,	
99).		Theologies	that	focus	only	on	contemplating	future	existence	are	thus	indicative	of	
a	privileged	status	and	a	degree	of	detachment	 from	those	for	whom	such	imaginings	
are	 irrelevant	 if	not	 impossible.	 	As	 Isasi‐Díaz	claims,	such	theologies	have	been	used	
“to	 encourage	 the	poor	 and	 the	 oppressed	 to	 postpone	hope	 and	 expectations	 to	 the	
next	world”	 (2004b,	52).	 	This	highlights	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 issue,	 for	eschatology	
appears	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 force	 for	 both	 comfort	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 suffering	 and	
resignation	to	that	suffering.		It	would	seem	that	the	greater	the	suffering	is,	the	more	
comforting	 the	eschatological	hope	becomes	but,	 likewise,	 the	more	essential	 it	 is	 for	
those	 in	 power	 that	 the	 eschatological	 promise	 is	 delayed.	 	 Eschatology	 here	 serves	
those	 in	 power	 by	 being	 disassociated	 from	 and	 incapable	 of	 touching	 the	 present.		
Resigned	to	the	future	alone,	it	is	accused	of	constructing	liberation	as	a	distant	utopic	
hope	and	oppression	as	an	unavoidable	present	reality;	the	former	to	be	wished	for,	the	
latter	to	be	endured.49			
	
Karen	 Baker‐Fletcher	 confirms	 Isasi‐Díaz’s	 observations,	 noting	 how	 eschatological	
hope	 and	 comfort	 has	 often	 been	 used	 by	 patriarchy	 in	 order	 to	 pacify	 those	 it	
oppresses,	who	so	often	are	women.		We	remember	Baker‐Fletcher’s	engagement	with	
Alice	Walker’s	 novel	The	Color	Purple,	and	her	 explanation	of	 how	dreams	of	 heaven	
were	juxtaposed	with	resistance	and	protest	(1998,	121).	 	She	goes	on	to	explain	that	
																																																													
49	 This	 indicates	 the	 necessity	 for	 any	 reconstruction	 of	 eschatology	 to	 take	 seriously	 such	
particular	experiences	and	to	be	capable	of	offering	something	back	to	those	experiences.		Still,	
my	 ability	 to	 contemplate	 such	 reconstructions	 admittedly	 signifies	 a	 proximity	 to	 privilege.		
Whilst	my	ability	 to	empathise	with	 these	perspectives	 is	 limited,	 though,	my	commitment	 to	
listening	to	them	is	not.	 	Elizabeth	A.	Johnson	claims	that	such	listening	is	the	basis	of	feminist	
ethics	which,	she	claims,	should	strive	“to	listen	to	women	for	clues	as	to	how	they	experience	
and	 interpret	 reality,	 and	 to	 use	 these	 indicators	 as	 guides	 to	 construct	 a	 vision	 of	 a	 moral	
universe	wherein	women’s	well‐being,	along	with	everything	they	cherish	is	promoted”	(2002,	
67).	 	 Furthermore,	 Nicola	 Slee	 writes	 that	 listening	 is	 a	 “spiritual	 practice”,	 given	 the	
attentiveness	 and	 commitment,	 to	 both	 oneself	 and	 the	 other,	 that	 it	 requires	 (2013,	 18).	 	 I	
similarly	strive	to	uphold	such	a	stance	in	this	thesis	by	attending	to	some	accounts	of	women’s	
lived	experiences. 
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such	dreaming	jeopardises	life	and	is	in	fact	suicidal,	for	it	“fails	to	respect	God’s	gift	of	
an	 embodied	 self	 in	 this	 life”	 (1998,	 121).	 	 It	 is	 clear	 from	 this,	 then,	 that	 traditional	
models	 of	 eschatology	 devalue	 life	 both	 by	 promoting	 an	 immaterial	 future	 (as	 the	
earlier	section	noted)	and	by	locating	all	value	in	this	unattainable	future.		Indeed,	each	
problem	noted	exposes	the	thoroughly	unattainable	nature	of	traditional	eschatologies,	
for	at	each	stage	they	have	been	alienated	from	our	present	experiences.	
	
However,	some	feminist	 theologians	argue	that	 it	 is	not,	and	has	not	always	been	the	
case	that	the	comfort	and	hope	provided	by	an	eschatological	perspective	is	pacifying	
or	 luxurious.	 	 There	 are	 instances	 where	 such	 a	 hope	 has	 been	 edifying	 and	
empowering.		Linda	A.	Moody	(1996,	96)	notes	that:	
When	 all	 else	 around	 them	 seemed	 hopeless,	 Black	 slaves	 could	 turn	 to	 God,	
singing,	praying,	and	shouting	their	troubles	away.		At	the	same	time,	the	Black	
religious	experience	provided	slaves	with	a	religion	that	enabled	them	to	resist	
slavery	and	to	work	for	freedom.	
Comfort	here	was	a	corollary	to,	and	perhaps	even	sustained	acts	of	resistance.50		Even	
when	such	resistance	is	not	the	product	of	comfort	though,	the	importance	of	comfort	
in	and	of	itself	should	not	be	underestimated.		This	is	recognised	as	an	omission	in	the	
theologies	 of	 some,	 though	 it	 is	 not	 always	 framed	 as	 a	 deficiency.	 	 Mary	 Grey,	 for	
example,	recognises	that	her	understanding	of	the	future	as	cyclical	means	that	“there	
is	 no	 real	 hope	 experienced	 for	 the	 future”,	 and	 though	 she	 still	 maintains	 that	 the	
process	of	becoming	“demands	that	we	move	forward”	(1989,	80),	to	what	end	and	for	
what	purpose	is	unclear.		Moreover,	Grey	recognises	that	a	solely	presentist	focus	does	
not	provide	a	once‐and‐for‐all	solution,	perceiving	as	she	does	that	present	redemption	
cannot	 eliminate	 all	 suffering	 and	 that	 “illness,	 bereavement	 and	 breakdown	 of	
relationships”	are	inevitable	parts	of	present	existence	(1989,	3).	 	Again,	then,	we	can	
																																																													
50	Moody’s	reference	to	“Black	religious	experience”	infers	an	important	point;	namely	that	the	
comfort	sought	and	found	was	rooted	in	Black	people’s	experiences.		This	was	a	comfort	that	was	
not	defined	or	dictated	by	 the	oppressor,	 and	as	 such	 indicates	 an	 element	of	 self‐possession	
and	self‐definition	 that	 is	 important	 to	 liberationist	 re‐modellings	of	hope,	as	we	shall	 shortly	
see. 
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observe	here	a	re‐emergence	of	the	key	concern	to	affirm	and	accept	the	limitations	of	
embodied	life.			
	
Whereas	 contemplation	 about	 the	 future	 was	 earlier	 identified	 as	 a	 luxury	 of	 the	
privileged,	it	may	also	be	the	case	that	the	lack	of	a	future	perspective	is	indicative	of	a	
privileged	position.		Althaus‐Reid	and	Isherwood	(2007,	119)	note	that	the	absence	of	
an	alternative	future	fails	to:	
take	 account	 of	 the	 life‐experience	 of	 those	who,	 because	 of	 social,	 economic	
and	ecological	situations,	die	young	and	have	no	chance	to	flourish,	unlike	most	
western	middle‐class	people.			
This	 suggests	 that	 the	 rejection	 of	 a	 future	 comfort,	 hope,	 and	 promise,	 far	 from	
emphasising	life	in	the	present,	can	actually	restrict	one’s	reality	to	life	in	the	present.		
When	 one’s	 present	 experience	 is	 void	 of	 the	 “chance	 to	 flourish”,	 a	 future	
characterised	 by	 a	 specific	 model	 of	 flourishing	 can	 provide	 a	 beam	 of	 hope	 in	 an	
otherwise	bleak	world.		Whilst	this	may	potentially	appear	to	be	yet	another	placating	
tool	 of	 a	 patriarchal	 eschatology,	 or	 a	 religious	 crutch	 upon	 which	 disempowered	
people(s)	can	passively	rest,	this	need	not	be	the	case.		In	further	support	of	such	hope,	
Althaus‐Reid	 and	 Isherwood	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 Elizabeth	 Stuart’s	 perspective,	
noting	 her	 contention	 that	 in	 rejecting	 all	 thoughts	 about	 the	 eschatological	 future,	
feminist	theology	has	simultaneously	rejected	the	way	in	which	to	gain	perspective	on	
present	 experiences.	 	 Instead,	 Althaus‐Reid	 and	 Isherwood	 note	 Stuart’s	 claim	 that	
feminist	theology,	in	depriving	itself	of	a	“heaven”,	has	“damned	itself	to	the	unforgiving	
and	suffocating	present”	(2007,	120‐121).		This	infers	that	without	a	future	perspective	
the	present	has	the	last	word	in	situations	of	oppression.		Stuart’s	comment	exposes	the	
inadequacy	 of	 a	 solely	 presentist	 stance	 in	 providing	 a	 substantial	 and	 empowering	
hope,	 and	 supports	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 future	 to	 instil	 such	 hope.	 	 Indeed,	 many	
liberationist	 perspectives,	whilst	 critical	 of	 traditional	 constructions	 of	 hope,	 seek	 to	
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retain	 hope	 by	 reconstructing	 its	 focus	 and	 meaning	 as	 something	 powerful	 and	
effective.	
	
Another	 important	 contribution	 to	 note	 here	 is	 Christina	 Thürmer‐Rohr’s	 argument	
that	 a	 utopic	 future	 hope	 resonates	 too	 closely	with	 “the	 young	white	man’s	 idealist	
adventure	 to	 the	 new	 frontier	 or	 the	 old	 white	 man’s	 yearning	 for	 immortality”	 (as	
cited	 by	 Keller,	 1996a,	 123)	 by	 locating	 hope	 in	 that	 which	 is	 unattainable,	 in	 the	
present	at	least.		Keller	further	interrogates	patriarchal	theological	constructions	of	the	
“place”	of	the	present,	particularly	as	they	are	constructed	in	relation	to	the	time	of	the	
future.	 	She	recognises	that	women	have	been	“scapegoats	 for	[...]	a	masculine	escape	
from	 time”	 due	 to	 their	 identification	with	 “finitude,	mortality,	 and	 corruption	 itself”	
(1996a,	127).		Keller	supports	the	claims	noted	earlier	by	other	feminist	theologians	by	
arguing	that	the	time	of	the	future	has	colonised	the	space	of	the	present	(1996a,	148).		
Keller	draws	 a	distinction	here	between	 space	 and	place,	 effectively	naming	place	 as	
what	 happens	 to	 space:	 “the	 relationality	 of	 space,	 [the]	 intersubjectively	 occupied	
space”	 (1996a,	 144).	 	 Place	 is	 thus,	 for	 Keller,	 the	 relational	 engagement	 and	
materialisation	of	space,	which	is	dichotomised	against	and	colonised	by	time.	 	Unlike	
other	 thinkers,	 though,	 Keller	 adds	 that	 the	 possession	 of	 place	 is	 supported	 by	 the	
possession	 of	 time,	 both	 of	 which	 are	 seen	 as	 male	 prerogatives.	 	 The	 depiction	 of	
power	 as	 possession	 again	 resurfaces.	 	 Moreover,	 Keller	 claims	 that	 the	 gendered	
language	 used	 to	 characterise	 space	 transforms	 it	 into	 a	 place	 that	 is	 open	 to	 future	
abuses	 and	 invasions	 (1996a,	 127).	 	 Keller	 names	 this	 the	 “annihilation	 of	 space	 by	
time”	(1996a,	148),	effected	by	colonizing	particular	places.	 	The	 implications	of	such	
an	 attitude	 are	 that	 theology	 fails	 to	 “mourn	 the	 loss	 of	 habitat”	 by	 “forget[ting]	
forward,	 into	 a	 supernaturally	 artificial	 environment”	 (1996a,	 150).	 	 This	 “forgetting	
forward”,	 Keller	 claims,	 enables	 and	 justifies	 the	 disregard	 and	 in	 some	 cases	
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destruction	of	space,	which	is	contextualised	as	place	through	its	association	with	the	
female.			
	
Interestingly,	 time	 in	 this	 context	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 male;	 this	 displays	 Keller’s	
novel	perspective	as	the	relativity	of	time,	or	the	fluidity	of	temporality,	has	more	often	
been	associated	with	female	bodies,	as	we	have	seen.	 	Keller	explains	this	by	claiming	
that	 binary	 ways	 of	 thinking	 are	 “context‐specific”	 (1996a,	 128).	 	 Indeed,	 Keller’s	
argument	 offers	 the	 unique	 contention	 that	 the	 association	 of	 women	 with	 time	 is	
malleable	and	able	to	be	changed	in	order	to	serve	the	agenda	of	a	patriarchal	vision	of	
eschatology.		Such	a	separation	of	time	from	place	is	difficult	to	detect	elsewhere	in	the	
literature:	the	two	have	been	so	intertwined	and	jointly	associated	with	women,	as	has	
been	seen.		Nevertheless,	Keller	is	helpful	in	highlighting	the	problems	with	locating	the	
future	as	somewhere	outside	of	this	earth	–	an	issue	we	do	see	reflected	in	the	rest	of	
the	 literature.	 	 In	 summary,	 Keller’s	 contribution	 is	 indispensible	 in	 expounding	 the	
problems	with	prioritising	 the	 time	of	 the	 future	over	 the	place	of	 the	present.	 	 This	
shows	 the	 necessity	 of	 eschatology	 taking	 the	 present	 seriously,	 particularly	 the	
present	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	by	women,	 as	 their	 bodies	have	been	 constructed	 as	 the	
reason	and	vehicle	for	the	escape	or	possession	of	the	present.	
	
Whilst	Keller’s	attention	 to	 time	and	space/place	has	a	unique	 focus	and	articulation,	
aspects	of	her	argument	are	similarly	proposed	by	other	 feminist	 theologians.	 	Brock	
and	Parker,	for	instance,	claim	that	the	“founders”	of	North	America	harboured	notions	
of	a	New	World	that	envisioned	and	idealised	a	“paradise‐past	and	paradise‐to‐come”	
and	 subsequently	 sought	 to	 “regain	 paradise	 by	 wiping	 away	 Satan’s	 old	 world	 and	
claiming	Christ’s	new	one	–	by	any	means	necessary”	(2008,	340).		Such	attitudes,	it	is	
observed,	led	to	a	desire	to	define	the	land’s	current	inhabitants	as	intruders,	when	in	
reality	 it	was	 the	 “founders”	who	were	 the	most	 intrusive,	 arriving	 as	 they	 did	with	
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their	notions	of	land	ownership	and	property	that	were	foreign	to	the	native	tribes	they	
encountered	(Bourne	citing	tribe	leader	Massasoit,	as	cited	by	Brock	and	Parker,	2008,	
349).	 	 The	 idea	 of	 regaining	 and	 reforming	 this	 lost	 paradise	 encapsulates	 both	
nostalgia	for	a	pre‐fallen	perfection	and	hope	for	a	perfect	future,	with	women’s	bodies,	
Keller	observes,	“absorb[ing]	the	full	force”	of	this	nostalgic‐utopic	presently‐occurring	
apocalypse	(1996a,	164).				The	present	is	thus	literally	and	symbolically	gendered,	and	
valued	only	in	its	openness	to	penetration	from	the	past	or	projection	into	the	future.		
The	 problems	 are	 only	 exacerbated	when	 this	 is	 coupled	with	 the	 patriarchal	 use	 of	
eschatological	hope	to	encourage	passive	acquiescence	to	present	suffering.			
	
Feminist	Response:	A	Realistic	Praxis	and	Hope	
Before	 exploring	 some	ways	 in	which	 hope	 has	 been	 reconfigured,	we	 should	 firstly	
note	 the	 emphasis	 that	 these	 responses	 place	 on	 praxis.	 	Whilst	 this	 is	 not	 strictly	 a	
response	to	the	futurist	leanings	of	traditional	models	of	eschatology	it	is,	more	widely,	
a	 critique	 and	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 intellectualised	 preoccupations	 of	 classical	
theology	which,	 it	seems,	are	exemplified	 in	eschatology.	 	Emphasis	here	 is	placed	on	
the	struggle	against	oppression,	which	is	summarised	neatly	by	Isasi‐Díaz,	who	writes	
that	“La	vida	es	la	lucha	‐	the	struggle	is	life”	(1988,	99).		By	emphasising	the	struggle,	
attention	 is	 directed	 away	 from	 the	 outcome	of	 the	 struggle	 and	 toward	 the	 realistic	
and	 feasible	 conditions	 needed	 to	 make	 the	 struggle	 possible	 and	 worthwhile.	 	 The	
struggle	 is	 for	 life,	 but	 more	 importantly	 for	 Isasi‐Díaz,	 the	 struggle	 is	 life	 itself.	 	By	
focussing	 on	 the	 struggle	 instead	 of	 the	 “fruits	 of	 labor”	 or	 the	 “reward”,	 Isasi‐Díaz	
posits	a	 challenge	 to	 the	 “resignation	and	expectation”	 that	has	been	critiqued	 (Isasi‐
Díaz,	 1988,	 99).	 	 What	 is	 prioritised	 here	 is	 practical	 attention	 to	 and	 action	 for	
liberation	from	concrete	experiences	of	oppression.		
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For	 Isasi‐Díaz,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 this	 struggle	 for	 liberation	 is	 realistic:	 if	 it	 were	
unattainable	it	would	merely	lead	to	apathy	–	a	very	real	experience	for	Latina	women,	
she	notes.	 	This	echoes	the	earlier‐noted	work	of	Jantzen	who	claimed	that	the	divine	
horizon	 was	 not	 to	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 something	 that	 we	 have	 no	 possibility	 of	 ever	
achieving	(1998,	92).	 	Rather	than	having	an	unattainable	goal,	then,	Isasi‐Díaz	claims	
that	the	goal	must	continuously	be	re‐considered	in	order	that	its	accomplishment	be	a	
real	 possibility	 (2004b,	 55).	 	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 Isasi‐Díaz	 notes	 that	 the	 struggle	 is	
often	 tinged	 with	 fear;	 not	 that	 its	 goal	 may	 be	 accomplished	 but	 rather	 that	 the	
accomplishments	 may	 be	 “co‐opted	 by	 the	 status	 quo”.	 	 This	 means,	 for	 Isasi‐Díaz	
(2004b,	55‐56),	that	the	struggle	must	be	self‐inspecting	and	specific,	as	she	writes:	
In	 order	 to	 counteract	 apathy	 and	 fear,	we	have	 to	 continue	 to	 elaborate	 our	
vision	of	the	future	at	the	same	time	that	we	work	to	articulate	the	details	of	our	
proyecto	 histórico	 [historical	 project].	 	 Making	 our	 preferred	 future	 a	 reality	
needs	much	more	than	vague	generalities.		Latinas’	proyecto	histórico	has	to	be	
specific	enough	for	each	of	us	to	know	how	we	are	to	participate	in	the	struggle	
to	make	it	a	reality,	and	what	our	task	will	be	when	it	becomes	a	reality.	
By	referring	to	“what	our	task	will	be	when	it	becomes	a	reality”	Isasi‐Díaz	signifies	the	
cyclical	process	of	 liberation.	 	 Just	as	earlier	contributions	emphasised	this	in	relation	
to	 affirming	 the	 earth	 and	 embodied	 lives,	 Isasi‐Díaz	 refers	 to	 it	 here	 in	 order	 to	
emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 continually	 reassess	 and	 recreate	 the	moves	 of	 liberation.	 	 In	
this	way,	she	speaks	of	a	historical	future	in	a	way	that	is	averse	to	the	spiritualised	and	
intellectualised	nature	of	traditional	eschatological	futures.		Moreover,	she	emphasises	
the	 specificity	 and	particularity	 of	 Latina	 struggles	 and	 the	need	 to	 envision	 a	 future	
rooted	in	and	capable	of	speaking	to	their	lives.51			
	
Many	 womanist	 theologians	 have	 claimed	 that	 their	 moves	 towards	 liberation	 and,	
indeed,	their	hopes	for	such	liberation,	can	be	developed	by	remembering	their	pasts.		
																																																													
51	 I	 contend	 that	 such	 contributions	can	help	us	 to	 think	eschatologically:	by	constructing	 the	
content	 of	 the	 eschaton	 as	 being	 characterised	 by	 particular	 bodies,	 such	 a	 future	 is	 able	 to	
affirm	 them	 and	 empower	 their	 struggle	 for	 integrity	 and	worth.	 	 The	meaning	 and	 value	 of	
struggles	and,	more	specifically,	struggles	for	survival,	are	attended	to	in	Chapter	Four.	 
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These	remembrances,	although	sometimes	lacking	in	specificity,	are	substantial	enough	
to	fuel	movements	towards	liberation.		As	Baker‐Fletcher	(1998,	30)	writes:	
While	we	may	not	know	how	our	mothers	‘walked	their	trouble	down’	or	‘how	
our	fathers	stood	their	ground,’	we	do	remember	that	they	did	so.	 	That’s	why	
we	 believe	 we	 too	 can	 survive	 both	 the	 evil	 of	 social	 injustice	 and	 natural	
disasters	
Remembrance,	for	Baker‐Fletcher,	thus	sustains	the	hope	that	troubles	can	once	again	
be	 overcome	 and	 resistance	 can	 once	 again	 be	 achieved.	 	 Oduyoye	 combines	 this	
remembrance	with	a	practice	of	self‐direction,	claiming	that	“I	have	the	memory	of	the	
future	 my	 grandmother	 and	 my	 mother	 put	 before	 me;	 I	 live	 out	 this	 future	 while	
creating	a	 future	for	myself”	(Oduyoye,	1988,	35‐36).	 	For	these	thinkers,	 then,	active	
remembrances	 of	 past	 liberation,	 which	 themselves	 were	 possibly	 fuelled	 by	 hope,	
contribute	 to	 hope	 in	 the	 present;	 the	 meaning	 and	 purpose	 of	 which	 must	
continuously	be	 examined	 in	 relation	 to	what	 it	means	 “for	myself”.	 	 It	 is	possible	 to	
infer	from	this	that	remembrance	is	important	not	only	to	conceiving	of	a	continuation	
of	identity	and	selfhood	but	also	to	constructing	one’s	own	hope	for	the	future.			
	
Moreover,	 the	 hope	 enabled	 by	 such	 remembrances	 is	 rooted	 in	 experiences	 and	 is	
committed	to	once	again	making	those	experiences	as	liberating	as	possible.	 	As	such,	
this	 remembrance	 can	 speak	 to	 what	 should	 endure	 in	 the	 future	 and	 what	 should	
cease.		That	which	was	experienced	as	liberating	can,	in	this	way,	be	affirmed	and	that	
which	 was	 experienced	 as	 oppressive	 can	 be	 afforded	 the	 ultimate	 contradiction.52		
Kwok	Pui‐lan	confirms	this	task,	writing	that	“Women	of	all	colors	need	to	search	for	
the	 liberating	 fragments	 in	our	 inheritance	 so	 that	we	can	mend	 the	 creation	 for	our	
daughters	and	their	daughters”	(2005,	230).		Whether	the	past	we	inherit	is	liberating	
																																																													
52	Such	uses	of	affirmation	and	contradiction	are	similarly	employed	in	this	thesis,	particularly	
in	Chapter	Three.	 	However,	I	seek	to	add	yet	more	specificity	by	using	these	affirmations	and	
contradictions	 to	 construct	 specific	 understandings	 of	 our	 existences	 in	 the	 eschatological	
future,	as	noted	in	this	thesis’s	Introduction. 
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or	 oppressive,	 the	 remembrance	 of	 it	 is	 here	 understood	 as	 bearing	 the	 capacity	 to	
shape	the	future	we	seek	and	the	way	we	live	in	the	present.			
	
Although	these	perspectives	are	sometimes	lacking	in	specificity	(exemplified	in	Baker‐
Fletcher’s	admission	that	“we	may	not	know	how”	liberation	was	sought	or	achieved),	
Letty	Russell,	 despite	 appearances	 thus	 far,	 does	 seek	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 specificity.		
She	similarly	upholds	the	importance	of	remembering	but	posits	this	in	relation	to	the	
future.	 	For	Russell,	past	 instances	of	God’s	 love	enable	one	to	“remember”	the	future	
that	 such	 love	 promises	 which	 in	 turn	 gives	 clues	 as	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 loving	
relationships	in	the	here	and	now	(1979a,	157‐8).		Russell	holds	the	past,	present,	and	
future	together	in	such	a	way	that	they	become	mutually	influential	to	one	another	and	
as	such	are	all	affirmed	and	assigned	value.		Still,	Russell	prioritises	the	future,	arguing	
that	 it	 is	 the	 lens	 through	 which	 the	 past	 and	 present	 should	 be	 interpreted	 and	
understood	(1979a,	164).		In	terms	of	interpreting	the	present,	Russell	envisions	a	focus	
on	the	 future	as	having	the	ability	 to	 “overcome	all	 forms	of	dualism	by	moving	 from	
future	wholeness	 toward	present	human	 transformation”	 (1979a,	164),	meaning	 that	
anything	in	the	“present	reality”	that	is	dehumanising	is	challenged	and	contradicted	by	
this	future	perspective	(1979a,	167).		This	is	not,	however,	a	stagnant	contradiction:	it	
does	not	only	describe	what	should	not	be	but	also	prescribes	what	should	be.	 	 If	 the	
future	 is	characterised	by	 liberation,	partnership,	and	wholeness	(1979a,	175‐6)	 then	
the	present	should	be	too.	 	Russell	 looks	to	the	future,	then,	as	she	believes	it	has	the	
ability	 to	 fuel	 and	 inform	 movements	 towards	 this	 abolition	 and	 construction.	 	 For	
Russell,	 then,	 the	 eschatological	 future	 does	 not	 detract	 from	 the	present,	 but	 in	 fact	
enlivens	and	substantiates	the	present.			
	
Locating	this	Thesis	
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Russell’s	specificity	nevertheless	remains	somewhat	limited.		Although	she	justifies	this	
by	referring	to	trust	in	God’s	promises	(1979a,	165),	Russell	ultimately	reproduces	the	
caution	that	exists	amongst	many	feminist	theologians	concerning	talk	about	the	future.		
Whilst	one	can	never,	of	course,	fully	verify	notions	of	the	future,	I	 intend	to	question	
whether	one’s	only	option	is	to	be	resigned	to	such	reticence.		If	Russell	is	correct	in	her	
view	 that	 the	 future	 is	 important,	 and	 I	believe	she	 is,	 then	 there	 is	a	need	 to	specify	
why	 and	how	 it	 is	 so.	 	A	 key	 aspect	 of	 this	 can	 and	 should,	 for	 reasons	noted	 in	 this	
section,	be	the	relationship	that	the	future	has	to	the	present	and	more	specifically,	on	
the	practicality	and	liveability	of	such	a	 future.	 	 I	am	convinced	by	the	responses	that	
emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 struggle	 and	 survival	 for	 they	 speak	 to	 the	 realities	 of	
experiences	of	oppression	and	seek	concrete	ways	to	alleviate	and	change	them.			
	
The	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 hope	 is	 also	 important,	 though	 it	 is	 this	 aspect	which	 I	 feel	
could	 benefit	 from	 specification,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	what	 the	 hope	 is	 for	 and	 how	 that	
hope	can	be	lived	in	the	present.		Thus,	Chapter	Three’s	reconstructions	of	the	content	
of	 the	 future	 seek	 to	 name	 that	 hope,	 which	 will	 then	 inform	 Chapter	 Four’s	
explorations	of	how	that	which	is	hoped	for	can	be	anticipated	and	created	by	life	in	the	
present.		The	perspectives	noted	in	this	section	will	further	inform	Chapter	Four,	as	the	
emphasis	 on	 reclaiming	 the	 significance	 of	 one’s	 own	 life	 and	 experiences	 helps	 to	
suggest	 certain	 values	 that	 must	 be	 made	 central;	 values	 such	 as	 self‐love	 and	 self‐
touch.	 	 I	 will	 be	 mindful	 of	 these	 when	 negotiating	 the	 process	 and	 content	 of	
eschatology	in	order	that	my	reconstructions	are	able	to	contribute	to	a	practice	where	
they	 are	 affirmed	 and	 enabled	 to	 flourish.	 	 Such	 constructions	 will	 also	 build	 on	
assertions	I	intend	to	make	in	Chapter	Two	by	reiterating	that	the	time	of	the	future	is	
not	yet	fully	known	or	created,	and	that	our	actions	are	worthwhile	and	can	shape	the	
future	we	hope	for.			
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Conclusion	
So	 far	 I	 have	 addressed	 the	 many	 and	 varied	 problems	 with	 traditional	 Christian	
understandings	 of	 eschatology,	 as	 exposed	 by	 feminist	 theological	 engagements	with	
the	 tradition.	 	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 exposed	 the	 tendency	
within	eschatological	thought	(whether	intentional	or	accidental;	explicit	or	implied)	to	
uphold	 certain	 definitions	 of	 female	 bodies	 and	 proceed	 to	 devalue	 them.	 	 This	was	
understood	to	have	been	achieved	by	constructing	the	process,	content,	and	time	of	the	
eschaton	 in	 patriarchal,	 androcentric,	 and	 futurist	 fashions.	 	 Suspicions	 of	 the	
eschatological	future	within	feminist	theology	are	thus	legitimate	and	understandable,	
and	 call	 for	 serious	 consideration,	 as	 I	 have	attempted	 to	do	 in	 this	 chapter.	 	This	 is,	
however,	only	half	of	the	story.		I	have	also	indicated	here	how	the	eschatological	future	
can	be	reconstructed	from	values	which	emerge	within	feminist	theological	literature.		
These	 pertain	 to	 the	 affirmation	 of	 embodied	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	 sensuous	
tactility.53	 	 I	 have	 signalled	 my	 intention	 to	 show	 that	 rethinking	 the	 eschatological	
future	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 values	 can	 pose	 a	 significant	 challenge	 to	 patriarchal	
constructions	 of	 female	 bodies	 and	 can	 envision	 a	 more	 hopeful	 future	 for	 all	 of	
creation.		This	has	not	always	been	posited	in	contradiction	to	feminist	responses;	the	
propensity	for	feminist	theologians	to	inform	my	own	response	has	been	noted,	as	have	
some	 perspectives	 that	 show	 a	 degree	 of	 appreciation	 for	 a	 future	 (if	 not	 always	
eschatological)	perspective.	
	
In	light	of	the	explorations	I	have	undertaken	in	this	chapter,	I	am	mindful	of	the	ways	
in	 which	 my	 constructions	 must	 proceed;	 firstly	 what	 I	 need	 to	 avoid	 and	 secondly	
what	 values	 and	 characteristics	 I	must	 affirm.	 	 These	 are	 not	 separate	 concerns:	 the	
need	for	eschatology	to	affirm	the	qualities	associated	with,	and	some	experiences	of,	
																																																													
53	Though	tactility	may	not	have	emerged	as	being	explicitly	evident	in	the	feminist	theological	
perspectives	addressed	here,	 the	emphasis	on	embodied	relationality	and	relational	presence,	
coupled	with	 allusions	 to	 being	 “in	 touch”	 with	 our	 bodies,	 infer	 an	 appreciation	 of	 tangibly	
feeling	and	responding	to	oneself	and	to	others	in	embodied	relations. 
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female	bodies	arises	because	it	has	overwhelmingly	discounted	and	discredited	them.		
In	 short,	 then,	 I	 must	 seek	 to	 construct	 an	 eschatology	 which	 avoids	 the	 latter	 and	
contributes	 to	 the	 former.	 	 We	 remember,	 though,	 that	 my	 approach	 here	 does	 not	
simply	 reproduce	 patriarchal	 essentialisms	 by	 claiming	 that	 all	 women	 experience	
their	bodies	as	relational,	fluid,	and	sensuous,	and	that	all	men	do	not.		Rather,	I	detect	
a	 need	 to	 revalue	 these	 qualities,	 along	 with	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	 them,	
because	the	the	tradition	has	assigned	these	traits	exclusively	to	female	bodies,	and	has	
proceeded	 to	 devalue	 both	 the	 traits	 and	 female	 bodies.	 	 That	 some	 women	 do	
experience	 their	 bodies	 in	 these	ways	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 significant	 and	 in	 need	 of	
affirmation.	 	 Recalling	 my	 earlier	 claims,	 this	 is	 fuelled	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 embodied	
relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	 sensuality	 are	 beneficial	 qualities	 for	 all	 existences	 to	
experience	and	cultivate.			
	
I	 now	 approach	 the	 task,	 then,	 of	 imagining	 and	 imaging	 an	 eschatology	 that	 is	
unequivocally	 embedded	 in	 embodiment.	 	 I	will	 seek	 to	make	 a	 new	 contribution	 by	
beginning	 from	where	 feminist	 theology	has	seemingly	stalled	or	 refused	 to	move	by	
rethinking	God	specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	eschatological	 future.	 	 I	benefit	 from	the	
feminist	perspectives	noted,	though,	as	I	will	conduct	this	rethinking	in	light	of	feminist	
appraisals	of	embodied	relationality	and	connectedness.		In	so	doing,	I	will	strive	for	a	
remodelling	of	the	eschatological	process	that	is	capable	of	holding	together	creaturely	
freedom,	divine‐creation	relationality,	and	divine	power	for	creation.		This	will	ground	
my	 later	moves	 to	 rethink	 the	 content	 and	 time	of	 the	 eschaton,	 for	 in	 reconfiguring	
how	we	get	to	the	future	I	can	consider	how	we	exist	in	that	future	and,	finally,	how	we	
can	live	such	a	future	now.	
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2.	A	Relational	Process54	
Introduction	
This	chapter	responds	to	feminist	critiques	surrounding	the	process	of	eschatology,	and	
embarks	 upon	 developing	 their	 constructions	 of	 divine	 power	 as	 power‐in‐relation.		
Rather	 than	 locating	 these	 considerations	 primarily	 in	 the	 present,	 though,	 my	
rethinking	 of	 divine‐creation	 relations	will	 be	 used	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 eschatological	
process.	 	 Cummings	 Neville	 claims	 that	 “the	 deepest	 question	 of	 eschatology	 is	 to	
address	 the	 relation	of	human	 life	 to	God	 in	 light	of	 the	difference	between	 time	and	
eternity”	(2005,	41).		If	his	assertion	is	correct,	then	negotiating	the	ways	in	which	God	
relates	to	creation	is	integral	to	eschatology.55		As	such,	aspects	of	feminist	theological	
models	 of	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	 “the	 relation	 of	 human	 life	 to	 God”	 will	 be	 used	 to	
remodel	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process.	 	 In	 short,	 this	 chapter	will	
argue	 that	 divine	 relational	 presence	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 embodied	 perception	 of	
and	 response	 to	 creation.	 	 I	 will	 claim	 that	 these	 are	 directed	 by	 God’s	 love	 for	 and	
loyalty	 to	 creation,	 such	 that	God	helps	 creation	 to	 experience	 relational	 presence	 in	
full,	which	is	understood	both	in	terms	of	intimacy	and	universality.		I	will	develop	the	
notion	that	the	divine	embrace	caresses	creation	into	the	full	experience	of	relationality	
whilst	 also	 holding	 open	 space	 for	 creation	 to	 genuinely	 affect	 this	 process.	 	 Such	 a	
remodelling	of	the	eschatological	process	will	be	seen	to	effect	the	full	actualisation	of	
relational	freedom.				
	
Divine	Power	as	Relational	
The	Case	for	Relationality	
																																																													
54	 Parts	 of	 this	 chapter	 appear,	 in	 a	 significantly	 condensed	 form,	 in	 my	 article	 in	 Feminist	
Theology,	entitled	“Does	Feminism	Need	the	Future?”	(2013).			 
55	 I	 do	 not	 uphold	Cummings	Neville’s	 distinction	 between	 time	 and	 eternity	 for	 it	 alludes	 to	
eternity	 being	 timeless,	 which	 simply	 perpetuates	 the	 association	 of	 eschatology	 with	
immateriality. 
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I	begin,	then,	by	attempting	to	construct	a	model	of	divine‐creation	relationships	that	is	
capable	 of	 underpinning	 a	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 eschatological	 process.	 	 Whilst	
upholding	the	feminist	proposal	that	God	cannot	possess	all	power,	on	account	of	the	
consequences	of	 this	 for	 relationality,	 I	 concur	with	Charles	Hartshorne’s	notion	 that	
God	 can	 have	 the	 “highest	 conceivable	 form	 of	 power”	 (1984,	 26).	 	 Power,	 for	
Hartshorne,	 means	 the	 power	 to	 participate	 with	 creation	 to	 whatever	 degree	 is	
possible	 without	 jeopardising	 freedom	 (Hartshorne,	 1984,	 25).56	 	 I	 digress	 from	
Hartshorne	 in	 that	 I	propose	an	eschatological	 vision	of	divine	and	creaturely	power,	
participation,	 and	 freedom.	 	 Still,	 further	 extrapolation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 power	
remains	crucial	here	in	order	that	it	be	not	only	unproblematic	but	positively	beneficial	
for	 rethinking	 the	 eschatological	 process.	 	 The	notion	 that	God	 can	hold	 the	 “highest	
conceivable	form	of	power”	is	thus	combined	with	feminist	appraisals	of	relationality.		
	
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 feminist	 theologians	 have	 noted	 the	 feminisation	 and	 subsequent	
trivialisation	and	devaluation	of	relationality	(cf.	Christ,	2003,	92).		Farmer	furthers	the	
observations	 made	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 by	 noting	 that	 embodiment	 and	
relationality	 have	 both	 been	 used	 to	 characterise	 women	 “and	 hence	 to	 exclude	 or	
subordinate	us”	(1987,	1).		It	seems	that	any	relationship	between	two	“others”	thwarts	
patriarchy’s	 desire	 to	 consistently	 be	 superior	 over	 and	 separate	 from	 the	 other	 (cf.	
Farmer,	1987,	11‐12),	hence	the	projection	of	such	connectedness	onto	female	bodies.		
Chapter	One	noted	 that	 a	 reclamation	 of	 relationality	was	deemed,	 by	 some	 feminist	
theologians,	to	be	essential	not	only	to	reclaiming	the	value	of	this	feminised	quality	but	
also	 to	 affirming	 all	 creaturely	 life.	 	 This	 enables	 a	 transformation	 of	 patriarchal	
categorisations,	as	that	which	has	traditionally	been	associated	with	women	is	seen	to	
give	insight	into	the	nature	of	all	of	creation	and,	I	propose,	the	future	of	creation.		We	
																																																													
56	This	could,	potentially,	still	be	framed	as	dominance,	though	my	reconstruction	of	power	will	
attempt	to	reframe	such	power	as	being	informed	by	God’s	capacity	to	be	the	most	loving	and	
loyal	and	thus	exercise	power	 for	 creation	as	opposed	to	wielding	 it	over	creation.	 	There	are	
intricacies	and	complexities	to	such	a	claim	which	will	be	explored	later	in	this	chapter. 
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remember	that	this	is	not	an	exercise	in	essentialism,	though;	women’s	bodies	are	not	
characterised	 as	 exclusively	 or	 simplistically	 relational.57	 	 Rather,	 it	 is	 a	 strategic	
attempt	to	remedy	the	devaluation	of	women’s	bodies	that	has	occurred	through	their	
association	with	relationality	by	claiming	embodied	relationality	to	be	indicative	of	and	
not	contrary	to	God’s	nature	and	intention.		
	
This	indicates	that	bodies	can	be	valued	as	meaningful	not	only	in	the	present,	but	also	
in	their	capacity	to	speak	about	the	future.		In	this	way,	they	can	be	named	as	prophetic.		
Such	a	reading	of	bodies	is	not	new	to	feminist	theology.		The	reclamation	of	bodies	as	
primary	sites	of	knowledge	that	was	noted	in	the	Introduction	has	been	engaged	with	
theologically	by	thinkers	such	as	Elaine	Graham,	Elizabeth	A.	 Johnson,	and	Melanie	A.	
May.	 	 Graham,	 for	 instance,	 names	 bodies	 as	 “epiphanies	 of	 meaning	 which,	 while	
locating	 us	 firmly	 in	 space	 and	 time,	 also	 take	 us	 beyond	 mere	 flesh	 and	 blood	 to	
confront	and	reveal	deeper	threads”	(2009b,	84).		Johnson	grounds	a	similar	conviction	
in	her	reading	of	the	Imago	Dei.	 	As	noted	in	this	thesis’s	Introduction,	Johnson	claims	
that	God’s	glory	is	“women,	all	women,	every	woman	everywhere,	fully	alive”,	and	that	
this	 flourishing	 anticipates	 the	 fullness	 of	 God’s	 glory	 (2002,	 15).	 	 Johnson	 sees	
relationality	as	integral	to	this	flourishing	(2002,	69)	thus	suggesting	that	experiences	
of	 relational	 flourishing	 image	God	 and	 the	 full	 glory	 of	God	 in	 the	 future.	 	 Likewise,	
May	claims	that	bodies	bear	witness	 to	the	“Good	News”	by	“proclaiming	what	 is	and	
what	 will	 be”	 (1995,	 22)	 and,	 she	 continues,	 “what	 our	 bodies	 know	 is	 a	 life‐giving	
source	of	our	knowledge	of	God”	(1995,	23).		Thus,	from	these	thinkers	we	may	garner	
a	sense	in	which	the	perceptions	and	prehensions	of	our	bodies	can	be	eschatological	
signifiers.		They	are	integral	to	our	beings	and	capable	of	expressing	the	divine.		I	add	to	
this	 that	 by	 attending	 to	 and	 valuing	 qualities	 assigned	 exclusively	 to	 female	 bodies,	
																																																													
57	As	noted,	relationality	is	understood	as	a	feature	that	benefits	all	existences,	and	in	addition	to	
this	 there	 are	 certainly	 difficulties	 and	 complexities	 contained	 within	 some	 women’s	
experiences	of	relationality.		Some	of	these	will	be	explored	over	the	course	of	this	chapter	and	
will	help	to	develop	my	definition	of	relationality. 
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and	to	ways	in	which	some	women	experience	these,	we	can	uncover	ways	to	radically	
rethink	the	eschaton.		This	means	that	our	embodied	experiences	can	be	both	signs	of	
the	future	and	embodiments	of	that	very	future.58			
	
This	radical	 rethinking	requires	a	clear	definition	of	 “embodied	relationality”,	and	we	
can	turn	again	to	the	feminist	theologians	noted	in	Chapter	One	in	order	to	help	with	
this.	 	Carol	Christ,	Grace	Jantzen,	and	Sallie	McFague,	among	others,	were	earlier	seen	
to	 re‐define	 omnipresence	 as	 embodied	 proximity.	 	 This	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 Carter	
Heyward,	who	writes	that	“being	really	present”	 is	what	characterises	“right	relation”	
(1989,	 132).	 	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 signify	 power‐in‐presence	 and	 embodied	 proximity,	
but	 also	 authentic	 availability,	 attention,	 and	 commitment	 to	 others.59	 	 This	 is	 not	
passive	presence,	then,	but	active,	constructive,	and	engaging	presence;	in	short,	a	way	
of	relating	that	can	draw	us	into	“full	relationality”	in	the	eschaton.		“Full	relationality”	
is	 used	 to	mean	 a	 relationality	 that	 is	 unhindered	by	 either	 rejection	or	 suffering.	 	A	
relational	 God	 is	 here	 understood	 as	 not	 only	 relating	 to	 creation	 intimately	 in	 the	
present,	but	also	and	through	this,	as	finally	helping	creation	to	experience	this	fully	in	
the	future.	
	
Still,	relationality	is	a	complex	value	to	negotiate.	 	Feminist	theologians	have	revealed	
the	necessity	of	affirming	women’s	freedom	and	agency	in	relationships,	as	patriarchal	
models	of	God	have	named	such	freedom	and	agency	as	being	the	domain	of	the	male.		
Thus,	a	relational	eschatological	process	must	make	space	for	such	freedom	and	agency	
																																																													
58	Some	details	of	how	this	may	be	possible	are	explored	in	more	depth	in	Chapter	Four. 
59	There	is	a	need	to	navigate	the	complexities	of	this	to	ensure	that	such	“availability,	attention,	
and	commitment	 to	others”	does	not	 amount	 to	 self‐emptying	or	 self‐negation.	 	My	emergent	
and	 developing	 definition	 of	 relationality	 will	 thus	 also	 note	 some	 problems	 in	 upholding	
relationality	as	the	primary	value	for	rethinking	the	eschatological	process,	and	will	accordingly	
emphasise	the	importance	of	a	nuanced	reading	of	relationality. 
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lest	 it	perpetuate	patriarchal	assumptions	concerning	femininity.60	 	 It	must	also	make	
space	for	and	actively	embrace	difference	and	diversity,	for	as	Slee	(2004a,	181)	notes:		
The	emphasis	on	[…]	relationality	in	the	work	of	white	feminist	theologians	has	
been	 critiqued	 by	 some	 as	 a	 denial	 of	 difference	 and	 the	 imposition	 of	 false	
connection	between	those	who	are	divided	by	injustice	and	oppression.	
Furthermore,	 it	 is	also	 true	that	relationships	 themselves	may	be	a	cause	of	suffering	
for	some;	Slee,	again,	observes	that	“Not	all	relationship	is	good”	(2004b,	136).		Melissa	
Raphael	develops	this	and,	writing	of	relationships	in	concentration	camps,	notes	that	a	
“holocaust	theology	of	relation”	shows	that	“relation	need	not,	of	itself,	connote	a	moral	
or	practical	good”	as	sometimes	the	burden	and	demands	of	relating	to	others,	in	these	
contexts,	was	too	much	to	bear	(2003,	92‐3).61		However,	such	experiences	can	be	said	
to	contradict	God’s	relational	 intentions	for	creation.	 	They	signify	the	need	for	a	God	
who	not	only	makes	Godself	authentically	present	within	suffering	but	also	offers	and	
actuates	the	freedom	from	it.		That	this	very	often	does	not	occur	within	the	lifespan	of	
an	individual	or	community	gives	merit	to	my	proposal	that	we	imagine	a	time	when	it	
will	occur.			
	
Embodied	Relating	
Exploring	what	 these	 relationships	may	 be	 like	 is	 necessary,	 and	 the	 experiences	 of	
some	women	whose	bodies	are	birthing	bodies	can	illuminate	this.62		Elizabeth	Johnson	
asserts	 that	 the	 universal	 experience	 of	 being	 “knit	 together”	 in	 the	 womb	 “is	 the	
paradigm	without	 equal”	 for	 conceiving	 of	 God’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 world	 (2002,	
																																																													
60	I	will	attend	to	this	in	the	second	section	of	this	chapter. 
61	 Instances	 where	 relationality	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 be	 an	 unequivocal	 “good”	 may	 also	 be	
experienced	by	other	individuals;	certain	people	with	autism,	for	instance.		This	firstly	speaks	to	
the	need	for	space	in	our	relating,	which	this	chapter	will	elucidate,	and	also	to	how	self‐touch	
can	be	an	empowering	form	of	relating	to	oneself,	as	Chapter	Four	explores. 
62	Abraham	cautions	 that	 “constructive	 feminist	 theology	must	critically	assess	 tropes	such	as	
motherhood	 rather	 than	 mobilize	 them	 as	 presupposed	 or	 idealized	 special	 sources	 for	
theological	 anthropology”	 (2009,	 161).	 	 I	 am	mindful	 of	 this	 and	 thus	 do	 not	 assume	 that	 all	
women	experience	their	bodies	as	birthing	bodies,	nor	do	I	claim	that	those	who	do	experience	
this	in	a	homogenous	fashion.			Instead,	I	note	that	gestation	and	maternity	are	experienced	by	
some	 women,	 and	 as	 such	 should	 be	 valued,	 but	 also	 that	 other	 ways	 in	 which	 women	
experience	their	bodies	can	be	just	as	valuable. 
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234).		This	paradigm,	she	claims,	both	communicates	divine	embrace	of	the	world	and	
“lifts	 up	precisely	 those	 aspects	 of	women’s	 reality	 so	 abhorred	 in	 classical	 Christian	
anthropology”	(2002,	235).	 	 Indeed,	 the	birthing	power	that	some	women	experience	
has	 been	both	usurped	 and	 vilified	 by	patriarchal	 theology.	 	Or,	 perhaps	 it	would	 be	
more	accurate	to	claim	that	this	power	has	been	usurped	because	 it	has	been	vilified.		
This	vilification	has	taken	much	the	same	form	as	the	association	of	women	with	death:	
women’s	 connectedness	 to	 embodied	processes	 has	 been	 deemed	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	
the	limitations	of	embodied	life.	 	As	Miller‐McLemore	so	concisely	articulates:	“Bodily,	
monthly,	women	know	life’s	limits”	(1994,	145).	 	Such	limitations	are	named	in	terms	
of	 finitude	 and	 transience;	 attributes	 that	 have	 been	 greatly	 feared	 by	 a	 patriarchal	
theology	that	prizes	the	ability	of	the	intellectual	and	the	spiritual	to	endure	forever.63		
This	 fear	 has	 manifest	 itself	 in	 the	 trivialization	 of	 motherhood;	 the	 collapsing	 of	
women’s	 “procreative	 powers”	 into	 “patronizing	 sentiments	 of	 a	 Mother’s	 Day	 sort”	
(Miller‐McLemore,	 1994,	 138).	 	 Thus,	 not	 only	 has	 relationality	 been	 feminised	 and	
subsequently	 trivialised,	 but	 so	 too	 have	 maternal	 bodies.	 	 The	 eschatological	
dimension	of	such	trivialisation	and	usurping	of	relationality	and	maternity	is	brought	
to	 light	 by	 Jantzen’s	 earlier‐noted	 claim	 that	 becoming	 divine	 requires	 a	 process	 of	
rebirth	by	and	through	the	Father	God	(Jantzen,	1998,	143).		Thus,	an	adequate	remedy	
to	problematic	 images	of	God	cannot	merely	amount	 to	 the	 transposition	of	maternal	
experiences	 onto	 God.	 	 The	 very	 image	 of	 God	must	 be	 substantially	 rethought,	 and	
taking	experiences	of	motherhood	and	birthing	seriously	can	help	with	this.	
	
The	maternal	metaphor	 can,	 for	 instance,	 offer	 a	model	of	 relational	presence	 that	 is	
dynamically	 active.	 	 Presence,	 particularly	 as	 it	 is	 imaged	 in	 relation	 to	 procreative	
experiences,	 cannot	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 passive	 stasis,	 lest	 it	 perpetuate	 patriarchal	
																																																													
63	 This	 further	 justifies	 my	 reclamation	 of	 bodies	 in	 the	 content	 of	 the	 eschaton	 in	 the	 next	
chapter. 
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constructions	of	 the	 female	body.	 	Aristarkhova	(2012,	175)	makes	this	clear	and	she	
responds	by	writing:	
The	 supposed	 passivity	 of	 the	 maternal	 relation	 that	 is	 often	 employed	 to	
marginalize	the	role	of	the	maternal,	then,	needs	to	be	understood	as	requiring	
‘work’	as	a	way	of	letting	the	other	be,	become,	breathe.	
	Thus,	 a	 maternal	 reading	 of	 relational	 presence	 can	 and	 should	 signify	 both	 a	
deliberate	posture	and	an	effective	practice.		Melissa	Raphael	adds	to	this	by	offering	a	
maternalist	perspective	on	God’s	presence	in	the	Holocaust.		Likening	this	presence	to	a	
mother’s	 response	 to	 a	 child’s	 cries,	 she	writes	 that	 “to	 say	 ‘here	 I	 am’	 is	 to	 say	here	
with	 you	 I	 am;	 my	 being	 human	 is	 to	 find	 and	 be	 present	 to	 you;	 here,	 in	 a	 place,	
answering	you”	(2003,	122‐123).	 	This	 indicates	Raphael’s	reading	of	divine	presence	
for	 she	 understands	 human	 presence	 as	 being	 energised	 by	 and	 bearing	 a	 trace	 of	
divine	presence	(2003,	101).		Thus,	the	mother	responding	to	the	cries	of	her	child	can	
help	us	to	image	divine	relational	presence	as	an	active	and	authentic	involvement	with	
and	loyalty	to	creation.			
	
Relational	Perception	and	Response	
God’s	Relational	Perception	of	Creation	
The	 use	 of	 a	 model	 of	 divine	 intimacy,	 or	 omnipresence,	 in	 order	 to	 rethink	 divine	
power	 and	 knowledge	 certainly	 seems	 concurrent	 with	 other	 voices	 in	 the	 feminist	
discussion.		Soskice	names	this	as	“continuous	presence”	(1997,	24‐25)	whilst	Suchocki	
refers	 to	 God	 as	 “the	 everlastingly	 concrescent	 entity,	 [who]	 must	 be	 related	 to	 the	
occasions	of	every	epoch”	(1988,	149).	 	Both	Soskice	and	Suchocki	seem	to	combine	a	
sense	of	relationality	with	eternity,	but	this	eternity	 is	 framed	as	an	ever‐presence	as	
opposed	 to	 a	 power	 over	 or	 knowledge	 of	 all	 times,	 events,	 and	 creatures	 therein.		
Taking	 this	 a	 step	 further,	 Grace	 Jantzen	 argues	 that	 God’s	 omnipresence	 does	 not	
signify	 a	 timeless	 and	 spaceless	God	who	entirely	 transcends	 the	world.	 	 Rather,	 she	
claims,	 omnipresence	 indicates	 that	 God’s	 care	 “extends	 infinitely	 beyond	 the	
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boundaries	of	our	own	little	individual	worlds”	(1984a,	49‐50).		God	is	thus	understood	
to	 be	 simultaneously	 infinite	 and	 intimate.	 	 Furthermore,	 Jantzen	 uses	 this	model	 of	
God	 to	 make	 claims	 concerning	 divine	 knowledge.	 	 Rather	 than	 upholding	 the	
tradition’s	 framing	of	 such	knowledge	as	prefixed	by	or	experienced	as	omnipotence,	
Jantzen	suggests	that	God’s	knowledge	is	achieved	through	a	process	of	acquisition	that	
is	enabled	by	 intimate	relationships	with	creation.	 	She	claims	that	“God	has	 intimate	
personal	knowledge	of	each	of	us	and	our	circumstances:	his	[sic.]	understanding	(not	
his	[sic.]	data‐retrieval	ability)	 is	 infinite”	(Jantzen,	1984a,	83)	Indeed,	she	claims	that	
knowledge	that	is	impersonal	and	merely	statistical	is	neither	God’s	concern	nor	should	
it	 be	 our	 concern	 for	 conceiving	 of	 God.	 	What	 really	matters,	 she	 contends,	 is	 God’s	
ability	to	understand	those	feelings	and	experiences	that	are	genuinely	important	to	us,	
such	as	“long‐term	struggle	against	depression,	or	chronic	severe	discomfort”	(1984a,	
83).	 	When	we	consider	the	presence	of	such	experiences	in	our	lives,	 Jantzen	asserts	
that:	
it	 becomes	 far	more	 significant	 that	 God	 should	 understand	 our	 feelings,	 not	
just	in	the	sense	of	knowing	about	them	from	some	lofty	untouched	plane	like	
an	eternal	bystander,	but	really	sympathizing,	‘feeling	with	us’.	
Thus,	a	God	who	is	able	to	know	creation	through	understanding	which	is	enabled	by	
intimate	and	compassionate	relational	presence	is	deemed	to	be	a	God	who	is	far	more	
relatable	 to,	 and	 able	 to	 relate	 to	 creation,	 than	 a	God	who	 impersonally	 contains	 all	
knowledge	in	a	factual,	timeless	manner.64				
	
Moreover,	this	is	an	undeniably	embodied	reading	of	relational	presence:	consisting	of	
the	 embodied	 perception	 of	 and	 response	 to	 the	 other.	 	 Regarding	 the	 former,	 and	
continuing	 the	appraisal	of	 images	of	God	on	understandings	of	embodiment,	 Jantzen	
																																																													
64	Somewhat	surprisingly,	Augustine	may	be	read	as	confirming	Jantzen’s	point	here;	he	writes	
that	“It	seems	to	me	that	the	hairs	on	a	head	are	more	easily	numbered	than	are	the	feelings	that	
beat	with	 the	 heart”	 (1950,	 63).	 	 This	 infers	 that	 a	 God	who	 perceives	 and	 understands	 our	
experiences	 garners	 a	 knowledge	 that	 is	more	 complex	 and	 valuable	 than	 a	 God	who	 always	
already	possesses	all	knowledge	of	creation,	as	the	tradition	was	understood	to	propose. 
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also	writes	that	“If	we	have	no	experience	of	perception	without	embodiment,	we	are	
reasonably	led	to	wonder	whether	a	God	who	has	perceptions	might	also	be	embodied”	
(Jantzen,	1984a,	78).		For	Jantzen,	then,	God	is	able	to	perceive	created	beings	and	the	
world	 we	 inhabit	 because	 God	 is	 intimately	 and	 physically	 connected	 to	 them.	 	 The	
maternal	 metaphor	 can	 offer	 an	 image	 of	 the	 umbilical	 connection	 to	 confirm	 this	
embodied	perception	of	creation,	but	the	relational	presence	must	go	further	than	this	
lest	creation	be	depicted	in	a	perpetual	state	of	infantilisation.		Using	this	as	the	starting	
point,	 though,	 can	 help	 us	 to	 consider	 the	 embodied	 nature	 of	 perception	 in	 all	
relationships;	that	 is,	 the	way	we	are	able	to	tangibly	 feel	the	experiences	of	others.65		
Although	this	does	not	signify	synonymous	experiences,	 it	certainly	enables	empathy.		
Indeed,	Karen	Baker‐Fletcher	claims	 that	 it	 is	empathy	and	not	sympathy	 that	God,	 in	
Jesus,	 experiences	 (2006,	 124),	 seemingly	 suggesting	 that	 empathy	 communicates	 a	
higher	 level	 of	 understanding	 and	 a	 greater	 commitment	 to	 feeling	 the	 suffering	 of	
another.		God’s	relational	presence	is	here	understood	to	be	embodied	in	the	sense	that	
God	authentically	and	physically	shares	in	our	embodied	experiences.66		Divine	power,	
then,	is	reformulated	here	as	the	power	to	empathise	with	the	experiences	of	others.							
	
It	 is	 also	 apparent,	 though,	 that	 God	 may	 often	 be	 experienced	 as	 an	 absence	 and	
silence	 rather	 than	 presence	 and	 action.	 	 Moltmann	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 “The	 appalling	
silence	 of	 the	 Father	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Son’s	 prayer	 in	 Gethsemane”	 (1981,	 77).		
However,	Streufert	reads	Elaine	Scarry’s	claim	that	silence	can	be	a	 form	of	powerful	
resistance	in	order	to	offer	a	different	perspective	on	silence.		Speaking	particularly	of	
Jesus’	silence	to	his	accusers,	Streufert	claims	that	“Jesus’	silence	[…]	could	indicate	that	
Jesus	gave	no	accommodation	to	the	torturers;	he	gave	them	no	power”	(2010,	31).		Of	
																																																													
65	Such	a	notion	provides	the	 foundation	for	my	claims	in	Chapter	Four,	wherein	the	practical	
expression	of	such	tangible	embodied	presence,	and	its	ability	to	both	anticipate	and	create	the	
future,	is	explored. 
66	Baker‐Fletcher’s	reference	to	Jesus	to	exemplify	this	should	not	be	overlooked	and,	as	we	shall	
shortly	see,	is	crucial	to	reformulating	divine	power.		 
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course,	this	reading	should	not	be	assumed	to	be	typical	of	all	silences,	for	it	is	true	that	
women	in	particular	have	suffered	from	imposed	silence	and	have	fought	for	“the	hard‐
won	 privilege	 of	 speech”	 (Pittenger,	 2011,	 96;	 cf.	 98).	 	 Still,	 a	 God	 who	 feels	 and	
perceives	 our	 experiences	 could	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 present	 and	 active	 even	 in	 silence,	
insomuch	as	God	is	sharing	in	the	experience	of	feeling	alone	and	voiceless.		Moreover,	
it	 could	 be	 that	 God’s	 felt	 absence	 and	 silence	 is	 actually	 a	mark	 of	 God’s	 outrage	 at	
attempts	to	mask	or	quell	God’s	presence.		Woolley	offers	yet	another	interpretation	of	
silence	in	her	study	of	Christian	women’s	practices	of	silence.		Here,	she	notes	a	sense	
of	agreement	with	Adrienne	Rich	that	silence	“should	not	be	confused	‘with	any	kind	of	
absence’”	(2013,	149).		Instead,	silence	is	variously	interpreted	as	a	place	of	coming	to	
know	God	 (2013,	 152)	 and	 of	 finding	 oneself	 held	 in	 God	 (2013,	 155).	 	 This	 further	
exemplifies	how	God	is	authentically	affected	by	creation,	for	in	addition	to	physically	
perceiving	the	experiences	of	creation	God	is	here	seen	to	create	and	inhabit	spaces	of	
silence	in	responsive	acts	of	protest,	empathy,	and	love.	
	
A	God	who	is	so	affected	by	creation	is	also	inferred	in	passages	such	as	Jeremiah	31.20	
and	 Hosea	 11.8.	 	 In	 these	 instances,	 we	 read	 about	 God	 being	 “deeply	 moved”,	 and	
God’s	heart	 recoiling	and	compassion	growing.	 	 In	 reference	 to	such	examples,	Lewis	
observes	that	“The	Impassible	speaks	as	if	it	suffered	passion,	and	that	which	contains	
in	 Itself	 the	 cause	 of	 its	 own	 and	 all	 other	 bliss	 as	 though	 it	 could	 be	 in	 want	 and	
yearning”	(1940,	40).		Lewis	explains	this	as	God	choosing,	out	of	love,	to	allow	Godself	
to	be	so	affected	by	humanity	in	an	act	of	“humility	that	passes	understanding”	(1940,	
39).	 	 Rather	 than	 an	 omnipotent	 God	 who	 is	 not	 affected	 in	 any	 significant	 way	 by	
creation,	God	puts	Godself	at	risk	for	the	sake	of	 loving	relationships.	 	Moltmann	puts	
this	more	succinctly,	asserting	that	“A	God	who	cannot	suffer	cannot	love	either.		A	God	
who	cannot	love	is	a	dead	God”	(1981,	38;	cf.	Teilhard	de	Chardin,	1999,	192).		God	can	
only	be	God	 if	God	 loves	and	 loving	entails,	at	 times,	suffering.	 	 Indeed,	1	 John	4.8‐10	
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claims	 that	 God	 is	 love,	 and	 goes	 on	 to	 speak	 of	 the	 extent	 of	God’s	 love	 as	 both	 the	
origin	 of	 all	 love	 and	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 salvation.	 	 Instead	 of	 this	 compromising	 God’s	
power,	this	ability	highlights	the	relational	core	of	God’s	power.		Furthermore,	this	does	
not	 compromise	 God’s	 freedom,	 for	 as	 Zizioulas	 writes,	 “Love	 as	 God’s	 mode	 of	
existence	 ‘hypostasizes’	God,	constitutes	His	 [sic.]	being”,	 such	 that	 “Love	 is	 identified	
with	ontological	freedom”	(1985,	46).		This	suggests	that	God’s	power	is	made	perfect	
in	the	freedom	to	be	in	loving	relationships.67		Thus,	whilst	the	Christian	tradition	has	
consistently	upheld	God	as	omnipotent,	this	is	here	exposed	as	being	inconsistent	with	
the	biblical	depiction	of	a	God	who	is	deeply	affected	and	changed	by	relationships	with	
creation.	 	 God	 as	 love	 thus	 directs	 God’s	 relational	 presence	 with	 creation	 which	 is	
manifest	in	God’s	openness	to	being	authentically	affected	by	creation.	
	
By	 claiming	 that	God	 is	 so	 authentically	 and	 substantially	 touched	by	 creation	 I	 thus	
claim	 that	 the	 eschatological	 process	 must	 also	 be	 one	 which	 creation	 affects.	 	 God	
cannot	 be	 unaffected	 by	 creation	 and,	 accordingly,	 cannot	 realise	 the	 eschaton	 in	 a	
detached,	 impersonal	 manner;	 this	 is	 simply	 not	 how	 God’s	 power	 works.	 	 Rather,	
because	 God’s	 power	 is	 manifest	 in	 a	 genuine	 openness	 to	 empathising	 with	 and	
sharing	in	the	experiences	of	creation,	God	actively	opens	the	eschatological	process	to	
creaturely	involvement	and	influence.		This	means	that	we	can	affect	it	for	good	or	ill;	
we	can	bring	 joy	or	hurt	 to	God	as	we	bring	 joy	or	hurt	 to	one	another	or	ourselves.		
Accordingly,	 there	must	 be	 another	 dimension	 to	 the	 eschatological	 process	wherein	
we	 are	 afforded	 space	 and	 time	 to	 process	 our	 actions	 and	 experiences.68	 	 This	 has	
variously	been	depicted	as	a	medicinal	or	pedagogic	process	(Origen	as	referenced	by	
Ludlow,	2000,	32)	or	as	an	antidote	to	sin,	according	to	Polkinghorne	(2002,	132).			In	
																																																													
67	 Such	 a	 concept	will	 assist	 with	 considerations	 of	 God’s	 freedom	 for	 relationships,	 and	 the	
eschaton	as	a	“free(ing)	process”	for	both	God	and	creation,	which	will	be	addressed	later	on	in	
this	chapter. 
68	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 our	 existences	 in	 the	 future	 are	 of	 greater	 or	 lesser	 significance,	
depending	 on	 our	 actions.	 	 Some	 problems	with	 this	 are	 noted	 later	 on	 in	 this	 chapter,	with	
specific	reference	to	some	experiences	of	disabilities. 
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short,	the	process	here	is	understood	to	be	one	in	which	experiences	of	damaging	and	
hurtful	actions	are	attended	to,	and	the	perpetrator	is	drawn	to	the	embrace	of	a	God	
who	caresses	them	through	a	process	of	realisation.		Such	a	process	means	that	all	can	
be	included	in	eschatological	life	in	such	a	way	that	both	the	causes	and	effects	of	hurts	
and	pains	are	authentically	acknowledged	and	transformed.69		
	
God’s	Relational	Response	to	Creation	
Despite	 the	 reading	 of	 absence	 and	 silence	 noted	 above,	 there	 is	 a	 definite	 need	 to	
emphasise	 the	 tangible,	 visible,	 and	 audible	 nature	 of	 God’s	 responsive	 presence.		
Wayne	Morris	explains	that	a	God	whose	presence	is	not	able	to	tangibly	be	perceived	
and	experienced	is,	in	fact,	irrelevant	to	those	who	rely	on	such	experiences	(2008,	97).		
This	adds	further	specificity	to	the	claim	that	creation	affects	the	eschatological	process	
for	 it	 is	 not	 only,	 or	 even	necessarily,	 our	 actions	 that	determine	 the	nature	of	God’s	
response	 but	 also,	 and	primarily,	 the	 particular	 nature	 of	 our	 embodied	 experiences.		
Speaking	of	the	experiences	of	Deaf	people,	Morris	writes	that	“For	God	to	be	accessible	
and	relevant,	he	[sic.]	must	be	a	God	who	can	be	seen	‘face	to	face’	and	whose	presence	
can	 be	 touched	 and	 experienced”	 (2008,	 97).	 	 John	 Hull	 adds	 to	 this	 that	 for	 Blind	
people,	presence	 is	communicated	again	by	touch	but	also	here	by	sound	rather	 than	
sight	(1990,	50).	 	Though	Hull	is	speaking	of	friend‐to‐friend	relationships,	combining	
this	 with	 Morris’s	 claim	 illustrates	 how	 God	 must	 be	 understood	 to	 be	 physically	
responsive	in	particular	ways	depending	on	the	experiences	of	the	person	to	whom	God	
responds.	 	Morris	 adds	 further	 substance	 to	 this	 by	 referring	 to	Thomas’s	 encounter	
with	Jesus	whereby	“Jesus	 invites	Thomas	to	touch	him”.	 	God,	Morris	claims,	“knows	
how	to	relate	to	Deaf	people	and	he	[sic.]	understands	their	culture”	(2008,	152).		As	in	
my	 earlier	 presentation	 of	 Jantzen’s	 argument,	 this	 understanding	 is	 predicated	 on	
God’s	 experiential	 knowledge,	 thus	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 claim	 that	 God	 experiences	
																																																													
69	Forgiveness	may	be	an	element	of	this,	but	there	are	instances	where	this	is	inappropriate,	for	
creation	at	least.		Some	such	instances	are	attended	to	in	Chapter	Four. 
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blindness	 and	 is	 therefore	 able	 to	 understand	 it	 and	 relate	 to	 those	 who	 are	 blind.		
However	this	 is	not	a	unilateral	relation;	 it	 is	not	only	the	case	that	God	invites	touch	
but	 also	 actively	 moves	 to	 touch	 others;	 Morris	 explains	 that	 some	 Deaf	 people	
experience	God’s	presence	as	feeling	God’s	touch	(2008,	153).70		Again	this	signals	the	
active	nature	of	embodied	presence	and	emphasises	its	personal	and	particular	nature.			
	
Furthermore,	this	helps	us	to	rethink	divine	power	as	that	which	is	tangibly	shared	in	a	
responsive	manner.		The	clearest	and	most	beneficial	examples	we	have	for	this	are	the	
stories	in	which	women	exercise	courage	to	elicit	a	response	from	Jesus.	 	Referring	to	
the	haemorrhaging	woman	in	Mark	5.21‐34	and	to	the	Syrophoenecian	woman	in	Mark	
7.25‐28,	Streufert	(2010,	33)	writes	that:	
Both	[…]	have	the	courage	to	claim	from	Jesus	what	they	need.		They	had	been	
invisible.	 	They	make	themselves	visible	to	 Jesus	and	by	doing	so	they	help	to	
reorder	the	dynamics	of	power.71		
That	 the	 bleeding	 woman	 claimed	 this	 power	 through	 touching	 Jesus	 illustrates	 the	
embodied	 nature	 of	 Jesus’	 responsive	 presence;	 that	 the	 Syrophoenecian	 woman	
claimed	this	power	by	negotiating	with	Jesus	illustrates	the	relational	nature	of	 Jesus’	
responsive	presence.		Both	usurp	patriarchal	notions	of	power	by	actively	seeking	and	
visibly	 receiving	 Jesus’	 power,	 and	 moreover	 by	 causing	 Jesus	 to	 share	 his	 power.		
Brock	 similarly	attends	 to	 the	 life	of	 Jesus	 in	order	 to	 illuminate	 this	 sense	of	 shared	
power.	 	 Brock	 frames	 power	 as	 participatory,	 and	 she	 understands	 this	 to	 be	
characteristic	of	the	type	of	power	displayed	by	Jesus	(1995,	84).		This	furthers	some	of	
the	perspectives	noted	in	Chapter	One,	which	sought	to	de‐center	Jesus,	as	Brock	claims	
that	“The	reality	of	erotic	power	within	connectedness	means	it	cannot	be	located	in	a	
single	individual”	(1995,	52)	thus	again	making	reference	to	the	importance	of	power	
																																																													
70	Again,	 this	 substantiates	a	positive	 reading	of	 touch	which	will	 inform	my	centralisation	of	
touch	in	Chapter	Four. 
71	More	 specifically,	 Streufert	 is	 here	 referring	 to	 the	haemorrhaging	woman	being	healed	by	
touching	Jesus’	cloak	(Mark	5.27‐29)	and	the	Syrophoenecian	woman’s	successful	petitioning	of	
Jesus	to	“cast	the	demon	out	of	her	daughter”	(Mark	7.28‐29). 
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being	shared.	 	She	goes	on	to	elucidate	this	by,	 like	Streufert,	referring	to	the	story	of	
the	 haemorrhaging	woman	 in	 Mark	 5.21‐34.	 	 Making	 note	 of	 Jesus’	 awareness	 “that	
power	 had	 gone	 forth	 from	 him”	 (Mark	 5.30),	 Brock	 claims	 that	 this	 woman	 “takes	
away	[Jesus’]	patriarchal	power	as	a	man”	by	disrupting	the	social	and	religious	barrier	
that	separated	him	 from	her.	 	 In	so	doing,	 she	claims,	 the	woman	“allows	 Jesus	 fuller	
participation	 in	 erotic	 power”	 for	 she	 facilitated	 the	 sharing	 of	 power	 (1995,	 84).		
Divine	power	emerges	here	as	 the	power	 to	perceive	and	respond	 to	 the	experiences	
and	needs	of	others,	both	of	which	are	practised	in	a	tangible	manner.	 	Thus	power	is	
here	 increased	 as	 it	 is	 distributed	 in	 a	 relationally	 responsive	 manner.72	 	 This	 can,	
again,	mean	that	the	eschatological	process	is	not	realised	by	a	divine	exercise	of	power	
over	 creation	but	 rather	 through	divine	openness	 to,	 presence	with,	 and	 response	 to	
creation’s	experiences	and	actions,	which	is	framed	here	as	a	proper	reading	of	divine	
power.		Of	course,	this	must	also	pertain	to	a	responsiveness	to	experiences	and	actions	
which	seek	to	quell	or	reject	God’s	relational	presence.		First,	though,	let	us	consider	the	
nature	of	God’s	freedom.	
		
God’s	Freedom	for	Relationships	
In	 addition	 to	 feeling,	 and	 therefore	 responding,	 to	 our	 experiences	 in	 this	way,	 and	
therein	making	manifest	a	particular	form	of	power,	it	is	crucial	to	maintain	a	sense	of	
God’s	 freedom	 in	 order	 that	 God	 not	 be	 depicted	 as	 bound	 and	 reduced	 to	 these	
experiences.		This	is	of	particular	import	when	using	the	maternal	metaphor	in	order	to	
counter	 depictions	 of	 motherhood	 as	 an	 essentialised	 marker	 of	 femininity,	 and	 of	
freedom	as	 inappropriate	 for	women.	 	Thus,	God’s	maternal	relating	to	creation	must	
																																																													
72	This	reading	of	relational	power	as	that	which	is	shared	will	inform	the	readings	of	freedom	
that	I	will	present	later	on	in	this	chapter.	 
 
 
~	124	~	
 
be	 understood	 as	 a	 free	 action.73	 	 Jürgen	 Moltmann’s	 contribution	 is	 crucial	 to	
developing	 this	 construction,	 as	 he	 understands	 divine	 freedom	 not	 as	 the	 choice	 to	
love	or	not	to	love,	but	rather	to	be	who	God	is;	“in	loving	the	world”,	Moltmann	claims,	
“[God]	is	by	no	means	‘his	[sic.]	own	prisoner’;	on	the	contrary	in	loving	the	world	he	
[sic.]	is	entirely	free	because	he	[sic.]	is	entirely	himself”	(1993,	55).		This	has	echoes	of	
the	 perspective	 noted	 from	 Zizioulas	 earlier,	 and	 substantiates	 the	 claim	 that	 loving	
relationality	 thus	epitomises	 the	very	nature	of	God.	 	 	This	 could	possibly	be	 read	as	
inferring	the	essential	nature	of	maternal	relationality,	but	the	analogy	is	not	so	direct;	
rather	the	freedom	God	experiences	is	the	freedom	to	be	fully	Godself,	meaning	that	the	
freedom	we	 experience	 is	 the	 freedom	 to	 be	 fully	 ourselves.	 	 Indeed,	 this	may	 even	
counteract	 essentialised	 models	 of	 femininity	 that	 present	 motherhood	 as	 a	
requirement,	for	it	instead	upholds	the	integrity	of	individual	and	particular	yearnings	
and	futures.			
	
In	this	understanding,	power	can	be	reframed	as	the	power	to	be	completely	oneself	in	
relationships.	 	What	 this	 ultimately	means	 is	 that	 God’s	 power	 is	 expressed	 in	 God’s	
free,	 loving	 action	 to	 relate	 to	 creation	 and	 thus,	 to	 a	 certain	 degree,	 depend	 on	
creation.		Basselin	(2011,	53)	reads	this	in	the	following	way:	
Scripture	 is	 clear	 that	 God	 is	more	 powerful	 than	 human	 beings,	 yet	 it	 is	 not	
through	our	understandings	of	power	that	the	Word	becomes	flesh.		Rather,	it	is	
the	 power	 of	 limitation,	 humility,	 vulnerability	 –	 a	 baby	 is	 born,	 fragile	 and	
completely	dependent.	
This	recalls	the	notion	of	God	being	genuinely	affected	by	relationships	with	creation,	
and	illustrates	the	fluidity	and	utility	of	the	maternal	metaphor,	for	God	here	becomes	
the	 child	 who	 depends	 on	 creation.	 Again	 this	 emphasises	 the	 way	 in	 which	 God	 is	
genuinely	affected	by	creation	and	adds	 to	 this	 that	such	willingness	 to	be	affected	 is	
																																																													
73	 This	 also	 has	 implications	 for	 thinking	 about	 our	 own	 freedom;	 if	 our	 experiences	 are	
legitimate	bases	from	which	to	think	about	God	then	God’s	freedom	can	speak	back	to	our	own	
and	tell	us	that	freedom	is	to	become	relationally	proximate	to	God.		This	is	a	claim	that	will	be	
developed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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the	free	action	of	God’s	love	for	creation.74		 	This	must	be	balanced,	however,	with	my	
next	consideration	(that	 is,	the	construction	of	God	as	more	than	creation)	lest	such	a	
model	 actually	 result	 in	 the	 disempowerment	 of	 God;	 that	 is,	 the	 characterisation	 of	
God	as	indistinguishable	from	creation.		Indeed,	Moltmann	reads	the	free	action	of	God	
to	feel	creation	as	being	indicative	of	the	process	through	which	God	both	suffers	with	
creation	and	“becomes	their	advocate”.	For	Moltmann	this	is	necessarily	eschatological	
as	 it	 leads	 to	God	 “throwing	open”	 creation’s	 future	 to	 them	 (1993,	56).	 	Thus,	God’s	
free	action	to	relate	to	creation	signifies	God’s	desire	to	draw	creation	into	the	fullness	
of	such	relations	in	the	eschatological	future.			
	
God’s	Relational	Help	for	Creation	
In	addition	to	God	depending	on	creation,	then,	God	is	also	presented	here	as	one	upon	
whom	we	can	depend;	who	can	offer	help	 to	us.	 	A	beneficial	way	 to	understand	 this	
concept	 of	 God	 is	 by	 considering	 God’s	 transcendence.	 	 Grace	 Jantzen	 seeks	 to	 hold	
together	 God’s	 immanence	 and	 transcendence;	 she	 does	 this	 by	 re‐imagining	 the	
eternity	of	God	in	terms	of	“omnitemporality”,	that	is,	“saying	that	God	endures	forever,	
throughout	 time”	 as	 opposed	 to	 without	 or	 outside	 of	 time	 (1984a,	 45).	 	 Such	
reconfiguring	 counters	 the	 traditional	 prioritising	 of	 the	 infinite	 over	 the	 finite,	 the	
transcendent	over	the	immanent,	and	instead	suggests	that	God	is	not	either	one	or	the	
other,	but	can	be	both,	without	contradiction.75		We	remember	that	Jantzen	proposes	a	
God	who	is	both	infinite	and	immanent,	and	we	can	develop	this	here	by	observing	that	
this	is	not	an	immanence	that	is	predicated	by	or	dependent	on	transcendence.		Rather,	
																																																													
74	This	also	further	counteracts	the	depiction	of	God	as	omnipotent,	for	as	Pamela	Sue	Anderson	
notes,	 notions	 of	 love	 have	 been	 distorted	 by	 the	 image	 of	 an	 omnipotent	 God	 which	 have	
promoted	a	“gender	ideal”	of	love	as	dominance	and	control	(2012,	90).		 
75	This	exemplifies	Jantzen’s	concern	to	overturn	and	transform	binaries,	as	opposed	to	simply	
reversing	 them	(Graham,	2009a,	4).	 	 Such	 concerns	are	 similarly	upheld	here	 in	my	desire	 to	
hold	 together	 God’s	 presence	 with	 and	 help	 for	 creation,	 instead	 of	 depicting	 the	 two	 as	
oppositional	entities.		This	overturning	of	binary	ways	of	thinking	is	a	consistent	feature	of	this	
thesis,	and	is	continued	in	the	universalistic	slant	of	my	proposals	in	this	chapter,	as	will	later	be	
seen.	 
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Jantzen	 defines	 this	 as	 existing	within	 but	 not	 being	 reduced	 to	 the	 spatio‐temporal	
(1984a,	125).		God’s	immanence	and	transcendence	are	thus	simultaneous;	are	part	of	
the	 same	 reality.	 	 Through	 retaining	 this	 element	 of	 transcendence	 in	 God’s	
relationships	 to	 creation,	 God	 emerges	 as	 one	 upon	 whom	 we	 can	 depend,	 for	 in	
addition	to	being	intimately	related	to	creation	it	 is	also	feasible	to	maintain	that	God	
remains	more	 than	 creation,	 and	 thus	 able	 to	 help	 creation.76	 	 Indeed,	 the	 divine	 co‐
suffering	 and	 empathy	 that	 was	 earlier	 said	 to	 typify	 God’s	 embodied	 and	 tangible	
relationships	with	creation	can	be	seen	as	not	exhausting	or	incapacitating	God,	for	as	
Jantzen	 claims,	 “God	 can	 cope	with	more	 than	we	 can”	 (1984a,	 84).	 Such	 a	 notion	 is	
embodied	in	one	woman’s	understanding	of	God’s	presence	in	the	conflicts	in	Northern	
Ireland.	 	This	woman	speaks	of	being	stuck	 in	 the	middle	of	 situations	and	 feeling	as	
though	she	was	being	“pulled	apart”.	 	God	though,	she	claims,	“can	stay	 in	the	middle	
and	 survive”	 (Porter,	 2013,	99).	 	This	 suggests	 that	God’s	power	 is	manifest	 in	God’s	
compassionate	 co‐experience	 of	 suffering	 and	 God’s	 ability	 to	 be	 more	 than	 that	
suffering.			
	
Again,	 the	 maternal	 metaphor	 can	 help	 us	 to	 develop	 this	 understanding.	 	 Carolyn	
Bohler	(1997,	29)	explicates	the	maternal	metaphor	used	here	by	paralleling	it	with	her	
own	experiences,	as	she	writes:			
As	 a	 nursing	mother	 who	 considered	myself	 unable	 to	 be	 more	 exhausted,	 I	
clung	 to	 the	 image	 of	 Nursing	Mother	 God	 who	would	 feed	me	 and	 give	me	
sustenance	at	the	same	time	that	I	held	our	daughter	in	my	arms,	feeding	her.		I	
had	 considered	 being	 in	 the	Womb	of	 God	while	my	womb	held	 the	 growing	
fetus.	
Alison,	 a	 respondent	 in	Woolley’s	 study,	 similarly	 speaks	 of	 her	 experience	 of	 being	
pregnant	 as	 revealing	 to	 her	 a	God	who	holds	her	 in	 love	 (2013,	 155).	 	 In	 these	 two	
examples,	we	not	only	see	the	self‐depletion	and	exhaustion	that	can	typify	experiences	
																																																													
76	 Furthermore,	 this	prevents	maternal	 readings	of	God	 from	upholding	 framings	of	maternal	
relations	as	self‐depleting.		Instead,	it	presents	mothering	as	an	agential	action,	which	indicates	
God’s	 ability	 to	 actuate	 help	 for	 creation.	 	 There	 are,	 however,	 problems	 relating	 to	 freedom	
when	considering	dependence;	these	will	be	addressed	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter. 
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of	motherhood,	but	also	 the	 significance	of	God	being	 imaged	as	one	upon	whom	we	
can	depend;	who	does	not	tire	of	the	relationship	and	continually	moves	to	uphold	and	
hold	 us	 in	 that	 relationship.	 	 Such	 a	 sentiment	 is	 shared	 by	 Julian	 of	 Norwich,	 who	
claims	 Jesus	as	our	Mother	 and	 therein	 asserts	 that	 “though	our	 earthly	mother	may	
suffer	 her	 child	 to	 perish,	 our	 heavenly	Mother,	 Jesus,	may	not	 suffer	 us	 that	 are	 his	
children	to	perish”	(1927,	151).	This	should	not	be	read	as	inferring	that	God	is	now	a	
supernatural	figure	of	motherhood,	whose	mothering	makes	all	other	mothers	pale	in	
comparison.	 	 If	 so,	 this	would	merely	perpetuate	problems	with	 traditional	 images	of	
God	 as	 Father.	 	 Instead,	 we	 remember	 the	 emphasis	 that	 has	 been	 placed	 here	 on	
rethinking	 power	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 sharedness.	 	 Thus,	 God	 is	 not	 a	 super‐heroine	 of	
motherhood	 but	 rather	 a	 mother	 who	 radically	 reverses	 assumptions	 of	 power	 and	
shares	her	power	so	that	we	may	all	experience	the	relational	help	of	God.		Thus,	whilst	
God	as	mother	can	transcend	and	transform	our	difficulties,	 this	 is	predicated	on	God	
entering,	feeling,	and	sharing	them.		Indeed,	Reinhard,	citing	Heimmel,	notes	that	Julian	
of	Norwich	does	not	present	a	slight	on	mothers	or	a	rejection	of	their	motherhood,	but	
rather	an	affirmation	of	the	inclusion	of	“our	earthly	mother”	into	the	actions,	relations,	
and	 intentions	of	God	 (2007,	634).	 	This	 simultaneous	appreciation	and	projection	of	
motherhood	 in	 God	 echoes	 my	 earlier	 claim,	 made	 in	 reference	 to	 Raphael’s	
presentation	 of	 the	 sometime	 burden	 of	 relationships	 in	 the	 Holocaust;	 such	
relationships	are	understood	here	to	be	both	felt	by	God	in	all	of	their	difficulty	but	also	
transcended	 and	 transformed	 by	 God	 in	 God’s	 ability	 to	 offer	 relational	 help	 within	
such	situations.	
	
This	 reading	 of	 God	 as	 physically	 and	 relationally	 perceiving	 and	 responding	 to	
creation,	whilst	also	remaining	more	than	creation,	means	that	God	both	desires	and	is	
able	 to	 help	 creation	 to	 experience	 the	 fullness	 of	 relationality	 in	 the	 eschatological	
future.		It	is	because	God	so	experiences	creation	that	God	desires	to	help	creation	and	
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does	so	in	a	relational	manner.		Indeed,	such	help	can	actually	be	said	to	constitute	an	
important	 element	 of	 God’s	 responsive	 relationship	 to	 creation.	 	 The	 presentist	
dimensions	 of	 this	 have	 already	 been	 communicated	 as	 divinely	 embodied	 presence	
which	is	manifest	in	perceiving	and	responding	to	personal	experiences.		However,	the	
understanding	 of	 God	 as	 both	 immanent	 and	 transcendent	 again	 resurfaces,	 and	
enables	an	eschatological	reading	of	help.		Mayra	Rivera	sees	relationality	as	typical	of	
transcendence	for	she	claims	that	transcendence	is	not	predicated	on	God’s	exteriority	
to	 creation	 but	 on	 God’s	 relational	 involvement	 with	 creation	 (2007,	 45).	 	 God’s	
transcendence	within	creation	can,	 in	 this	way,	be	read	as	pertaining	to	 the	ability	 to	
both	 sustain	 present	 relationships	 and	 birth	 creation	 to	 the	 full	 experience	 of	
relationality.	 	 It	 is	precisely	because	God	is	relational	in	the	way	claimed	thus	far	that	
God	desires	to	help	us	into	this	full	experience	of	relationality,	which	I	propose	means	
unhindered	 and	 universal	 presence	 with	 God	 and	 with	 other	 members	 of	 creation.		
Julian	of	Norwich,	again,	also	seems	to	uphold	this	twofold	emphasis	on	God,	in	Jesus,	
both	feeling	and	helping	or	“feeding”	us.		With	reference	once	more	to	the	motherhood	
of	Jesus,	Julian	asserts	that	“Jesus	is	our	very	Mother,	not	feeding	us	with	milk,	but	with	
himself;	opening	his	side	to	us,	and	challenging	all	of	our	love”	(1927,	123).	 	Reinhard	
reads	Jesus’	open	side	as	signifying	his	penetrable	body;	at	once	receptive,	enveloping,	
and	nourishing	(2007,	636‐638).77	 	Further	to	this,	Meg,	a	respondent	 in	Nicola	Slee’s	
study	 of	 women’s	 faith	 development,	 tells	 of	 how	 her	 experience	 of	 motherhood	
mediated	her	experience	of	interrelationship	with	God.	 	Here,	the	self	is	both	“feeding	
and	fed,	denied	and	affirmed,	offered	and	received”	(Slee,	2004b,	127).		These	readings	
of	 relationality	 can	 help	 us	 to	 formulate	 a	 model	 of	 God	 that	 encompasses	 both	
vulnerable	 sentience	 to	 creation	 and	 active	 help	 for	 creation	 without	 contradiction.		
This	is	what	Russell	calls	the	“radical	help”	that	God	provides	humanity	with,	in	order	
																																																													
77	 Reinhard	 also	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 “the	 tactile	 way	 in	 which	 humanity	 is	 united	 to	 Christ	 her	
mother”	(2007,	636),	which	further	substantiates	Chapter	Four’s	focus	on	relational	tactility	as	a	
way	of	embodying	both	God	and	the	eschaton. 
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that	they	“find	their	way	back	into	the	circle	of	humanity	with	other	human	beings	and	
with	God”	 (1982a,	 80).	 	 Given	God’s	 involvement	with	 creation,	 any	 failure	 to	 finally	
and	 fully	 realise	such	relationality	would	be	contradictory	 to	God’s	very	self	which	 is	
characterised	by	the	free	action	to	be	relationally	present	to	creation.			
		
God’s	Relational	Help	for	All	of	Creation		
God’s	loyalty	to	relational	presence	with	and	for	creation	necessitates	an	eschatological	
fullness	 of	 relationality	 in	 order	 that	 this	 loyalty	 be	 fulfilled,	 then.	 	 Fulfilment,	 to	
reiterate,	means	uncompromised	experiences	of	presence	but	in	addition	to	this	it	must	
also	mean	the	universal	experience	of	such	presence.		There	are	questions	to	be	asked	
here	concerning	the	coherence	of	such	universality	with	creaturely	freedom,	and	these	
will	 be	 attended	 to	 in	 the	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter.	 	 Before	 this,	 though,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 expound	 the	 claim	 that	 God’s	 relational	 presence	 with	 creation	 must	
ultimately	 mean	 that	 God	 desires	 to	 and	 will	 help	 all	 of	 creation	 to	 experience	 full	
relationality.	 	 God’s	 love	 and	 loyalty	 are	 integral	 to	 understanding	 this.	 	 Hartshorne	
(2001,	110‐111)	reads	changelessness	through	the	lens	of	Whitehead’s	presentation	of	
the	primordial	nature	of	God,	and	claims	that	it	may	thus	be	thought	of	as:	
all‐penetrating	 love.	 	 At	 no	 time	 is	 God	 without	 interest	 in	 and	 benevolent	
toward	his	[sic.]	creatures	as	existent	at	that	time.		The	changeless	character	of	
God	is	his	absolute	loyalty.			
This	can	support	the	notion	that	part	of	God’s	intimate	relationships	with	creation	is	a	
loyal	 commitment	 to	 making	 that	 intimacy	 ultimate;	 God	 is	 never	 not	 loyal	 to,	
interested	 in,	 or	 loving	 towards	 creation	 and	 thus	 cannot	 logically	 be	 content	with	 a	
future	in	which	full	relationality	is	not	experienced	by	all.		Delio	further	explains	this	by	
claiming	that	“It	is	precisely	the	relational	nature	of	God	as	love	that	begs	the	question	
whether	 or	 not	 creation	 is	 eternal,	 since	 love	 implies	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 other”	
(2005,	280).		Commitment	here	is	not	simply	that	which	is	experienced	in	the	present;	
it	also	signifies	an	enduring	commitment.		Again,	this	is	not	an	exercise	in	God	exerting	
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power	over	creation;	this	is	simply	not	the	kind	of	power	that	God	experiences.		Rather,	
God’s	 power	 is	 found	 in	 God’s	 relational	 presence	 to	 creation	which	 is	 both	 open	 to	
being	affected	by	creation	and	committed	 to	helping	all	of	 creation	 to	experience	 full	
relationality.		
	
Relationality	 must	 ultimately	 be	 realised	 for	 all,	 then,	 in	 order	 that	 God’s	 love	 and	
loyalty	 not	 ultimately	 and	 eternally	 be	 frustrated	 and	 compromised.	 	 Letty	 Russell	
expresses	 a	 similar	 perspective	 when	 she	 states	 that	 “The	 gift	 [of	 God’s	 love]	 is	 for	
everyone”	(1979a,	175).		God’s	love	and	the	eschatological	fulfilment	of	relationality	are	
inseparable,	 then,	 and	 it	 is	 out	 of	 love	 that	 God	 not	 only	 desires	 all	 of	 creation	 to	
experience	 full	 relationality,	 but	 that	 God	 ultimately	 can	 do	 no	 other.	 	 Moltmann	
concurs,	 and	 citing	 1	 Corinthians	 15,	 he	 claims	 that	 Paul’s	 concern	 is	 “the	 universal	
glorification	of	God.		This	embraces	the	universal	reconciliation	of	human	beings	and	the	
bringing	again	of	all	 things	 into	 the	new	creation.	 	Otherwise	God	would	not	be	God”	
(2010,	 141;	 cf.	 1992,	 118;	 1989,	 67).78	 	 This	 is	 further	 substantiated	 by	 Pinnock’s	
reading	of	Revelation	22.2	which	relays	John’s	vision	of	a	river	flowing	with	life	and	a	
tree	 blossoming	 with	 life.	 	 The	 tree’s	 leaves,	 it	 is	 said,	 are	 “for	 the	 healing	 of	 the	
nations”,	 and	 verse	 three	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 “Nothing	 accursed	will	 be	 found	 there	
anymore”.		Pinnock	reads	this	to	mean	that	“God	is	not	going	to	give	up	on	the	nations	
that	fought	and	resisted	him	[sic.]	and	persecuted	his	[sic.]	people	so	cruelly”,	and	this	
communicates	God’s	universal	and	relentless	love,	for	Pinnock.		He	continues:	“God	will	
finally	win	victory	over	 them,	not	 through	naked	power,	but	 through	boundless	 love”	
(1992,	34‐35).		Whilst	the	language	of	victory	is	problematic	given	its	associations	with	
conquest,	 we	 can	 nevertheless	 use	 Pinnock’s	 assertion	 to	 acquire	 a	 sense	 of	 the	
eschaton	 being	 brought	 about	 not	 by	 domineering	 power	 but	 by	 relentless	 love.		
																																																													
78	It	seems	here	that	Moltmann	is	paying	particular	attention	to	the	assertions	that	“as	all	die	in	
Adam,	so	all	will	be	made	alive	in	Christ”	(1	Corinthians	15.22)	and,	later,	that	this	must	happen	
“so	that	God	may	be	all	in	all”	(1	Corinthians	15.28). 
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Accordingly,	 a	 relational	 eschatological	 process	 can	 draw	 relationships	 to	 their	
fulfilment	not	only	 in	 their	quality	but	also	 in	 their	quantity.	 	 Loving	divine	presence	
will	 be	 encountered	 fully	 (though	 differently)	 by	 every	 individual	 in	 the	 collective	
experience	of	the	eschaton.			
	
The	propensity	for	divine	love	to	be	universal	is	a	notion	supported	by	many	feminist	
theologians,	 albeit	 not	 always	 in	 a	 future‐eschatological	 sense	 given	 the	 problems	
already	noted	with	future‐oriented	eschatology.		Marit	Trelstad,	for	example,	insists	on	
the	unmerited,	uncontrollable	love	of	God	for	creation	(2006,	121),	arguing	for	“Love,	
fully	offered	again	and	again,	regardless	of	our	attempts	to	reject	or	kill	it”	(2006,	124).		
This	 relentlessness	 can	 legitimately	 be	 conceived	 of	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 eschatological	
future,	 and	 indeed	 some	women	 have	 subscribed	 to	 such	 imaginings.	 	 Sarah	 Apetrei	
highlights	the	marginal	but	compelling	voices	of	Elizabeth	Bathurst	and	M.	Marsin,	who	
both	sought	to	articulate	a	universalist	understanding	of	the	eschatological	 future.	 	Of	
Bathurst,	 Apetrei	 explains:	 “She	 could	 not	 accept	 that	 God	 could	 be	 ‘so	 partial	 in	 his	
[sic.]	 Love	 towards	 his	 Creatures,	 as	 to	 choose	 some,	 but	 leave	 the	 greatest	 part	 of	
Mankind	[sic.]	in	the	fallen	state’”	(2009,	136).79		Moreover,	Apetrei	(2009,	143)	notes	
that	both	Bathurst	and	Marsin	read	this	universalism	as	having	an	especially	political	
impact,	albeit	an	impact	that	was	somewhat	restricted	to	ecclesiastical	life:	
If	the	heathen,	the	infant	and	the	ignorant	could	be	encompassed	by	grace,	how	
much	 more	 were	 barriers	 to	 the	 ministry	 of	 godly	 women	 removed.	 	 The	
election	of	men	for	dominant	religious	roles	seemed	to	[Bathurst	and	Marsin]	as	
arbitrary	as	ordaining	the	smallest	part	of	humanity	for	salvation.	
																																																													
79	Of	course,	the	masculine	language	used	here,	and	other	language	used	by	the	two	thinkers,	is	
problematic.	 	 Still,	 as	we	shall	 later	 see	with	contributions	 that	 refer	 to	 the	 ‘Kingdom	of	God’,	
such	language	does	not	render	the	ideas	redundant	or	entirely	unhelpful,	even	if	such	language	
is	rejected.		 
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For	these	thinkers,	then,	grace	was	understood	to	be	ultimately	indiscriminate	and	as	
such	could	not	be	arbitrarily	dispensed	to	select	individuals	in	the	here	and	now.80		As	
such,	 whilst	 steeped	 in	 the	 language	 of	 the	 historical	 context	 in	which	 Bathurst	 and	
Marsin	wrote,	and	presenting	a	somewhat	limited	understanding	of	the	social	impact	of	
a	 universalist	 idea	 of	 salvation,	 these	 two	 thinkers	 illustrate	 the	 feasibility	 of	
synthesising	universalist	eschatological	images	with	present	concerns	for	affirming	the	
full	 participation	 and	 inclusion	 of	 women	 in	 relationships	 with	 the	 divine.	 	 Indeed,	
much	feminist	theological	thought	upholds	a	sustained	rejection	of	dualistic	structures	
that	define	and	dichotomise	beings	as	good	or	bad,	 and	 this	 finds	especial	 resonance	
with	universalist	images.		A	God	who	finally	and	fully	realises	relationship	for	all	can	be	
conceived	 of	 as	 one	who	honours	 the	 particularity	 of	 individuals	whilst	 rejecting	 the	
value‐laden	 separation	 of	 individuals.	 	 That	 this	 is	 realised	 for	 all	 of	 creation	 again	
emphasises	 the	 usurping	 of	 dichotomous	 constructions	 by	 synthesising	 both	
particularity	and	universality	in	the	eschatological	process.	
	
It	is	both	a	logical	deduction	and	a	biblical	assertion,	then,	to	claim	that	God’s	love	for	
and	loyalty	to	creation	necessitates	the	inclusion	of	all	in	the	eschatological	experience	
of	 relational	presence.	 	 If	 this	 is	not	experienced	 fully	 (meaning	both	 in	 intensity	and	
universality)	then	God	is	not	actually	loving,	ultimately	not	loyal,	and	creation	eternally	
deprived.		We	would	all,	including	God,	eternally	suffer,	for	as	Talbott	writes	“if	[God’s]	
love	is	infinitely	greater	than	ours,	then	his	[sic.]	own	suffering	over	the	loss	of	a	single	
loved	one	would	likewise	be	infinitely	greater	than	our	own”	(Talbott,	2003,	17).	 	Our	
creaturely	 experiences	 of	 love	 communicate	 to	 us	 that	 eternal	 alienation	 from	 our	
loved	ones	would	be	unbearable,	and	this	can	inform	our	conceptions	of	God.		Again,	if	
God	is	so	affected	by	our	actions	and	experiences	then	God’s	empathetic	“feeling	with”	
																																																													
80	Norman	Wirzba	offers	 an	 interesting	observation	 in	 relation	 to	understandings	of	 grace	by	
explaining	the	similarities	in	the	Hebrew	word	for	grace	(hēn)	and	the	life‐giving	womb	(rehem)	
(2008,	 238).	 	 This	 again	 draws	 us	 back	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 model	 of	 God’s	 intimate	 and	
embodied	relational	love	for	and	loyalty	to	creation. 
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creation	and	loving	“power	for”	creation	can	help	us	to	conclude	that	God	would	both	
suffer	 over	 any	 severing	 of	 relationships	 with	 creation	 and	 would	 actively	 move	 to	
remedy	 this	 by	 helping	 all	 into	 the	 full	 and	 final	 experience	 of	 relationality	 in	 the	
eschaton.		
	
Such	a	reading	of	divine	power	as	the	relational	response	to	help	all	of	creation	finally	
and	 fully	 experience	 relationality	 does,	 however,	 lead	 to	 questions	 of	 why	 this	 is	
eschatological	and	not	realised	immediately.		There	are	certainly	situations	where	this	
would	not	 only	be	welcome	but	 crucial.	 	 If	 this	 help	 is	 delayed	 then	we	 are	 reverted	
back	 to	 the	 problems	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 One;	 namely	 that	 God	 appears	 callous	 and	
unconcerned	with	present	struggles.		However,	I	have	here	presented	a	case	for	a	God	
who	is	relationally	perceptive	and	responsive	both	in	the	present	and	in	the	future.		It	is	
because	God	 relates	 like	 this	 in	 the	present	 that	God	must	 also	 relate	 like	 this	 in	 the	
future	and	that	that	future	must	be	realised	in	accordance.		In	short,	the	future	must	be	
one	that	we	can	genuinely	affect	and	that	God,	through	loyalty,	can	help	us	to	achieve.		
The	 model	 I	 have	 presented	 of	 God’s	 relational	 presence	 as	 both	 perceptive	 and	
responsive	has	elucidated	the	claim	that	God	does	offer	help	now.		Nevertheless,	there	
are	undoubtedly	situations	where	God	is	not	experienced	as	relationally	and	helpfully	
perceptive	and	responsive.		In	such	circumstances,	the	model	of	eschatology	proposed	
here	can	offer	not	an	excuse,	as	Keller’s	critique	of	traditional	eschatologies	claims,	but	
rather	an	alternative	perspective.		This	perspective	can	reveal	that	God	is	never	not	for	
creation,	thus	will	never	abandon	creation,	in	the	present	as	much	as	in	the	future.		As	
this	 chapter	 earlier	 claimed,	 God’s	 apparent	 absence	 can	 instead	 be	 understood	 as	
God’s	proximity	 to	 the	pain	of	desolation,	 such	 that	God	shares	 in	 and	 truly	 feels	 the	
experience	 of	 feeling	 alone	 and	 abandoned.	 	Again,	God	 is	 thus	one	 to	whom	we	 can	
authentically	 relate	 for	 God	 truly	 understands	 our	 sufferings.	 	 Moreover,	 given	 the	
rejection	of	divine	omnipotence,	this	is	not	a	God	who	invades	present	circumstances	in	
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order	to	exercise	power	over	them	and	thus	change	them.	 	 Instead,	 this	 is	a	God	who	
accompanies	 us	 even	 in	 the	 loneliest	 of	 places;	 as	 Psalm	 139.7‐12	 confirms,	 God	 is	
indeed	omnipresent	and	does	not	abandon	us	even	if	we	find	ourselves	in	the	darkest	
and	most	distant	places:	
	 If	I	take	the	wings	of	the	morning		
	 and	settle	at	the	farthest	limits	of		
the	sea,	
even	there	your	hand	shall	lead	me,	
and	your	right	hand	shall	hold	me	fast.	
If	I	say,	‘Surely	the	darkness	shall		
cover	me,	
and	the	light	around	me	become		
night’,	
even	the	darkness	is	not	dark	to	you;	
the	night	is	as	bright	as	the	day,	
for	darkness	is	as	light	to	you	(9‐12).	
	
A	 similar	 sensing	 of	 God’s	 presence	 is	 expressed	 by	 one	 of	 the	 participants	 in	 Slee’s	
study;	here,	Marion	conveys	a	 feeling	that	God	is	“always	there	available…even	in	the	
darkness	 and	 desolation”	 (2004b,	 141).	 	 God’s	 unfailingly	 intimate	 presence	 in	 the	
eschaton	does	not	diminish	experiences	of	a	perceived	lack	of	presence	in	the	present,	
then,	but	instead	it	helps	us	to	alter	our	perceptions	in	accordance	with	the	promise	of	
perpetual	divine	presence.	 	 In	so	doing,	we	can	strive	to	reflect	on	our	perceptions	of	
divine	absence	and	strive	to	perceive,	instead,	a	different	kind	of	presence.		This	may	be	
a	 quieter	 and	 gentler	 presence	 than	we	may	 have	 thought	 or	 even	 desired,	 but	 it	 is,	
nonetheless,	a	powerful	presence.	
	
Still,	if	God	is	both	willing	and	able	to	offer	help	to	finally	realise	this	full	experience	of	
relationality	we	may	continue	to	ask	why	this	 is	not	 fully	experienced	now;	what	 it	 is	
that	prevents	God	 from	actuating	this	 fullness	 in	 its	entirety	now.	 	However,	 the	very	
fact	that	it	is	not	realised	now	signals	that	God	is	honouring	the	process.		Returning	to	
the	maternal	metaphor,	there	must	be	a	process	of	gestation	before	there	can	be	birth;	
there	is,	indeed,	“a	time	for	every	matter”	(Ecclesiastes	3.1).		The	unpredictability	of	the	
precise	moment	of	birth	does	not	mean	that	we	cannot	now	feel	its	joy,	for	just	as	God	
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is	affected	by,	feels,	and	relates	to	us	we	too	can	be	affected	by,	feel,	and	relate	to	God	
and	perceive	the	type	of	relationship	we	will	be	birthed	to	in	the	eschaton.		It	is	possible	
to	detect	a	similar	eschatological	reading	of	relationality	 in	 the	work	of	Mayra	Rivera	
(2007,	 137),	 who	 conceives	 of	 God	 opening	 creation	 up	 to	 “relational	 infinity”.	 	 She	
writes:	
A	God	who	knows	(in	the	broadest	sense	of	the	term)	each	and	every	creature	
[…]	 embraces	 each	 one	 of	 them	 and	 is	 touched	 by	 each	 one	 in	 her/his	 own	
singularity	–	caressing	and	calling	the	particularity	of	each	and	every	creature	
to	its	new	births.81			
Such	a	perspective	enables	a	reading	of	the	eschatological	process	not	as	realised	by	an	
omnipotent	 God	 through	 triumphalism	 and	 conquest,	 but	 rather	 by	 every	 individual	
experience	 of	 creation	 affecting	 God	 and	 God	 affecting	 all	 of	 creation	 in	 a	 dynamic	
interplay	 of	 maternal	 relationality.	 	 This	 embracing	 body	 of	 God	 does	 not	 confine,	
Rivera	explains	(2007,	135),	and	I	add	to	this	that	the	tactile	openness	of	God’s	embrace	
creates	a	space	wide	enough	for	the	process	to	take	time,	and	intimate	enough	to	gently	
caress	 us	 toward	 involvement	 in	 the	 process.	 	 This	 is	 a	 body	 that	 holds	 and	 helps,	
certainly,	but	one	that	does	so	in	relationship	with	the	one	who	is	held	and	helped.		This	
means	 that	 whilst	 God’s	 embrace	 can	 take	 care	 of	 creation,	 it	 cannot	 do	 so	
independently	of	the	effects	and	existences	of	creation.		Creation	remains	agential	even	
as	God	embraces	and	caresses	it	to	true,	full	freedom.	
	
Creaturely	Freedom	
The	Case	for	Freedom	
Even	 so,	 more	 must	 be	 said	 about	 freedom	 if	 this	 remodelling	 of	 the	 eschatological	
process	is	to	be	at	all	feasible;	questions	remain	in	this	universalistic	model	(as,	indeed,	
in	most	models	of	universalism)	concerning	the	experiences	of	those	who	may	not	want	
to	 affect	 or	 be	 affected	 by	 God,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 choice	 in	 this	 (for	 those	 who	 either	
																																																													
81	This	highlights	the	simultaneous	particular	and	universal	nature	of	the	eschaton	which	will	be	
elaborated	in	the	next	chapter,	as	I	attend,	in	more	depth	than	has	been	alluded	to	thus	far,	to	
the	possibility	and	meaning	of	particular	bodies	enduring	in	the	eschaton. 
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cannot	or	do	not	wish	to	make	choices).			Before	these	questions	are	addressed,	though,	
we	should	explore	why	the	question	of	freedom	is	pertinent	to	this	discussion.		As	we	
will	 see	 in	more	depth	momentarily,	 Jantzen	 (1984b,	 39),	 Baker‐Fletcher	 (2006,	 83),	
and	Keller	(2003b,	422),	claim	that	for	love	to	be	possible	freedom	must	be	authentic.		
Ultimately	this	means,	for	these	thinkers,	that	no	final,	universal	eschatological	future	is	
possible,	as	it	would	remove	the	possibility	of	freely	refusing	participation	or	existence	
in	that	future.			Emphasis	here	is	placed	on	creaturely	agency	and	decision‐making,	and	
the	necessary	preservation	of	both	in	order	that	relationships	of	freedom	are	honoured.		
The	critique	that	 this	offers	of	eschatology	 is,	 in	short,	 that	 the	end	cannot	 justify	 the	
means;	if	the	end	result	is	loving	relationality,	the	means	by	which	this	is	achieved	must	
also	be	loving.		If	this	is	to	be	at	all	possible,	it	is	claimed,	creation	must	always	be	free	
to	 express	 agency	 and	 responsiveness,	 even	 if	 this	 manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 refusal	 of	
relationship.			
	
Attentiveness	 to	 freedom	 emerges	 as	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 a	 specifically	 feminist	
remodelling	of	the	eschatological	process,	for	just	as	relationality	has	been	constructed	
as	 the	 domain	 of	 women,	 so	 too	 has	 freedom	 been	 framed	 dualistically	 as	 the	 sole	
possession	of	men.		Christ	(2003,	184‐185)	extrapolates	the	details	of	this,	noting	that:	
Traditionally,	 individual	 freedom	 has	 been	 a	male	 prerogative,	 while	 women	
have	been	told	that	we	must	give	up	our	desires	for	individual	human	freedom	
in	order	to	meet	the	needs	of	husbands	and	children.	
The	 omnipotent	 God	 of	 traditional	 eschatology,	 modelled	 on	 patriarchal	
understandings	of	power,	is	thus	exposed	here	as	perpetuating	gendered	definitions	of	
freedom	and	relationality;	the	suggestion	seems	to	be	that	women	cannot	be	free	and	
must	 settle	 with	 their	 supposedly	 appropriately	 inferior	 experience	 of	 relationality.		
That	 such	 relationality	 is	 understood	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 to	 be	 abstracted	 from	
traditional	 models	 of	 divinity	 only	 confirms	 its	 inferiority.	 	 Such	 understandings	 of	
freedom	both	benefit	from	and	add	credence	to	a	model	of	divine	omnipotence	which	
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depicts	creaturely	 freedom	as	 illusory	and	 impossible.	 	The	observation	 that	not	only	
God	 but	 also	 freedom	have	 been	 constructed	 in	male	 terms,	 and	 have	 been	 assigned	
exclusively	 to	men,	makes	 the	divine	diminishing	of	 freedom	even	more	problematic.		
Furthermore,	an	omnipotent	God,	and	the	future	created	by	such	a	God,	is	deemed	by	
these	thinkers	not	only	to	compromise	human	freedom	but	also	to	care	little	for	it,	such	
that	any	of	creation’s	experiences	and	actions	appear	inconsequential	to	the	life	of	the	
divine.	
	
Whilst	 I	 have	 here	 presented	 a	 God	 who	 does	 care	 for	 creation	 and,	 further	 still,	 is	
genuinely	affected	by	relationships	with	creation,	 some	problems	remain	particularly	
with	regards	to	freedom.		The	perspectives	noted	above	illustrate	that	the	remodelling	I	
have	 presented	 of	 God	 as	 involved	 with	 but	 also	 more	 than	 and	 capable	 of	 helping	
creation	 to	 final,	 full	 experiences	 of	 relationality,	 can	 also	 potentially	 jeopardise	
creaturely	 autonomy.	 	 God,	 in	 this	 understanding,	 could	 be	 accused	 of	 retaining	 an	
ability	 to	 actuate	 a	 specific	 future	 for	us;	 affected	by	 the	 experiences	of	 creation	 and	
regarding	 their	 choices	 but	 not,	 ultimately	 or	 significantly,	 altering	 the	 course	 or	
character	of	the	future	in	relation	to	them.		Such	an	understanding	still	requires	God	to	
be	in	complete	and	ultimate	possession	of	all	power.		This	is	developed	by	Keller,	who	
writes	that	“No	matter	how	perfect,	beautiful,	and	joyful	 is	the	restoration,	 if	 it	 finally	
overrides	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 creature	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 respond	 in	 love	 then	 the	
reconstitution	 is	a	work	not	of	 love	but	of	dominance”	 (2003b,	 422).	 	 Continuing	 the	
emphasis	 on	 human	 freedom,	 Jantzen	 similarly	 concludes	 that	 “surely	 if	 there	 is	
freedom	there	is	always	the	possibility	of	refusal”	(Jantzen,	1984b,	39).		Eschatological	
indeterminacy	 thus	 connotes	 eschatological	 risk;	 if	 there	 is	 to	 be	 an	 eschatological	
future	 at	 all,	 the	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 human	 freedom	would	 thwart	 any	universal	
future.	 	 This	 is	 echoed	 by	 Karen	 Baker‐Fletcher	 who	 claims	 that	 God	 certainly	 has	
“loving	desire	for	the	world”	but	will	not	force	us	to	participate	in	this,	such	that	“The	
 
 
~	138	~	
 
potential	 to	 choose	 the	 opposite	 of	 God’s	 aim	 for	 the	well‐being	 of	 creation	 is	 a	 risk	
entailed	in	the	freedom	that	is	inherent	in	all	of	life”	(2006,	83).82		What	is	prioritised	by	
these	thinkers,	then,	is	the	integrity	of	creaturely	freedom	to	make	authentic	decisions;	
this	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 “choked	 off”	 by	 divine	 power	 which	 is	 framed	 as	 total	 control	
(Keller,	2003b,	415).	 	This	suggests	that	our	concern	should	not	be	with	what	kind	of	
future	we	will	experience,	but	rather	with	whether	that	 future	was	our	own	decision:	
neither	determined	or	known	by	God.			
	
Such	 perspectives	 further	 suggest	 that	 even	 if	 God	 finally	 realises	 an	 existence	 that	
seems	 to	be	 characterised	by	 love,	 it	 cannot	 actually	be	 so	 for	God	has	 therein	 acted	
upon	creation	with	no	regard	or	need	for	creaturely	agency.	 	Brock	and	Parker	define	
this	 framing	 of	 power	 as	 “benevolent	 paternalism”	 (2008,	 422),	 and	 Brock’s	 earlier	
work	exposes	the	insufficiency	of	such	benevolence.		She	writes	that	“if	we	choose	some	
element	of	domination,	no	matter	how	benevolent,	we	reduce	the	presence	of	the	other	
in	 the	 relationship	 and	 diminish	 the	 creativity	 of	 connection”	 (1995,	 39).	 	 Elizabeth	
Johnson	 detects	 a	 similar	 problem;	 we	 remember	 her	 earlier‐noted	 assertion	 that	
“Benevolent	 patriarchy	 is	 still	 patriarchy”	 (2002,	 34).	 	 It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 even	 if	
eschatology	 is	 framed	 as	 entirely	 egalitarian,	 as	 “God’s	 relational	 help	 for	 all	 of	
creation”,	 the	 problem	 remains	 that	 this	 requires	 a	 God	who	 finally	 exercises	 power	
over	 creation.	 	 As	 such,	 any	 final	 future,	 in	 this	 understanding,	 cannot	 actually	 be	
“perfect,	beautiful,	and	joyful”	for	it	compromises	the	integrity	of	creation	and	confirms	
the	dominance	of	God.	
	
Not	 only	 this,	 though;	 universal	 understandings	 in	 any	 form	 are	 understood	 to	 be	
problematic	 for	 their	 proximity	 to	 and	 perpetuation	 by	 colonial	 and	 imperialistic	
forces.	 	 Grace	 Jantzen,	 for	 instance,	 proposes	 that	 notions	 of	 universal	 salvation	 are	
																																																													
82	 It	 should	 be	noted	 that	 despite	 appearances	 here,	 Baker‐Fletcher	does	maintain	 a	 sense	 of	
finality	by	claiming	that,	in	the	end,	all	will	recognise	God’s	authority	in	Jesus	(2006,	145). 
 
 
~	139	~	
 
founded	on	particularly	Christian	understandings	of	salvation.		This	means,	for	Jantzen,	
that	 universal	 salvation	 presents	 Christianity	 as	 a	 universal	 truth,	 which	 is	 deeply	
problematic	 when	 confronted	 with	 difference	 in	 any	 forms	 and	 particularly	 with	
religious	pluralism	(1998,	168).		This	is	echoed	by	Vine	Deloria,	who	understands	such	
perspectives	 as	 actually	 espousing	a	 “universal	 imperialism”	 (in	Ruether,	2002,	 210).		
Given	 the	 feminist	 critique	 of	 universalistic	 claims	 that	 have	 commonly	 underpinned	
gender	 theory	and	 theology,	 as	noted	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 an	eschatology	 that	 is	 final	
even	 if,	 or	 especially	 if,	 it	 is	 for	 all,	 is	 charged	 with	 perpetuating	 this	 myth	 of	
universality.	 	 Essentially,	 it	 claims	 an	 homogenous	 future	 defined	 by	 one	 dominant	
perspective	 and	 relies	 on	 a	 domineering	 God	 to	 effect	 it.	 	 We	 see	 similar	 problems	
resurfacing	here	then:	whilst	I	have	significantly	rethought	the	eschatological	process,	
my	model	thus	far	could	be	charged	with	compromising	both	difference	and	freedom.		
This	 critique	 substantiates	 the	 earlier	 noted	 critique	 from	 Christ;	 namely	 that	
omnipotence	compromises	relationality	and	freedom.			
	
Thus,	even	if	the	eschatological	process	is	reconstructed	on	the	basis	of	divine‐creation	
relationality,	if	the	finality	of	this	is	ultimately	achieved	by	God,	then	it	is	deemed	to	be	
no	less	problematic	than,	and	even	too	closely	akin	to,	an	omnipotent	God	who	controls	
the	 trajectory	of	creation.	 	 I	have	begun	 to	challenge	 this	critique	by	claiming	 that	an	
eschatological	God	 is	not	an	omnipotent	God;	 this	chapter’s	attempts	at	reconfiguring	
divine	power	 in	relation	 to	 the	eschatological	process	have	emphasised	the	relational	
nature	of	both.		Therein,	I	argued	that	if	God	did	not	finally	help	creation	to	realise	full	
relationality	then	God’s	relational	 love	for	creation	would	forever	be	frustrated,	God’s	
loyalty	to	relationships	with	creation	would	ultimately	be	compromised,	and	creation’s	
ability	to	experience	unfettered	and	abundant	relationality	would	be	thwarted.	 	Thus,	
God’s	eschatological	help	was	understood	in	terms	of	a	shared	power	which	empowers	
creation	to	embrace	the	full	and	final	experience	of	relationality	with	one	another,	with	
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oneself,	and	with	God.		As	such,	both	God	and	creation	are	enabled	finally	to	enter	into	
the	 full	 experience	 of	 relationality	 which	 is	 both	 constructed	 and	 glimpsed	 in	 the	
present	when	we	build	relationships	which	mirror	such	eschatological	fullness.	
	
“The	Torment	of	Choice”83	
However,	it	is	possible	to	take	the	challenge	further,	and	make	my	case	more	legitimate,	
by	being	attentive	 to	 the	diversity	of	experiences	within	creation.	 	Such	attentiveness	
challenges	the	above‐noted	theologians’	readings	of	freedom,	and	also	addresses	their	
claims	 that	 “universality”	 necessarily	 overlooks	 and	 even	 thwarts	 difference	 and	
diversity.	 	A	beneficial	place	 to	begin	 is	with	questioning	 the	alignment	of	choice	and	
agency	with	freedom,	for	what	is	suggested	here	is	that	creation	must	always	be	free	to	
choose	to	respond	to	or	refuse	God.		This	complete	alignment	of	freedom	with	response	
and	refusal	is	inappropriate	as	it	fails	to	account	for	those	who	do	not	have	the	capacity	
or	 ability	 to	 make	 such	 decisions.84	 	 Morris	 (2011,	 126)	 calls	 this	 the	 “tyranny	 of	
salvation”	whereby	God	is	presented	as	one	who	will	only	save	those	who	respond	in	
faith.		He	continues:	
Such	an	understanding	of	salvation	could	only	 lead	us	to	conclude	that	people	
with	 certain	 learning	 and	 intellectual	 disabilities	 could	 not	 be	 saved	 because	
they	 would	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 know	 intellectually	 anything	 of	 Christ’s	
salvific	work	or	have	a	faith	that	could	be	explicitly	expressed	to	others	through	
language.	
																																																													
83	Moltmann	 refers	 to	 the	 “torment	 of	 choice”	 between	 good	 and	 evil,	 “with	 its	 torments	 and	
threats”,	as	a	lesser	freedom	when	compared	with	the	freedom	which	desires	only	good	(1993,	
55).	 	 Although	 I	 present	 a	 slightly	 different	 reading	 of	 freedom,	 I	 concur	 with	 Moltmann’s	
critique	of	depicting	choice	as	the	sole	determinant	of	freedom. 
84	 Christ	 makes	 an	 important	 observation	 that	 “Unfortunately	 there	 are	 many	 people	 in	 the	
world	whose	freedom	is	so	limited	that	[...]	it	might	seem	meaningless	to	speak	about	creative	
freedom	to	them	or,	worse,	insensitive	to	their	real	needs”	(Christ,	2003,	179;	cf.	Jantzen,	1998,	
259).	 	In	light	of	this,	it	may	seem	that	my	ensuing	discussion	of	freedom	is	not	mindful	of	the	
lived	 experiences	 of	 those	 who	 do	 not	 have	 the	 freedom	 to	 even	 contemplate	 freedom.		
However,	my	overriding	purpose	 is	 to	respond	to	 feminist	 theological	critiques	of	 the	ways	 in	
which	 traditional	 Christian	 understandings	 denied	 freedom	 to	 women,	 and	 subsequently	 to	
propose	 an	 eschatological	 vision	 that	 rethinks	 freedom	 as	 something	 that	 should	 and	will	 be	
experienced	by	all.	 	My	explorations	here	are	not,	 then,	 ignorant	of	 such	experiences.	 	On	 the	
contrary,	I	am	mindful	of	their	experiences	of	the	curtailment	of	freedom,	and	seek	to	affirm	the	
quest	for	and	possibility	of	freedom.	
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Choice	cannot,	then,	be	upheld	as	the	sole	defining	feature	of	ultimate	freedom,	as	this	
suggests	that	those	who	are	not	able	to	choose	are	likewise	incapable	of	experiencing	
freedom.	 	 Similarly,	 choice	 cannot	be	 constructed	 as	 a	prerequisite	 for	 inclusion	 into	
the	 eschatological	 future	 as	 this	 creates	 an	 exclusive	model	 of	 eschatology	 that	 only	
serves	 to	 further	 marginalise	 those	 who	 do	 not,	 or	 cannot,	 experience	 decision‐
making.85		Indeed,	claiming	that	the	absence	of	choice	in	the	future	means	redemption	
will	be	an	act	of	dominance	runs	the	risk	of	reproducing	such	dominance;	such	a	claim	
bears	 the	 potential	 to	 normalise	 those	who	have	 the	 ability	 to	 choose,	 and	 construct	
any	 others	 as	 deviant	 or	 somehow	 lacking.	 	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 have	 implications	 for	
certain	 individuals	 with	 learning	 and	 intellectual	 disabilities,	 but	 it	 also	 calls	 into	
question	the	 inclusion	of	 infants	and	non‐human	animals	 in	 the	eschatological	 future.		
This	 potentially	 compromises	 the	 interrelationality	 of	 creation,	 suggesting	 that	 the	
eschatological	 future	 can	 possibly	 be	 true	 for	 some	 but	 not	 for	 all.	 	 Placing	 such	
importance	on	the	ability	to	choose	only	justifies	such	exclusivity.	 	 It	is	inappropriate,	
then,	 to	 claim	 that	 absence	 of	 “the	 capacity	 to	 respond”	 means	 that	 God’s	 final,	
eschatological	act	of	power	for	creation	will	necessarily	be	an	act	of	dominance.	
	
Such	readings	of	choice	and	agency,	and	the	inference	that	they	alone	connote	freedom,	
are	further	problematised	by	their	suggestion	that	freedom	resides	in	the	capacity	to	be	
self‐determining.86		The	claim	here	is	that	the	essence	of	freedom	is	the	ability	to	be	the	
sole	 determining	 factor	 in	 one’s	 own	 existence.	 	 Moltmann,	 for	 instance,	 claims	 that	
what	 is	 often	 being	 communicated	 in	 talk	 of	 self‐determination	 is	 essentially	 one’s	
																																																													
85	This	is	not	to	assume	that	all	 individuals	with	learning	or	intellectual	disabilities	experience	
an	 inability	 to	 make	 decisions.	 	 Jean	 Vanier,	 through	 his	 work	 with	 people	 with	 intellectual	
disabilities,	 notes	 how	 one	 young	 woman,	 Claudia,	 “had	 to	 learn	 that	 she	 […]	 could	 make	
choices,	however	small”	and	that	this	was	a	loving	act	of	empowerment	for	Claudia	(1999,	27).		
Thus,	it	is	also	necessary	to	recognise	that	the	space	and	ability	to	make	choices	can	be	a	facet	of	
freedom	and	can	affect	the	eschatological	process,	hence	this	chapter’s	later	efforts	to	appreciate	
this. 
86	Again,	out	of	an	appreciation	for	diverse	experiences,	it	should	be	noted	that	freedom	may	be	
understood	and	 experienced	 as	 self‐determination;	 such	perspectives	 are	 attended	 to	 later	 in	
this	 chapter.	 	 The	 contention	 here	 is	 that,	 given	 the	 experiences	 noted,	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 sole	
defining	feature	of	freedom. 
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“freedom	[to]	rule	over	oneself”	(1992,	115).	 	Again,	Morris’s	response	sheds	 light	on	
the	inappropriateness	of	such	understandings.	 	With	reference	to	his	work	within	the	
Deaf	community,	Morris	notes	 that	whilst	 for	some,	 the	ability	 to	be	self‐determining	
may	 indeed	 connote	 freedom,	 for	others	 it	 is	 trust	 in	 community	 that	allows	 for	 true	
freedom	 (2011,	 133).	 	 Such	 alternative	 readings	 of	 freedom	will	 be	 engaged	with	 in	
more	 depth	 shortly,	 for	 there	 remain	 some	 other,	 associated	 difficulties	 that	 need	
addressing	here.	 In	addition	to	the	 inappropriateness	of	upholding	self‐determination	
as	the	only	feature	of	freedom,	there	are	also	undertones	of	mastery	in	the	alignment	of	
freedom	 with	 choice	 and	 agency:	 the	 individual	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 free	 if	 they	 are	
unaffected	 by	 any	 other	 and,	 accordingly,	 affected	 only	 by	 themselves.	 	 Moltmann	
(1992,	117)	makes	this	observation,	noting	that:	
Even	when	we	say:	a	person	is	free	if	he	[sic.]	is	not	determined	by	any	inward	
or	 external	 compulsions,	 we	 are	 interpreting	 freedom	 as	 mastery	 –	 as	 a	
person’s	mastery	over	himself	[sic.].	
	
Freedom	 here	 is	 defined	 as	 isolation	 and	 complete	 separateness	 from	 any	 other.		
Moreover,	 this	 definition	 seems	 to	 be	 rooted	 in	 fear	 of	 the	 other,	 that	 is,	 fear	 that	
encountering	any	other	being	may	curtail	one’s	own	ability,	even	right,	to	be	the	master	
of	one’s	own	destiny.		This	merely	serves	to	perpetuate	the	view	that	“all	that	is	not	the	
self	 impinges	 on	 essential	 freedom	 and	must	 therefore	 be	 conquered	 and	 contained”	
(Smith,	 1989,	 150).	 	 Here	 the	 individual’s	 own	 freedom,	 understood	 as	 self‐
determinism,	 is	 necessarily	 given	 priority	 over	 the	 freedom	 of	 others	 and	 justifies	 a	
violent	response	to	the	other.		Individual	freedom,	in	this	understanding,	is	achieved	at	
the	 expense	 of	 another’s	 freedom.	 	 This	 understanding	 of	 freedom	 is	 too	 akin	 to	
understandings	of	power	as	possession	and	is,	accordingly,	challenged	by	the	notion	of	
authentic	power	as	that	which	is	shared.		Along	these	lines,	freedom	should	similarly	be	
rethought	in	terms	of	it	being	shared	in	and	for	relationality.	
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The	 “individual	 freedom”	 that	 is	 inferred	by	emphasising	 self‐determinism	cannot	be	
uncritically	upheld	as	a	hallmark	of	freedom,	then.		If	an	individual’s	“freedom”	curtails	
or	diminishes	the	freedom	of	another	it	is	not	true	freedom;	as	Letty	Russell	contends,	
“none	 of	 us	 is	 completely	 free	 until	 all	 are	 free”	 (1982a,	 92;	 cf.	 Grey,	 1989,	 7).	 	 This	
exposes	“individual	freedom”	as	being	the	desire	to	form	an	existence	that	is	exterior	to	
community	 and	 relationality.	 	 Such	 rejections	 of	 relationality	 were,	 earlier	 in	 this	
chapter	 and	 concurrent	 with	 many	 feminist	 theological	 voices,	 critiqued	 as	 being	
inappropriate	for	our	understandings	of	God.		They	are	therefore	also	inappropriate	for	
understandings	of	humanity.	 	 I	earlier	claimed	that	relationality	 typifies	creation,	and	
Ackermann	 (1998,	 18)	 adds	 to	 this	 that	we	 cannot	 understand	 humanity	 apart	 from	
relationality:	
My	 humanity	 is	 found,	 shaped,	 and	 nurtured	 in	 and	 through	 the	 humanity	 of	
others.	 	 I	 can	only	exercise	my	humanity	by	being	 in	 relationship	with	others	
and	there	is	no	happiness,	growth,	or	fulfilment	for	me	apart	from	other	human	
beings.	
Surely	 “happiness,	 growth”	 and	 “fulfilment”	 are	 more	 beneficial,	 accurate,	 and	
appropriate	 measures	 of	 freedom	 than	 isolation	 and	 individualism,	 which	 are	 the	
progeny	of	the	desire	to	be	entirely	self‐determining.	 	Whist	one	can	certainly	exist	in	
isolation,	 this	 is	only	ever	existence:	 it	 is	neither	a	reflection	of	 true	or	 fulfilled	being.		
Indeed,	Soskice	explains	that	being	in	relationships	with	others	actually	draws	one	into	
their	 true	 being	 (2007,	 175‐6).	 	 It	 is	 interdependence,	 then,	 and	 not	 autonomy,	 that	
characterises	 relationality	and	 freedom	 in	 those	 relationships.	 	A	 life	which	 is	 shared	
with	others	 in	 relationship,	 then,	 is	 indicative	of	 freedom	much	 in	 the	same	way	 that	
power	 is	 properly	 understood	 to	 be	 shared	 rather	 than	 possessed.	 	 The	 power	 of	
relationality	 is	manifest	 in	 communal	 sharing	 of	 life	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 experiencing	
and	 helping	 all	 to	 experience	 freedom.	 	 “Individual	 freedom”	 thus	 emerges	 as	 a	
contradictory	concept,	for	true	freedom	can	never	be	the	domain	of	the	individual	alone	
but	must	always	be	for,	with,	and	in	relationship	with	others.		The	individual	is	not	only	
retained	 and	 affirmed	here,	 but	positively	 celebrated,	 as	 individuals	 are	brought	 into	
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the	fullness	of	 their	particular	existences	 in	relationships	with	other	 individuals.	 	 It	 is	
thus	more	beneficial	 to	strive	 for	 freedom	in	relationships,	 than	to	attempt	 to	be	 free	
apart	 from	 relationships,	 as	 such	 freedom	has	 the	 capacity	 to	 bring	 us	 all	more	 fully	
into	who	we	are,	both	now	and	in	the	future.	
	
This	 is	 given	 further	 clarity	 and	 confirmation	 by	 Basselin	who,	 again,	 attends	 to	 the	
experiences	of	disabled	people	in	order	to	“deconstruct	societal	and	theological	ideals	
of	 self‐sufficiency	and	autonomy”	and	present	new	 ideals	of	 “vulnerability,	weakness,	
and	dependency”	(2011,	47).		Subscribing	to	the	latter,	he	claims,	signifies	a	willingness	
to	“experience	the	freedom	of	non‐autonomy	and	communal‐sufficiency”	(2011,	55).		In	
direct	contrast	to	the	earlier	noted	perspectives,	autonomy	is	here	constructed	as	non‐
freedom	 whereas	 dependence	 on	 and	 vulnerability	 to	 others	 in	 relationships	 is	
presented	as	authentic	freedom.		This	is	not	to	say	that	disability	is	to	be	unequivocally	
paralleled	 with	 vulnerability.	 	 Rather,	 Basselin	 seems	 to	 be	 claiming	 that	 when	
associations	 are	 made	 between	 disability	 and	 vulnerability,	 these	 should	 not	 be	
devalued	 and	 framed	 as	 powerlessness	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 essence	 of	 relationality.		
Whenever	 any	 member	 of	 creation	 expresses	 a	 willingness	 to	 be	 vulnerable	 with	
another,	 then,	 we	 see	 the	 essence	 of	 full	 relationality.	 	 This	 means	 that	 such	
relationships	 with	 God	 can	 be	 not	 only	 present	 manifestations	 of	 freedom	 but	 also	
anticipatory	ones.		Indeed,	the	process	of	coming	to	full	freedom	in	the	eschaton	is	not	
severed	from	the	present	but	occurs	in	the	present	when	we	cultivate	relationships	of	
care	 and	 openness	 and	 experience	 the	well‐being	 and	 flourishing	 that	 such	 relations	
can	produce.		Far	from	being	averse	to	freedom,	then,	opening	oneself	up	to	God’s	own	
openness	 to	us,	 and	 therein	depending	on	God	 for	 the	 full	 realisation	of	 relationality,	
actually	connotes	the	most	authentic	experience	of	freedom.	
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It	is	possible	to	develop	this	further	still,	and	claim	that	this	relationality	not	only	draws	
us	 into	 authentic	 freedom	 but	 also	 into	 our	 own	 humanity.	 	 The	 contribution	 from	
Ackerman	noted	above	touches	on	this	by	highlighting	that	relationships	are	the	crux	
upon	and	within	which	we	are	able	to	develop	and	uncover	our	own	and	each	other’s	
humanity.		Thus,	when	I	speak	of	being	drawn	into	freedom	through	relationality,	what	
this	means	 is	 that	we	 are	 drawn	 into	 becoming	 and	being	who	we	 truly	 are.	 	 Vanier	
(1999,	117)	adds	clarity	to	this	assertion	by	claiming	that:	
To	be	free	is	to	know	who	we	are,	with	all	that	is	beautiful,	all	the	brokenness	in	
us;	it	is	to	love	our	own	values,	to	embrace	them,	and	to	develop	them;	it	is	to	be	
anchored	in	a	truth	but	also	to	be	open	to	others	and	so	to	change.		
Thus,	being	free	here	means	being	open	and	vulnerable	in	relationships	with	others,	in	
such	a	way	that	we	do	not	fear	but	rather	welcome	the	changes	that	they	may	effect	on	
us.87		As	Norman	Wirzba	writes,	“‘to	be’	is	always	already	‘to	be	in	relation’	with	others.		
Life	simply	is	being	in	relation,	being	‘in	touch’	with	others”	(2008,	235).	 	A	relational	
presence	that	is	open	to	change	and	to	being	in	touch	with	others	can,	then,	be	said	to	
characterise	 the	eschatological	process.	 	Not	only	 can	we	be	 involved	 in	 this	process,	
but	we	 can	 also	benefit	 from	 it	 as	we	develop	 relationships	 that	 sustain	 and	nurture	
ourselves	and	each	other.		This	informs	the	very	nature	of	the	eschatological	future	that	
the	 process	 draws	 us	 towards,	 and	 also	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 can	 both	 create	 and	
anticipate	such	a	future	in	the	present,	as	the	ensuing	chapters	will	explore.				
	
Still,	even	expressing	a	willingness	to	be	open	and	vulnerable	presupposes	the	ability	to	
make	 such	 expressions.	 	 This	 raises	 another	 issue	 with	 reading	 freedom	 as	 self‐
determination	as	 it	draws	parallels	with	 the	ability	 for	self‐representation.	 	Although,	
reading	 Nancy	 Eiesland	 (1994,	 64),	 Hans	 Reinders	 notes	 that	 self‐representation	
																																																													
87	 Of	 course,	 being	 so	 open	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 others	 is	 not	 without	 its	 risks	 and	 dangers;	 the	
practical	 implications	 and	 outworkings	 of	 such	 relational	 presence	 and	 openness	 will	 be	
thoroughly	explored	when	this	thesis	moves	to	discuss	such	practicality	in	Chapter	Four. 
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typifies	a	disability‐rights	approach,	Reinders	detects	problems	with	such	an	emphasis.		
He	writes	(2008,	168)	that:	
human	 beings	 incapable	 of	 self‐representation	 have	 no	 place	 in	 this	 strategy.		
They	 are	 dependent	 on	 being	 represented	 by	 others,	 but	 this	 dependency	 is	
part	of	the	problem	of	their	marginalization.	
Offering	 a	 reappraisal	 of	 dependence,	 in	 the	 above	 noted	manner,	 goes	 some	way	 to	
addressing	such	views	of	dependence.		Furthermore,	Eiesland’s	and	Reinders’s	differing	
approaches	here	illustrate	the	complexities	in	negotiating	the	meaning	of	freedom,	for	
whilst	 the	 space	 to	 be	 self‐determining	 and	 to	 engage	 in	 self‐representation	 are	
certainly	markers	of	 freedom	 for	 some,	 the	naming	of	 these	 as	hallmarks	of	 freedom	
marginalises	 those	 who	 cannot	 participate	 in	 such	 actions.	 	 This	 means	 that	 an	
adequate	model	 of	 freedom	 in	 the	 eschatological	 process	must	 both	make	 space	 for	
choice	whilst	 also	 contemplating	 the	meaning	 of	 freedom	when	 such	 choosing	 is	 not	
possible	or	perhaps	not	even	desired.	
	
Space	for	Choice	
Whilst	it	is	inappropriate,	for	reasons	noted,	to	define	choice	as	either	the	sole	hallmark	
of	freedom	or	a	prerequisite	to	inclusion	in	the	eschatological	future,	an	eschatological	
process	which	honours	particularity	must	also	honour	the	fact	that	the	ability	to	make	
real	 decisions	may,	 for	 some,	 be	 an	 aspect	 of	 their	 freedom.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 removal	 or	
delegitimisation	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 make	 choices	 has	 often	 been	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 of	
oppression.	 	 It	 is	 understandable,	 then,	 that	 agency	 is	 understood	 by	 some	 to	 be	
concomitant	with	freedom.	 	Any	compromising	of	“freedom”	is	especially	problematic	
for	feminist	theology.		We	remember	that	it	perpetuates	the	presentation	of	the	male	as	
belonging	 in	the	domain	of	 the	 intellectual	ability	 to	make	decisions	and,	accordingly,	
the	promotion	of	the	female	as	passive	and	not	able	or	entitled	to	partake	in	authentic	
decision‐making.		In	addition	to	the	problems	already	noted,	then,	to	claim	that	choice	
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has	no	place	in	freedom	potentially	perpetuates	the	damaging	perception	that	agency	is	
an	inappropriate	desire,	particularly	for	women.			
	
Furthermore	some	mujerista	 theologians	have	argued	that	the	space	to	make	genuine	
choices	is	not	only	an	appropriate	but	a	necessary	tool	of	liberation.		In	agreement	with	
Gutierrez’s	notion	that	the	poor	must	become	“artisans	of	their	own	proper	liberation”	
(1975,	 52),	 Isasi‐Díaz	 reveals	 the	 necessity	 of	 certain	 oppressed	 peoples	 harnessing	
agency	 and	 therefore	 taking	 steps	 to	 determine	 their	 own	 liberation	 and	 to	 become	
“agents	of	our	own	history”	(Isasi‐Díaz,	2004b,	54).			Just	as	a	reclamation	of	all	of	our	
embodied	 locations	 was	 noted	 in	 the	 Introduction	 in	 relation	 to	 exposing	 the	
subjectivity	 and	 positionality	 of	 all	 theorising,	 it	 emerges	 here	 as	 also	 essential	 to	
liberation.		Marta	Benavides	offers	further	explanation	of	the	significance	of	this	to	the	
lives	of	Latina	woman,	writing	that	“All	that	we	have	left	is	ourselves	and	the	future	we	
forge.		Our	inheritance,	above	everything	else,	is	our	will	to	survive	as	self‐determining	
people”	 (1988,	 139).88	 	 Engaging	 with	 a	 different	 context,	 but	 detecting	 a	 similar	
emphasis	 on	 self‐determination,	 Fran	 Porter	 notes	 that	 for	 women	 and	 others	 who	
experienced	 the	 conflicts	 in	 Northern	 Ireland,	 “empowerment	 is	 experienced	 by	
individuals	or	groups	as	they	assume	responsibility	for	themselves”	and	“become	active	
agents	 in	 their	 situation”	 (2013,	 94).	 	 For	 a	 people	 whose	 historic	 remembrances,	
present	realities,	and	future	hopes	have	been	co‐opted	by	oppressive	forces,	then,	the	
importance	of	re‐centring	their	own	lives	and	experiences,	and	determining	their	own	
liberation,	becomes	essential	to	survival	and	to	envisioning	a	future	that	honours	and	
empowers	 those	 lives	 and	 those	 experiences.89	 	 Furthermore,	 this	 emphasis	 on	 self‐
determination	 is	 of	 wider	 importance,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 the	 earlier	 critiques	 of	
																																																													
88	Survival	is	an	important	element	of	this,	and	is	thoroughly	explored	in	Chapter	Four. 
89	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 these	 perspectives	 are	 either	 atheistic	 or	 egotistical;	 rather,	 the	
emphasis	 here	 is	 on	 exercising	 moral	 agency	 (Isasi‐Díaz,	 2004b,	 61)	 in	 solidarity	 with	 the	
oppressed	 (Isasi‐Díaz,	 2004b,	 58),	 empowered	 by	 the	 God	 who	 “calls	 women	 to	 work	
unceasingly	 for	 justice”	 (Moody,	 1996,	 68).	 	 There	 is	 an	 emphasis	 here,	 then,	 on	 God	
empowering	these	moves	towards	self‐determination.		 
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eschatology	which	 noted	 the	 denial	 of	 female	 bodies	 and	 the	 encouragement	 of	 self‐
denial	in	women.90			
			
Delores	Williams	provides	a	similar	perspective	 in	her	reading	of	Hagar,	wherein	she	
interprets	 Hagar’s	 experience	 as	 a	 “self‐initiated	 liberation	 event”,	 coupled	 with	 a	
“radical	encounter	with	God”	(1993,	26).		Williams	sees	in	Hagar	a	woman	who	resisted	
and	protested	against	oppressive	 forces	by	being	agential	 in	crafting	and	shaping	her	
own	liberation.		This	should	not	be	read	as	being	purely	individualistic,	though;	Hagar’s	
concern	was	not	only	for	herself	but	also	for	her	son.91		Moreover,	the	enduring	impact	
of	 such	 stories	 is	 doubtless,	 for	 as	 Clark	 writes:	 “[Hagar’s]	 life	 story	 of	 single	
motherhood,	 slavery,	 poverty,	 hardship,	 abuse,	 and	 survival	 provides	 a	 compelling	
parallel	 to	 black	 women’s	 experiences	 in	 the	 United	 States”	 (2012,	 48).	 	 Indeed,	
Williams	notes	that	Hagar’s	story	subsequently	“empowers	the	female	slave	of	African	
descent	to	hope	and	act”	(1993,	26).	 	Thus,	being	agential	 in	one’s	own	liberation	can	
here	be	seen	as	also	having	both	communal	and	generational	impacts.		These	readings	
reveal	 that,	 for	 some	 women,	 the	 space	 and	 ability	 to	 be	 self‐determining	 people	 is	
crucial	to	their	own	liberation,	and	to	the	liberation	of	others	they	are	connected	with.		
As	such,	any	model	of	the	eschatological	process	must	make	space	for	this.	 	However,	
whilst	liberation	can	take	the	form	of	self‐determination	and	self‐initiation,	it	need	not	
follow	 that	 self‐determination	 is	 the	 sole	 defining	 feature	 of	 liberation.	 	 Indeed,	 this	
brings	 problems	 for	 other	 oppressed	 people	 who	 do	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 be	
agential	 in	this	manner,	as	noted.	 	Other	framings	of	 freedom,	then,	should	be	held	as	
equally	constitutive	of	freedom,	in	order	to	truly	and	fully	value	different	experiences	
of	the	meaning	of	freedom.	
																																																													
90	This	also	adds	that	the	praxis	of	eschatology	must	be	one	which	supports	the	development	of	
self‐possession;	 thus	 Chapter	 Four	 will	 explore	 the	 role	 that	 self‐love	 can	 play	 in	 living	 an	
embodied	eschaton. 
91	Genesis	21.14‐19,	for	instance,	tells	how	Hagar	wept	for	her	son	when	“the	water	in	the	skin	
was	gone”	and	how	God	opened	Hagar’s	eyes	to	a	well	of	water,	to	which	she	“went,	and	filled	
the	skin	with	water,	and	gave	the	boy	a	drink”.		 
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The	 eschatological	 process	 can	 thus	 be	 thought	 to	 consist	 of	 God	 making	 space	 for	
those	who	are	willing	and	able	to	choose	to	accept	or	refuse	God.		Moltmann	speaks	of	
the	relational	“wide	space”	of	God	(1996,	336),	and	I	argue	that	such	wide	space,	if	truly	
relational,	must	honour	the	choices	of	created	beings.		This	is	a	space	wide	enough	both	
for	creation	to	be	effective	and	for	God	to	be	affected,	both	for	good	and	for	ill.	It	is	thus	
appropriate	 to	 claim	 that	 God’s	 love	 is	 precarious,	 and	 that	 God	 remains	 open	 to	
suffering	as	creation	suffers	and	causes	suffering.		Such	instances,	we	may	claim,	grieve	
the	heart	of	God	(Genesis	6.6).	 	Vanstone	takes	this	a	step	further	and	notes	that	such	
precariousness	is	actually	integral	to	love.		He	writes	that	“Where	the	object	of	love	is	
truly	 an	 ‘other’,	 the	 activity	 of	 love	 is	 always	 precarious”	 on	 account	 of	 the	 distance	
between	 loves,	 the	 possibility	 of	 misjudgement	 or	 rejection,	 or	 a	 response	 that	 is	
disproportionate	to	the	love	offered.	 	 It	 is	 for	this	reason	that	Vanstone	claims	love	is	
both	 poignant	 and	 potentially	 tragic	 (1977,	 46).	 	 Thus,	 the	 wide	 space	 that	 God’s	
embrace	 creates	 allows	 creation	 to	make	 genuine	 choices,	 even	 if	 such	 choices	 cause	
the	suffering	of	other	members	of	creation	and	of	Godself.	
	
However,	 whilst	 there	must	 be	 space	 for	 creation	 to	 express	 genuine	 agency	 in	 this	
way,	 there	must	also	be	space	 for	 these	choices	not	 to	hinder	God’s	ultimate	 love	 for	
and	loyalty	to	relational	presence	with	all	members	of	creation.	 	Again,	this	cannot	be	
achieved	 through	dominance	but	 through	 loving	relationality.	 	This	 is	 truly	a	mark	of	
freedom	 as	 it	 draws	 creation	 into	 an	 existence	 where	 nothing	 can	 obstruct	 loving	
relationships	amongst	creation	and	between	creation	and	God;	not	even	creation	itself	
is	able	to	hinder	this.		Indeed	Romans	8.38‐39	asserts	that:	
neither	death,	nor	life,	nor	angels,	nor	rulers,	nor	things	present,	nor	things	to	
come,	nor	powers,	nor	height,	nor	depth,	nor	anything	else	in	all	creation,	will	
be	able	to	separate	us	from	the	love	of	God	in	Christ	Jesus	our	Lord.			
 
 
~	150	~	
 
What	this	means,	according	to	Moltmann,	is	“not	just	that	the	murderers	will	finally	fail	
to	 triumph	 over	 their	 victims,	 but	 that	 they	 cannot	 in	 eternity	 even	 remain	 the	
murderers	 of	 their	 victims”	 (Moltmann,	 1996,	 255).	 	 This	 is	 not	 an	 eschatological	
discounting	 of	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 individual,	 as	 both	 God	 and	 creation	 suffer	 as	 a	
consequence	 of	 such	 choices,	 but	 rather	 an	 eschatological	 transformation	 of	 such	
choices.		This	means	that	choices	are	honoured	and	genuinely	affect	the	process.		When	
these	 choices	 run	contrary	 to	 the	experience	of	 loving	 relationality,	 it	 is	 legitimate	 to	
claim	 that	 they	 hurt	 both	 God	 and	 creation,	 both	 now	 and	 in	 the	 future.	 	 Still,	 given	
God’s	loyalty	to	all	of	creation	in	relationship,	God’s	love	cannot	ultimately	be	thwarted	
by	such	choices.		It	can	be	lastingly	affected	insomuch	as	its	particular	expressions	and	
manifestations	 perceive	 and	 respond	 to	 creaturely	 choices,	 but	 its	 flow	 cannot	 be	
stemmed	 by	 such	 choices.	 	 	 In	 drawing	 all	 into	 God’s	 embrace	 in	 the	 eschatological	
future,	 then,	 God	 tears	 down	 all	 oppressive	 dichotomies	 which	 would	 separate	
individuals	or	communities	into	“saved”	and	“damned”,	and	reveals	a	love	that	enables	
all	 to	 become	 members	 of	 the	 web	 of	 loving	 relationality	 through	 the	 loving	
transformation	of	that	which	hinders	such	relationality.92	
	
However,	 Hans	 Reinders	 notes	 that	 even	 such	 a	 universal	 perception	 of	 God’s	 love	
appears	 to	 be	 insufficient	 in	 the	 face	 of	 those	 with	 profound	 disabilities.	 	 Reinders	
engages	specifically	with	David	Pailin’s	work	on	the	unconditionality	of	God’s	love,	thus	
it	is	helpful	to	first	expound	this	before	we	examine	Reinders’s	critique.		Pailin	critiques	
the	 contributory	 notion	 of	 value	 or	 “norm	 of	 worth”	 in	 light	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	
“severely	handicapped	people”	(1992,	96).		He	goes	on	to	present	a	number	of	reasons	
as	 to	 why	 it	 is	 both	 unethical	 and	 unloving	 to	 apportion	 worth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	
individual’s	contributory	abilities	(1992,	95‐108)	and	thus	concludes	that	worth	is	not	
to	 be	 established	 by	 contribution.	 	 Rather,	 he	 claims,	 “[all]	 are	 of	 ultimate	 worth	
																																																													
92	This	reference	to	transformation	will	be	continued	in	the	following	chapter	with	reference	to	
embodied	continuity	and	discontinuity	in	the	content	of	the	eschaton. 
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because	 they	 are	 embraced	within	 and	 cherished	by	 the	 divine”	 (1992,	 120).	 	 	 Thus,	
Pailin’s	 starting	point	 for	demarcating	worth	 is	 the	embrace	of	 the	divine,	and	 I	have	
similarly	 proposed	 a	 universal	 and	 indeed	 eschatological	 divine	 embrace	 that	 is	 not	
predicated	on	choice	or	agency.				
	
However,	Reinders	raises	a	critique	to	Pailin	that	could	similarly	be	levelled	against	my	
proposals.	 	 Whilst	 appreciating	 the	 moves	 to	 present	 God	 as	 one	 who	 does	 not	
apportion	 concern	 or	 care	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 creaturely	 response	 (as	 argued	 by	 Pailin,	
1992,	113,	and	myself	earlier	in	this	chapter),	Reinders	posits	that	such	accounts	fail	to	
clarify	 the	 teleological	 existence	 of	 the	 profoundly	 disabled	 (2008,	 223).	 	 In	 short,	
Reinders’s	point,	when	applied	to	my	own	constructions,	is	that	including	all	of	creation	
in	 the	 eschaton	 whilst	 similarly	 claiming	 that	 God	 and	 the	 eschaton	 are	 affected	 by	
creation	maintains	a	hierarchy	of	worth.		In	such	a	model,	according	to	Reinders,	all	are	
included	but	some	experience	this	inclusion	in	more	effective	and	transformative	ways	
than	others.		As	Reinders	writes,	“It	certainly	seems	that	that	account	marginalizes	the	
profoundly	disabled	to	the	point	of	irrelevance”	(2008,	223).		This	is,	of	course,	not	my	
intention,	 and	 the	 emphasis	 I	 have	 placed	 on	 experiences	 over	 actions	 enables	 a	
response	 to	 Reinders’s	 concerns.	 	 By	 claiming	 that	 it	 is	 our	 many	 and	 varied	
experiences	that	are	the	primary	factor	in	affecting	both	God	and	the	future,	I	affirm	the	
existences	of	both	those	who	can	make	choices	and	act	in	agential	manners,	and	those	
who	do	not	or	cannot.		The	capacities	to	choose	and	to	act	are	simply	some	aspects	of	
some	people’s	existences;	they	affect	God,	but	no	more	so	than	any	other	experiences.		
Furthermore,	the	wide	space	of	God	that	makes	space	for	choice	can	also	be	thought	of	
as	 “the	 interval	 that	 protects	 the	 otherness	 of	 the	 Other”	 (Rivera,	 2007,	 130).	 	 This	
means	 that	 there	 is	 also	 equal	 space	 to	 honour	 the	 experiences	 of	 those	who	 cannot	
choose.		Nevertheless,	choice	is	given	attention	here	because	it	has	been	and	indeed	still	
is	an	important	aspect	of	some	people’s	existences,	and	one	that,	as	we	have	seen,	has	
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been	 used	 to	 challenge	 notions	 of	 a	 universal	 future.	 	 I	 thus	 hold	 together	 an	
appreciation	of	this	with	a	conviction	that	choice	is	not	the	only	measure	of	freedom	or	
of	 inclusion	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future,	 nor	 is	 it	 the	 only	 factor	 that	 affects	 our	
relationships	with	God.	
	
I	 have	 touched	 upon	 the	 experiences	 of	 those	whose	 relationship	 to	 choice	 is	 either	
non‐existent	 or	 undesired,	 and	 the	 latter	 element	 signifies	 a	 dimension	 to	 the	
hindrance	 of	 relationality	 that	must	 be	 considered.	 	 Just	 as	 the	 active	 refusal	 of	 God	
prevents	one	 from	experiencing	God	and	 therefore	experiencing	 true	 freedom,	so	 too	
can	the	familiarity	with	one’s	own	situation	hinder	one’s	perception	of	the	meaning	of	
and	need	for	freedom.		Thus,	the	embrace	of	all	in	the	eschatological	future	cannot	only	
be	a	process	of	God	transforming	the	choice	to	refuse	God,	but	must	also	include	God	
transforming	 apathy.	 	 This	 is	 crucial	 for	 creation,	 and	 for	 women	 in	 particular,	 as	
women	have	often	been	taught	that	such	apathy	or	passivity	is	an	appropriate	response	
to	suffering	or	injustice	(Grey,	2000,	33).			Moltmann	expounds	this	claim	and,	knowing	
more	 than	most	 the	 effect	 that	 a	 curtailing	 of	 freedom	 can	 have	 on	 one’s	 desire	 for	
freedom,	 he	 explains	 that	 if	we	never	 believe	 in	 an	 alternative	 to	 present	 pains	 then	
these	 pains	 become	 chains	 with	 which	 we	 familiarise	 and	 acquiesce.	 	 However,	 he	
writes,	 “When	 freedom	 is	close,	 the	chains	begin	 to	hurt”	 (1992,	75).	 	By	God	drawing	
near	to	creation	through	embodied	relational	presence,	then,	creation	is	presented	with	
an	alternative,	both	presently	and	in	the	future,	to	their	current	pains	and	is	enabled	to	
experience	 true	 freedom.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 precariousness	 of	 love	 that	was	 noted	 above	
must	be	balanced	with	 the	promise	of	 love,	 for	we	know	that	“the	Exodus	 leads	 to	 the	
covenant”	 (Moltmann,	 1992,	 113;	 cf.	 Russell,	 1974,	 60).	 	 This	 means	 that	 God	 is	
endlessly	 committed	 to	 perceiving	 and	 responding	 to	 that	 which	 binds	 us	 into	 the	
desire	for	non‐relationality,	and	transforming	these	chains	through	relentlessly	offering	
relational	love	to	all	of	creation.			
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This	cannot	simply	be	an	offer	of	relationality	 though,	 for	 there	would	always	remain	
the	possibility	of	refusal.	 	Having	claimed	that	choice,	when	manifest	as	the	refusal	of	
relationships,	is	not	to	be	upheld	as	an	accurate	or	appropriate	measure	of	freedom,	I	
can	thus	argue	that	God	not	only	offers	relationality	but	actively	helps	all	to	experience	
it.		This	does	not	thwart	freedom	but,	in	fact,	actuates	full	freedom,	for	refusals	are	not	
discounted	 but	 instead	 are	met	with	 even	more	 abundant	 loving	 relationality	which	
relentlessly	reveals	and	draws	us	to	the	freedom	of	relationality	against	 the	chains	of	
refusal.		In	light	of	all	of	these	explorations,	then,	Keller’s	critique	can	be	challenged,	as	
the	final	act	of	redemption	simply	cannot	be	one	of	dominance.		God	is	not	domineering	
but	is	rather	the	loving	God	who	liberates	from	forms	of	dominance.		The	process	and	
goal	 of	 the	 eschatological	 future,	 then,	 is	 God’s	 relational	 love:	 dominance	 does	 not	
obtain.	
	
Still,	there	may	be	circumstances	where	the	rejection	of	relationship	with	God	is	not	a	
product	 or	 action	 of	 hurtful	 intent	 or	 apathetic	 passivity.	 	 It	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	
individuals	simply	do	not	desire	to	be	in	relationship	with	God,	the	reasons	for	which	
may	be	multitudinous.		If	God	is	truly	to	honour	relationships	with	creation	then	it	may	
seem	feasible	to	claim	that	God	must	also	honour	the	desire	to	absent	oneself	from	or	
never	even	enter	into	such	relationships.		Simply	claiming	that	this	would	hurt	God	and	
hinder	God’s	 freedom	 is	 not	 reason	 enough	 to	 claim	 that	 creation	must	 therefore	 be	
drawn	 into	 relationship.	 	 Members	 of	 creation	 who	 have	 no	 desire	 for	 God	 would	
seemingly	 also	 have	 no	 concern	 for	 experiencing	 relational	 freedom	 with	 God.		
However,	 the	 emphasis	 I	 have	 placed	 on	 the	 distinctly	 communitarian	 nature	 of	
freedom	can	help	with	responding	to	this,	for	the	eschatological	process	is	not	achieved	
for	 or	 by	 God	 in	 isolation.	 	 Indeed,	 it	 has	 been	 highlighted	 that	 true	 freedom	 cannot	
pertain	to	autonomy	and	isolation.		Those	who	desire	this	alone	can	be	said	to	be	self‐
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enclosed;	 that	 is,	 severed	 from	 true	 freedom	which	 is	 relationality,	 even	 if	 only	with	
other	members	of	creation.		Moltmann	infers	that	turning	away	from	such	relationality	
is	in	itself	turning	away	from	God;	it	is	“being	imprisoned	in	one’s	own	existing	being,	
and	closed	against	the	future”	(1993,	210).		Thus	the	lack	of	desire	for	relationship	with	
God,	who	 is	 in	essence	 loving	relationality,	 is	essentially	 the	 lack	of	desire	 for	 the	 full	
experience	of	 relationality	with	all	 of	 creation.	 	This	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	when	we	 seek	
relationships	 with	 other	 members	 of	 creation,	 then	 we	 automatically	 desire	
relationship	with	God,	whether	we	are	aware	of	this	or	not.		Instead,	the	interconnected	
nature	 of	 relationships	means	 that	 relationships	 amongst	 creation	 can	never	 be	 fully	
experienced	unless	God	too	 is	 included	in	such	relating	and,	moreover,	 is	accepted	as	
the	final	help	to	realise	such	relating	in	full.	
	
This	 may,	 conversely	 to	 my	 intentions,	 seem	 an	 insensitive	 proposal;	 there	 may	 be	
members	of	creation	whom	we	do	not,	for	legitimate	reasons,	wish	to	relate	to	for	all	of	
eternity.	 	 People	 who	 have	 severely	 hurt	 us	 or	 hurt	 those	 we	 love,	 for	 example.		
However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 restate	 that	 I	 am	 not	 advocating	 an	 automatic	 and	
instantaneous	 inclusion	 of	 all	 into	 the	 eschatological	 future	 but	 rather	 a	 process	
wherein	 hurtful	 actions	 are	 processed	 and	 transformed	 in	 the	 fullness	 of	 God’s	 love.		
Returning	 to	 the	maternal	metaphor	 can	 yet	 again	 offer	 clarity	 to	 this	 consideration.		
Often	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 expectation	 of	women	 to	 “give	 the	 time	 to	 others”,	 and	
accordingly	 not	 to	 themselves	 (Diprose,	 2009,	 150	 and	 153),	 time	 in	 the	 maternal	
metaphor	 can	 be	 rethought	 as	 both	 giving	 and	 having	 time	 to	 develop	 relationships.		
Heyward	observes	that	a	great	deal	of	time	is	needed	“for	us	to	learn	how	to	let	go	of	
our	senses	of	separateness,	isolation,	and	self‐control”	(1989,	100)	and	Anderson	adds	
to	 this	 that	 loving	relationships	must	be	given	 the	 freedom	of	 time	(2012,	167).	 	The	
gestational	 time	 needed	 to	 develop	 an	 embodied	 relationship	 with	 a	 child	 in	 its	
mother’s	 womb	 can	 again	 reflect	 the	 processual	 time	 of	 the	 eschaton	 wherein	
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relationships	 are	 cultivated	 by	 an	 involved	 and	 intimate	 God,	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	
instantaneously	 brought	 into	 existence	 by	 an	 omnipotent	 God.	 	 This	 can	 mean	 that	
when	 relationships	 have	 been	 hindered	 by	 abuse	 or	 hurt,	 time	 is	 afforded	 for	 the	
reparation	of	 those	 relationships;	 those	hurts	we	have	experienced,	 along	with	 those	
who	have	hurt	us	and	those	who	we	have	hurt,	are	afforded	time	to	be	transformed	by	
and	 in	 loving	relational	presence	with	God.93	 	 Indeed,	Moltmann	claims	 that	 it	 is	only	
through	 God	 lovingly,	 actively,	 and	 freely	 being	 with	 creation	 that	 creation	 can	 be	
brought	out	of	such	“closed‐in‐ness”	 (1993,	210).	 	Accordingly,	Moltmann	claims	 that	
“freedom	 means	 the	 unhindered	 participation	 in	 the	 eternal	 life	 of	 the	 triune	 God	
himself	 [sic.],	 and	 in	 his	 [sic.]	 inexhaustible	 fullness	 and	 glory”	 (1993,	 213).94	 	 This	
further	 honours	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 creation	 can	 help	 to	 create	 the	 process,	 for	 a	
relational	 God	 is	 seen	 to	 engage	 in	 and	 even	 require	 a	 process	 of	 transformation	 in	
order	that	relationships	be	characterised	by	love	and	not	tainted	by	hurt.	
	
A	Free(ing)	Process	
Thus	far	it	has	been	claimed	that	freedom	cannot	solely	be	defined	by	choice	but,	given	
God’s	 loyalty	 to	 relationships	 with	 creation,	 the	 eschatological	 process	 must	 make	
space	for	it	in	order	to	honour	the	experiences	of	those	for	whom	choice	is	important.		
Full	 freedom,	 however,	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 full	 relationality	 hence	 the	 claim	 that	
choices	which	hinder	this	will	be	transformed	by	the	loving	help	of	God.		This	has	been	
understood	 to	 be	 offered	 and	 actualised	 by	 God	 out	 of	 loyalty	 to	 relationships	 with	
creation.	 	 If	 such	 relationality	 is	 a	 hallmark	 of	 freedom	 then	 we	 can	 perceive	 the	
meaning	of	the	claim	in	Galatians	5.1	that	“For	freedom	Christ	has	set	us	free”.		It	is	for	
																																																													
93	 The	 space	 of	 time	 has	 practical	 significance,	 to	 be	 sure,	 and	 this	 will	 be	 explored	 more	
thoroughly	when	I	come	to	address	the	significance	of	touch	particularly	in	the	contexts	of	such	
abuses	 and	 hurts	 in	 Chapter	 Four.	 	 Furthermore,	 this	 highlights	 again	 how	 the	 pursuit	 of	
freedom	in	relationality	is	something	we	can	experience	and	practise	in	the	present. 
94	 The	 particular	 character	 or	 content	 of	 this	 life	 will	 be	 constructed	 more	 fully	 in	 the	 next	
chapter	wherein	I	negotiate	the	particularities	of	continuity	and	discontinuity	of	experiences	of	
suffering	(and	those	who	have	caused	the	suffering)	in	the	eschatological	future.		 
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freedom	 that	God	created	creation	and	God	 intends	 to	partake	 in	 and	assist	both	 the	
present	and	final	freeing	of	creation	to	experience	full	freedom.		Russell	articulates	this	
by	asserting	that	“God	has	created	us	and	bids	us	become	what	God	intends	us	to	be”	
(1982a,	 42).	 	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 creation	 is	 called	 to	 help	 create	 the	
relational	 process	 of	 actualising	 full	 freedom	 for	 all,	 even	 as	 creation	 remains	
dependent	 on	 God	 as	 the	 ultimate	 ground	 and	 goal	 of	 that	 freedom.	 	 This	 is	 not	 a	
greater	calling	for	those	who	are	able,	on	behalf	of	those	who	are	not.		Instead,	it	is	an	
assertion	 that	 we	 are	 all	 called	 to	 be	 in,	 and	 to	 depend	 on	 others	 for,	 loving	
relationships	 of	 freedom	 in	 whatever	 form	 and	 to	 whatever	 degree	 is	 possible	 and	
appropriate	for	each	individual	in	such	relationships.	
	
Such	 an	 understanding	 is	 rooted	 in	 both	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 all	 members	 of	
creation	to	one	another	and	to	their	Creator,	and	moreover	in	the	inseparability	of	the	
freedom	 of	 one	 from	 the	 freedom	 of	 another,	 as	was	 earlier	 claimed.	 	 	 Letty	 Russell	
expands	 on	 her	 claim	 that	 freedom	 is	 only	 fulfilled	when	 it	 is	 experienced	 by	 all	 by	
asserting	 that	 “Our	 freedom	 does	 not	 consist	 of	 exercising	 our	 rights	 in	 competition	
with	the	rights	of	others.		Rather,	it	consists	of	sharing	the	rights	of	others”	(1982a,	94;	
cf.	 Jantzen,	 2009,	 144).	 	 In	 such	 an	 understanding,	 freedom	 is	 constructed	 as	
diametrically	 opposed	 to	 the	 earlier	 definitions	 whereby	 “exercising	 our	 rights	 in	
competition	with	the	rights	of	others”	was	deemed	to	be	the	hallmark	of	a	freedom	that	
pertains	 to	 self‐determining	 actions.	 	 Instead,	 freedom	 here	 means	 relationality	 and	
concern	 for	 another,	 not	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 one’s	 own	 “rights”	 or	 choices,	 but	 for	 the	
purpose	of	enhancing	the	lives	of	all	members	of	creation,	both	now	and	in	the	future.		
Indeed,	it	is	the	very	recognition	of	the	worth	of	the	other	and	the	movement	towards	a	
universal	 recognition	 of	 that	worth	 that	 signifies	 God’s	 loving	 intention	 for	 creation.		
This	again	means	that	inclusion	in	God’s	love	and	in	the	eschaton	cannot	be	measured	
on	our	contribution.		Accordingly,	Pailin	(1992,	149)	claims	that:		
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Freedom	means	 that	 individuals	 are	 to	be	 respected	 as	 the	persons	 that	 they	
are,	 not	 for	 their	 readiness	 and	 ability	 to	 satisfy	 the	 requirements	 of	 a	
Procrustean	measure	of	allegedly	authentic	human	being.	
Our	freedom,	then,	is	enhanced	by	relationality	and	the	recognition	of	the	worth	of	each	
and	 every	 individual	 in	 relation.	 	 Accordingly,	 it	 is	 compromised	 by	 isolation	 and	
individualism;	 we	 are	 to	 be	 recognised	 as	 worthy	 individuals	 in	 relationship,	 not	 to	
strive	after	 individualism	at	 the	expense	of	 relationship.	 	We	remember,	 though,	 that	
this	does	not	mean	that	the	individual	is	lost:	isolation	thwarts	the	fullness	of	life	and,	
accordingly,	relationality	draws	all	particular	individuals	into	the	fullest	experience	of	
themselves	in	relationship	with	other	individuals.		
	
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 individual	 freedom	 is	 impossible	 but	 rather	 that	 it	 is	 always	
communal,	 as	was	 earlier	 argued.	 	 Bearing	 in	mind	 this	 communal	 interconnectivity	
and	relationality,	it	is	legitimate	to	claim	that	freedom	is	only	objectively	and	generally	
“true”	when	it	is	subjectively	and	individually	true	for	all,	as	non‐freedom	in	the	life	of	
one	 other	 impinges	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 freedom	 in	 the	 life	 of	 all.	 	 This	 justifies	 an	
appeal	to	the	eschatological	future,	because	whilst	human	progression	may	be	able	to	
envision	and	create	a	future	that	actualises	the	freedom	of	many,	its	ability	to	actualise	
this	for	all	is	questionable.		Moltmann	concurs,	and	names	the	reliance	on	human	ability	
alone	the	“progressive	syndrome”.		He	claims	that	those	who	subscribe	to	this	view	are	
limited	 in	 their	 vision	of	 the	 future,	 and	 can	only	 conceive	of	 the	 future	 as	 “merely	 a	
prolongation	 of	 the	 present”	 (1999a,	 276;	 cf.	 Bauckham,	 1999a,	 160).	 	 Whilst	 not	
hopeless,	there	is	something	more	hopeful	that	we	can	grasp	at	here:	the	emphasis	can	
again	 be	 on	 God	 both	 joining	 with	 creation	 in	 their	 striving	 to	 actuate	 freedom	 and	
ultimately	helping	 creation	 to	 achieve	 that	 freedom.	 	This	 “joining	with”	 creation	has	
the	ability	 to	 communicate	a	 sense	of	 creation	having	a	 certain	 responsibility	 to	help	
God	 realise	 the	 future	 in	 the	 present,	 in	 active	 response	 to	 God’s	 loyalty	 to	 helping	
creation.	
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This	 is	 further	 explained	by	Grace	 Jantzen.	 	Whilst	 Jantzen	would	most	 probably	 not	
support	a	reading	of	her	work	through	the	lens	of	an	eschatological	future,	it	is	possible	
to	use	her	work	in	such	a	manner	in	order	to	claim	that	God’s	role	in	the	eschatological	
process	does	not	thwart	freedom	but	actually	helps	creation	to	experience	full	freedom.			
Continuing	 the	 reading	 of	God’s	power	 as	directed	by	God’s	 love,	 Jantzen	writes	 that	
“God’s	power	is	his	[sic.]	power	to	give	independence,	autonomy,	even	to	creatures	over	
whom,	strictly	speaking,	he	[sic.]	 is	sovereign”	(Jantzen,	1984a,	152).	 	Although	I	have	
disagreed	with	the	reading	of	freedom	solely	in	terms	of	autonomy,	it	is	possible	to	see	
here	that	God’s	loving	help	draws	creation	to	the	full	experience	of	freedom	as	opposed	
to	 compromising	 it.	 	 Jantzen	 explains	 this	 at	 length	 by	 claiming	 that	 God	 does	 not	
“compel	 or	manipulate	 but	 invites	 response”	 (1984a,	 153).	 	 It	 is	 because	God	 is	 love	
that	God	cannot	coerce	or	even	persuade.		Instead,	God	opens	Godself	to	the	response	
of	 creation;	 just	as	God	 is	 responsive	 to	creation,	God	 is	also	 responsive	 to	creation’s	
response.	 	 Yet,	 Jantzen	 (1984a,	 153)	 continues	 in	 the	 vein	 of	 which	 I	 have	 argued,	
asserting	that	God	is	also	more	than	this.		She	writes:	
This	would	be	a	very	misleading	half	of	the	truth	if	the	other	half	were	not	also	
remembered:	that,	as	creator	and	sustainer,	no	creature	exists	or	has	autonomy	
except	 from	 him:	 God	 is	 All,	 Being	 Itself.	 	 One‐sided	 emphasis	 on	 human	
autonomy	 impoverishes	our	appreciation	of	God’s	 sovereignty.	 	Yet	one‐sided	
emphasis	on	his	sovereignty	can	easily	hide	from	us	the	extent	of	his	self‐giving	
love,	in	whom	we,	finite	and	dependent	and	yet	autonomous,	live	and	move	and	
have	our	being.	
Along	these	 lines	we	can	claim	that	 freedom	is	created	by	God,	thus	its	eschatological	
fulfilment	is	not	contrary	to	our	freedom	but	rather	signifies	its	fulfilment.		That	this	is	
dictated	 and	 balanced	 by	 God’s	 loving	 loyalty	 to	 being	 present	 in	 the	 experiences	 of	
creation	and	actively	feeling	and	responding	to	these	experiences	means	that	the	help	
to	finally	experience	full	freedom	is	not	an	act	of	divine	dominance	but	rather	the	most	
wholehearted	 and	 profound	 experience	 of	 divine	 loving	 relationality,	 which	 is	 true,	
authentic,	fulfilled	freedom.	
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If	the	final	and	full	experience	of	relationality	in	the	eschaton	can	be	understood	to	be	
indicative	of	authentic	and	full	freedom,	we	are	again	drawn	to	specify	the	process	by	
which	this	is	achieved.		In	considering	the	role	that	God	may	play	in	achieving	this,	we	
can	again	return	to	considering	the	experience	of	God	in	relation	to	creation.		Moltmann	
proposes	 God’s	 experience	 of	 God	 drawing	 near	 to	 and	 dwelling	 with	 creation	
(Moltmann,	1981,	102),	in	such	a	way	that	the	experience	of	being	relationally	present	
with	God	is	not	reliant	on	the	cognisance	or	choice	of	creation.		Rather,	it	is	reliant	on	
God’s	love	and	desire	for	relationship	with	all	of	creation	in	all	of	the	particularities	of	
their	existences.	 	Included	in	this	are	both	the	ways	in	which	our	experiences	and	our	
choices,	when	possible	or	employed,	affect	God	for	good	and	for	ill.		All	are	lasting	and	
significant	to	the	life	of	God	and	to	all	life	in	the	eschaton,	but	they	do	not	compromise	
God’s	 love	 for	 creation.	 	 Maintaining	 a	 sense	 of	 God	 being	 both	 in	 and	 more	 than	
creation	 is	 integral	here,	as	God	emerges	as	one	who	not	only	draws	near	to	creation	
through	indwelling	with	creation,	but	also	as	one	who	is	able	to	draw	creation	to	dwell	
in	Godself	(cf.	Moltmann,	1981,	211‐212).		God	thus	has	the	intent	and	power	to	make	
all	 free,	but	 far	 from	this	being	an	exercise	 in	dominance,	 it	 can	be	seen	as	a	process	
through	which	God	will	also	arrive	at	God’s	freedom.	 	This	means	that	 freedom	is	not	
something	 that	 God	 possesses	 and	 imposes	 onto	 creation,	 but	 rather	 it	 is	 something	
that	can	only	be	achieved,	for	creation	and	for	God,	through	relationality.			
	
Russell	 calls	 this	a	 “gift”	 (1979a,	175),	but	again	 this	should	not	be	used	 to	 infer	 that	
freedom	 is	 something	 that	 God	 already	 possesses	 in	 full.	 	 Indeed,	 if	 freedom	 is	
understood	as	loving	relationality	and	divine	power	is	framed	accordingly,	then	this	is	
not	something	to	be	owned	but	rather	developed	as	it	is	shared.		We	remember	Brock’s	
reading	 of	 the	 story	 of	 the	 haemorrhaging	 woman	 in	 Mark	 5.27‐34,	 wherein	 she	
highlighted	the	mutual	sharing	and	co‐creating	of	power	between	Jesus	and	the	woman	
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(Brock,	1995,	52).		We	may,	then,	agree	with	Suchocki	who	uses	the	language	of	gift	to	
counter	 claims	 that	 God	 possesses	 full	 freedom	 and	 actualises	 it	 in	 a	 hierarchical	
manner.		She	contends	that	“Insofar	as	freedom	is	a	gift,	it	is	mutually	accorded	on	the	
basis	of	personhood,	not	hierarchy”	(1976,	156).		Thus,	God	is	able	to	draw	creation	to	
receiving	the	gift	of	freedom	out	of	love	for	creation,	even	if	it	is	only	in	the	full	drawing	
of	 all	 of	 creation	 that	 the	 gift	 becomes	 a	 full	 reality	 for	 both	 God	 and	 creation.	 	 The	
process	cannot,	however,	be	entirely	mutual,	as	God	remains	able	to	help	creation	and	
thus	 holds	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 power.	 	 By	 reframing	 this	 power	 in	 terms	 of	 relational	
presence	 which	 is,	 importantly,	 shared	 with	 creation,	 and	 the	 actuation	 of	 freedom	
accordingly,	 this	 lack	 of	mutuality	 does	 not	 signify	 dominance	 nor	 does	 it	mean	 that	
freedom	is	accorded	on	the	basis	of	hierarchy.		Rather	it	signifies	God’s	ability	to	fulfil	
God’s	love	for	and	loyalty	to	creation	by	the	full	sharing	of	both	power	and	freedom	in	
relationships.	 	That	power	has	been	so	reframed	means	 that	God’s	ability	 to	be	more	
powerful	 does	 not	mean	 that	 God	 remains	 domineering,	 but	 rather	 that	 God	 is	most	
relational	of	all	beings	(cf.	Christ,	2003,	46)	and	most	able	to	help	creation	by	actively	
and	universally	sharing	the	power	to	be	freed	for	and	free	in	relationships.		God	can,	in	
this	way,	 be	 said	 to	 experience	more	 freedom	 and	more	 power	 than	 creation,	 but	 in	
such	 a	 way	 that	 God	 is	 most	 able	 to	 help	 creation	 to	 share	 in	 the	 experience	 of	
relational	freedom	and	power.				
	
It	 is	 important	to	restate	that	God’s	 love	for	creation,	whilst	universally	helping	all	 to	
experience	 full	 relationality,	 does	 so	 on	 a	 personal	 and	 individual	 basis.	 	 Still,	 the	
emphasis	on	relationality	being	experienced	in	 full	(that	 is,	without	the	hindrances	of	
rejection	 or	 suffering)	 may	 appear	 to	 imply	 a	 lack	 of	 difference	 in	 order	 that	 such	
harmony	be	possible.	 	 Indeed,	 if	God	wishes	to	draw	all	 into	 freedom,	which	 is	 loving	
relationality,	one	may	question	whether	this	necessitates	the	abolition	of	difference	in	
order	to	avoid	conflict.		The	need	to	avoid	any	such	homogenising	universal	models	is	a	
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concern	 for	many	 feminist	 theologians.	 	 Jantzen	 (2009,	39‐40),	 for	example,	observes	
that:	
Philosophers	can	generate	universals	in	abstraction,	but	insofar	as	we	hope	to	
understand	 the	 world	 and	 the	 society	 which	 we	 inhabit,	 let	 alone	 offer	
constructive	interventions,	we	cannot	dispense	with	actual	life	stories	and	their	
intersections.	
The	contention	here	 is	 that	universal	categories	and	structures	all	 too	easily	discount	
the	lives	of	individuals	for	the	purpose	of	serving	a	unifying	agenda.		This	was	seen	in	
the	Introduction	with	reference	to	the	assumed	gender	neutrality	within	gender	theory	
and	theology,	and	emerges	here	as	a	concern	also.		A	universal	view	of	the	future,	then,	
potentially	harbours	dangers	 as	 the	 unifying	 agenda	 could	quite	 easily	 be	 that	 of	 the	
powerful	and	dominant	members	of	society.		Indeed,	Russell	observes	that	“Differences	
are	 [usually]	 overcome	 by	 adopting	 a	 consensus	 that	 excludes	 those	 with	 different	
theology,	 lifestyle,	culture,	race	or	nationality”	(1982b,	303).	 	 If	such	an	agenda	 is	 the	
intention	 of	 God,	 then	 not	 only	 is	 God’s	 very	 nature	 called	 into	 question,	 but	 also	
justification	is	potentially	provided	for	similar	agendas	within	creation.		However,	just	
as	God’s	final	eschatological	act	cannot	be	one	of	domination	as	God	is	not	domineering	
but	is	rather	loving	and	relational,	so	too	can	this	final	act	not	be	one	of	homogenisation	
as	this	too	is	an	act	of	dominance.		Furthermore,	homogeneity	cannot	feasibly	be	what	a	
loving	and	relational	God	desires.		The	abolition	of	difference	again	seems	more	akin	to	
a	model	of	colonialism	and	dominance	than	to	a	model	of	love.			
	
The	freedom	that	God’s	love	draws	creation	universally	to,	then,	must	affirm	difference	
and	 diversity.	 	 Russell	 articulates	 this	 universality	 in	 terms	 of	 “unity	 without	
uniformity”	(2009,	65)	and	observes	that	“It	seems	that	God’s	intention	is	to	‘remove	all	
the	bars’	and	create	a	world	full	of	riotous	difference”	(2009,	55;	cf.	Bauckham,	1999b,	
15;	Soskice,	2007,	186).95		Claiming	that	all	will	be	included	in	the	eschatological	future	
																																																													
95	Quite	fittingly,	this	openness	can	be	framed	as	the	ever‐changing	and	ever‐expanding	body	of	
God.		Vanier	(1988,	103),	for	instance,	sees	the	communal	nature	of	the	body	of	God	as:		
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need	not	 obliterate	 diversity,	 then,	 but	 rather	 can	 signify	 the	 drawing	 together	 of	 all	
diverse	 members	 of	 creation	 together	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 particularities	 of	
individual	 lives	 and	 identities	 are	 retained	 and,	 even	 more,	 celebrated.	 	 This	 is	 an	
appropriate	and	beneficial	model	for	the	future	as	it	 is	rooted	in	God	drawing	near	to	
and	 dwelling	 with	 creation	 in	 all	 of	 its	 particularities.	 	 The	 ultimate	 purpose	 of	 this	
drawing	near	is	to	draw	all	into	a	future	which	embraces	these	particularities;	that	is,	
both	 makes	 space	 for	 them	 and	 helps	 them	 to	 flourish.	 	 Just	 as	 God’s	 responsive	
presence	was	deemed	to	be	directed	by	and	to	particular	experiences	then,	the	future	is	
also	 imaged	 accordingly.96	 	 This	 helps	 us	 to	 experience	 such	 freedom	 now	 as	 it	
encourages	 us	 to	 create	 spaces	 that	 embrace	 different	 others,	 in	 all	 of	 their	
particularity,	and	so	help	cultivate	their,	and	our	own,	flourishing.			
		
Creating	Freedom97	
The	 reading	 of	 freedom	 that	 I	 have	 proposed	 has	 been	 focussed	 primarily	 on	 the	
eschatological	process	and	 the	ways	 in	which	such	 freedom	is	compatible	with	a	God	
who	ultimately	uses	loving	power	to	actualise	loyalty	to	all	of	creation	so	as	to	draw	all	
into	 future	 life.	 	 I	have	claimed	 that	 this	 is	 also	experienceable	 in	 the	present	as	God	
holds	 this	 future	open	 to	our	 influence;	 that	 is,	 our	actions	and	experiences,	whether	
they	confirm	or	contradict	the	full	experience	of	relational	freedom,		affect	God	and	the	
future.	 	 I	 have	 also	 inferred	 that	 this	 can	 encourage	 us	 to	 create	 experiences	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																												
a	living,	dynamic	body,	
	 it	is	in	continual	movement.	
	 It	evolves	as	people	grow,	
	 As	the	whole	body	grows	in	welcoming	new	people.	
This	can	help	us	to	consider	the	universal	embrace	of	God	in	the	eschatological	future	as	being	
one	which	cultivates	a	community	that	 is	dynamically	and	vibrantly	embodied.	 	This	 indicates	
yet	more	support	for	considering	the	content	of	the	eschaton	as	being	characterised	by	fluid	and	
changing	embodiments,	as	the	next	chapter	argues. 
96	 This	 is	 a	 claim	 that	will	 be	 explored	more	 thoroughly	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	wherein	 I	 speak	
more	specifically	about	the	nature	of	eschatological	bodies	and	God’s	eschatological	 intentions	
for	particular	bodies. 
97	Some	specific	ways	in	which	we	can	create	and	shape	both	the	future	and	the	experience	of	
the	future	in	the	present	will	be	the	focus	of	the	final	chapter.		The	focus	here	is	on	how	a	God	
who	 helps	 the	 process	 to	 its	 completion	 can	 encourage	 us	 to	 similarly	 help	 to	 create	 the	
increasing	freedom	of	all	of	creation.	
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relational	freedom,	and	it	is	now	important	to	develop	this	inference,	for	it	may	still	be	
claimed	 that	 creation	 could	 legitimately	 do	 nothing	 and	 still	 the	 future	 would	 be	
realised	 on	 account	 of	 God’s	 love	 and	 loyalty.	 	 Hart	 (1999,	 69)	 appears	 to	 concur,	
explaining	that:	
if	the	eventual	outcome	is	secure	regardless	of	our	striving	or	lack	of	it	towards	
the	 goal	 of	 our	 hope,	 if	 redemption	 does	 not	 rest	 on	 our	 fashioning	 of	 the	
conditions	 for	 the	 coming	 kingdom,	 then	 surely	 the	 more	 economic	 and	
comfortable	option	is	to	sit	back	and	wait	for	it	all	to	happen.	
In	short,	 if	we	cannot	affect	 the	 future	 then	we	would	be	 foolish	 to	waste	our	energy	
trying.	 	 Such	perceptions	of	 the	eschatological	 future	signify	 the	promotion	of	apathy	
about	the	present,	and	a	reliance	on	the	future	to	resolve	all	the	injustices	of	both	the	
past	and	present.		However,	Vanstone	claims	that	“The	creation	is	‘safe’	not	because	it	
moves	 by	 programme	 towards	 a	 predetermined	 goal	 but	 because	 the	 same	 loving	
creativity	is	ever	exercised	upon	it”	(1977,	63).		This	can	be	read	alongside	Grey’s	claim	
which	 was	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 that	 “God	 is	 always	 offering	 redemptive	
possibilities	 to	 the	world”	 (1989,	 35).	 	 It	was	 there	noted	 that	 these	possibilities	 can	
only	be	realised	by	creation’s	active	response	to	God’s	offer	or	God’s	“loving	creativity”,	
thus	 again	 signifying	 God’s	 dependence	 on	 creation:	 if	 creation	 fails	 to	 respond,	 the	
possibilities	for	redemption	remain	only	possibilities	(Grey,	1989,	35).		Thus	whilst	it	is	
true	to	assert	that	I	have	claimed	creation	is	“safe”	on	account	of	God’s	loving	loyalty	to	
creation,	this	does	not	mean	that	creation	can	sit	idly	by.		To	do	so	would,	in	fact,	be	a	
mark	 of	 non‐freedom,	 for	 passivity	 and	 inaction	 have	 been	 deemed	 to	 be	 averse	 to	
relational	presence	and,	accordingly,	to	freedom.		Furthermore,	such	idleness	would	be	
of	no	benefit	or	sustenance,	to	ourselves	or	to	others,	as	it	would	hinder	our	well‐being	
and	the	development	of	who	we	are	in	relationships	with	others.			
	
An	 eschatology	 of	 embodied	 relationships,	 wherein	 God	 helps	 all	 to	 experience	 full	
freedom,	can	encourage	us	to	enter	into	relationships	with	others	in	order	to	help	them	
to	become	free.	 	May	offers	a	similar	perspective	whereby	she	proposes	a	doxological	
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reading	 of	 presence	which	 signifies	 God’s	 eternal	 faithfulness	 to	 creation	 (1995,	 69).		
She	 goes	 on	 to	 claim	 that	 this	 speaks	 to	 creaturely	 life	 as	 it	 signifies	 that	 those	 in	
positions	of	privilege	have	a	responsibility	to	divest	the	power	of	privilege	“in	order	to	
participate	 in	 the	 revelatory	 presence”	 (1995,	 74)	 which,	 as	 she	 earlier	 writes,	 is	
concerned	with	“being	alive	in	a	way	that	makes	others	alive”	(1995,	71).		Thus,	for	May	
as	for	me,	divine	relational	presence	calls	creation	to	respond	by	being	responsible	for	
the	freedom	of	others	and	of	oneself	both	in	and	for	relationship.		Participation	in	such	
relationships	need	not	only	refer	to	the	active	offer	of	relationships	but	can	also	pertain	
to	 an	 open	 welcome	 to	 the	 offer	 of	 relationships,	 which	 is	 in	 itself,	 we	 remember,	
active.98		In	addition	to	this,	we	recall	that	depending	on	others	in	relationships	is	also	
affirmed.	 	 These	 are	 authentic	practices	of	 both	power	and	 freedom	 for	 they	 live	 the	
conviction	 that	 the	 two	 are	 increased,	 not	 diminished,	 as	 they	 are	 shared	 in	
relationality.	
	
Although	we	are	called,	in	this	way,	to	help	create	freedom,	we	also	remember	that	the	
actions	of	 creation	cannot	be	 the	 sole	determining	 factors	of	our	hope	 for	 the	 future.		
McCulloch	rightly	notes	that	such	a	perspective	invests	all	hope	in	human	beings	(2002,	
172)	 as	 creation	 are	 depicted	 as	 equally	 co‐creators	 of	 the	 future.	 	 This	 serves,	
McCulloch	 claims	 to	 elevate	 “human	 beings	 to	 a	 ‘God‐like’	 status”	 (McCulloch,	 2002,	
80),	and,	I	add,	to	relegate	God	to	a	“human‐like”	status.		An	eschatological	perspective	
is,	 again,	 crucial	 here	 lest	 the	 weight	 of	 responsibility	 for	 creating	 a	 free	 future	 fall	
solely	on	humanity.		Indeed,	much	earlier	in	this	chapter	we	saw	Raphael’s	observation	
that	 relationships	 can	 often	 be	 too	 heavy	 a	 load	 to	 bear	 for	 those	 in	 situations	 of	
extreme	 suffering.	 	 It	 is	 Raphael’s	 observation	 that	 is	 of	 particular	 import	 for	 this	
																																																													
98	 We	 also	 remember	 the	 earlier‐noted	 perspectives	 that	 attended	 to	 some	 experiences	 of	
disability	in	order	to	praise	vulnerability	 in	relationships.	 	Whilst,	we	recall,	disability	was	not	
unequivocally	 paralleled	 with	 vulnerability,	 the	 point	 was	 made	 that	 when	 disability	 is	
associated	with	vulnerability,	 this	should	not	be	devalued	but	rather	 framed	as	the	essence	of	
relationality.	 	 Here,	 then,	 we	 see	 that	 we	 can	 help	 to	 create	 freedom	 both	 by	 offering	 and	
accepting	relationships	which	draw	us	into	experiences	of	freedom.			
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section,	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 responsibility	 placed	 on	 humanity	 in	 this	 conception	 is	
inordinate,	even	impossible,	particularly	when	one	considers	the	experiences	and	lives	
of	 those	who	struggle	daily	 to	survive.	 	This	 is	not	 to	 juxtapose	struggles	 for	survival	
with	redemption;	 indeed,	struggles	and	protests	against	oppression	can	be	seen	to	be	
significant	 in	 helping	 to	 create	 the	 eschatological	 process.	 	 I	 earlier	 observed	 Isasi‐
Díaz’s	claim	that	“the	struggle	is	life”	(1988,	99)	and,	far	from	this	being	a	resignation	to	
the	 struggle,	 it	 locates	 the	quest	 for	 liberation	 firmly	 in	 the	present.99	 	 Still,	my	point	
here	is	that	removing	any	notion	of	God	being	able	to	help	in	this	process	and	placing	
all	 hope	 in	 the	 actions	 of	 humanity	 is	 ultimately	 hopeless	 for	 those	who	 are	 already	
burdened	by	their	oppressions.		It	discounts	the	particularities	and	extremities	of	some	
sufferings,	 and	 whilst	 the	 location	 of	 redemption	 solely	 in	 humanity	 can	 certainly	
compel	us	to	empathise	and	share	in	suffering	we	cannot,	on	our	own,	effect	final	and	
full	experiences	of	life	where	suffering	does	not	obtain.				
	
There	 are	yet	more	problems	with	 relying	 so	heavily	on	 creation’s	 actions	 to	 actuate	
the	eschaton.		This	chapter	has	also	observed	critiques	of	the	reliance	on	human	ability	
from	 Moltmann,	 who	 challenged	 the	 “progressive	 syndrome”	 and	 the	 Western	
emphasis	on	progress	and	development	(1999a,	276).	 	 	The	 location	of	 responsibility	
solely	in	humanity	certainly	presents	an	elitist	and	Western	understanding	of	progress	
wherein	 humanity	 alone	 is	 deemed	 capable	 of	 creating	 a	 hopeful	 future.	 	 Brunner	
claims	 that	 this	 pertains	 to	 “belief	 in	 progress	 as	 hope	 resting	 upon	 self‐confidence”	
which,	he	claims,	“is	the	opposite	of	Christian	hope,	which	is	hope	founded	upon	trust	
in	God”	(Brunner,	1954,	10).		Recalling	McCulloch’s	observation	is	beneficial	here,	as	he	
notes:	
The	 idea	that	we	are	co‐creators	with	God	is	designed	to	undercut	the	biblical	
theme	 of	 divine	 sovereignty	 over	 creation,	 yet	 ironically	 this	 elevates	 human	
beings	to	a	‘God‐like’	status	(2002,	80).	
																																																													
99	Such	notions	will	be	addressed	in	more	depth	in	Chapter	Four.		 
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In	such	a	perspective,	the	future	is	potentially	conceived	of	as	a	mere	product	of	human	
progression.		Whilst	this	progression	may	be	informed	by	the	redemptive	possibilities	
that	God	offers	to	the	world	(Grey,	1989,	35)	it	is	ultimately	humanity’s	responsibility	
to	 realise	 this	 redemption,	 as	 Christ	 claims:	 “the	 responsibility	 for	 ending	 humanly	
created	suffering	[is	placed]	squarely	in	human	hands”	(2003,	175).		The	inference	here	
is	 that	 suffering	 is	 a	 human	 creation	 therefore	 its	 remedy	 must	 also	 be	 a	 human	
creation.		However,	God	again	emerges	here	as	distant	and	aloof,	just	as	in	the	concepts	
of	God	as	omnipotent.		Thus,	whilst	it	is	important,	in	my	understanding	of	realising	the	
eschatological	process,	to	affirm	the	actions	of	some	members	of	creation,	reliance	on	
such	actions	cannot	be	total;	that	is,	the	realisation	of	the	eschatological	process	cannot	
be	reducible	to	human	action.		Whilst	it	is	a	significant	part	of	it	and	shapes	the	process,	
the	weight	of	responsibility	should	not	be	so	much	that	it	becomes	central,	unbearable	
or	 egotistical.	 	 Instead,	 the	 actions	 of	 creation	 must,	 as	 I	 have	 consistently	 argued	
throughout	 this	 chapter,	 be	 balanced	 with	 God’s	 ability	 to	 help.	 	 This	 offers	 both	
humility	and	hope	as	 it	highlights	 that	we	cannot	actualise	 the	eschatological	process	
alone	but	also	that	this	inability	is	not	the	sum	of	the	end	to	which	the	process	moves.		
Those	whose	existences	 include	 the	ability	 to	act,	have	agency,	and	make	choices	are	
called	to	engage	these	abilities	in	ethical	ways.		This	means	helping	others	and,	indeed,	
oneself	to	experience	relational	freedom	in	the	hope	that	God	does	and	will	actuate	the	
future	of	full	relationality,	and	thus	full	freedom,	for	all.		
	
Still,	 given	 the	ways	 in	which	 God	 is	 authentically	 affected	 by	 and	 responsive	 to	 our	
actions	we	can	claim	that	the	future	remains	open.		What	this	means	is	that	God	can	still	
be	surprised	by	 the	particular	content	of	 the	 future.	 	Such	a	perspective	actually,	and	
perhaps	itself	surprisingly,	 finds	correlation	with	elements	of	process	thought.	 	Christ	
(2011a),	for	instance,	writes	that:	
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I	like	to	think	that	the	world	we	know	has	been	co‐created	through	the	billions	
of	years	of	the	evolutionary	process	and	that	even	Goddess	has	been	surprised	
and	delighted	by	the	particular	ways	life	has	evolved	on	this	planet.	
Having	 here	 claimed	 that	 God	 honours	 creaturely	 life	 by	 being	 both	 involved	 in	 the	
eschatological	process	and	helping	it	to	its	completion,	it	is	legitimate	to	claim	that	the	
eschatological	process	can	be	understood	as	being	both	known	and	unknown.		That	is,	
God	can	know	that	all	will	be	drawn	 into	 it,	on	account	of	God’s	 loyalty,	but	does	not	
know	 the	 particular	 experiences	 contained	 therein	 and,	 accordingly,	 the	 particular	
responses	 needed.	 	 Again,	 this	 emphasises	 the	 simultaneous	 universality	 and	
particularity	of	the	eschaton,	insomuch	as	God	can	be	said	to	know	the	universal	scope	
of	the	future	whilst	only	partially	knowing	the	specific	content	of	that	future.		As	Letty	
Russell	writes,	the	universal	hope	for	all	of	humanity	“is	at	the	same	time	the	concrete,	
situation‐variable	proclamation”	of	liberation	(1979b,	23).		Thus,	we	can	claim	that	God	
has	created	us	to	be	developing	and	becoming	beings	therefore	can	be	surprised	(and	
frustrated)	by	us;	this	emphasises	God’s	love	as	relationally	responsive	in	relation	to	our	
ever‐changing	selves.	 	This	 love	has	been	articulated	alongside	an	emphasis	on	God’s	
loyalty	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 that	 creation’s	 refusals	 of	 relational	 presence,	 whilst	
certainly	 affecting	 the	 experience	 of	 relational	 freedom,	 do	 not	 ultimately	 hinder	 its	
realisation.		Rather,	this	love	makes	space	for	the	transformation	of	choice	and	even	for	
the	 absence	 of	 choice	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 is	 loyal	 to	 the	 particularities	 of	 creaturely	
experiences	and	committed	to	the	full	experience	of	loving	relationality	with	all	in	the	
freedom	of	the	eschatological	future.	
	
Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	responded	to	feminist	theological	critiques	of	an	omnipotent	God	and	
their	reconstructions	of	God	as	relationally	involved	with	creation.		I	have	argued	that	a	
God	whose	power	is	reframed	as	relational	presence	with	and	response	to	creation	is	
also	a	God	whose	loving	power	helps	all	to	experience	this	relationality.		I	have	claimed	
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that,	far	from	thwarting	creaturely	freedom,	this	actually	draws	all	of	creation	into	the	
full	experience	of	freedom	which	is	loving	relationality	with	God	and	with	all	members	
of	 creation.	 	 This	 was	 seen	 to	 be	 underpinned	 by	 a	 God	 who	 is	 simultaneously	
immanent	and	transcendent;	that	is,	 intimately	involved	with	creation	and	committed	
and	 able	 to	 help	 all	 of	 creation	 experience	 this	 intimacy.	 	 The	 eschatological	 process	
has,	 on	 this	 basis,	 been	 reconstructed	 as	 one	 that	 creation	 authentically	 affects	 as	
creation	 affects	God	 in	 relationship.	 	This	pertained	not	 only	 to	God	 feeling	with	 and	
responding	 to	creation	but	also	 to	 the	particular	nature	of	 the	process	and	creation’s	
actions	 in	 helping	 to	 create	 this	 process.	 	 By	 emphasising	 God’s	 final	 help,	 though,	 I	
countered	claims	that	creaturely	choice	is	to	be	made	definitive	of	freedom	and	instead	
argued	that	the	fullest	experience	of	freedom	is	relationality.		True	freedom	was	seen	to	
be	characterised	by	God’s	final	loving	help	to	enable	all	to	experience	this	relationality.		
Furthermore,	this	freedom	was	seen	to	be	beneficial	 in	the	present	as	it	enables	us	to	
cultivate	 and	 experience	 greater	 levels	 of	 flourishing,	 and	 draws	 us	 into	 more	 full	
experiences	of	ourselves	in	relationships	with	others.			
	
Within	this,	choices	were	honoured	for	those	with	the	capacity	to	make	choices,	even	if	
this	 amounted	 to	 the	 choice	 to	 refuse	 relationship	 with	 God.	 	 Such	 refusals	 were	
understood	 to	 hurt	 God,	 but	 not	 to	 thwart	 God’s	 commitment	 to	 loving	 relationality	
with	all	of	creation.		The	diverse	nature	of	such	refusals	was	seen	to	affect	both	God	and	
the	eschaton	in	terms	of	the	particular	nature	of	God’s	tangible	response	and	the	active	
embrace	of	the	time	and	space	needed	to	actuate	eschatological	existence.			This	space	
was	also	deemed	to	be	wide	enough	to	authentically	embrace	and	relate	to	those	who	
do	not	have	the	ability	to	make	decisions.		Again,	this	contributed	to	my	critique	of	the	
centrality	 of	 choice	 and	 my	 emphasis	 instead	 on	 relationality	 as	 the	 hallmark	 of	
freedom.		Furthermore,	the	exercising	of	choices,	and	particularly	the	choices	of	those	
who	would	reject	God,	were	understood	to	be	met	with	God’s	relentless	love	which	is	
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unceasing	in	its	revelation	of	and	help	to	experience	full	freedom	in	relationality.		The	
space	 of	 time	 in	 which	 these	 loving	 relationships	 are	 cultivated	 was	 understood	 to	
honour	 creation’s	 actions	 and	 experiences,	 as	 such	 existences	 were	 not	 said	 to	 be	
instantaneous.		This	was	also	seen	to	honour	God’s	loyalty	to	the	process	by	bringing	it	
to	fruition	in	a	loving,	relational	manner.	
	
This	 suggests	 that	 grasping	 at	 specificity	 for	 the	 future	 is	 possible	 on	 account	 of	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	hope	in	both	God	and	therefore	the	future	also.		Moreover,	the	partial	
knowledge	of	God	that	was	spoken	of	a	moment	ago	enables	us	to	grasp	at	specificity,	
for	the	future	is	rooted	in	our	existences	and	experiences	in	relation	to	one	another	and	
to	God.		As	we	experience	our	bodies	and	the	bodies	of	others	in	relationships,	we	share	
the	 partial	 knowledge	 of	 the	 eschaton	 that	 God	 too	 experiences.	 	 Having	 here	
emphasised	 the	 embodied	 and	 tangible	 nature	 of	 God’s	 relational	 presence	 and	
response	 I	 am	 able,	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 to	 construct	 a	 future	 that	 affirms	 the	
reclamation	of	embodiments	and	earthiness	and,	even	more	so,	allows	them	to	flourish	
in	the	abundance	for	which	they	are	intended.		In	so	doing	I	will	seek	to	contradict	the	
aspects	 of	 life	 which	 should	 not	 find	 a	 place	 in	 the	 future:	 aspects	 that	 are	 both	
damaging	 and	 inappropriate	 to	 a	 life	 characterised	 by	 love	 and	 liberation.	 	 More	
importantly,	 though,	 I	will	construct	an	 image	of	newness	and	creativity	whereby	the	
specific	nature	of	redeemed	life	is	grasped	at,	to	as	great	a	degree	as	is	possible.		Such	
newness	is	rooted	in	both	the	experiences	of	creation	and	the	intentions	of	God.	 	This	
means	that	whilst	we	cannot	know	the	full	nature	of	the	future	for	which	we	hope,	by	
hoping	 in	 a	 God	who	 so	 affirms	 relationships	with	 embodied	 beings,	we	 can	 see	 our	
embodiments	 as	 being	 capable	 of	 uncovering	 something	 revelatory	 concerning	 the	
nature	of	the	eschatological	future.			
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3.	A	Changing	Content	
Introduction	
This	 chapter	 responds	 to	 feminist	 theological	 critiques	 surrounding	 the	 content	 of	
eschatology,	 and	 also	 emerges	 out	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	 reconstructions	 of	 the	
eschatological	process.	 	There	must,	 in	short,	be	congruence	between	the	process	and	
the	content	(or	the	means	and	the	end)	for,	as	was	earlier	argued,	the	end	cannot	justify	
the	means.		Thinkers	such	as	Jantzen	(1984b,	39),	Baker‐Fletcher	(2006,	83),	and	Keller	
(2003b,	 422),	 raised	 the	 contention	 that	 no	 eschaton	 could	 be	 loving	 if	 it	 ultimately	
compromised	the	freedom	and	integrity	of	creation.		Having	reconstructed	the	process,	
or	 the	means,	 as	 being	 capable	 not	 only	 of	 affirming	 but	 also	 of	 bringing	 creaturely	
freedom	to	 its	 fullest	experience,	 it	 is	appropriate	now	to	reconstruct	 the	content	 (or	
end)	 in	 a	 coherent	 manner,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 these	 thinkers’	 charges	 from	 being	
defensible.	 	 This	 chapter,	 then,	will	 contend	 that	 a	God	who	 relates	 to	 creation	 in	 an	
embodied	 and	 tangible	manner,	 and	 honours	 those	 relationships	 in	 the	ways	 I	 have	
claimed,	 signifies	 a	 God	 who	 takes	 relationships	 with	 creation	 seriously.	 	 This	 must	
mean	that	God	takes	our	bodies	seriously	for	as	Berry	proposes,	“We	are	not	who	we	
are	without	our	bodies”	(1982,	953).		An	eschatology	that	is	realised	by	divine‐creation	
relations	which	 are	necessarily	 embodied,	 then,	must	 likewise	be	 an	 eschaton	 that	 is	
characterised	by	such.100		Moreover,	it	was	argued	in	the	previous	chapter	that	divine‐
creation	 relations	 are	 conducted	 on	 a	 personal	 level,	 with	 God	 attending	 to	 the	
particularities	 of	 creaturely	 life.	 	 This	 grounds	 the	 ensuing	 discussion	 as	 I	 seek	 to	
negotiate	 how	 such	 embodied	particularity	 is	 affirmed	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Informed	by	
Bacon’s	 observation	 that	 “All	 embodiments	 are	 particular”	 (2009,	 234),	 I	 claim	 that	
																																																													
100	Authenticity	 in	 such	 relations	 cannot,	 though,	 simply	pertain	 to	affirming	embodied	 life	 as	
unequivocally	“good”,	for	as	Berry	posits,	“both	the	dark	and	the	bright	sides	of	our	embodied	
existence	must	be	attended	to	if	we	are	to	regard	our	finitude	as	theologically	relevant”	(1982,	
953).		A	God	who	takes	relations	with	embodied	creation	seriously,	that	is,	so	seriously	that	they	
are	instrumental	in	the	process	and	integral	in	the	content	of	the	eschaton,	must	perceive	and	
respond	to	both	edifying	and	oppressive	experiences	of	embodiment.		Accordingly,	this	chapter	
will	similarly	attend	to	both. 
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focussing	on	 framings	and	experiences	of	women’s	bodies	 here	 is	both	 legitimate	 and	
necessary,	for	a	God	who	takes	particular	bodies	seriously	must	also	take	seriously	the	
fact	 that	 women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	 and	 are	 oppressed	 precisely	 because	 of	 that	
particularity.		Relevant	to	this	discussion	is	the	observation,	noted	in	Chapter	One,	that	
women’s	bodies	have	been	excluded	from	the	eschaton	on	account	of	their	association	
with	 change	 and	 death.	 	 I	 will	 reconfigure	 these	 associations	 and	 so	 challenge	 this	
exclusion	by	constructing	a	model	of	dynamic	and	fluid	eschatological	embodiment.101			
	
The	Affirmation	of	Bodies	
Grounding	the	Construction	
The	 affirmation	 of	 qualities	 associated	 with	 female	 bodies,	 and	 some	 women’s	
experiences	of	 these	qualities,	 coupled	with	God’s	 love	 for	and	 loyalty	 to	 them	 forms	
the	basis	of	an	eschatological	model	of	affirmation	(what	will	endure	in	the	eschaton),	
contradiction	(what	will	not	endure),	and	construction.102	 	 Jürgen	Moltmann	similarly	
utilises	 an	 eschatological	model	 of	 affirmation	 and	 contradiction;	 however	 he	 places	
more	 confidence	 in	 the	 power	 of	 contradiction	 than	 in	 affirmation.	 	 This	 is	
understandable	 as	 contradictions	 benefit	 from	 a	 substantial	 experiential	 grounding	
that	is	potentially	lacking	in	affirmations.		Moltmann	(1997,	123‐124)	subscribes	to	this	
notion,	arguing	that	the	futurist	images	we	conceive	of:	
are	all	strong	in	their	denial	of	the	negative	from	which	we	suffer	[…]	But	they	
are	feeble	in	their	picture	of	the	positive	side,	because	in	this	impaired	life	we	
can	as	yet	have	no	experience	of	new	creation.	
According	 to	 Moltmann,	 then,	 we	 have	 an	 experiential	 epistemology	 that	 feeds	 our	
assertions	of	the	negative;	that	which	we	suffer	and	desire	to	be	freed	from.		When	we	
																																																													
101	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Christian	tradition	has	had	no	sense	of	eschatological	embodiment;	
Isherwood	and	Stuart	note	a	 semblance	of	bodily	appreciation	 in	 the	works	of	Tertullian	and	
Augustine,	for	example	(1998,	135).		Still,	there	has	been,	as	is	well‐documented,	a	devaluation	
of	 the	 female	 body	 which	 has	 been	 promoted	 in	 association	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	
incorporeality	of	the	body	in	the	eschaton. 
102	It	should	be	noted	that	these	categories	are	not	compartmentalised	but	rather	interact	with	
and	inform	one	another. 
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come	 to	 articulate	 the	 positive	 though,	 our	 speech	 is	 hindered	 by	 a	 poverty	 of	
experience	 and	 knowledge	 about	 this	 “new	 creation”.	 	 However,	 the	 grounds	 of	 my	
affirmation	suggest	that	we	have	access	to	concrete,	albeit	complex,	information	about	
the	nature	of	the	future.		Embodied	experiences	can	again	be	understood	as	prophetic.		
In	particular,	the	alignment	of	female	bodies	with	material	fluidity	is	here	reclaimed	as	
something	 that	 speaks	 truthfully	of	 all	 existences,	 both	now	and	 in	 their	 future	 lives.		
Such	 an	 affirmation	 can	 then	 feed	 contradictions,	 as	 an	 eschatology	 typified	 by	
dynamically	changing	embodiments	contradicts	anything	that	threatens	the	affirmation	
of	bodies;	namely,	suffering,	pain,	and	death.			
	
These	 affirmations	 and	 contradictions,	 to	 be	 extrapolated	 over	 the	 course	 of	 this	
chapter,	 can	 enable	 a	 specific	 and	 novel	 construction	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 eschaton.		
Such	constructions	are	crucial	in	order	that	the	eschaton	not	be	a	mere	perpetuation	of	
the	positive	or	negation	of	the	negative.		Jantzen	makes	a	similar	observation,	claiming	
that	speaking	in	the	negative	indicates	a	failure	to	move	beyond	the	level	of	critiquing	
that	which	 already	 exists.	 	 Subsequently,	 it	 hampers	 the	 possibility	 of	 articulating	 or	
imagining	anything	new	 (1998,	2‐4).	 	 Similarly,	 though,	 if	we	 confine	our	 thinking	 to	
affirming	whatever	 is	 identified	 as	 “positive”	 then	we	 likewise	 restrict	 our	 ability	 to	
extend	our	imagining	into	considering	the	newness	of	the	future.		There	must,	then,	be	
something	novel	about	the	eschaton	lest	it	be	indistinguishable	from	present	lives	and	
experiences	 and,	 therefore,	 be	 unnecessary.	 	 The	 emphasis	 on	 transformation	 in	 the	
latter	part	of	this	chapter	speaks	to	this	novelty	as	it	signifies	the	future’s	simultaneous	
connection	to	and	difference	from	present	life.		By	attempting	to	construct	a	new	model	
of	the	eschatological	future	on	the	basis	of	traits	identified	with	female	bodies,	I	again	
conduct	a	strategic	engagement	with	essentialised	understandings	of	female	bodies.	 	I	
also	 align	myself	 with	 the	methodologies	 of	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Jantzen	 and	 Isasi‐Díaz,	
who	 see	 construction	 as	 a	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 feminist	 theology.	 	 Isasi‐Díaz’s	 claims	
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resurface	as	being	particularly	relevant	to	this	chapter,	as	we	recall	her	assertion	that	
we	need	to	“flesh	out	the	shape	of	the	kind	of	new	heaven	and	the	new	earth	for	which	
justice‐seeking	people	hunger	and	thirst”	(1999,	229).	 	My	approach,	then,	in	addition	
to	 contributing	 to	 the	 challenge	 to	 traditional	 constructions	of	 the	eschaton,	will	 also	
contribute	 to	 feminist	discourse	by	 speaking	with	 specificity	about	 the	eschatological	
future	 and	 doing	 so	 in	 a	 way	 that	 transforms	 the	 patriarchal	 devaluation	 of	 female	
bodies.	
	
Female	Bodies	and	Change	
The	association	of	female	bodies	with	change	has	been	used	to	justify	the	treatment	of	
female	bodies	as	suspect,	troublesome,	and	fearful,	as	we	have	seen.		Miller‐McLemore	
even	goes	so	far	as	to	say	that	there	has	been	a	hatred	of	the	“chaotic	interconnections	
that	women	embody”	(Miller‐McLemore,	1994,	183).		By	claiming	that	such	readings	of	
female	 bodies	 can	 instead	 be	 transformed	 into	 a	 valuation	 of	 the	 fluidity	 of	 all	
existences,	 I	 challenge	 essentialised	 readings	 of	 female	 bodies	 and,	 similarly,	 the	
traditional	 alignment	 of	 static	 disembodiment	 with	 perfection.	 	 In	 light	 of	 Christ’s	
observation	that	women	have	been	devalued	through	their	association	with	embodied	
changes	(2003,	48),	I	re‐read	this	association	as	a	beneficial	way	to	rethink	the	nature	
of	all	bodies	and	God’s	intention	for	those	bodies	in	the	future.		Mount‐Shoop	proposes	
that	such	theologising	has	the	ability	to	help	us	“out	of	a	disembodied	faith	toward	a	re‐
membering	of	God’s	embodied	hopes	for	us”	(2010,	26).		The	reasons	for	emphasising	
the	need	 for	an	eschatology	 that	embraces	embodied	change	 lie	 in	 the	 importance	of	
embodiment	and	the	inseparability	of	embodiment	from	fluidity.		As	Keller	writes,	“The	
body	is	a	self’s	ownmost	place”,	not	that	it	is	lived	in	like	a	house,	“but	that	as	body	the	
self	 takes	 place”	 (Keller,	 1996a,	 176).	 	 Existence	 apart	 from	 bodiliness	 is	 thus	
inconceivable.		A	future	existence	of	enduring	life	that	affirms	bodies	must	accordingly	
and	necessarily	also	affirm	change,	lest	this	new	life	be	nothing	like	life	at	all.		This	has	
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particular	 resonance	 with	 feminist	 theology	 because,	 as	 has	 been	 illustrated	
throughout	 this	 thesis	 so	 far,	 women’s	 bodies	 have	 suffered	 greatly	 under	 their	
association	with	materiality,	fluidity,	sensuality,	and	all	that	is	contained	therein.			
			
Indeed,	the	temporal	process	has	been	understood	to	be	writ	large	on	women’s	bodies;	
wrinkling,	expanding,	shrinking,	or	even	disbanding	bodies	mark	not	only	the	course	of	
time	 but	 also	 the	 porousness	 of	 space.	 	 Female	 bodies	 have	 been	 burdened	with	 the	
assumption	that	they	alone	tell	the	time	and	fill	the	space;	they	are	feared	for	ostensibly	
exposing	 our	 existences	 as	 thoroughly	 temporal	 and	 material.	 	 As	 noted,	 such	
associations	 have	 been	 charged	with	 claims	 of	 imperfection;	 patriarchal	 thought	 has	
presented	the	static	and	settled	(male)	“body”	as	the	rightful	inheritor	of	the	“Kingdom	
of	God”.		This	is	an	inheritance	that	female	bodies,	characterised	as	changing	and	fluid,	
have	been	denied.		Annalet	van	Schalkwyk	offers	a	different	reading,	and	refers	to	“the	
peace	 that	we	 experience	 in	 our	 bodies	 as	 they	 change	 from	 young	 and	 beautiful	 to	
middle‐aged	 or	 old	 and	 yet	 beautiful	 in	 new	 ways”	 (2002,	 151).	 	 Of	 course,	 such	
changes	 have	 not	 been,	 and	 are	 often	 still	 not	 defined	 as	 “beautiful”;	 indeed,	 going	
through	the	change	is	often	caricatured	as	being	exemplary	of	female	unpredictability	
and	instability.		As	Moltmann‐Wendel	(1994,	27)	writes:	
The	 body	 is	 the	 terrain	 on	 which	 [the	 process	 of	 aging]	 is	 played	 out,	 and	
particularly	 in	 the	 rich	 countries	 the	 aged	 body	 has	 become	 a	 spectre,	
contrasting	with	the	ideals	of	these	countries	with	their	self‐image	of	health	and	
success.	
Aging	 bodies,	 and	 specifically	 female	 aging	 bodies,	 are	 thus	 seen	 to	 be	 averse	 to	 the	
particularly	western	ideals	of	well‐being,	achievement,	and,	we	may	add,	beauty.			
	
If,	 on	 the	other	hand,	we	affirm	 the	 aging	process,	 and	other	 embodied	processes,	 as	
being	 indicative	 of	 the	 vitality	 and	 creativity	 embedded	 in	 embodied	 life,	we	 can	not	
only	reclaim	the	value	and	worth	of	women’s	complex	experiences	of	embodiment,	but	
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also	 affirm	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 all	 life.	 	 As	 Nicola	 Slee	 (2004c,	 90)	 writes	 in	 her	
poem,	“This	woman’s	body”:		
This	woman’s	body	of	mine	
which	has	always	been	growing	and	changing	and	shedding	and	
ripening	
is	forever	gifting	me	with	her	wisdom		
	
By	grasping	hold	of	the	patriarchal	assumption	that	women’s	bodies	are	particularly	in	
touch	with	the	material	and	temporal,	and	reclaiming	this	as	a	gift	of	wisdom,	we	can	
redefine	embodied	change	as	something	to	be	celebrated	and	valued	in	all	of	creation.		
In	so	doing,	we	can	reunite	all	bodies	with	a	sense	of	ultimate	worth.		Moreover,	we	can	
consequently	 reframe	 the	 eschaton	 as	 a	 hopeful	 place	 full	 of	 dynamic	 bodies,	 as	 this	
chapter	will	shortly	specify.103			
	
Further	 to	 this,	 embodied	 changes	 can	 also	 be	 revalued	 by	 reading	 them	 as	 being	
indicative	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 empowerment.	 	 This	 is	 noticeable	 in	 Lucille	 Clifton’s	 poem	
“Homage	 to	 My	 Hair”	 which	 affirms	 and	 celebrates	 aging,	 as	 the	 poet	 exclaims,	 “the	
grayer	 she	 do	 get,	 good	 God,	 the	 blacker	 she	 do	 be!”	 (cited	 by	 Kriner,	 2005,	 197).		
Speaking	with	 similar	 poeticism	 about	 a	 woman	 and	 her	 hair,	 Griffin	 writes	 that	 its	
growth	on	the	body	signals	that	“Profusion	is	cherished.		Profusion	is	unravelled.		Each	
moment	acquires	identity”	(1978,	210).		In	both	of	these	examples,	changing	and	aging	
bodies	are	experienced	as	a	woman	becoming	more	in	touch	with	herself;	her	identity	
increasing	as	her	body	changes.	 	Embodied	change	can,	 in	this	way,	be	understood	as	
signifying	a	creative	relationship	with	time	(rather	than	time	charting	its	course	on	the	
passive	female	body),	and	an	increased	sense	of	identity.	 	This	means	that	bodies	and	
their	 changes,	 rather	 than	 signifying	 deterioration	 and	 death,	 can	 instead	 signify	 a	
creative	newness	that	constantly	becomes	more	than	it	once	was	without	what	it	once	
was	being	less	than	it	now	is.	 	This	also	has	implications	for	identity,	as	“who	we	are”	
																																																													
103	This	can	also	encourage	us	to	pursue	practices	that	bring	ourselves	more	in	touch	with	our	
embodiments,	as	both	a	sign	and	a	creation	of	such	an	eschaton.		The	ways	in	which	we	may	do	
this	shall	be	the	focus	of	the	next	chapter. 
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becomes	more	complete,	not	by	leaving	behind	previous	experiences	but	by	embracing	
them	in	an	ever‐expanding	newness	of	bodiliness.104		Bodies	can,	in	this	way,	be	said	to	
be	both	in	touch	with	and	touched	by	their	relationships	with	time	and	space,	and	with	
other	 bodies	 in	 time	 and	 space.	 	 An	 eschaton	 characterised	 by	 an	 open	 embrace	 of	
bodies	 that	 so	 feel	 and	 change	 can	 reclaim	embodied	 change	by	affirming	 it	 as	being	
indicative	 of	 fulfilled	 life.	 	 Bodies	 are	 no	 longer	 in	 dualistic	 relationships	 with	 their	
spiritualised	 “self”,	 then,	 but	 rather	 are	 the	 very	 location	 of	 the	 self’s	 creative	 and	
complex	identity.105			
	
Affirming	 these	 various	 and	 complex	 embodied	 changes	 can	 find	 confirmation	 in	
certain	 readings	 of	 Jesus’	 embodiment.	 	 Bacon	 (2009,	 245),	 for	 example,	 notes	 that	
Jesus’	embodiment	was	far	from	static	or	stable.		She	writes	that:	
Jesus’	 body	 is	 indeed	 a	 site	 of	 contestation:	 It	 is	 a	 male	 body	 but	 also	 a	
transgendered	 body	 (on	 account	 of	 the	 inclusivity	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Christ),	 a	
temporal,	 suffering	 body	 but	 also	 a	 timeless,	 resurrected,	 glorified	 body;	 a	
divine	body	but	also	a	human	body.		His	body	thus	cannot	reflect	a	stable	image	
of	oneness	back	at	itself.	
Challenging	 the	 association	 of	 stasis	 and	 stability	 with	 perfection,	 and	 even	 with	
divinity,	this	praises	the	complexity	of	bodies	and	finds	worth	in	their	uncontrollability	
and	indefinability.		Indeed,	Bacon	claims	that	this	suggests	that	“particularity	itself	[…]	
is	affirmed	by	the	Incarnation”	and	therefore	that	“female	bodies	in	all	their	difference	
and	diversity	might	be	affirmed	on	the	grounds	of	their	own	particularity”	(2009,	234‐
235).	 	Thus	the	divine	embrace	that	was	spoken	of	 in	Chapter	Two	is	wide	enough	to	
provide	space	not	only	for	individuals	to	make	genuine	decisions	and	so	effect	change,	
but	also	for	them	to	hold	on	to	their	particular	identities	and	so	embrace	the	embodied	
changes	 that	 comprise	 these	 identities.	 	The	particular	 elements	of	 embodied	 change	
																																																													
104	 This	 notion	 of	 bodies	 becoming	 more	 than	 they	 presently	 are	 is	 developed	 later	 in	 this	
chapter. 
105	 This	 calls	 us	 back	 to	 claims	 made	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 wherein	 freedom	 was	 understood	 to	
pertain	 to	becoming	 fully	 “who	we	are”	 through	embracing	open	and	vulnerable	 relationality.			
Bodies	are	similarly	valued	as	integral	here,	for	it	is	through	being	in	touch	with	our	bodies	and	
the	bodies	of	others	that	we	become	who	we	truly	are. 
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affirmed	 above,	whilst	 not	 conclusive	 of	 all	 experiences	 of	 embodied	 change,	 can	 be	
affirmed	 in	 their	 particularity	 and	 can	 foster	 a	 sense	 that	 various	 embodied	 changes	
can	be	 celebrated	 and	 valued.	 	 They	 can	 also	 convey	 something	 of	God’s	 actions	 and	
intentions,	as	God	relates	to	such	changing	beings	in	all	of	their	particularity,	and	helps	
us	 to	 a	 future	where	 such	 particularity	 not	 only	 endures	 but	 abounds.	 	 Propelled	 by	
such	 affirmations	 of	 embodied	 changes,	 then,	 I	 propose	 that	 an	 eschatological	 future	
which	 truly	 honours	 and	 embraces	 dynamic	 embodiments	 must	 also	 effect	 the	
contradiction	of	death.	
	
The	Contradiction	of	Death	
Grounding	the	Contradiction	
An	eschatology	which	contradicts	death	can	be	constructed	firstly	by	attending	to	past	
and	 present	 experiences	 of	 oppression,	 suffering,	 and	 death.	 	 In	 taking	 seriously	 the	
sufferings	 of	 those	 who	 have	 gone	 before	 us	 and	 those	 we	 encounter	 now	 we	 can	
specify	 the	 subject	 of	 contradiction	 and	 enact	 the	 contradiction,	 informed	 by	 and	 in	
anticipation	of	the	affirmation.		Such	a	task	is	appreciated	by	Thiel,	who	claims	that	“A	
meaningful	eschatology	[...]	is	one	in	which	knowledge	of	the	future	emerges	from	the	
existential	 circumstances	 of	 the	 believer’s	 life	 now”	 (2006,	 520).	 	 An	 ethic	 of	
attentiveness	 to	 lived	 experiences	 ensures	 that	 any	 constructions	 of	 the	 future	 are	
informed	by	considerations	of	past	and	present	experiences.		Quite	appropriately,	this	
sense	of	attentiveness	has	resonance	with	the	sense	of	being	“really	present”,	to	recall	
the	earlier	point	made	by	Carter	Heyward	(1989,	132).		Being	“really	present”	was	seen	
to	be	a	hallmark	of	relational	presence,	thus	attentiveness	to	lived	experiences	emerges	
as	useful	not	only	 in	the	eschaton	but	also	in	rethinking	the	eschaton.	 	To	summarise,	
our	 recollections	 of	 people’s	 experiences	 of	 situations	 that	 have	 prevented	 or	
compromised	 the	 integrity	of	 embodied	 life	 contradicts	what	will	 be	 in	 the	eschaton,	
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and	 are	 thus	 themselves	 contradicted	 by	 a	 future	 in	 which	 embodied	 life	 is	 fully	
affirmed.			
	
A	 model	 of	 contradiction	 is	 similarly	 alluded	 to	 by	 DeBorst.	 	 Firstly,	 she	 notes	 that	
Isaiah	65.17‐25	lists	various	sufferings	that	“shall	not”	endure	in	the	New	Creation,	but	
are	rather	contradicted	by	God’s	intentions	for	the	future	of	creation.		Framed	in	terms	
of	God	creating	a	New	Jerusalem,	we	read	that	the	inhabitants	of	this	new	creation:	
shall	not	labour	in	vain,		
or	bear	children	for	calamity;		
for	they	shall	be	offspring	blessed	by	the	LORD	–		
and	their	descendants	as	well.			
Before	they	call	I	will	answer,		
while	they	are	yet	speaking	I	will	hear	(23‐24).	
	
Futile	labour	and	calamitous	existence	are	in	this	way	contradicted	by	the	nearness	and	
blessedness	of	God’s	immediate	presence	in	the	eschaton;	earlier	seen	as	typical	of	the	
process	of	realising	the	eschaton	and	here,	again,	affirmed	as	the	particular	nature	of	
eschatological	existence.		DeBorst	goes	on	to	note	that,	more	recently,	the	Argentinian	
Commission	 on	 the	 Disappearance	 of	 Persons	 published	 a	 document	 detailing	 the	
disappearances,	 kidnappings,	 and	 abuses	 that	 occurred	 in	 pre‐democracy	 Argentina.		
The	document	was	appropriately	entitled	Nunca	más	(never	again)	(DeBorst,	2010,	47),	
and	simultaneously	 exposes	and	opposes	 the	oppression	of	 the	Argentinians	by	 their	
previous	 governmental	 regime.	 	 These	 two	 dimensions	 of	 exposition	 and	 opposition	
can	mutually	 constitute	 the	 nature	 of	 contradiction	 and	 converge	 in	 the	 declaration,	
“never	 again”.	 	 Such	 protestations	 are	 similarly	 inferred	 by	McFague,	whereby	 God’s	
love	 of	 creation	 and	God’s	 very	 presence	 in	 creation	 are	 understood	 to	 propel	 God’s	
protest	 against	 death.	 	 Observing	 God’s	 presence	 in	 nature’s	 health	 and	 beauty,	 she	
similarly	 sees	God	being	 present	 in	 deterioriation	 and	destruction,	 albeit	 in	 different	
ways.		In	the	former,	she	detects	God’s	presence	as	a	“positive	affirmation	of	God’s	glory	
through	 the	 flourishing	 of	 creation”,	 yet	 in	 the	 latter,	 she	 perceives	 God’s	 “negative	
protest	 against	whatever	 is	 undermining	God’s	 creation”	 (2001,	 137).	 	 The	 examples	
 
 
~	179	~	
 
provided	here	 indicate	 the	power	of	 this	 twofold	attentiveness	 to	past	experiences;	a	
power	which	both	honours	the	lived	experiences	and	lays	claim	to	a	hopeful	future	for	
them.	
	
McFague’s	observations	help	us	 to	 see	 that	worth	can	and	 indeed	must	be	 located	 in	
fluidity	 and	 changeability;	 however,	 there	 are	 also	 instances	where	 the	 deterioration	
and	death	 that	 are	 contained	 therein	are	 actually	 averse	 to	 the	valuation	of	 creation.		
Indeed,	 it	 is	 simply	not	 the	 case	 that	death	always	 leads	 to	an	appreciation	of	 life,	 as	
Christ	and	Jantzen	were	seen	to	imply	in	Chapter	One.		On	both	personal	and	ecological	
levels,	the	deaths	of	members	of	creation	can,	in	fact,	lead	to	grief	and	despondence	and	
therefore	 to	more	 death.	 	 In	 conjunction	with	 this,	we	 should	 also	 acknowledge	 that	
many	may	never,	 in	their	own	lifetimes,	experience	the	overcoming	of	oppression.	 	In	
instances	 where	 oppression	 has	 not	 been	 overcome	 in	 the	 lifetime	 of	 an	 individual,	
though,	the	power	of	the	divine	protestation	against	death,	coupled	with	the	power	of	
the	future	to	contradict	such	sufferings,	are	intensified.		Indeed,	we	must	take	seriously	
the	fact	that	some	lives,	and	in	many	cases	women’s	lives,	are	characterised	by	suffering	
and	death.	 	 Vento	 (2002,	 19)	makes	 a	 similar	 observation,	 noting	 that	 faith	 in	 a	God	
who	finally	overcomes	suffering:			
holds	 out	 hope	 for	 those	 already	 defeated	 and	 long	 dead	women	who	 never	
experienced	 healing	 in	 their	 own	 lifetimes,	 whose	 stories	 are	 forgotten	 or	
distorted	 by	 official	 histories,	 whose	 victimization	 was	 interpreted	 as	
acceptable,	beneficial,	or	otherwise	justified.	
In	subscribing	to	the	view	that	freedom	is	incomplete	until	all	are	able	to	experience	it,	
as	my	previous	chapter	claimed,	we	simply	cannot	be	content	with	the	attitude	that	this	
life	is	all	there	is.		God’s	ability	to	offer	sympathy	and	help	in	the	present	is	simply	not	
enough.106		We	must,	then,	be	able	to	hope	for	those	whose	bodies	were	never	anything	
																																																													
106	Of	course,	there	are	some	for	whom	their	suffering	in	this	life	quashes	any	desire	for	life	to	
continue	 after	 death;	 such	 experiences	 are	 significant	 for	 this	 thesis,	 and	will	 accordingly	 be	
addressed	later	in	this	chapter.	
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other	 than	 tools	 for	 others	 or	 sites	 of	 suffering.	 	 An	 embodied	 eschatology	 can	 do	
precisely	 this	 by	 claiming	 an	 alternative	 ending	 to	 their	 story	 and	 informing	ways	 to	
embody	this	ending	now,	as	my	next	chapter	will	explore.	
			
Still,	our	constructions	of	 the	 future,	 informed	though	 they	are	by	such	attentiveness,	
must	also	rely	on	a	degree	of	imagination	and	creativity.		This	does	not	quell	the	power	
of	the	past,	though:		we	remember	Baker‐Fletcher’s	observation	that	whilst	we	may	not	
always	know	how	 people	have	overcome	oppression,	 the	very	 fact	 that	 they	have	 (in	
some	cases)	inspires	hope	that	we	can	do	the	same	(1998,	30;	cf.	Moltmann,	1989,	37).		
Yet	 if	 the	 lived	 experiences	we	 recall	 are	 limited	 in	 their	 specificity,	 we	must	 utilise	
additional	 tools	 in	order	 to	aid	our	eschatological	constructions.	 	 I	add	 to	 this	 that	as	
oppression	continues	to	be	experienced	in	the	here	and	now,	as	noted,	we	have	further	
cause	 to	 employ	 imaginative	 tools	 to	 envision	 a	 future	 void	of	 such	oppression.	 	 The	
creative	 imagining	 of	 the	 future	 need	 not	 and	 should	 not	 be	 mere	 utopic	 fantasy.		
Rather,	it	can	be	a	generative	process	that	sprouts	from	our	experiential	knowledge	in	
order	to	grasp	at	novelty.	 	Indeed,	Grace	Jantzen	writes	that	invoking	the	imagination,	
when	we	“have	become	conscious	of	what	has	been	repressed	and	are	actively	looking	
for	new	symbols”,	can	be	“an	indispensible	well‐spring”	(1998,	98).	 	We	have	much	to	
feed	 these	 imaginings,	 as	 was	 seen	 in	 my	 reference	 to	 the	 prophetic	 power	 of	
experiences	of	embodiment.		Still,	before	more	specificity	is	possible,	it	is	necessary	to	
further	justify	my	focus	on	death.			
	
There	 exists	 a	 problematic	 aspect	 to	 the	 suggested	 eschatological	 contradiction	 of	
death:	 it	may	 seem	 that	 such	 a	 focus	 on	death	 is	 disharmonious	with	wider	 feminist	
theological	discussions.	 	This	perspective	 is	understandable	as	 the	Christian	 tradition	
has	 long	 associated	 death	 with	 women.	 	 Firstly,	 Eve	 has	 been	 constructed	 as	 the	
figurehead	 for	 all	 women,	 supposedly	 bestowing	 a	 legacy	 of	 culpability	 for	 sin	 and	
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death.		This	presents	a	dual	narrative	in	which	all	women	are	deemed	both	weakened	
to	 the	 temptations	 of	 sin	 and	 responsible	 for	 the	 result	 of	 sin	 which	 is	 death	 (cf.	
Isherwood,	 2001,	 18‐9).	 	 Interestingly,	 but	 worryingly,	 this	 perspective	 finds	
materialisation	 in	 both	 an	 obsession	 with	 death	 and	 an	 indifference	 towards	 death.		
Grey	 observes	 that	 a	 “preoccupation	 with	 death	 has	 meant	 symbolising	 women	 as	
responsible	for	decay	and	death	(at	the	same	time	as	an	indifference	with	women’s	own	
death)”	(2009a,	352).	 	From	this,	 it	seems	as	though	women	are	deemed	deserving	of	
death	 because	 they	 are	 responsible	 for	 death.	 	 An	 extreme	 perspective,	 perhaps,	 but	
one	 that	 has	 nevertheless	 benefited	 from	 theological	 validation.	 	 Speaking	 of	 an	
eschatology	 that	 overcomes	 death,	 then,	 potentially	 subscribes	 to	 the	 gendered	
vilification	of	mortality	and	justifies	apathy	towards	women’s	experiences	of	suffering	
and	 death.	 	 This	 is	 further	 compounded	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	
identified	as	holding	the	capability	for	both	death	and	life,	and	that	this	assignation	has	
instilled	 fear.	 	Christ	notes	 that	 this	 fear	“is	a	consequence	of	a	rejection	of	 life	 in	 the	
body,	life	that	comes	through	the	body	of	the	mother”	(2003,	207;	cf.	2011b,	129;	Sjoo,	
1992,	12;	Gebara,	2002,	19).	 	Perspectives	and	practices	that	seek	to	overcome	death,	
then,	have	indicated	a	desire	to	overcome	that	which	has	been	unequivocally	associated	
with	 the	 female	 body.	 	 However,	 such	 problems	 do	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	
contradiction	of	death	in	the	eschatological	future	must	be	abandoned;	rather,	it	can	be	
reconfigured.107			
	
The	Many	Deaths	of	Bodies	
Just	as	attitudes	towards	death	are	diverse,	so	too	are	experiences	of	death;	as	DeBorst	
rightly	observes,	“Death	has	many	faces”	(2010,	44;	cf.	Gebara,	2002,	25).		Negotiating	a	
definition	of	death	 is	 thus	helpful	now,	not	only	 to	 clarify	my	ensuing	arguments	but	
also	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 previously	 noted	 feminist	 critique	 of	 the	 tradition’s	
																																																													
107	 In	 light	 of	 the	 perspectives	 noted,	 though,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 death	 does	 not	
perpetuate	patriarchal	constructions	of	a	male	future	existence.		This	will	be	addressed	shortly. 
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presentation	of	death	need	not	quell	our	distaste	for	it.		The	first	of	these	“faces”	we	can	
explore	is	death	as	the	end	to	biological	life.108		If	death	is	wholly	conclusive	(that	is,	if	it	
marks	 the	 final	 and	 full	 cessation	 of	 experiences	 of	 embodied	 life),	 then	 it	 finally	
removes	 all	 possibility	 of	 individuals	 (who,	 as	 I	 have	 claimed,	 are	 inseparable	 from	
their	 embodiments)	 ever	 experiencing	 both	 freedom	 from	 suffering	 and	 freedom	 for	
relationship.109	 	 Mortality	 has	 truly	 triumphed	 over	 materiality:	 accepting	 death	 as	
conclusive	signifies	an	acceptance	of	 the	 final	obliteration	of	materiality	by	mortality.	
Far	 from	 an	 acceptance	 of	 this	 death	 orienting	 us	 to	 an	 appreciation	 of	 life’s	
fleetingness,	as	suggested	by	some	thinkers	noted	earlier,	it	actually	makes	the	present	
the	sole	locus	of	reality.		In	so	doing,	no	alternatives	are	made	available	to	the	suffering	
and	death	we	experience:	our	bodies	cease	to	exist	at	death,	rather	than	experiencing	
enduring	 embodiments	 in	 the	 future.	 	 As	 we	 have	 noted	 that	 experiences	 of	
embodiment	 are	 far	 from	homogenous,	we	 should	also	note	here	 that	 experiences	of	
death	 are	 varied	 and	 may	 even	 be	 conflicting.	 	 As	 Stuart	 observes:	 “one	 cannot	 be	
liberated	from	one’s	own	body	and	if	your	body	is	a	site	of	pain,	a	liberatory	theology	of	
disability	will	not	be	enough”	(2000,	166).		Although	certainly	not	typical	of	all	people’s	
experiences	 of	 disability,	 Stuart’s	 point	 is	 important;	 it	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	 death	
would	 be	 welcome	 for	 those	 experiencing	 pain	 and	 suffering.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 lack	 of	
bodiliness	that	a	complete	cessation	of	existence	would	elicit	may	be	the	most	hopeful	
future	for	those	who	experience	their	bodies	as	painful,	troublesome	sites.		Accordingly,	
the	prospect	of	an	embodied	eschatology	may	be	unappealing	and	even	oppressive.			
	
																																																													
108	 Though	 I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 suggest	 a	 binary	 split	 between	 the	 physical	 and	 emotional,	 and	
indeed	recognise	their	connectedness,	it	is	helpful	to	elaborate	on	these	different	dimensions	of	
death	separately.			
109	My	 emphasis	 on	 experiences	 of	 embodied	 life	 is	 particularly	 pertinent	 here.	 	 Although	we	
remember	that	thinkers	such	as	Ruether	suggest	that	our	bodies	exist	after	death	on	account	of	
their	 capacity	 to	 “contain	 the	 promise	 of	 continuing	 springtime,	 new	 greening	 that	 again	 and	
again	makes	the	overcoming	of	drought	and	death	possible”	(2008,	337),	there	is	no	discussion	
of	how	we	may	experience	 this	 existence.	 	 Similarly,	 there	 is	no	 sense	 in	which	 this	 can	help	
transform	often	painful	and	always	personal	experiences	of	suffering	and	death.	 	Thus,	whilst	
hopeful	 for	 the	 endurance	 of	 materiality,	 perspectives	 such	 as	 Ruether’s	 are	 limited	 in	 their	
ability	to	speak	of	a	hopeful	future	for	experiences	of	embodiment. 
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Yet,	it	is	difficult	to	reconcile	the	God	of	the	previous	chapter,	who	so	loves	and	honours	
creation,	with	one	who	offers	no	alternative	to	such	experiences	of	embodiment.	 	It	is	
possible,	 then,	 to	 claim	 that	 painful	 experiences	 of	 embodiment	 signify	 that	 the	pain	
and	suffering	of	bodies	must	be	contradicted,	and	not	bodies	themselves.		There	are,	of	
course,	questions	to	be	asked	here	concerning	whether	such	a	distinction	can	be	made;	
questions	 that	 I	will	address	 in	 the	 latter	part	of	 this	chapter.	 	For	now,	my	aim	 is	 to	
highlight	that	such	attempts	are	legitimate;	they	do	not	discredit	painful	experiences	of	
embodiment	 but	 they	 do	 hope	 for	 their	 transformation.	 	 Indeed,	 Stuart	 (2000,	 166)	
notes	that	even	when	one’s	body	is	a	site	of	pain,	
this	does	not	rule	out	the	possibilities	of	a	new	form	of	bodiliness	in	which	pain	
and	suffering	is	absent	and	the	processes	of	creation	continue	disrupting	all	our	
perceived	 notions	 of	materiality.	 	 Therefore,	 the	 beliefs	 that	 the	 resurrection	
involves	some	kind	of	bodily	change	and	that	bodies	continue	to	bear	the	scars	
of	 human	 contingency	 are	 not	 necessarily	 incompatible.	 	 Indeed	 they	 are	
mysteriously	connected.	
Nancy	 Eiesland	 calls	 this	 a	 “liberatory	 realism”	 which	 does	 not	 indicate	 a	 “utopian	
vision	of	hope	as	the	erasure	of	all	contingency”	but	rather	signifies	a	recognition	and	
acceptance	of	one’s	bodily	limits	(1994,	103).	 	Stuart	and	Eiesland	thus	illustrate	how	
some	 embodied	 “limits”,	 or	 perhaps	 we	 may	 say	 embodied	 experiences	 and	 effects,	
must	 endure	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future	 if	 identity	 is	 to	be	honoured.	 	An	 embodied	
eschatology	 can,	 then,	 without	 contradiction,	 embrace	 both	 the	 continuity	 and	
discontinuity	 of	 embodied	 existences	 by	 honouring	 the	 experiences	 of	 those	 whose	
bodies	are	a	site	of	pain,	and	offering	the	chance	for	such	troubled	bodies	to	experience	
their	embodiments	in	new	ways.			
	
Still,	similar	to	the	ways	in	which	death	may,	for	some,	signify	liberation	from	the	pains	
of	 embodied	 lives,	 death	 is	 further	 complexified	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 people,	 and	
women	 in	particular,	have	used	death	 to	escape	 from	the	evils	of	 life.	 	Gebara,	 in	her	
book	Out	of	the	Depths,	provides	a	moving	account	of	various	women	whose	lives	have	
been	so	controlled	by	patriarchal	powers	that	death	seemed	for	them	the	only	way	to	
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be	 released	 from	 the	 grip	 of	 patriarchy	 (2002,	 22‐34).	 	 In	 this	 way,	 death	 may	 be	
interpreted	 as	 a	 form	 of	 protest	 against	 the	 patriarchal	 powers	 that	 would	 curtail	
women’s	 expressions	of	power.	 	 Choosing	death,	 in	 this	 context,	may	be	 the	ultimate	
nunca	más	(never	again)	–	a	woman’s	ultimate	statement	that	oppression	and	violence	
will	never	again	be	practised	on	her	body.		However,	in	light	of	God’s	love	for	embodied	
creation	 and	 loyalty	 to	 fulfilled	 relationships	 with	 them,	 we	 can	 challenge	 the	
structures	and	systems	that	cause	and	enable	death	to	have	such	power.		In	situations	
where	 life	has	become	so	unbearable	 that	death	becomes	welcome,	we	can	express	a	
hope	 for	 those	who	 have,	 in	 this	way,	 lost	 hope.	 	 An	 embodied	 eschatology	 can	 thus	
become	the	hopeful	“never	again”	that	contradicts	the	despairing	“never	again”	that	is	
sought	 in	 death.	 	 An	 embodied	 eschatology	 can	 tell	 those	 who	 are	 suffering	 that	
although	death	may	 end	 their	 suffering,	God	desires	 and	 intends	more	 for	 their	 lives	
than	for	it	to	simply	be	free	of	suffering.110		This	can	bolster	and	hearten	protestations	
that	strive	for	life	amidst	the	death‐dealing	powers	being	experienced.			
	
The	 second	 “face”	 of	 death	 is	 the	 emotional	 face.	 	 The	 very	 final	 point	 of	 physical,	
biological	death	is	inevitably	identical	for	each	individual:	in	short,	bodies	cease	to	take	
breath,	cease	to	live.		“Emotional	deaths”,	however,	are	neither	conclusive	nor	uniform:	
they	are	experienced	 in	 a	 cacophony	of	different	ways,	 endure	 throughout	 individual	
lives,	and	do	not	always	culminate	in	physical	death.		For	this	reason	(and	for	reasons	
also	noted	earlier)	any	discussion	of	them	can	only	ever	be	partial.	 	As	Gebara	rightly	
observes,	“Whatever	is	said	will	never	be	able	to	contain	exactly	what	has	been	lived”	
(2002,	 41).	 	 We	 can,	 however,	 note	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 deaths	 are	
experienced.	 	 Constructed	 in	 terms	 of	 “lack”,	 Gebara	 identifies	 some	 Latin	 American	
and	African	women’s	experiences	of	 lack	of	power,	worth,	and	education,	all	of	which	
culminate	 in	 a	 powerlessness	 (2002,	 42),	 or	 a	 death	 of	 power.	 	 An	 alternative	
																																																													
110	 This	 also	 speaks	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 seeking	novelty	 in	 the	 content	 of	 the	 eschatological	
future,	rather	than	simply	negating	what	should	not	be;	this	will	later	be	developed. 
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perspective	is	offered	by	Bringle,	who	speaks	from	a	western	context	and	suggests	that	
death	may	be	experienced	as	the	death	of	identity.		Whereas	this	once	occurred	through	
the	marginalisation	of	women,	she	claims	that	many	women	now	risk	the	assimilation	
of	 their	 femaleness	 into	a	normative	maleness.	 	 She	writes	 that	 “Instead	of	being	 the	
inferior	‘other’	to	man,	we	risk	becoming	his	identical	twin”	(1980,	155)	in	order	to	be	
deemed	 culturally	 acceptable	 or	 successful.111	 	 Not	 only	 has	 patriarchal	 theology	
associated	death	with	women,	and	caused	the	deaths	of	women	in	their	embodied	lives,	
then,	 but	 it	 has	 also	 required	 women	 to	 die	 countless	 emotional	 deaths.112	 	 If	
eschatology	 is	 instead	 built	 on	 the	 understanding	 of	 embodied	 change	 as	 being	
indicative	 of	 empowerment	 and	 identity,	 it	 can	 contradict	 such	 death‐dealing	
experiences	by	proclaiming	their	 impermanence	and	alterity	 to	 the	 intentions	of	God.		
It	can	also	signal	a	radical,	even	subversive,	existence	where	power‐in‐relation	and	the	
fulfilment	of	particular	identities	are	presented	as	tangible	possibilities.			
	
Indeed,	 it	 is	 in	 response	 to	 such	 experiences	 that	 I	 am	 compelled	 to	 express	 a	
dissatisfaction	 with	 death	 and	 with	 all	 of	 the	 other	 deaths	 that	 so	 often	 precede	 it.		
Death	 can	 be	 understood	 to	 be	 the	 ultimate	 preventer	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	
embodied	sufferings,	 the	endurance	of	embodied	relationships,	and	 the	abundance	of	
dynamic	 embodiments.	 	 Attentiveness	 to	 the	 language	 used	 is	 necessary	 here:	 I	
purposefully	choose	to	speak	of	 transformation	rather	than	“healing”	 for	a	number	of	
reasons.		Whilst	much	talk	about	the	eschatological	Kingdom	of	God	(or,	perhaps	more	
accurately,	the	“kin‐dom”	of	God)	and	its	experience	in	the	present	makes	reference	to	
signs	of	wholeness	and	healing	(see	Jantzen,	2009,	161;	Moltmann,	2004a,	6),	there	are	
																																																													
111	We	have	already	seen	how	eschatological	constructions	have	epitomised	this	assimilation	by	
prioritising	a	spiritual	existence	that	seeks	to	do	away	with	women’s	embodied	lives,	hence	my	
desire	to	reconfigure	the	former	and	revalue	the	latter.		 
112	This	 is	not	to	one‐dimensionally	construct	women	only	as	victims;	I	am	aware	that	women	
can	and	do	often	cause	sufferings	and	deaths,	and	that	men	too	experience	such	suffering	and	
death.		My	intention	here,	however,	is	to	indicate	that	women’s	lives	are	more	entrenched	with	
these	on	account	of	the	theoretical	and	symbolic	association	of	women	with	death	and	the	lived	
experiences	of	some	women	who	encounter	death	in	the	ways	noted	here. 
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two	problems	to	be	addressed	here.				Firstly,	the	effects	of	sufferings	upon	people	are	
often	 so	 grave	 and	 vast	 that	 the	 removal	 or	 reversal	 of	 those	 sufferings	 may	 be	
impossible.	 	Conradie	expresses	 this	with	more	clarity,	asserting	 that	 “Some	 forms	of	
injustice	 are	 almost	 irreversible”	 as	 they	 have	 lasting,	 destructive	 effects,	 and	 that	
“Salvation	cannot	undo	the	traumatic	experience	itself”	(2005,	265).		This	does,	though,	
present	 a	 somewhat	 narrow	understanding	 of	 healing.	 	Healing	 is	 not	 and	 cannot	 be	
reliant	on	the	sufferings	being	reversed.		Given	that	I	previously	argued	for	a	God	who	is	
intimately	involved	with	creation,	it	would	be	inconsistent	to	here	suggest	that	God	can	
somehow	manipulate	time	in	order	to	reverse	it.		To	do	so	would	ultimately	be	disloyal	
to	the	experiences	of	a	creation	who	are	incontrovertibly	temporal.		Rather,	speaking	of	
eschatological	 healing	may	 be	 able	 to	 communicate	 the	 embrace	 of	 a	 God	who	 both	
takes	loss	into	Godself	and	transforms	it	into	life.	
	
Granted,	 this	 is	 still	 a	 difficult	 concept:	 given	 the	 intensity	 and	 severity	 of	 some	
sufferings,	 the	 transformation	of	 them	may	be	 an	arduous	process.	 	 In	 recognition	of	
this,	Vento	(2002,	14)	cites	women’s	experiences	of	trauma	and	Post‐Traumatic	Stress	
Disorder.		He	writes	that:			
Women	who	are	victims	of	such	severe	trauma	require	long	periods	of	recovery	
with	explicit	attention	to	regaining	the	sense	of	self	lost	through	violence	and	its	
aftermath.	
For	 Vento,	 the	 language	 of	 healing	 is	 accurate	 as	 it	 communicates	 the	 process	 of	
acknowledging,	 mourning,	 and	 finally	 finding	 restoration	 from	 the	 traumatic	
experience	(2002,	14).	 	 In	 light	of	this,	eschatological	existence	understood	as	healing	
cannot	 simply	 be	 an	 instantaneous	 transference	 from	 suffering	 to	 non‐suffering	
existence.		Again,	the	importance	of	the	process	being	one	that	takes	time	is	highlighted.		
The	 particularities	 of	 individual	 sufferings	 must,	 then,	 be	 attended	 to	 in	 order	 for	
healing	 to	 be	 authentic	 and	 lasting.	 	 Healing	 here	 is	 not	 merely	 the	 cessation	 of	
suffering	 but	 a	 process	 by	 which	 the	 individual	 finally	 experiences	 a	 joyous	 and	
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peaceful	embodied	existence.			This	is	made	possible	by	a	God	who	is	both	with	us,	(and	
therefore	able	to	understand	that	which	we	require	healing	from),	and	for	us	(to	such	a	
degree	that	this	healing	can	be	achieved),	as	argued	in	Chapter	Two.	
	
However,	 there	 remains	 another,	 more	 challenging	 problem	 with	 the	 use	 of	 the	
language	 of	 “healing”.	 	 Just	 as	 with	 agency	 in	 my	 previous	 chapter,	 theologies	 of	
disability	 have	 highlighted	 the	 inadequacy	 and	 potential	 inappropriateness	 of	 the	
language	 of	 healing.	 	 Morris	 notes	 that	 “healing	 narratives”	 such	 as	 Luke	 4.18‐21,	
wherein	 Jesus	 speaks	 of	 being	 sent	 to	 proclaim	 the	 “recovery	 of	 sight	 to	 the	 blind”	
(Luke	4.18),	have	been	interpreted	as	being	indicative	of	the	nature	of	the	Kingdom	of	
God,	as	I	have	here	illustrated.		The	problem	arises	when	such	healing	is	interpreted	in	
terms	 of	 a	 “cure”	 and	 thought	 to	 mean	 “for	 disabled	 people,	 the	 removal	 of	 their	
disability	 and	 subsequent	 normalization”	 (Morris,	 2011,	 128).113	 	 Morris	 bases	 his	
critique	 on	 healing	 being	 constructed	 as	 a	 condition	 for	 inclusion	 in	 God’s	 salvation	
plan.	 	 However,	 I	 have	 already	 argued	 for	 a	 universally	 inclusive	 eschatology	 and	
negotiated	the	retention	of	particularity	within	this	universality.	 	As	such,	the	focus	of	
the	 problem	 for	 this	 thesis	 shifts	 a	 little.	 	What	Morris’s	 contribution	 compels	me	 to	
consider	 is	whether	embodied	 lives	 in	 the	eschatological	 future	require	some	kind	of	
transformation	and	whether	it	can	be	at	all	legitimate	to	construct	this	transformation	
in	terms	of	healing.		Whilst	the	language	of	healing	may,	in	some	cases,	be	appropriate	
and	 accurate,	 this	 latter	 critique	 suggests	 we	 consider	 alternative	 or	 additional	
articulations.	 	 The	 language	 of	 transformation	 can,	 I	 feel,	 convey	 the	 processual	 and	
personal	elements	that	talk	of	healing	may	also	transmit,	whilst	avoiding	associations	
with	cure	and	normalization.		Moreover,	“transformation”	can	speak	more	directly	than	
“healing”	 to	a	dynamic	process	of	change	 that	continually	affirms	embodied	 lives	and	
contradicts	their	deaths.	
																																																													
113	 Attending	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 Jesus’	 resurrected	 body	 further	 helps	 us	 to	 consider	 the	
inappropriateness	of	such	talk,	and	so	will	be	thoroughly	engaged	with	later	in	this	chapter. 
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Features	of	an	Embodied	Eschaton	
Deathless	Change	
A	 true	 appreciation	 of	 embodied	 changes	 cannot,	 however,	 ignore	 Carol	 Christ’s	
observation	 (2011b,	 133)	 that	 change	 is	 concurrent	with	 (though	not	 limited	 to)	 the	
experience	 of	 decay	 and,	 ultimately,	 death.	 	 Change	 and	 fluidity	 have	 often	 found	
articulation	in	such	allusions	to	limitations	and	finitude.		This	rests	on	the	assumption	
that	that	which	changes	ceases	to	be	what	it	once	was,	and	ultimately	ceases	to	change.		
Conradie	 notes	 that	 “the	 problem	 remains	 here	 that	 the	 sting	 of	 finitude	 is	 death”	
(2005,	305).		Whether	this	be	the	death	of	moments,	of	experiences,	of	relationships,	or	
the	ultimate	death	of	bodies,	 change	seems	synonymous	with	 finitude.	 	This	 suggests	
that	if	change	is	to	be	part	of	our	eschatological	existence,	then	death	and	decay	must	
also	 feature.	 	 Questions	 are	 raised	 in	 light	 of	 this	 about	 whether	 God’s	 love	 for	 and	
loyalty	 to	 creation	 can	 ever	 be	 complete:	 if	 death	 endures	 in	 the	 eschaton	 then	 the	
eschaton	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 characterised	 by	 a	 ceaseless	 cessation	 of	 bodies	 and	
relations.	 	 This	 poses	 the	 most	 substantial	 challenge	 to	 an	 eschatology	 that	 is	
embodied:	the	endurance	of	bodies	entails	an	endurance	of	change,	but	an	endurance	of	
change	 potentially	 entails	 a	 lack	 of	 completeness.	 	 In	 short,	 it	 appears	 that	 future	
fullness	of	 life	 cannot	be	wholly	achieved	 if	bodies	 continue	 to	embody	change	 in	 the	
form	of	decay	and	death.			
	
There	 is	 a	marked	need	 to	 focus	here	not	only	on	women’s	bodies	but	also	 the	earth	
body,	 as	 female	 bodies	 and	 the	 earth	 body	 have	 both	 suffered	 a	 similar	 and	
simultaneous	 fate	 under	 patriarchal	 theology.	 	 Both	 have	 been	 vilified	 through	 the	
claim	 that	 they	 alone	 embody	 change	 and	 transience,	 which	 have	 been	 deemed	 to	
culminate	in	or	even	cause	death.		Genesis	8.22,	for	example,	asserts	that	“As	long	as	the	
earth	endures,	seedtime	and	harvest,	cold	and	heat,	summer	and	winter,	day	and	night,	
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shall	not	cease”.		However	it	is	this	very	seasonality	that	proves	problematic	as	what	it	
entails,	 even	 requires,	 is	 a	 cyclical	 process	 of	 loss	 and	 death.	 	 The	 problem	 is	
exacerbated	by	Hall	(2006,	31),	who	notes	that,	ecologically	speaking,	the	lives	of	some	
members	of	creation,	some	aspects	of	the	earth,	actually	depend	on	the	death	of	others.		
He	writes:	
The	 teleological	 end	of	 an	acorn	 is	 to	become	an	oak;	 and	 that	 ‘transcendent’	
purpose	is	also	contained	within	the	structure	and	substance	of	the	acorn.		In	a	
real	sense,	therefore,	disintegration	and	integration,	destruction	and	fulfilment,	
death	and	life	are	present	in	every	organism.		
Although	Hall	is	not	necessarily	envisioning	the	acorn	and	the	oak	tree	as	two	separate	
subjects,	his	proposal	does	lead	one	to	question	whether	the	eschatological	cessation	of	
death	means	that	the	acorn	endures	and	the	oak	tree	can	never	live.		It	seems	that	the	
two	cannot	simultaneously	endure.		This	adds	to	the	problematic	assertion	that	change	
is	 inseparable	 from	death,	and	so	challenges	concepts	of	an	eschatologically	enduring	
changeability.	
	
Yet,	 there	 are	 many	 who	 argue	 that	 change	 is	 unproblematically	 founded	 on	 this	
finitude	 that	 embraces	 and	 enables	 death.	 	 It	 is	 not	 finitude	 that	must	 be	 overcome,	
Jantzen	writes,	but	rather	the	desire	to	overcome	finitude	(1998,	155;	cf.	Suchocki,	1977,	
296).		This	returns	us	to	the	suggestion	that	the	most	appropriate	response	to	death	is	
to	accept	it	as	an	inescapable	and	integral	part	of	life.		Keller	expands	on	this,	claiming	
that	a	“death‐free	creation	[is]	unimaginable	without	reconstituting	 the	very	elements	
of	which	all	life	is	made”	(2003b,	419).		Creation,	it	would	seem,	is	so	accustomed	to	the	
experience	 of	 death	 that	 a	 cessation	 of	 death	 would	 compromise	 the	 very	 heart	 of	
creation’s	 identity.	 	 This	 challenges	 my	 earlier	 allusions	 to	 a	 changing,	 deathless	
eschatology	marking	a	fulfilled	sense	of	identity,	and	suggests	that	life	would	not	be	life	
if	it	were	endless;	if	death	were	not	its	conclusion.		Thus,	again,	if	change	is	to	endure	in	
the	eschatological	future	it	seems	necessary	that	death	must	also.			
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In	 responding	 to	 and	 attempting	 to	 overcome	 this	 problem,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 way	
forward	 cannot	 be	 to	 reject	 the	 association	 of	 women	with	 change	 and	 fluidity,	 and	
claim	that	women	are	static	beings.		Keller	cautions	against	such	attempts,	writing	that	
“A	woman	without	flux	[…]	is	no	mother	of	feminism”	(2003a,	79).		Indeed,	if	we	were	
instead	to	privilege	stability	and	to	name	this	as	a	hallmark	of	all	existences,	we	would	
simply	be	expanding	 the	patriarchal	 appraisal	 of	male‐defined	 traits	 and	denying	 the	
appreciation	 of	 fluidity	 in	 all	 existences.	 	 Rather,	 what	 we	 should	 strive	 to	 do	 is	
reconfigure	the	association	of	bodiliness,	and	women’s	bodies	in	particular,	with	death.		
Christ	further	helps	our	considerations	here	by	asserting	that	“Not	to	be	embodied,	not	
to	change,	 is	not	to	be	alive”	(2003,	45).	 	We	can	re‐affirm,	then,	that	 it	 is	change	and	
not	death	that	characterises	all	 life.	 	Possessing	life	does	not	mean	one	day	dying,	but	
rather	 living	 with	 and	 in	 changing	 and	 fluid	 embodied	 existences.	 	 As	 such,	 we	 can	
legitimately	construct	an	eschatological	future	that	is	void	of	death	without	imagining	a	
future	 void	 of	 change.	 	 Whilst	 difficult,	 this	 is	 not	 impossible:	 Bauckham,	 reading	
Moltmann,	claims	that	he	sees	temporality	and	fluidity	as	being	ambiguous.		He	writes	
that	 creation	 is	 “open	 to	 both	 constructive	 possibilities	 and	 destructive	 possibilities”	
(1999b,	18).		One	of	these	“constructive	possibilities”	can	be	the	quest	for	a	future	that	
presents	 a	 positive	 view	 of	 embodied	 changes	 whilst	 maintaining	 its	 ability	 to	
contradict	death.	 	Baker‐Fletcher	 (2003,	86)	believes	such	a	 task	 is	 legitimate,	 as	 she	
ponders:	
Perhaps	within	the	divine	aim	is	an	end	to	death	but	not	to	cycles	of	perpetual	
perishing	 and	 becoming	 in	 which	 entities	 regenerate	 through	 a	 dynamic	
process	 of	 recreation	 or	 renewal	 as	 subjects	 experience	 the	 increase	 of	God’s	
own	glory	or	satisfaction.	
The	 separation	 of	 perpetual	 perishing	 from	death	 that	 Baker‐Fletcher	 speaks	 of	may	
seem	 somewhat	 untenable,	 given	 the	 contentions	 raised;	 however,	 a	 rethinking	 of	
change	can	elucidate	the	feasibility	of	her	suggestion.	
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The	Transformation	of	Change114	
Transformation	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future	 can	 mean	 that	 bodies	 retain	 their	
particularities	 even	 as	 they	 are	 enabled	 to	 become	 more;	 to	 endure	 eternally.		
Moltmann,	 whilst	 evidently	 interpreting	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 God	 in	 terms	 of	 healing,	 as	
noted,	is	careful	to	retain	a	sense	of	the	endurance	of	physical	joys	and	sorrows,	pains	
and	 pleasures,	 albeit	 in	 a	 transformed	 manner.	 	 Considering	 the	 meaning	 and	
importance	 of	 the	 resurrection	 assists	Moltmann’s	 thinking:	 speaking	 of	 resurrected	
life,	he	claims	that	“‘Resurrection’	always	also	means	transformation”	(2004b,	162)	and	
this	transformation	means	that:		
Even	wounds	 that	have	healed	can	 still	be	 seen	 from	 the	 scars	 they	have	 left,	
though	they	no	longer	hurt.	 	Even	if	 the	tears	of	grief	are	wiped	away	and	the	
grief	has	been	turned	into	joy,	the	eyes	are	still	wet.	
We	 may	 wonder	 whether	 the	 scars	 and	 tears	 can	 possibly	 remain	 without	 them	
hurting,	 and	moreover	whether	we	would	want	 them	 to.	 	 It	 is	 not	 only	 true	 that	 the	
memory	of	suffering	can	itself	be	painful,	but	it	is	also	the	case	that	suffering	can	have	
an	irreversible	impact	on	the	formation	of	identity.	 	Scars	and	wounds	touch	our	very	
bodies	 in	 penetrative	 and	 enduring	ways.	 	 Tina	 Takemoto	 (reading	 Parveen	 Adams)	
notes	that	“although	a	scar	may	be	healed,	it	nevertheless	opens	you	up	continuously	to	
the	 previous	 time	 of	 the	 open	wound,	 a	 continuous	 reopening	 of	 the	wound”	 (2001,	
112).		The	feasibility	of	a	future	void	of	suffering	is	thus	brought	into	dispute:	it	seems	
either	 impossible	 or	 potentially	 undesirable	 for	 the	 contingency	 of	 embodied	 beings.		
However,	 the	 above	 quotation	 from	 Moltmann	 provides	 ample	 scope	 with	 which	 to	
respond	 to	 this.	 	 Looking	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 future,	 we	 can	 claim	 that	 the	
formative	 impact	 of	 suffering(s)	 on	 identities	 is	 not	 obliterated	 by	 the	 endurance	 of	
																																																													
114	 This	 reference	 to	 transformation	 may	 seem	 to	 speak	 more	 to	 considerations	 of	 the	
eschatological	process,	but	the	emphasis	here	is	different.		The	previous	chapter	focussed	on	the	
process	of	coming	to	the	eschaton;	here,	I	speak	of	transformation	in	the	eschaton,	as	a	feature	
of	eschatological	existence.	
	
 
 
~	192	~	
 
bodies	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future.	 	 Individual	 identities	 are	 certainly	 moulded	 and	
shaped	by	their	sufferings	and	this	cannot	be	discounted	in	the	eschaton.			
	
Still,	suffering	is	not	the	only	contributing	factor	to	the	formation	of	identity;	whether	
numerous	 or	 rare,	 we	 are	 also	 formed	 by	 positive	 experiences	 of	 love,	 in	 whatever	
form(s).		That	such	love	typifies	and	is	experienced	fully	in	the	eschatological	future,	as	
my	 previous	 chapter	 claimed,	 means	 that	 we	 will	 then	 be	 able	 to	 remember	 our	
sufferings	 from	 a	 place	 of	 security.	 	 The	 sufferings	 have	 formed	 us,	 partially	 or	
substantially,	but	they	can	no	longer	hurt	us.		Similarly,	the	presence	of	those	who	have	
caused	 the	scars	and	the	tears	can	no	 longer	hurt	us.	 	This	 is	not	 to	make	 light	of	 the	
pain	 but	 rather	 to	 view	 it	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 future	where	 the	 overwhelming	
experience	 will	 be	 one	 of	 relational	 compassion.	 	 In	 cases	 where	 this	 pain	 has	 a	
creaturely	 cause,	 the	 gracious	 embrace	 of	 God	 will	 provide	 ample	 space	 in	
relationships.	 	 This	 means	 that	 the	 realities	 of	 relationships	 are	 honoured:	 pain	 is	
acknowledged	and	 forgiveness	 is	not	enforced.115	 	 Still,	all	are	held	 in	 the	embrace	of	
God	which	feels	compassion	both	for	the	individual	who	has	suffered	and	the	individual	
who	 has	 caused	 that	 suffering.	 	 This	 is,	 understandably,	 a	 difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	
concept	 for	 some;	 however	 I	 maintain	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 such	 a	 future	 that	 all	 may	
individually	experience	the	love	and	freedom	in	relationship	that	is	both	God’s	nature	
and	intention.		Furthermore,	the	loving	embrace	of	God,	as	I	have	consistently	claimed,	
provides	a	space	which	is	wide	enough	for	this	process	to	take	time,	and	a	caress	which	
is	intimate	enough	to	gently	reveal	to	us	that	“we	are	beloved	and	so	is	everyone	else”	
(Vanier,	1999,	159).116		This	will,	of	course,	be	different	for	each	individual	as	embodied	
sufferings	are	experienced	and	interpreted	in	various	ways.		It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	
																																																													
115	This	spacious	relationality	resurfaces	in	Chapter	Four	when	we	come	to	consider	some	ways	
in	which	a	tactile	embrace	of	others	can	be	comprised	of	touching	the	space	between	ourselves	
others.	 	 In	 some	 cases,	 such	 as	 those	 where	 abuse	 is	 present,	 this	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 a	 more	
appropriate	practice	of	tactility. 
116	 Within	 this	 it	 is	 also	 appropriate	 to	 explore	 the	 feasibility	 of	 practising	 forgiveness;	 a	
possibility	which	will	be	explored	most	substantially	in	the	next	chapter. 
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future	 is	 necessarily	 both	 particular	 and	 universal:	 God	 shall	 in	 the	 end	 effect	 the	
transformation	of	all	individuals	as	individuals.			
	
Moreover,	there	must	be	a	correlation	between	the	process	of	transformation	and	that	
which	 we	 are	 transformed	 to,	 as	 earlier	 claimed.	 	 We	 may	 say,	 then,	 that	 an	
eschatological	 change	 occurs	 so	 that	 change	 may	 endure	 eschatologically.	 	 Passages	
such	as	1	Corinthians	15.35‐57,	with	 its	unequivocal	emphasis	on	 the	resurrection	of	
the	 body,	 aid	 my	 thinking	 here.	 	 The	 passage	 specifies	 that	 the	 resurrected	 body	 is	
characterised	by	“imperishability”	and	“immortality”	(15.53).		This	need	not	and	should	
not	be	used	to	refer	to	bodies	being	discarded	and	replaced	by	different,	imperishable,	
immortal	bodies.		Rather,	verse	51	which	proclaims	the	“mystery”	that	“We	will	not	all	
die,	 but	 we	will	 all	 be	 changed”	 can	 be	 read	 as	 asserting	 that	 mortal	 bodies	 will	 be	
changed	 to	 become	 imperishable	 and	 immortal.	 	 Similarly,	 referring	 to	 the	 bodily	
transformation	depicted	in	Ezekiel	11.19,	which	speaks	of	creation	being	given	a	“heart	
of	flesh”,	Moltmann	claims	that	“The	new	creation	doesn’t	abolish	bodiliness.		It	renews	
it	for	eternal	livingness”	(1997,	24‐25).		Bodiliness	is	deemed	to	endure,	then,	albeit	in	a	
transformed	manner.		It	is	important,	however,	to	exercise	caution	in	these	attempts	to	
articulate	 the	 transformed	 nature	 of	 eschatological	 bodies.	 	 Potentially,	 such	
constructions	 could	 come	 too	 close	 to	 the	 patriarchal	 theological	 depiction	 of	 a	
spiritually	 embodied	 existence	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 	 As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	One,	 promoting	
such	an	existence	merely	upholds	the	binary	oppositions	of	the	male	and	the	spirit	over	
and	 above	 the	 female	 and	 the	 material.	 	 Moreover,	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 that	 an	
emphasis	on	 transformed	bodily	existences	undermines	 life	 as	 it	 is	 experienced	now.		
Yet	 if	 we	 attend	 to	 and	 interpret	 bodies	 not	 only	 as	 the	 inescapable	 location	 of	 our	
identities	but	also	as	God’s	 intended	homes	 for	us,	and	 furthermore	as	 the	sites	 from	
which	we	construct	eschatology	and	as	inseparable	from	eschatology,	we	see	that	such	
perspectives	cannot	legitimately	be	upheld.			
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Indeed,	the	affirmation	of	thoroughly	material	bodies	can	and	should	be	achieved	and	
not	 thwarted	 by	 eschatological	 considerations.	 	Moltmann	 claims	 that	 the	 eternal	 life	
we	 are	 to	 experience	 is	 not	 a	 different	 life	 from	 the	 one	 we	 experience	 now,	 but	 is	
rather	a	life	that	makes	this	life	different	(1997,	22).		Material	life	endures	but	is	made	
different,	is	“derestricted”	(Bauckham,	1999b,	16),	so	that	it	may	be	enabled	to	endure.		
Moltmann	 is	 emphatic	 about	 not	 rejecting	 the	 physicality	 of	 lived	 existences,	 as	
elsewhere	he	writes	that	“it	 is	 this	mortal,	 this	 lived,	and	this	 loved	 life	which	will	be	
raised,	 healed,	 reconciled,	 completed,	 and	 thus	 find	 its	 divine	 destiny”	 (2010,	 62).		
Embodied	 life	 is	 not,	 then,	 rejected	 in	 favour	 of	 either	 a	 disembodied	 or	 spiritually	
embodied	 future.	 	 Rather,	 physical	 embodiments	 arrive	 at	 their	 completion,	 are	
experienced	 in	 full,	 and	 are	 eternally	 imperishable	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future.		
Importantly,	 change	 can	 and	 should	 remain	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 this	 eschatological	
physicality,	this	future	embodied	life,	for	bodies	have	not	lost	anything	that	constitutes	
their	bodily	identity.		We	may	even	claim	that	identities	increase	as	bodies	embrace	the	
dynamism	of	enduring	change.	
	
We	can	also	consider	the	possibility	of	this	change	occurring	and	enduring	within	the	
full	and	final	realisation	of	eschatological	embodiment,	as	opposed	to	change	indicating	
the	movement	from	life	to	death.		To	rearticulate	Moltmann’s	perspective,	we	may	say	
that	our	material	existences	are	not	dislocated	from	their	materiality	but	rather	change	
so	 that	 materiality	 can	 become	more	 than	 it	 presently	 is.	 	 The	 initial	 change	 in	 the	
eschaton	 enables	 an	 enduring	 change	 that	 does	 not	 entail	 death	 and	 decay.	 	 Hagner	
(1998,	119)	expresses	a	similar	perspective,	and	writes:	
The	 transformation	 of	 the	 old	 creation	 into	 a	 new	 creation	 will,	 therefore,	
involve	the	redemption	of	our	corruptible	bodies	from	their	bondage	to	decay.			
And	 it	 is	 at	 this	 point	 that	 the	 tangibility	 of	 the	 body	 of	 Jesus,	 whose	
resurrection	is	prototypical,	is	important.	
 
 
~	195	~	
 
We	see	allusions	here	as	to	how	the	resurrection	narrative	can	aid	our	thinking	about	
eschatological	bodies.		Jesus’	resurrected	existence	is	thoroughly	material,	and	affected	
by	the	material,	but	this	materiality	differs	from	its	pre‐resurrection	state.		Rather	than	
denying,	 rejecting,	 or	 forgetting	 his	 pain,	 Jesus’	 scarred	 skin	 signifies	 both	 a	
remembrance	of	pain	and	a	 re‐membering	of	his	body.	 	 Indeed,	Mount‐Shoop	argues	
that	this	is	precisely	the	message	of	the	Incarnation:	a	faith	which	feels	and	re‐members	
bodies	(2010,	48).	 	Resurrected	bodies,	then,	are	these	present	bodies	made	different,	
as	Moltmann	was	seen	to	argue.		Moltmann’s	claim	concerning	the	endurance	of	scars	
and	 tears	 is	 here	 affirmed,	 but	 again	 the	 feasibility	 of	 their	 endurance	 must	 be	
explained.		Jesus’	resurrected	body	can	be	viewed	as	one	which	honours	life	lived	in	a	
body	 whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time	 exposing	 the	 pain	 experienced	 in	 that	 body	 as	 being	
impermanent.		Jesus	does	not	mask	his	marks,	but	reveals	them	in	order	to	show	their	
impotence	in	the	face	of	resurrected	life.		The	pain	that	was	experienced	is	not	denied,	
but	it	is	no	longer	experienced	as	pain.		Thus,	we	may	say	that	whilst	we	will	remember	
the	pain	in	the	eschaton,	we	will	not	remember	in	pain.	
	
Our	 bodies	 continue	 to	 change,	 then,	 because	 our	 resurrections	 effect	 a	 new	 kind	 of	
change:	one	that	does	not	culminate	in	death.		We	remember	that	bodies	were	said	to	
change	so	 that	embodied	change	may	endure.	 	Endurance	of	our	bodies	 is	 integral	 to	
the	contingency	of	the	eschaton,	but	we	can	only	endure	as	we	are	if	a	change	occurs;	a	
change	 that	 both	 honours	 our	 bodies	 particularities	 and	 identities	 and	 their	 creative	
capacity	 to	 survive	 and	 endure,	 and	 also	 enables	 them	 to	 become	 more	 than	 they	
presently	are.		As	Stuart	writes,	“perfect	humanity	seems	to	include	an	embracing	of	the	
contingency	of	human	 life	and	an	 ‘unself‐pitying,	painstaking	 survival’”	 (Stuart,	2000,	
172,	citing	Eiesland,	1994,	104).		Again,	this	does	not	infer	a	different	life,	but	rather	a	
life	 made	 more	 than	 it	 presently	 is.	 	 Jantzen’s	 exploration	 of	 transcendence	 and	
immanence	 is	 again	 beneficial,	 and	 she	 expresses	 a	 similar	 perspective	 wherein	 she	
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affirms	 bodies	 whilst	 also	 conveying	 the	 need	 for	 a	 transcendent	 horizon.	 	 Jantzen	
argues	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 speak	 of	 transcending	 our	 bodies,	 as	 “more	 things	 can	
rightly	 be	 said	 of	 [a	 person]	 than	 are	 reducible	 to	 statements	 about	 her	 physical	
composition”	 (1998,	 271).	 	 Thus	 transcendence,	 for	 Jantzen,	 acknowledges	 the	
complexity	and	depth	of	being.			
	
In	 addition	 to	 this,	 Jantzen	 refers	 to	 transcendence	 in	 order	 to	 articulate	 her	
understanding	 of	 becoming:	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 self	 is	 extended	 through	
embodied	 transcendence.	 	To	explain,	 Jantzen’s	 construction	of	a	 transcendent	 future	
horizon	 differentiates	 this	 future	 from	 the	 present.	 	 She	 claims	 that	 individuals	 have	
within	them	a	capacity	for	transcendence	which	does	not	mean	becoming	disembodied	
but	rather	means	becoming	“embodied	in	loving,	thoughtful,	and	creative	ways”	(1998,	
271).	 	 	This	 is	not	to	say	that,	 for	Jantzen,	transcendence	expresses	a	distant	goal,	but	
rather	one	that	can	only	be	sought	within	immanence,	that	is	embodiment,	as	“physical	
complexity”	 enables	 the	 achievement	 of	 intelligence	 or	 creativity	 (1998,	 271).	 	 For	
Jantzen,	then,	the	future	is	neither	disembodied	nor	distant,	and	personhood	does	not	
seek	 an	 eschatological	 end‐goal.	 	 Rather,	 her	 understanding	 of	 the	 transcendent	
horizon	 asserts	 that	personhood	 is	 to	be	 sought	 in	 the	 constant	process	of	becoming	
transcendentally	 embodied.	 	 Whilst	 Jantzen	 may	 reject	 any	 future‐eschatological	
dimension	 to	 this,	 we	 may	 use	 her	 explorations	 to	 affirm	 bodiliness	 whilst	
simultaneously	claiming	that	we	can,	in	the	eschatological	future,	experience	existences	
where	 the	 intermingling	 of	 transcendence	 and	 immanence	 allows	 for	 ever‐mutating,	
never‐depleting	experiences	of	embodiment.	
	
Embodied	experiences	of	change	do	not	require	death,	then,	but	may	instead	be	typified	
by	the	transformation	of	death	to	life.		Referring	back	to	the	acorn	and	oak	tree	scenario,	
the	acorn	in	this	understanding	finds	its	existence	fulfilled	in	becoming	an	oak	tree;	this	
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is	 “creation	 brought	 to	 its	 fullest,	 most	 abundant	 potential	 in	 God’s	 future”	 (Hessel‐
Robinson,	 2010,	 19).	 	 Change	 can	 thus	 continue	 to	 be	 present	 in	 our	 future	
eschatological	bodies,	as	we	are	enabled	 to	change	within	 our	bodies	 rather	 than	our	
bodies	changing	from	life	to	death.		The	earth	body,	like	our	bodies,	is	transformed	so	
that	 life	 no	 longer	 necessitates	 death	 but	 is	 rather	 characterised	 by	 change.		
Seasonality,	then,	remains	in	the	eschatological	future,	but	without	the	tragedy	of	loss	
and	decay.	 	 Certainly,	 this	 requires	 a	 vivid	 imagination	 to	 consider	 how	 summer	 can	
change	 into	 autumn	without	 leaves	 falling,	 flowers	 withering,	 and	 fruit	 rotting.	 	 But	
again	 we	 recall	 the	 notion	 of	 transformation;	 all	 shall	 be	 held	 together	 in	 a	 web	 of	
embodied	relations	that	does	not	allow	space	for	erosion	or	sorrow	but	rather	weaves	
each	change	together	into	embodiments	that	abound	with	dynamism.	
	
The	Transformation	of	Death	
Just	as	change	 is	 transformed	in	the	eschaton	in	order	that	 it	no	 longer	culminates	 in	
death,	 so	 too	 can	 we	 claim	 that	 death	 will	 be	 transformed	 (and,	 in	 this	 way,	
contradicted).	 	 The	 resurrection	 narrative,	 alongside	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	
their	bodies	as	birthing	bodies,	again	emerges	as	being	particularly	helpful	in	thinking	
about	 this	 transformation.	 	Both	make	manifest	 the	ability	 to	be	generative;	 to	create	
something	new.	 	Williams,	 for	 instance,	 claims	 that	 “Jesus	 conquered	 sin	 through	 his	
living,	not	through	his	dying”	(as	cited	by	Crawford,	2002,	96).		Whilst	Williams	retains	
the	 notion	 of	 conquest,	 she	 reframes	 it	 in	 order	 to	 emphasise	 the	 power	 of	 life.117		
Williams’s	 goal	 here	 is	 to	 emphasise	 the	 divine	 prioritisation	 of	 life	 over	 death.		
Rosemary	A.	Carbine	(2006,	95)	develops	this	by	refusing	to	see	the	cross	as	the	unique	
and	defining	aspect	of	Jesus’	life.		Instead,	she	writes:	
From	 an	 eschatological	 perspective,	 the	 cross	 is	 critically	 reclaimed	 as	 one	
among	multiple	aspects	of	Jesus’	life	that	signify	his	full	humanity	as	well	as	his	
multidimensional	struggle	for	human	flourishing.	
																																																													
117	 Whether	 this	 truly	 overcomes	 the	 problems	 with	 the	 language	 of	 conquest	 is	 certainly	
debatable,	but	Williams	is	nevertheless	helpful	in	providing	an	alternative	perspective	on	this. 
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For	 Carbine	 then,	 the	 cross	 is	 interpreted	 as	 being	 indicative	 of	 Jesus’	 human	
experience	 of	 suffering,	 which	 forms	 one	 part	 of	 his	 entire	 life’s	 struggle	 against	
oppression.		Monica	A.	Coleman	adds	to	this	that	such	a	belief	can	serve	as	a	source	of	
empowerment.		She	writes	that	“Just	as	Jesus	overcame	his	persecution	and	suffering	in	
the	 resurrection	 from	 death,	 black	 women	 will	 also	 overcome	 their	 situations	 of	
oppression”	(2008,	15).		This	suggests	that	it	is,	in	fact,	out	of	death	and	not	away	from	
it	 that	 life	 is	 brought	 to	 its	 fullest	 experience.118	 	 Jesus’	 resurrection,	 in	 addition	 to	
elucidating	the	endurance	or	contingency	of	embodied	 life,	can	also	be	 interpreted	as	
being	 indicative	of	a	new,	eschatological	 life	 that	transforms	death	 into	an	even	more	
abundant	experience	of	embodied	life.119	
	
Resurrection	as	a	model	for	new	life	can	thus	be	central	to	imagining	an	eschatological	
future	where	death	does	not	obtain	but	is,	rather,	transformed	into	new	life.		However,	
given	a	perceived	necessity	to	attend	to	some	ways	in	which	women	experience	their	
bodies,	 more	 discussion	 is	 necessary.	 	 Again,	 the	 resurrection	 narrative	 of	 Jesus	
provides	 further	 fuel	 for	 our	 discussion	 here,	 as	 it	 makes	 women	 central	 to	 the	
experience	of	new	life.	 	Hagner	notes	that	it	is	to	women	that	Jesus	communicates	the	
first	message	of	his	resurrected	life	(1998,	109).		Here,	it	is	as	though	the	tomb	of	Jesus	
has	 been	 transformed	 into	 a	 womb	 from	 which	 Jesus	 is	 birthed	 into	 new	 life.	 	 The	
message	of	new	life	is	then	transferred	from	the	stone	womb	to	the	fleshy	womb,	as	the	
two	Marys	 are	 called	 to	birth	 the	 resurrection	 story	 to	 others	 (see	Matthew	28.7‐10,	
Mark	16.7‐8,	and	Luke	24.9).		This	is	a	story	of	new	life	that	is	birthed	to	others	by	these	
women,	which	indicates	that	the	birthing	metaphor	has	more	than	just	literal	meaning.		
																																																													
118	This	 is	an	extremely	 important	consideration	 for	those	whose	existences	are	characterised	
by	suffering,	and	it	also	suggests	that	a	rethinking	of	death	and	the	resurrection	is	possible,	as	
this	chapter	has	argued. 
119	There	are	other	problems	with	 referring	 to	 Jesus	here,	 as	his	 resurrected	body	seemed,	 in	
some	 ways,	 to	 be	 disembodied,	 noticeable	 in	 his	 apparent	 ability	 to	 transgress	 material	
boundaries.	 	 This	 need	 not,	 however,	 refer	 to	 a	 formless	 or	 fleshless	 body,	 but	 rather	 can	
confirm	that	in	the	eschaton	our	bodies	will	change	in	new	and	surprising	ways. 
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Still,	the	resurrection	story	can	depict	an	eschatological	life	that	does	not	vilify	or	usurp	
the	 birthing	 experiences	 of	 some	women.	 	 Instead,	 it	 centralises	 them.	 	 Even	 greater	
affirmation	is	provided	when	we	take	account	of	the	fact	that	Jesus	relies	on	the	voices	
of	women	to	communicate	his	resurrection.		This	was	a	radical	move,	particularly	when	
read	 from	our	 context	where	 it	 is	only	 relatively	 recently	 that	women	have	begun	 to	
have	their	voices	heard	(cf.	Keller,	2008,	907).			Jesus’	resurrection,	then,	emphasises	an	
overwhelming	 life:	 one	 that	 transforms	 both	 biological	 death	 and	 all	 the	 symbolism	
held	 therein,	 and	 also	 the	 institutional	 deaths	 caused	 by	 the	 silencing	 of	 women.120		
This	 again	 signals	 the	 possibility	 of	 eschatology	 displaying	 attentiveness	 to	 lived	
experiences	as	it	transforms	death	in	all	of	its	multiform	complexity.	
	
This	assertion	directs	us	back	to	considerations	of	the	nature	of	God.	 	Death	prevents	
creation’s	full,	final,	and	enduring	experience	of	relationships	with	God,	hence	the	need	
for	 a	 future	 that	 transforms	mortality	 for	 the	 sake	of	 relationality.	 	Moltmann	 (1981,	
92),	 though	 evidently	 cautious	 about	 overly‐constructive	 approaches	 to	 eschatology,	
nevertheless	 speaks	 confidently	 and	 positively	 about	 God’s	 negation	 of	 death.	 	 He	
claims	that	because	God	is:	
‘Lord	of	both	the	dead	and	of	 the	 living’	(Rom.	14.9)	he	[sic.]	cannot	rest	until	
death	too	has	been	destroyed.		But	if	death	is	no	more,	then	Christ	with	his	life‐
giving	Spirit	has	made	all	the	dead	live.	
																																																													
120	 There	 are,	 to	 be	 sure,	 issues	 here:	 Rambo	 notes	 that	 examples	 of	 women	 speaking	 and	
writing	theology	do	not	inherently	or	automatically	mean	that	women	were	liberated	in	doing	
so.		“What	they	speak”,	she	argues,	“cannot	be	overshadowed	by	the	fact	that	they	speak”	(2011,	
40),	with	women’s	speech	often	indicating	“not	the	power	to	speak	her	own	truth	but	the	power	
to	 speak	 the	 Truth,	 something	 that	 comes	 from	 outside	 of	 her”	 (2011,	 46).	 	 In	 the	 instance	
referred	to	here,	it	is	the	male	Jesus	who	is	both	the	enabler	and	the	subject	of	the	message	that	
the	women	bear.		Furthermore,	in	Mark	and	Luke’s	accounts	the	women’s	message	was	received	
with	incredulity	as	opposed	to	open	acceptance	(see	Mark	16.11	and	Luke	24.11).	 	Indeed,	we	
read	in	Luke	that	“these	words	seemed	to	them	an	idle	tale”	(24.11).	 	Thus	there	are	certainly	
problematic	 gender	 dynamics	 present	 here.	 	 However,	 Rambo	 invites	 us	 to	 consider	 an	
alternative	 perspective:	 she	 argues	 that	 women	 can	 “inhabit	 traditional	 theological	 houses	
without	being	imprisoned	by	them”	(2011,	52).		The	message	I	am	concerned	with	here	is	that	of	
a	 future	 which	 finds	 articulate	 expression	 in	 qualities	 assigned	 to	 and	 some	 experiences	 of	
women’s	bodies.	 	This	suggests	that	whilst	being	conveyed	within	 the	confines	of	a	masculine	
culture	and	context,	the	women	as	message‐bearers	and	the	message	that	they	bear	is	liberating.	 
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We	 can	 see	 here	 that	 God’s	 commitment	 to	 life	 is	 understood	 as	 necessitating	 the	
transformation	of	death	in	order	that	all	are	able	to	lastingly	experience	life.		God’s	life	
is	thus	drawn	to	completion	as	creation	is	enabled	to	experience	their	embodied	lives	
in	 fullness	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Again,	 this	 is	 a	 collaborative	 process:	 eschatologically	
embodied	 lives	are	actuated	 in	divine‐creaturely	partnership.	 	Here,	we	can	appeal	 to	
the	 story	 of	 the	 Valley	 of	 Dry	 Bones	 in	 Ezekiel	 37.1‐14	 to	 further	 comprehend	 this	
partnership.		In	this	instance,	God	does	not	create	life	from	an	abyss	and	without	help,	
but	 rather	 from	 the	 very	materiality	 of	 creation	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 Ezekiel,	 who	
prophesies	to	the	bones.	 	McFague	has	observed	these	dynamics,	and	writes	that	“The	
power	 of	 life	 can	 override	 the	 reality	 of	 death	 with	 the	 help	 of	 God’s	 partners”,	 as	
Ezekiel	mediates	the	word	of	God	and	the	wind	gives	life	to	the	dry	bones	(2001,	171).		
The	contradiction	of	death	is	not,	then,	an	action	of	God	alone,	wholly	removed	from	the	
actions	 and	 intentions	 of	 creation.	 	 Rather,	 God’s	 contradiction	 of	 death	 calls	 for	 the	
cooperation	 of	 creation	 in	 making	 the	 affirmation,	 and	 indeed	 the	 creation,	 of	
eschatological	life	a	reality.121		God’s	own	life	requires	the	lives	of	all	of	creation,	then,	
but	this	cannot	be	reduced	down	to	necessity	alone.		Life	is	not	only	required	but	is	also	
desired	by	God.	 	We	detect	 this	 in	passages	such	as	Isaiah	25.8	which	speaks	of	God’s	
intention	 to	 “swallow	 up	 death	 for	 ever”.	 	 Death	 is	 thus	 transformed	 by	 creation’s	
cooperation	with	God	and	by	God’s	desire	to	embrace	the	bodies	of	creation	and	caress	
them	into	experiences	of	fully	embodied	lives;	that	is,	lives	which	are	dynamic	and	void	
of	death.			
	
Moreover,	 we	 can	 frame	 this	 resurrection,	 this	 eschatological	 transformation	 from	
death	to	life,	in	terms	of	natality.		I	again	utilise,	or	“futurise”,	Grace	Jantzen’s	symbolic	
																																																													
121	Synthesis	emerges	here	with	my	previous	chapter’s	claims	concerning	the	call	for	creation	to	
help	create	the	eschaton.		We	remember	that	this	was	not	deemed	to	be	indicative	of	worth	or	
status.		Instead,	it	was	seen	to	reveal	both	the	relationality	of	God	as	God	is	touched	by	creation,	
and	 also	 how	 creation	 can	 create	 this	 by	 helping	 others	 and	 oneself	 to	 experience	 relational	
freedom. 
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of	natality	here.		Jantzen	argues	that	natality	is	no	more	to	be	associated	with	birth	than	
mortality	is	with	death:	it	may	be	a	corollary	of	it	but	is	not	exhaustibly	defined	by	it.		
Indeed,	Graham	writes	that	Jantzen	insisted	that	her	use	of	natality	“is	a	long	way	from	
any	 kind	 of	 celebration	 of	 ‘Mother	 God’	 or	 goddess,	 or	 of	 the	 maternal	 as	
unimpeachable”	 (2009a,	 17).	 	 Rather,	 Jantzen	 writes,	 natality	 communicates	 “the	
potential	for	newness	and	for	hope,	the	creative	possibilities	of	beginning	again	that	are	
introduced	into	the	world	by	the	fact	that	we	are	all	natals”	(2009,	8;	cf.	1998,	144).122		
This	 is	 unequivocally	 embodied,	 as	 “natality	 cannot	 be	 thought	 of	without	 body	 and	
gender”	(Jantzen,	2009,	48;	cf.	1998,	136),	and	it	 is	unequivocally	universal	as	we	are	
indeed	all	birthed	into	newness	through	the	material	process	of	being	birthed.		Still,	in	
spite	of	Jantzen	not	presenting	a	“paean	to	actual	motherhood,	nor	a	simplistic	appeal	
to	 maternal	 values”,	 she	 does	 offer	 a	 “recognition	 of	 women	 as	 vital	 and	 necessary	
participants	 in	 the	ultimate	creative	act	of	new	 life	–	birth”	 (Joy,	2009,	33).	 	This	 can	
lead	 us	 into	 considering	 ways	 in	 which	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	 the	 birthing	
process	can	be	used	to	rethink	the	content	of	the	eschaton.		Bonnie	J.	Miller‐McLemore	
(1994,	138;	cf.	142),	for	example,	draws	on	her	own	experiences	of	mothering	in	order	
to	 create	 a	 theology	 of	 motherhood	 that	 reclaims	 its	 interpretive	 and	 experiential	
significance.	 	 Acknowledging	 the	 suppression	 and	 marginalisation	 of	 this,	 she	
nevertheless	asserts	that:		
Women’s	reproductive	labor	does	have	redemptive,	life‐giving	dimensions	of	a	
certain	kind.	 	Mother‐love	may	be	among	the	greatest	sources	of	spiritual	and	
moral	insight.	
This	 insight,	she	claims,	exemplifies	a	certain	 type	of	 familial	 relationality	 that	was	at	
the	heart	of	Jesus’	message	(1994,	138‐139).	 	As	my	previous	chapter	emphasised	the	
importance	 of	 relationality,	 I	 certainly	 endorse	 this	 interpretation	 of	 the	 theological	
value	of	motherhood.		It	can,	indeed,	speak	to	us	of	a	future	where	all	bodies	are	held	in	
the	 relational	 embrace	 of	 a	mothering	 God,	which	 is	wide	 enough	 for	 each	 to	 retain	
																																																													
122	This	reference	to	“newness”	will	be	explored	in	more	depth	later	on	in	this	chapter. 
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their	 particularity	 and	 to	 experience	 enduring	 change.	 	 And	 yet,	 the	 motif	 of	
motherhood	is	not	unproblematic.			
	
Firstly,	 we	 should	 note	 that	 some	 women	 feel	 a	 lack	 of	 enjoyment	 in	 experiencing	
motherhood.		Indeed,	Isaiah	49.15	questions:	“Can	a	woman	forget	her	nursing	child,	or	
show	no	compassion	for	the	child	of	her	womb?	Even	these	may	forget,	yet	 I	will	not	
forget	you”.		This	recognises	the	cacophony	of	experiences	of	birthing,	and	that	birth	is	
neither	 joyous	 for	 nor	 does	 it	 elicit	 compassion	 in	 all	 women.123	 	 However,	 what	 is	
depicted	here	is	a	God	who	both	acknowledges	and	transcends	these	experiences.		God	
is	the	Mother	who	cannot	abandon	any	of	her	children	but	rather	embraces	each	one	of	
them,	drawing	them	into	the	experience	of	the	fullness	of	life	which	has	both	its	origin	
and	purpose	in	God.	 	This	not	only	gives	hope	for	children	whose	experience	of	being	
mothered	 is	 fraught	with	 difficulty,	 but	 it	 also	 provides	 hope	 for	mothers	who	 have	
struggled	 to	mother.124	 	 Again,	 the	 contradiction	 of	 embodied	 pain	 is	 enabled	 by	 an	
affirmation	of	God’s	 love	for	and	loyalty	to	embodied	experiences	and	God’s	ability	to	
transcend	these	experiences.		Even	in	less	extreme	cases,	it	provides	hope	for	mothers	
who	 have	 experienced	 feelings	 of	 failure	 in	 their	 mothering	 practices.	 	 In	 this	
construction,	all	 are	embraced	 in	 the	sufficiency	and	empathy	with	and	 in	which	God	
gives	and	embraces	life.	
	
A	more	 sensitive	matter	 to	 negotiate	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 some	women	who	 desire	 to	 be	
mothers	do	not	even	have	this	opportunity	to	succeed	in	or	struggle	with	mothering.		I	
have	 been	 compelled	 to	 think	 in	 this	 direction	 by	 L	 .Serene	 Jones’s	 article	 “Hope	
																																																													
123	Cullinan	also	makes	this	observation	with	reference	to	some	women’s	experiences	of	fistula,	
noting	the	politicised	and	sexualised	discrediting	of	such	suffering	(2008,	96‐97).	 	This	further	
substantiates	the	need	to	simultaneously	attend	to	the	complexities	and	difficulties	of	women’s	
experiences	of	their	bodies,	and	particularly	some	women’s	experiences	of	birthing,	and	also	to	
conceive	of	a	God	who	both	empathises	with	and	ultimately	transforms	suffering. 
124	We	remember	that	this	is	not	a	presentation	of	God	as	a	supernatural	and	inaccessible	model	
of	motherhood	but	rather	a	reformulation	of	God	as	mother	who	shares	in	our	pains	and	draws	
us	all	to	the	embracing	body	of	God. 
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Deferred”,	 in	which	 she	 retells	 and	 reflects	 on	 her	 friend’s	 experience	 of	 suffering	 a	
miscarriage.	 	 Here,	 we	 see	 the	 reverse	 of	 the	 resurrection	 story:	 whereas	 the	 tomb	
there	became	a	womb,	 Jones’s	 friend’s	womb	becomes	a	 tomb.	 	Her	 friend,	Wendy,	 is	
forced	 to	 confront	 her	 realisation	 that	 “My	womb	 is	 a	 death	 bed,	my	 body	 a	 grave”	
(2001,	 235).	 	 Jones’s	 reflections	 on	 this	 provide	 a	 window	 of	 hope	 for	 the	 tragic	
experience,	and	enable	us	 to	 think	of	a	new	model	 for	eschatology	that	embraces	not	
only	women	who	experience	their	bodies	giving	birth,	but	also	women	who	experience	
their	bodies	as	unable	to	birth;	of	having	their	ability	to	birth	taken	away	from	them.		
Referring	to	the	crucifixion,	Jones	claims	that	Jesus’	death	occurred	in	the	very	depths	
of	God,	even	in	God’s	womb,	and	as	such	indicated	God’s	ability	to	take	death	into	God’s	
very	 being	 (2001,	 242).	 	 The	 experience	 of	 death	 within	 life	 that	 occurs	 when	 a	
woman’s	body	miscarries	can,	in	this	way,	be	understood	as	mirroring	God’s	experience	
of	 loss	on	the	cross.	 	This	 is	not	to	romanticise	or	divinise	the	woman’s	suffering,	nor	
should	it	subsume	women’s	experiences	or	make	them	pale	 in	comparison.	 	Rather,	 it	
indicates	 “God’s	 solidarity	 with	 them”	 (Jones,	 2001,	 242);	 God’s	 empathy	 with	 the	
embodied	 encountering	 of	 loss	 and	 sorrow	 that	 typify	many	women’s	 experiences	of	
miscarriage.	
	
And	yet,	as	I	have	consistently	argued,	God’s	engagement	with	creation	is	not	exhausted	
at	 the	 point	 of	 empathy:	 God	 expresses	 both	 power‐with	 creation	 and	 power‐for	
creation.	 	 What	 this	 means	 in	 this	 context	 is	 that	 God	 is	 able	 to	 empathise	 with	
experiences	of	 simultaneously	embodying	 life	and	death,	whilst	 remaining	more	 than	
these	experiences.	 	God	 is	able	 to	embrace	and	transform	these	deaths	by	enveloping	
them	 in	God’s	 life	 and	 therein	 caressing	 them	 into	new	 lives	 of	 their	 own.	 	Referring	
back	 to	 Jones	 (2001,	 243),	 I	 understand	 her	 reflections	 as	 holding	 together	 God’s	
empathy‐with	 her	 friend	 with	 God’s	 transcendence	 of	 the	 suffering	 that	 has	
necessitated	that	empathy.		She	imagines	her	friend:	
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finding	great	solace	in	her	solidarity	with	this	God	who	has	born	such	loss,	her	
sense	 of	 utter	 aloneness	melting	 away.	 	 I	 also	 imagine	Wendy	 looking	 at	God	
and	being	even	more	amazed	and	comforted	by	the	differences	between	herself	
and	this	God	that	holds	her.	
Rothwell	notes	a	similar	experience	being	expressed	by	a	woman	named	Eileen	when	
discussing	 the	 early	 death	 of	 her	 daughter.	 	 Eileen	 relays	 how	 her	 daughter,	 “newly	
born	and	baptized”,	was	rushed	 to	hospital	without	Eileen	ever	seeing	her.	 	Rothwell	
observes	 that	 it	 seemed,	 for	 Eileen,	 that	 this	 religious	 rite	 of	 passage	 denied	 her	 the	
chance	 to	 “love	 and	 comfort	 her	 baby”.	 	 Still,	 Rothwell	 goes	 on	 to	write	 that	 “in	 the	
midst	 of	 her	 pain	 and	 silenced	 by	 Church	 and	 society”,	 Eileen	 still	 prayed	 and	
encountered	 God	 as	 “an	 almighty,	 all‐loving,	 non‐judgemental,	 merciful	 God”	 (2013,	
135).		In	such	experiences,	as	with	those	noted	by	Jones,	we	can	say	that	the	embrace	of	
God	takes	loss	and	death	into	Godself	in	such	a	way	that	God	is	deeply	touched	by	the	
experience,	and	also	able	to	sustain	us	in	those	experiences	and	ultimately	to	transform	
them	into	new	experiences	of	life.			
	
Jennifer	Hurd	 further	helps	us	 to	 see	 the	 impact	of	 such	notions	and	 their	 resonance	
with	maternal	imagery.		Relaying	the	response	of	one	of	her	interviewees,	named	“S”	in	
her	study,	Hurd	notes	that	“For	S,	as	for	others,	the	divine	was	found	to	be	present	in	
the	 tomb‐like	 abyss,	 which	 in	 turn	 became	 a	 womb‐like	 place	 of	 natal	 flourishing”	
(2013,	203).		Again,	then,	God’s	presence	is	such	that	God	experiences	our	sorrow,	pain,	
loss	 and	 death	with	 us	 but	 also	 helps	 those	 experiences	 to	 be	 transformed	 into	 new	
experiences	of	flourishing	life.		Indeed,	Moltmann	makes	note	of	both	Jesus’	experience	
of	the	loss	of	God’s	presence,	and	God’s	experience	of	the	loss	of	Jesus	in	the	crucifixion	
(1981,	 81),	 seemingly	 highlighting	 that	 the	 fleetingness	 of	 temporal	 existence	 can	
legitimately	be	said	to	be	part	of	God’s	experience	of	creation.		And	yet,	in	the	midst	of	
the	authentic	experience	of	such	fleetingness,	God	must	simultaneously	transcend	such	
transience	 lest	 creation	be	 resigned	 to	accepting	 the	 “irrevocable	 loss	of	 the	past	but	
also	the	ambiguities	of	the	present	and	the	uncertainties	of	the	future”	(Jantzen,	1984a,	
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57).	 	Whilst	 some	may	 seek	 to	 be	 reconciled	with	 such	 transience	 (see	 Christ,	 2003,	
116;	 Suchocki,	 1977,	 296;	 Sands	 as	 cited	 by	 Keller,	 1996a,	 134),	 I	 contend	 that	 an	
acceptance	of	transience	produces	a	limited	hope,	as	there	is	no	possible	alternative	to	
the	griefs	and	sorrows	experienced,	as	I	earlier	contended.125		Eschatological	life,	then,	
may	 simply	 (though	 certainly	 not	 ineffectually	 or	 insignificantly)	 pertain	 to	 a	
recognition	of	the	compassion	of	others	and	of	God,	but	it	can	be	much	more	than	this.		
If	 we	 think	 eschatologically,	 the	 transformation	 of	 death	 into	 life	 embraces	 the	
emotional	 states	 of	 life,	 as	 I	 have	 argued,	 but	 also	 fully	 and	 finally	 enables	material	
experiences	of	bodies	transformed	from	death	into	abundant	and	eternal	life.		
	
If	death	can	be	contradicted	by	its	transformation,	we	may	now	wish	to	consider	some	
ways	 in	which	we	can	mourn	or	 grieve	 for	 the	deceased	 in	 a	way	 that	embraces	 and	
anticipates	 this	 transformation.126	 	 An	 eschatological	 appreciation	 of	 embodiments	
means	 that	we	must	come	 to	 terms	with	 the	complete,	albeit	 temporary,	 cessation	of	
the	individual’s	existence.		It	would	be	incongruent	with	an	affirmation	of	embodiments	
to	consider	those	individuals	to	be	merely	living	on	in	a	different	(typically	thought	of	
as	a	“spiritual”)	mode.		Such	a	concept	compromises	both	embodiment	and	relationality	
and,	as	Herbert	(2006,	123)	rightly	notes,	provides:	
a	weak	kind	of	consolation	because	it	conveys	something	of	a	fragmented	and	
incomplete	 vision	 of	 salvation,	 depicting	 the	 deceased	 as	 alive	 but	 having	 to	
consciously	 wait	 for	 the	 gradual	 piecing‐together	 of	 the	 network	 of	
relationships	they	left	behind.	
Conceiving	 of	 the	 deceased	 as	 still	 existing	 in	 a	 disembodied	manner	 is	 undoubtedly	
comforting	to	some,	as	such	thought	allows	one	to	consider	the	deceased	as	no	longer	
suffering	but	still	capable	of	communicating	with	those	who	are	alive.	 	 	Such	concepts	
were	also	understood	to	be	comforting	for	the	individual	experiencing	the	suffering,	as	
																																																													
125	 Of	 course,	 transient	 life	 is	 not	 only	 comprised	 of	 grief	 and	 sorrow,	 but	 they	 are	 certainly	
aspects	of	it	and	often	have	immense	effects	on	individual	lives.		To	reiterate,	it	is	for	this	reason	
that	I	navigate	here	the	possibility	of	an	eschatological	future	that	is	void	of	death. 
126	This	signals	the	beginning	of	my	construction	of	ways	we	can	touch	the	future	in	the	present;	
a	task	that	will	be	engaged	in	more	thoroughly	in	the	next	chapter. 
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noted	earlier.		Moreover,	it	means	that	those	still	living	need	not	go	through	the	process	
of	mourning	the	complete	absence	of	the	one	who	has	died.		I	appreciate	the	appeal	of	
such	 an	 understanding	 but	 cannot,	 in	 light	 of	 Herbert’s	 considerations	 and	my	 own	
affirmation	of	embodiment,	agree	with	it.	 	Herbert’s	argument	is	convincing	insofar	as	
it	exposes	the	mind‐body	dualism	that	 is	at	the	heart	of	such	perspectives.	 	 It	expects	
the	deceased	to	be	conscious	and	communicative	but	in	a	fragmented	and	incomplete	
manner.	 	 The	 disembodied	 “aspect”	 of	 the	 deceased	 is	 expected	 to	 await	 the	
reunification	 with	 their	 body	 in	 order	 to	 once	 again	 experience	 the	 “network	 of	
relationships	 they	 left	behind”.	 	This	 is	 the	kind	of	delayed	promise	 that	has	been	 so	
rightly	 criticised	by	 feminist	 theologians,	 and	 is	neither	a	 relational,	 embodied	 future	
nor	 one	 that	 can	 help	 us	 to	 practise	 an	 appreciation	 of	 bodies	 in	 the	 present,	 as	my	
following	chapter	will	propose.	 	The	most	that	such	a	perspective	can	communicate	is	
an	 incomplete	 kind	 of	 relationship;	 even	 if	 the	 deceased	 were	 able	 to	 relate	 in	 a	
disembodied	 manner	 this	 would	 be	 insufficient	 and	 ineffectual,	 as	 critiques	 of	 a	
disembodied	God	have	argued.		There	would	be	no	possibility	of	intimate	and	tangible	
relations	with	such	entities,	 thus	there	would	be	no	authentic	relations.	 	Although	we	
can	hold	onto	a	hope	in	the	ultimate	and	final	reunification	with	those	who	have	died,	
then,	we	should	not	consider	them	to	be	existing	at	present	on	some	disembodied	plane	
but	rather	to	be	authentically	and	completely	 lacking	existence,	 lacking	life,	until	 they	
are	 embraced	within	 and	 caressed	 by	 God’s	 touch	which	 works	 in	 partnership	with	
them	to	birth	them	anew	to	their	own	embodied	dynamism.	
	
Ivone	 Gebara	 contends	 that	 such	 desires	 for	 parallel	 “heavenly”	 existences	 of	 loved	
ones	are	borne	out	of	a	lack	of	adequate	language	offered	by	the	Christian	tradition	in	
situations	of	death	and	loss.		Whilst	the	perspective	explored	above	may	be	comforting,	
as	 noted,	 Gebara	 suggests	 that	 imagining	 the	 concurrent	 existence	 of	 the	 deceased	
alongside	the	living	projects	pain	and	suffering	onto	“divinities	and	a	discourse	full	of	
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abstract	and	ahistorical	concepts”	(2010,	61).		As	such,	she	continues,	any	suffering	that	
remains	 after	 the	 departure	 of	 a	 loved	 one	 is	 silenced.	 	 “There	 is”,	 Gebara	writes,	 “a	
rupture	of	 language	 in	 the	midst	of	continued	suffering”	 (2010,	61).	 	Thus,	whilst	 the	
notion	 of	 a	 parallel	 heavenly	 realm	may	 provide	 comfort,	 and	 as	 such	 should	 not	 be	
underestimated	or	hastily	dismissed,	it	must	be	acknowledged	that	such	a	model	does	
not	ultimately	help	with	confronting	and	truly	feeling	the	reality	of	death(s)	in	this	life.		
Instead,	 an	 eschatology	 typified	 by	 God’s	 empathetic	 and	 vast	 embrace	 of	 embodied	
experiences	is	one	that	makes	space	and	time	for	the	reality	of	death	to	be	experienced	
in	all	of	its	pain	and	sorrow.		Such	an	eschaton	calls	us	to	authentically	experience	the	
integrity	of	life	in	the	present	by	fully	feeling	the	reality	of	death.		
	
Whilst	 sorrowful,	 this	 is	 certainly	 not	 hopeless	 for	 amidst	 the	 very	 real	 and	 often	
difficult	processes	of	mourning	the	cessation	of	bodies	and	relationships	we	can	call	on	
our	 remembrances	 and	 trust	 in	 God’s	 promise.	 	 This	 is	 the	 promise	 of	 embodied	
relational	 presence	 and	 response,	 and	 God’s	 loyalty	 to	 seeing	 these	 fulfilled.	 	 Carol	
Christ,	for	example,	suggests	that	God,	being	the	most	related	and	most	sympathetic	of	
beings,	is	able	to	ensure	some	futurity	to	creaturely	existence.		She	contends	that	God’s	
involvement	 with	 the	 world	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 imbuing	 the	 lives	 of	 creation	 with	
significance	both	in	the	present	and	in	the	future.		Christ	presents	the	divine	memory	in	
the	following	way:	
When	the	individual	life	ends,	it	will	become	part	of	the	divine	love	that	is	the	
ground	of	all	being	and	becoming.	 	The	memory	of	our	individual	lives	will	be	
preserved	 by	 Goddess/God	 […]	 In	 the	memory	 of	 Goddess/God,	 every	 single	
individual	in	the	universe	will	live	forever	(2003,	139).	
Christ	claims	that	faith	in	such	remembrance	overflows	with	hope	for	the	individual,	as	
it	means	that	“[t]here	 is	nothing	 in	 life	or	death	that	can	separate	us	 from	the	 love	of	
Goddess/God”	(2003,	139;	cf.	Romans	8.39).	 	She	adds	to	this	that	individual	eternity,	
or	endurance,	is	also	to	be	located	in	the	remembrances	of	the	living	(2011b,	143).		As	
such,	 connectedness	 with	 God	 is	 here	 coupled	 with	 connectedness	 with	 creation	 in	
 
 
~	208	~	
 
ways	that	enable	both	mourning	and	hoping	for	the	endurance	of	 those	we	 love	after	
they	 have	 died.	 	 Christ	 thus	 affirms	 both	 creature‐to‐creature	 relationships	 and	
creature‐to‐Creator	relationships	and	adds	to	the	latter	that	God’s	power	is	expressed	
in	the	eternal	preservation	of	creaturely	existence.				
	
Whilst	 Christ’s	 view	 is	 helpful	 in	 showing	 that	 future	 endurance	 is	 not	 necessarily	
averse	 to	 a	 relational	God,	 her	 appeal	 to	 divine	memory	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 this	 is	
problematic	 for	 it	may,	contrary	to	my	 intentions	and	 indeed	Christ’s	own	 intentions,	
compromise	relationality.		Although	Christ	envisions	God	as	taking	creation	“back	into	
her	body	at	death”,	and	thus	understands	there	to	be	“a	component	of	embodiment”	to	
this	remembrance	(2011b,	145;	cf.	Keller,	2003b,	421),	it	seems	to	me	that	absorption	
into	 the	 body	 of	 God	 is	 too	 akin	 to	 assimilation.	 	Whilst	 Christ	may	 be	 proposing	 an	
organic	 return	 to	 the	 earth,	which	would	 cohere	with	 the	 depictions	 of	 the	world	 as	
God’s	body	that	were	noted	in	Chapter	One,	it	seems	that	individual	identity,	and	with	it	
cognisant,	 sentient,	 embodied	 relationality	 is	ultimately	 abandoned.	 	 Suchocki’s	helps	
to	further	this	critique,	 for	although	she	similarly	proposes	a	future	where	creation	is	
remembered	by	and	“taken	into	God”	(1977,	300),	she	also	notes	a	problem	when	this	
fails	to	account	for	the	“experiencing	subject”	(1977,	302).		She	writes	that:	
The	retention	of	 immediacy	must	result	 in	a	mutuality	of	 immediacy	between	
God	 and	 the	 occasion;	 the	 mutuality	 must	 indicate	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 the	
occasion	participates	in	God’s	immediacy,	even	whilst	retaining	its	own.				
Retention	 in	God,	 then,	 for	Suchocki	and	 for	myself,	must	also	mean	retention	of	self.		
Notable	here	is	the	claim	that	creaturely	endurance	in	God’s	memory	as	a	mere	memory	
is	an	insufficient	model	of	God,	creation,	and	the	future.			
	
Herbert	provides	 further	clarification	here,	and	shows	how	notions	of	 the	memory	of	
God	 may	 be	 rethought	 in	 more	 beneficial	 ways.	 	 He	 reads	 the	 memory	 of	 God	 as	
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pertaining	 to	 a	 love	 for	 and	 loyalty	 to	 those	 who	 no	 longer	 live.127	 	 Alongside	
recognising	 that	 “the	 deceased	 are	 dead,	with	 no	 implication	 of	 a	 disembodied	 spirit	
enduring	the	death	of	the	body”	he	claims	that	there	exists	the	assurance	that	“the	dead	
are	by	no	means	‘lost’	but	are	safely	preserved	in	God,	by	God’s	faithfulness	and	power	
alone”	 (2006,	 125).	 	 Because	 of	 God’s	 commitment	 to	 embracing	 all	 of	 creation,	
expressed	 eschatologically	 in	 terms	 of	 God’s	 desire	 for	 relationships	 with	 all	 of	
creation,	God	will	not	forget	any	members	of	creation	in	the	future.	 	This	adds	further	
substance	 to	 our	 practice	 of	 a	 hopeful	mourning,	 as	 although	we	must	 be	 reconciled	
with	 the	 inaccessibility	 and	 genuine	 cessation	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 those	 we	 love,	 we	
nevertheless	realise	that	this	is	not	conclusive.		We	may	mourn	the	end	of	existences	in	
all	of	their	totality,	both	embodied	and	spiritual,	but	we	can	also	hope	and	trust	in	God’s	
love	for	and	loyalty	to	creation	in	order	to	assert	that	their	existences	will	not	only	be	
brought	back	to	life	but	will	be	enabled	to	live	in	a	way	that	abounds	with	dynamism.128		
Along	these	lines,	the	resurrected	body	that	Paul	speaks	of	in	1	Corinthians	15.44	can	
be	interpreted	not	as	a	fleshless	body	but	as	“our	own	resurrected,	perfectly	embodied,	
transcendent,	 fluid	 and	 eternal	 selves”	 (Haws,	 2007,	 194).129	 	 To	 reiterate	my	earlier	
claim,	 these	are	bodies	 that	are	 thoroughly	material	as	 they	are	 the	same	bodies	 they	
always	were,	and	radically	material	as	they	are	more	than	they	once	were.		Thus,	whilst	
such	mourning	may	be	more	difficult	and	less	comforting	in	the	immediate	than	belief	
in	a	heaven	that	runs	parallel	to	our	earthly	existences,	it	is	nevertheless	the	only	way	
of	mourning	that	sufficiently	affirms	embodied	relationships	and	existences.			
	
																																																													
127	This	adds	another	dimension	to	the	love	and	loyalty	of	God	which	has	underpinned	much	of	
my	thesis	thus	far. 
128	Again,	this	is	not	God	affecting	such	an	existence	in	a	domineering	and	independent	manner	
but	rather	in	a	relational	and	co‐operative	manner,	as	Chapter	Two	proposed. 
129	Despite	many	readings	that	would	frame	Paul	as	dichotomising	the	body	and	soul,	Isherwood	
and	Stuart	observe	that	Paul’s	attitude	toward	the	body	is,	in	fact,	ambiguous.		Passages	such	as	
1	Corinthians	15.44,	with	 its	discussion	of	 “physical”	and	 “spiritual”	bodies,	 can	be	 read,	 they	
claim,	as	contrasting	flesh	and	spirit,	as	opposed	to	body	and	soul.		The	flesh	is	here	understood	
as	 communicating	 “the	 human	 being	 (body	 and	 soul)	 in	 its	 fallen	 state”	 (1998,	 62).	 	 This	
suggests	 that	 the	 “spiritual”	 body	 of	which	 Paul	 speaks	 can	 be	 understood	 to	 consist	 of	 “the	
human	being	(body	and	soul)”	in	its	redeemed	state. 
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Although	death	 is	a	real	and	often	pervasive	and	painful	aspect	of	present	existences,	
then,	the	future’s	emphasis	on	embodied	life	can	make	us	again	consider	ways	in	which	
we	may	 flourish,	even	 in	the	midst	of	death.	 	Letty	Russell	offers	an	understanding	of	
flourishing	as	being	partly	manifest	 in	self‐love,	and	she	helps	us	to	consider	how	the	
cultivation	of	 such	 love	 can	 assist	us	 in	mourning	 the	 loss	of	 others.130	 	 She	 suggests	
that	 we	may	 hope	 not	 only	 for	 the	 loved	 one,	 that	 is,	 for	 their	 future	 eschatological	
existence,	 but	 also	 one	 may	 hope	 for	 oneself,	 as	 “the	 loss	 of	 one	 still	 leaves	 whole	
persons	 to	 move	 forward	 on	 a	 new	 journey”	 (1979a,	 41‐42).	 	 Hunt	 (1994,	 131)	
articulates	a	similar	perspective	which	further	perceives	the	importance	of	developing	
self‐love,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 loss	 and	 mourning.	 	 She	 notes	 that	 such	
experiences	illustrate:	
why	befriending	ourselves	–	loving	our	bodies,	enjoying	our	work,	finding	ways	
to	relax	and	reflect	alone	–	 is	so	very	 important.	 	Then	we	can	see	 the	 loss	of	
friends	for	what	 it	 is	–	a	severe	and	disconcerting	experience	but	one	that	we	
will	survive.	
This	is	not	to	say	that	isolation	should	be	sought	to	prevent	the	experience	of	loss,	but	
rather	that	we	should	strive	to	locate	our	love,	worth	and	value	both	 in	ourselves	and	
alongside	 others	 so	 that	when	 these	 others	 are	 no	 longer	 present,	whilst	we	may	be	
depleted,	 dispirited,	 and	 despondent,	 we	 will	 not	 ultimately	 be	 defeated.	 	 Given	 the	
magnitude	 and	 sorrowfulness	 of	 the	 losses	 that	 prefix	 mourning,	 such	 survival	 may	
seem	 far	 too	 alien	 and	 distant.	 	 Indeed,	 in	 some	 cases	 it	 may	 never	 be	 actualised.		
However,	 I	earlier	claimed	that	the	fact	that	some	sufferings	are	not	overcome	in	this	
life	only	intensifies	the	power	of	the	eschaton.		Even	in	the	struggle	to	survive	loss	we	
can	maintain	hope:	we	can	glance	at	our	mourning,	our	pain,	and	our	suffering	from	the	
perspective	 of	 a	 future	 where	 both	 those	 for	 whom	 we	 mourn	 and	 the	 pains	 we	
experience	in	this	mourning	are	transformed.	 	This	transformation	is	effected	both	by	
the	 reunion	 with	 those	 we	 have	 lost	 and	 the	 change	 of	 (theirs	 and	 our)	 pain	 into	
																																																													
130	 This	 attentiveness	 to	 self‐love	 informs	my	next	 chapter’s	 focus	 on	 self‐love	 as	 one	way	 to	
embody	the	eschaton	in	the	present. 
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embodied	existences	that	abound	with	dynamism.	 	 In	the	present,	 then,	we	can	allow	
ourselves	 the	 grace	 of	 space	 and	 time	 to	 experience	mourning	 in	 its	 fullness,	 whilst	
being	heartened	by	a	belief	 that	 those	we	have	 lost,	and	 the	relational	and	emotional	
aspects	of	ourselves	that	we	have	both	lost	and	become	in	the	light	of	such	losses	will	
not,	ultimately,	be	lost	in	the	future.				
	
The	Newness	of	Eschatological	Bodies	
These	considerations	can	cause	us,	albeit	cautiously	and	considerately,	to	articulate	an	
eschatology	 that	 contradicts	 deaths,	 not	merely	 by	 abolishing	 them	but	 by	 creatively	
transforming	 them	 into	 lives	 that	 abound	with	 dynamic	 experiences	 of	 embodiment.		
Moltmann	(1996,	336)	articulates	this	particularly	eloquently,	as	he	writes:	
The	 fullness	 of	 God	 is	 the	 rapturous	 fullness	 of	 divine	 life;	 a	 life	 that	
communicates	 itself	 with	 inexhaustible	 creativity;	 an	 overbrimming	 life	 that	
makes	what	 is	dead	and	withered	 live;	a	 life	 from	which	everything	 that	 lives	
receives	its	vital	energies	and	its	zest	for	living.	
Such	a	perspective	posits	the	life	of	God	and	the	life	we	receive	from	relationships	with	
God	as	the	overwhelming	reality	and	totality	of	creation’s	existences.		This	is	not	to	say	
that	the	realities	of	death	are	discounted;	they	continue	to	be	experienced	in	the	here	
and	 now,	 as	 noted,	 and	 are	 not,	 as	 Jantzen	 rightly	 observes,	 anything	 to	 be	 ignored	
(2009,	48).	 	We	can	recall	Jantzen’s	focus	on	natality	here,	and	develop	this	by	noting	
that	 natality	 is	 decidedly	 ethical	 for	 Jantzen	 as	 its	 perspective	 stretches	 beyond	 our	
own	 individual	 lives	 and	 out	 to	 “a	 love	 of	 the	world	 and	 the	 lives	 of	 those	 to	 come”	
(1998,	 152).	 	 By	 focussing	 on	 natality	 rather	 than	 mortality	 Jantzen	 succeeds	 in	
presenting	an	ethical	calling	to	all	of	creation,	for	we	all	experience	being	birthed	and	
thus	“we	are	all	natals”	(Jantzen,	2009,	8),	however	varied	our	experiences	of	this	may	
be.	 	Reading	this	 through	an	eschatological	 lens	can	 lead	us	 to	claim	that	God	cannot,	
ultimately,	allow	death	to	obtain;	 instead	God	helps	us	 to	make	experiences	of	 life	an	
eschatological	and	ethical	reality.	
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Although	 we	 remember	 that	 Jantzen	 herself	 claims	 that	 natality	 is	 not	 only	 about	
women’s	experiences	of	birthing	(cf.	2009,	8),	 it	 is	nevertheless	beneficial	to	consider	
this	eschatological	and	ethical	calling	to	life	in	the	contexts	of	life‐giving	experiences	of	
birthing	and	mothering.131	 	Re‐readings	and	 reconstructions	of	Mary	help	us	 to	 think	
more	 about	 this.	 	 Speaking	 particularly	 of	 Latin	 American	 women’s	 perspectives	 on	
Mary,	Elina	Vuola	notes	that	Mary	is	understood	to	exist	in	a	liminal	space	between	the	
commonplace	and	the	divine;	both	an	ordinary	woman	and	divine	figure.		Vuola	(2002,	
177)	explains	that:	
For	a	woman	 in	 labour,	Mary	 is,	on	 the	one	hand,	a	sister	or	mother	with	 the	
same	experience,	and	on	the	other	hand,	a	divine	figure	whom	one	can	ask	for	
help	in	one	of	the	most	difficult	situations	in	a	woman’s	life.		Mary	can	help	even	
in	 birth	 pains.	 	 Thus,	 in	 women’s	 everyday	 experience	 Mary	 shares	 and	
confirms	but	also	transcends	their	experience.	
By	placing	emphasis	on	Mary’s	ordinariness,	then,	Latin	American	perspectives	such	as	
those	noted	by	Vuola	draw	attention	away	from	classical	constructions	of	Mary	as	pure	
and	 virginal	 and	 rather	 focus	 on	 her	 involvement	 and	 empathy	with	 the	 realities	 of	
some	women’s	experiences	of	their	bodies.	 	This	adds	further	credence	to	the	earlier‐
noted	 reconstructions	 of	 God	 as	 one	who	 is	 intimately	 involved	 in	 the	world,	 and	 it	
adds	substance	to	Jantzen’s	construction	of	natality	for	it	makes	the	commitment	to	and	
involvement	in	life	central.			
	
Natality	also	emphasises	the	creation	of	something	novel.		This	novelty	is	integral	to	the	
rethinking	 and	 reconstruction	 of	 an	 eschatology	 that	 is	 embodied	 and,	 crucially,	 that	
makes	our	varied	embodiments	more	than	they	presently	are.	 	Jantzen	names	natality	
as	 “the	 possibility	 of	 fresh	 starts,	 new	 and	 creative	 approaches	 that	 can	 subvert	
violence	and	destruction”	(Jantzen,	2009,	48).		The	particular	violence	and	destruction	
that	 such	 an	 emphasis	 on	 natality	 and	 novelty	 can	 subvert,	 if	 read	 through	 an	
eschatological	 lens,	 is	 the	 patriarchal	 desire	 to	 construct	 eschatology	 as	 the	 final	
																																																													
131	Of	 course,	 life‐giving	 is	 not	 synonymous	with	birthing;	 contrasting	 experiences	 of	 birthing	
and	mothering	have	here	been	acknowledged. 
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obliteration	of	embodied	fluidity.		Accordingly,	eschatological	finality	can	be	rethought	
of	 as	 an	 end	 that	 begins	 new	 experiences	 of	 newness.	 	 This	 “beginningness”,	 as	
Moltmann	calls	it,	is	far	from	static.		It	is	not	simply	the	“eternalization”	of	present	lives,	
as	Moltmann	rightly	notes	that	this	would	mean	that	“nothing	new	could	be	expected	of	
eternity”	(2004b,	152;	cf.	154).	 	 I	add	to	 this	 that	such	an	“eternalization”	would	also	
fail	 to	 address	 and	 transform	 the	 suffering	 and	 decay	 that	 so	 permeate	 life	 as	 it	 is	
presently	experienced.		In	addition	to	this	focus	on	the	meaning	of	novelty	for	creation,	
we	can	assert	that	novelty	is	an	essential	part	of	God’s	being.		As	I	posited	earlier,	God	
only	 fully	 becomes	 who	 God	 is	 when	 creation	 reaches	 its	 completion	 in	 new	 and	
dynamic	lives	in	the	future.	 	In	a	similar	vein,	Suchocki	invites	us	to	consider	the	idea	
that	an	openness	to	newness	communicates	something	of	God’s	nature.		She	writes	that	
“God	is	both	the	condition	and	the	outcome	of	creativity,	the	provider	and	the	recipient	
of	novelty,	because	of	God’s	genuine	openness	toward	actuality”	(1988,	99).		God	both	
inspires	 and	 receives	 creative	 newness,	 then,	 because	 God	 is	 genuinely	 open	 to	
creatures	being	able	to	have	and	express	novelty	and	actuality.			
	
For	 an	 understanding	 of	 eschatology,	 this	 allows	 us	 to	 consider	 a	 final	 point	 in	 time	
where	 engagements	 with	 and	 enactments	 of	 novelty	 are	 drawn	 into	 new	 forms	 of	
expression	and	are	enabled	to	flourish.		Flourishing,	for	Jantzen,	is	rooted	in	this	life,	in	
the	affirmation	of	earthly,	everyday	existence,	and	in	the	struggle	to	abolish	injustice	in	
the	here	 and	now	 (1998,	168‐9).	 	Graham	calls	 this	 an	 “absorption	 into	 ‘life	 in	 all	 its	
fullness’”	 (2009a,	 10).	 	Moreover,	 the	 symbolic	 of	 “flourishing”	 is	 used	 by	 Jantzen	 to	
refer	to	an	active,	interconnected,	and	dynamic	process	of	transformation	(1998,	160‐
1).	 	 If,	 again,	 we	 read	 this	 through	 an	 eschatological	 lens,	 we	 can	 envision	 a	 future	
wherein	death	will	no	longer	pose	a	threat	to	the	dynamic	endurance	of	 life.	 	What	 is	
more,	 this	eschatological	emphasis	on	 life,	 far	 from	distracting	from	Jantzen’s	reading	
of	 flourishing	 being	 rooted	 in	 this	 life,	 can	 return	 us	 to	 this	 life	 and	 encourage	 us	 to	
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engage	 in	 relationships	 of	 interconnectivity	 which	 strive	 to	 embody	 the	 flourishing	
future	we	anticipate.	
	
Such	a	reading	of	flourishing	again	touches	on	the	necessity	of	reclaiming	the	value	of	
the	earth	body	in	the	eschatological	future.		Indeed,	Jantzen	notes	the	versatility	of	the	
phrase	 as	 she	 writes	 that	 flourishing	 for	 humans	 can	 denote	 prosperity	 and	 good	
health,	and	in	nature	can	mean	to	blossom	or	thrive	(1998,	160).		Affirming	the	body	of	
the	earth	is	significant	not	only	in	and	of	itself,	but	also	because	of	the	connections	that	
have	 been	 made	 between	 the	 earth	 body	 and	 female	 bodies.	 	 Dorothy	 Soelle,	 for	
example,	 appeals	 to	 the	 Bible	 in	 order	 to	 substantiate	 a	 vision	 of	 the	 future	 that	 is	
decidedly	 earth‐affirming.	 	One	way	 in	which	 she	achieves	 this	 is	by	 interpreting	 the	
reference	 in	 Matthew	 6.10	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 God	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 envisions	 an	
eschatological	“new	earth”,	not	as	a	destruction	or	escape	from	this	earth,	as	we	have	
seen	many	feminist	theologians	critique,	but	as	a	restoration	of	this	earth.	Soelle	argues	
that	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 God,	 whilst	 only	 fully	 manifest	 in	 the	 eschatological	 future,	 is	
brought	to	and	affirms	the	present	when	relationships	between	all	of	creation	are	just,	
loving,	and	void	of	abuse	(1993,	33).		Halkes	confirms	Soelle’s	contention,	writing	that	
the	end	can	actually	be	envisioned	as	“the	end	of	 the	culture	of	violence”	(1991,	160)	
and	so	can	actually	be	a	beneficial	vision	 for	 the	earth.	 	Letty	Russell	also	proposes	a	
beneficial	reading	of	the	“new	creation”	which	is	decidedly	eschatological.	 	She	claims	
that	we	are	to	live	with	a	vision	that	“one	day	God	will	fulfil	the	unity	of	the	church	and	
mend	the	creation	that	has	been	so	torn	apart”	(1974,	59).		Each	of	these	perspectives	
shows	 that	 the	 eschatological	 future	 can	 legitimately	 consist	 of	 the	 restoration	 and	
mending	of	the	earth,	as	opposed	to	its	destruction	or	desertion.			
			
Moreover,	 the	 eschatological	 existence	 of	 the	 earth	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 creation	 seem	
inextricably	 connected.	 	 In	 a	 further	 development	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 flourishing,	 Grey	
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notes	 that	 flourishing	 “links	 person	or	 creature	with	 environment”	 (1999,	 402),	 thus	
signalling	the	concurrent	affirmation	of	human	bodies	and	the	earth	body.				We	can	see	
this	exemplified	in	Isaiah	65.1‐16,	which	DeBorst	reads	as	proclaiming	that	“The	land	of	
death	 is	 now	 able	 to	 offer	 rest	 and	 sustain	 the	 life	 of	 animals	 and	 people!	 The	
relationships	shattered	by	sin	are	mended	by	God’s	recreative	hand”	(2010,	46).132		The	
earth	is,	in	this	way,	a	mirror	to	the	rest	of	creation:	the	transformation	of	the	earth	is	
synonymous	 with	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 creation.	 	 Again,	 we	 detect	 an	
emphasis	on	relationality	and	connectedness.		Following	on	from	my	previous	chapter’s	
assertion	 of	 the	 necessity	 of	 embodiment	 for	 this	 relationality,	 we	 see	 here	 further	
evidence	 of	 an	 embodied	 future.	 	 God	 creates	 new	 life	 out	 of	 the	 old	 creation	 by	
enabling	all	 to	experience	a	thoroughly	embodied	and	relational	eschaton,	 typified	by	
sustained	lives	and	mended	relationships.133		This	can	call	us	now	to	feel	with	the	earth	
and	honour	its	place	in	the	divine	embrace.134			
	
																																																													
132	 DeBorst	 highlights	 specific	 verses	within	 this	 passage	 that	 highlight	 God’s	 commitment	 to	
both	 the	 people	 and	 the	 earth.	 	 Isaiah	 65.1‐2,	 for	 instance,	 speaks	 of	 God	 being	 “ready	 to	 be	
sought	out	by	 those	who	did	not	ask,	 to	be	 found	by	 those	who	did	not	seek	me”,	and	of	God	
holding	out	God’s	hands	“all	day	long	to	a	rebellious	people”.		DeBorst	further	refers	to	verse	10,	
which	 claims	 that	 “the	 Valley	 of	 Achor	 [shall	 become]	 a	 place	 for	 herds	 to	 lie	 down,	 for	my	
people	who	have	sought	me”,	and	verse	16	which	reads:	“whoever	invokes	a	blessing	in	the	land	
shall	bless	by	the	God	of	faithfulness,	and	whoever	takes	an	oath	in	the	land	shall	swear	by	the	
God	of	faithfulness;	because	the	former	troubles	are	forgotten	and	are	hidden	from	my	sight”.	 
133	This	is,	to	be	sure,	as	much	for	non‐human	animals	as	it	is	for	human	animals;	we	recall	the	
prophetic	vision	in	Isaiah	11.6‐9	wherein	the	“wolf	shall	live	with	the	lamb”,	and	multitudes	of	
other	animals	who	no	longer	cause	destruction	to	one	another	but	rather	share	in	the	fullness	of	
the	knowledge	of	God.	 
134	Such	an	assertion	can	draw	us	closer	to	considering	the	significance	of	tactility,	as	thinkers	
such	 as	 Pavey,	 Vanier,	 and	 Wirzba	 emphasise	 the	 tactile	 nature	 of	 such	 an	 embodied	
relationship	 with	 the	 earth.	 	 Pavey,	 for	 instance,	 offers	 a	 unique	 re‐reading	 of	 Exodus	 3.5,	
interpreting	God’s	 command	 to	Moses	 to	 remove	his	 sandals	not	as	a	prohibition	or	warning,	
but	 rather	 as	 an	 invitation	 “to	 touch	with	 our	 skin	what	God	 has	 touched,	 created,	moulded”	
(2013,	6).		Vanier	adds	further	substance	to	Pavey’s	claims	by	positing	that	each	person	is	“holy	
ground”,	and	that	“each	one	 is	part	of	a	common	humanity”	(1997,	60).	 	Furthermore,	Wirzba	
claims	 that	 God’s	 tactile	 relationship	 with	 the	 earth,	 as	 evident	 in	 Psalm	 65.9‐10	 with	 its	
emphasis	on	ecological	abundance	at	the	hands	of	God,	should	similarly	define	our	relationship	
with	the	earth,	“for	in	this	touch	we	participate	in	the	ongoing	creative	and	sustaining	work	of	
the	Creator”	(2008,	236‐237).		Thus,	a	reclamation	of	the	earth	body	in	the	eschatological	future	
can	 further	 nourish	 our	 moves	 to	 embody	 tangible	 and	 tactile	 relationships	 of	 love	 in	 the	
present,	as	will	be	developed	in	the	next	chapter. 
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I	 add	 to	 this	 that	 the	 passages	 pertaining	 to	 the	 eschatological	 transformation	 and	
endurance	of	 the	earth	provide	us	with	such	 illuminating	 images	of	 the	new	creation,	
that	 if	we	 are	 to	 draw	parallels	 between	 the	 earth’s	 future	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 creation’s	
future	 then	we	 have	 a	 very	 hopeful	 vision	 indeed.	 	 There	 certainly	 exists,	within	 the	
tradition,	substantial	and	explicit	references	to	an	eschatological	future	that	is	earthly	
and,	what	 is	more,	 that	 is	abundant	 in	 its	 earthliness.	 	 Both	 Jantzen	 (2009,	 143)	 and	
Grey	 (2000,	 50)	 note	 the	 fecundity	 and	 splendour	 that	 typifies	 the	 flourishing	 of	
creation	in	Isaiah	35.1‐2.		The	passage	reads:	“The	wilderness	and	the	dry	land	shall	be	
glad,	the	desert	shall	rejoice	and	blossom;	like	the	crocus	it	shall	blossom	abundantly,	
and	rejoice	with	joy	and	singing”.	 	Jantzen	interprets	passages	such	as	this	in	terms	of	
flourishing,	which	she	uses	 to	 further	 revalue	both	 female	bodies	and	 the	earth	body	
(2009,	210).		Indeed,	reclaiming	the	fluidity	of	a	flourishing	earth	as	an	integral	part	of	
eschatological	existence	signifies	one	way	in	which	the	revaluation	of	 feminised	traits	
can	bear	fruit	for	the	rest	of	creation.		That	this	eschatological	fulfilment	is	expressed	in	
the	 language	 of	 earthiness	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 some	metaphorical	 allusion	
used	to	describe	human	flourishing	alone,	though.		Rather	we	should,	with	Carol	Christ,	
read	such	associations	to	mean	that	“all	of	nature	is	included	in	God’s	salvation	and	that	
other	 than	 human	 forms	 of	 life	 have	 some	 degree	 of	 feeling”	 (2003,	 29).	 	 The	
transformation	 of	 the	 earth	 body,	 like	 creaturely	 bodies,	 is	 thus	 integral	 to	 the	
realisation	and	specific	nature	of	the	eschatological	future.	
	
Moreover,	exploring	the	specific	nature	of	the	earth’s	future	existence	can	further	assist	
us	 in	 considering	 the	 endurance	of	 change	 in	 that	 future.	 	 Such	blossoming	and	pure	
joyfulness	 that	 is	 depicted	 in	 Isaiah	 35.1‐2	 is	 far	 removed	 from	 a	 static,	 changeless	
future.	 	 Rather,	 what	 this	 and	 other	 passages	 (such	 as	 Isaiah	 55.12	 and	 Amos	 5.24)	
detail	 is	 a	 harmonious	 tumultuousness;	 to	 reverse	 Catherine	 Keller’s	 assertion,	 a	
“turbulence	 within	 stability”	 (cf.	 Keller,	 2003a,	 215).	 	 Far	 from	 this	 being	 a	
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reproduction	 of	 patriarchal	 appraisals	 of	 stability,	 stability	 here	 is	 found	 in	 the	
enduring	 life	of	 the	earth	 just	as	much	as	 turbulence	 in	 found	the	enduring	 life	of	 the	
earth.		The	earth	continues	in	the	eschatological	future	but	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	is	
even	more	dynamic	and	abundant	than	it	presently	is.	 	Again,	this	is	understood	to	be	
indicative	 of	 the	 “Kingdom”	 of	 God,	 which	 Moltmann	 describes	 as	 “the	 reciprocal	
interpenetration	of	God	and	world”	(2004a,	158),	by	which	he	means	that	God	emerges	
from	the	very	depths,	even	from	the	“womb”,	of	the	earth	in	order	to	dwell	within	the	
earth	(Moltmann,	2010,	79).		In	so	doing,	the	infinite	God	permeates	the	finite	creation	
in	a	way	that	enables	the	fulfilment	of	 that	creation	as	 it	becomes	able	to	contain	the	
infinite	(cf.	Keller,	2003a,	81‐82).		The	whole	earth	shall	then	truly	become	full	of	God’s	
glory	 (cf.	 Isaiah	6.3)	because	of	 this	 “finitum	capax	 infiniti	–	a	 finitude	 that	 embraces	
infinity”	 (Moltmann,	 1999b,	 41).	 	 Finitude	 is	 retained,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 transitional	
processes	and	dynamic	 experiences	of	 embodied	 life,	but	 it	becomes	permeated	with	
infinity	in	such	a	way	that	these	processes	and	experiences	may	endure	forever	and	no	
longer	be	hindered	by	their	ultimate	cessation.	
	
Conclusion	
An	 eschatology	 that	 is	 characterised	 by	 experiences	 of	 dynamic	 and	 deathless	
embodiment,	 in	the	way	that	 I	have	here	attempted	to	argue,	has	the	ability	to	affirm	
the	complexity	of	experiences	of	embodiment,	even	if	that	self‐same	complexity	makes	
a	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 these	 experiences	 ultimately	 elusive.	 	 Nevertheless,	 the	
partiality	 I	have	operated	within	does	 lend	 itself	 to	aspects	of	 specificity	 in	which	we	
can	 both	 ground	 and	 direct	 our	 hope.	 	 Attentiveness	 to	 past	 sufferings	 and	 the	
overcoming	of	some	sufferings	has	propelled	my	imaginings	into	the	future,	exploring	
what	an	ultimate	transformation	of	suffering	and	death	may	look	like.		The	retention	of	
bodies	 and	 their	 corollary	 of	 change	 is	 a	 tricky,	 though	 essential,	 aspect	 of	
eschatological	 existences,	 and	 their	 simultaneous	 endurance,	 transformation,	 and	
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fulfilment	is	what	I	have	sought	to	specify	here.	 	That	this	relates	to	creaturely	bodies	
but	 also	 to	 the	 earth	 body	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 to	 remember.	 	 Not	 only	 does	 this	
affirm	the	interconnectivity	that	has	been	central	to	my	thesis,	but	 it	also	embeds	the	
changing	processes	of	 life	 in	tangible	experiences.	 	As	Grey	(2003,	212)	so	eloquently	
writes:	
This	 is	our	yearning,	our	hope:	that	the	earth’s	woundedness	will	be	over	and	
together	we	shall	know	each	other	in	a	flowing	world	where	our	yearnings	are	
realized	 in	 truth,	 peace	 and	 love.	 	 Only	 then	 will	 we	 awaken	 to	 a	 deeper	
yearning,	and	know	ourselves	held	and	cherished	by	the	desire	of	God.	
Whilst	 Grey	 may	 here	 be	 speaking	 of	 a	 more	 fixed	 state	 than	 myself,	 we	 can	
nevertheless	use	her	assertions	to	consider	the	“flowing	world”	of	the	future	as	one	of	
endless	 realisation.	 	 This	 means	 experiencing	 relationality	 that	 is	 always	 able	 to	 be	
fulfilled,	potentiality	that	is	always	able	to	be	met,	and	bodiliness	that	is	ever‐dynamic	
and	ultimately	full	of	life.135		Moreover,	existing	as	bodies	who	are	fully	in	relation	with	
one	 another	 and	 with	 God	 within	 this	 dynamically	 changing	 eschatological	 future	
suggests	 bodies	 that	 are	 open	 to	 and	 in	 touch	 with	 their	 own	 and	 each	 other’s	
embodiments.	 	 Each	 of	 these	 facets	 underpins	my	 next	 chapter’s	 examination	 of	 the	
relationship	 of	 those	 reconstructions	 of	 the	 eschatological	 future	 to	 our	 lives	 in	 the	
present.	
	
Indeed,	these	explorations,	imaginings,	and	affirmations	would	be	pointless	and	would	
merely	 perpetuate	 the	 problems	with	 classical	 understandings	 if	 they	were	 to	 settle	
with	reconstructing	only	the	process	and	content	of	the	eschatological	future.		We	must	
also	speak	of	how	such	futurist	visions	can	inform	experiences	of	embodiment.		This	is	
not	 simply	 the	 future	 speaking	 to	 the	 present	 though.	 	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	 completion	
																																																													
135	 This	 could	 potentially	 be	 read	 as	 a	 future	 which	 is	 perpetually	 unfulfilled,	 as	 bodies	 that	
continually	 change	 could	 be	 said	 to	 be	 bodies	 that	 continually	 become	more	 than	 they	were,	
thus	meaning	that	eschatology	inevitably	contains	elements	of	loss.		However,	such	change	has	
here	been	presented	as	occurring	within	 the	divine	embrace	of	a	God	who	does	not	 forget	or	
discard	any	members	of	creation	thus	meaning	that	bodies,	in	all	of	their	shifting	and	changing,	
are	 enabled	 in	 the	 eschaton	 to	 retain	 what	 they	 once	 were	 whilst	 continuously	 becoming	
abundant	in	their	embodiments. 
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(though	 not	 closure)	 of	 the	 methodological	 cycle	 which	 begins	 with	 revaluing	 traits	
aligned	with	female	bodies	for	the	concern	of	all	bodies,	uses	that	revaluation	to	benefit	
all	experiences	of	embodiment,	and	explores	how	this	revaluation	can	help	us	all	to	live	
in	ways	that	shape	both	the	present	and	the	future.		Thus,	I	now	direct	my	focus	toward	
the	ways	 in	which	an	eschatology	 that	 is	 characterised	by	bodies	 that	experience	 the	
full	freedom	of	relationality	and	dynamic	change	may	return	to	present	experiences.		In	
so	doing,	I	will	explain	that	such	an	eschatology	can	help	us	to	consider	ways	of	living	
now.			
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4.	A	Tactile	Time136	
Introduction	
This	chapter	honours	feminist	theologians’	attentiveness	to	the	present	and	continues	
my	 own	 affirmation	 of	 present	 experiences	 by	 considering	 how	 a	 relational	 and	
dynamic	embodied	eschatology	can	be	both	created	and	anticipated	in	the	present.		The	
reconstructions	of	eschatology	that	were	developed	in	the	previous	chapters	enable	me	
now	to	speak	of	the	future	as	a	tactile	time.		That	is,	a	time	where	bodies	are	in	touch	
with	 themselves	and	one	another	 in	 the	 fullness	of	relational,	embodied	 freedom	and	
also	a	time	that	can	be	touched	in	the	present.		This	means	that	tactile	relationships	can	
be	both	signifiers	of	the	eschaton	and	the	eschaton	itself	made	present	in	the	flesh,	here	
and	now.	 	Quite	 fittingly,	 then,	 I	will	 propose	 that	 the	practice	 of	 touch	 can	 facilitate	
such	touching	of	the	future.137		In	this	way,	I	claim	that	the	future	can	not	only	inform	
our	actions	in	the	present,	but	that	the	future	itself	can	also	be	shaped	and	created	by	
those	 actions.	 138	 	 Whilst	 this	 chapter	 aligns	 itself	 with	 much	 of	 feminist	 theology’s	
locatedness	 in	 the	present,	 such	reflections	are	here	enabled	by	reading	 from	and	 for	
the	future.			
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 here	 that	 this	 is	 not	 a	 work	 in	 applied	 theology:	 my	 earlier	
constructions	are	not	merely	 speaking	 to	 practice.	 	More	 specifically,	 I	 do	not	 simply	
																																																													
136	Elements	 from	this	chapter	also	 feature,	 in	a	 significantly	 revised	 form,	 in	my	 forthcoming	
publication	“Touching	the	Future”	in	The	International	Journal	of	Public	Theology. 
137	I	propose	the	practice	of	touch	as	one	way	in	which	we	may	create	and	anticipate	the	future;	
this	does	not	exclude	other	practices	nor	does	it	present	those	who	are	capable	and	desiring	of	
touch	as	more	worthy	or	able	of	being	included	in	the	eschaton.		What	it	does	suggest,	however,	
is	that	there	are	benefits	in	both	offering	and	receiving	“good”	touch,	in	ways	that	can	both	be	
informed	by	and	can	help	to	create	the	eschaton. 
138	Again,	my	reference	to	creation	shaping	and	creating	the	future	is	not	intended	to	infer	that	
any	 such	 actions	 are	 necessary	 to	 inclusion	 in	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Nor	 should	 it	 be	 read	 as	 being	
indicative	 of	 varying	 degrees	 of	 worth	 or	 effectiveness	 in	 realising	 or	 experiencing	 the	
eschatological	 future.	 	 I	 have	 already	 presented	 a	 case	 for	 the	 universality	 and	 totality	 of	
inclusion	 in	 the	 eschaton,	 and	 we	 remember	 that	 an	 important	 addition	 to	 this	 was	 Pailin’s	
critique	 of	 the	 contributory	 notion	of	 value	 or	 “norm	of	worth”	 in	 light	 of	 the	 experiences	 of	
“severely	 handicapped	 people”	 (1992,	 96).	 	 Accordingly,	 I	 qualify	 my	 claims	 here	 and	
throughout	my	thesis	by	noting	that	it	is	our	experiences	that	are	paramount	in	shaping	God	and	
the	eschaton.	 	We	remember	Chapter	Two’s	claim	that	our	actions	and	choices	also	shape	the	
eschaton,	and	they	matter,	but	that	they	do	not	demarcate	varying	levels	of	worth	or	worthiness.		 
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impose	 an	 eschatological	 framework	 on	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 touch.	 	 Instead,	 the	
eschatological	 values	 of	 embodied	 relationality	 and	 fluidity	 are	 understood	 to	 be	
capable	 of	 being	 brought	 together,	 and	 indeed	 embodied,	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 touch.	
Neither	is	this	a	work	in	practical	or	pastoral	theology:	the	practices	explored	here	are	
not	 directive	 or	 prescriptive,	 nor	 do	 they	 begin	with	 “problems	of	 action”	 (Hermans,	
2014,	 124).	 	 Indeed,	 Hermans	 provides	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 theology	 that	 is	
practical	(or,	in	Hermans’	language,	“practice‐oriented”)	and	theology	that	is	theoretical	
(2014,	124).		He	writes	that:	
Practice‐oriented	 research	 starts	 with	 problems	 of	 action	 (decision	 making;	
discernment;	 re‐constructing	 one’s	 life	 story;	 knowing	 how	 to	 communicate	
experiences	in	the	name	of	God)	rather	than	theory	[…]	A	theoretical	problem	
arises	from	a	theoretical	issue	such	as	being	unable	to	describe	or	explain	some	
phenomenon	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 actual	 theory.	 	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	
expand	our	theory.	
	
Having	begun	my	thesis	by	expressing	my	dissatisfaction	with	theories	of	eschatology,	
and	 working	 in	 previous	 chapters	 to	 address	 this,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 present	 a	
conceptual	 or	 theoretical	 understanding	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 touch	 in	 light	 of	 these	
problems	and	constructions.		It	certainly,	though,	considers	practicality	as	it	seeks	to	be	
feasible	and	realistic,	and	beneficial	to	living	well	in	the	present.	
	
This	 chapter,	 then,	will	 firstly	offer	 an	examination	of	 the	meaning	of	 touch,	both	 for	
others	and	for	oneself.		Underpinning	this	will	be	an	affirmation	of	erotic	power	which	
draws	 together	 Chapter	 Two’s	 efforts	 to	 locate	 power	 in	 relationality,	 and	 Chapter	
Three’s	appraisals	of	embodied	lives.		An	eschatology	that	is	realised	through	relational	
power	 which	 draws	 us	 into	 experiences	 of	 dynamically	 embodied	 lives	 can	 be	 both	
created	and	anticipated	in	the	present	through	tangibly	feeling	and	embracing	our	own	
and	each	other’s	bodies.	 	 I	will	 then	move	on	to	negotiate	some	of	 the	ways	 in	which	
touch	 can	 function	 as	 both	 a	 sign	 and	 an	 embodiment	 of	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Here,	 I	 will	
explore	the	capacity	of	touch	to	communicate	the	eschatological	valuation	of	bodies;	to	
create	and	nurture	the	kind	of	dynamic	embodiments	that	typify	eschatological	life;	and	
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to	hope	for	bodies	in	response	to	difficult	experiences	of	touch.		Connected	to	this	latter	
point	 is	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 feasibility	 and	 possibility	 of	 tactile	 practices	 of	
forgiveness	and	mourning.		By	speaking	of	the	eschaton	as	a	tactile	time,	then,	I	aim	to	
show	that	the	eschatological	future	can	be	touched	in	the	present	by	bodies	touching	in	
the	present.			
	
A	Liveable	Future	
Practice	and	the	Eschaton	
My	previous	 chapters	 have	 contributed	 to	 challenging	 some	problematic	 elements	 of	
traditional	 eschatology	 by	 reconstructing	 the	 eschatological	 process	 as	 one	 in	which	
creation	is	both	involved	and	assisted,	and	the	eschatological	content	as	characterised	
by	the	transformation	of	embodied	sufferings.	 	These	claims	have	never	been	severed	
from	present	life	experiences,	but	have	instead	been	responsive	to	them.		Still,	a	more	
comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 the	 utility	 of	 such	 claims	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now	 is	
necessary.	 	Such	specificity	 is	crucial;	as	noted	 in	Chapter	One,	 Isasi‐Díaz	(2004b,	56)	
writes:	
Making	our	preferred	future	a	reality	needs	much	more	than	vague	generalities.		
Latinas’	proyecto	histórico	has	to	be	specific	enough	for	each	of	us	to	know	how	
we	are	to	participate	in	the	struggle	to	make	it	a	reality,	and	what	our	task	will	
be	when	it	becomes	a	reality.	
Interestingly,	 although	 the	 future	 that	 Isasi‐Díaz	 speaks	 of	 here	 is	 not	 necessarily	
eschatological,	Keller	helps	us	to	see	that	Isasi‐Díaz’s	perspective	is	actually	more	loyal	
to	the	origins	of	eschatological	thought	than	traditional	models	appear	to	be.		Alongside	
Isasi‐Díaz’s	caution	against	being	“co‐opted	by	the	status	quo”	(2004b,	55‐56)	that	was	
noted	 in	 Chapter	 One,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 detect	 in	 her	 emphasis	 on	 praxis	 a	 definite	
challenge	 to	 the	 status	 quo,	 for	 she	 refuses	 to	 sit	 idly	 by	 and	 await	 liberation,	 and	
instead	 calls	 for	 active	 and	 pragmatic	 work	 to	 realise	 that	 liberation	 now.	 	 This	 is	
characteristic	of	eschatology,	Keller	claims,	for	“Eschatology	in	general	is	distinguished	
by	its	indignation	in	the	face	of	injustice,	that	is,	its	prophetic	critique	of	the	status	quo”	
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(1996a,	 20).	 	 Indeed,	 Isasi‐Díaz	 claims	 that	 the	 struggle	 is	 not	 to	 be	 contrasted	with	
utopic	 imaginings	 for	 at	 heart	 utopia	 communicates	 both	 a	 “condemnation	 of	 the	
existing	order”	and	a	“forecast	of	a	different	order	of	things”	(2004a,	344).	 	Whilst,	as	
we	 have	 seen,	 eschatology	 has	 certainly	 not	 always	 served	 this	 purpose,	 its	
proclamation	 of	 a	 different	 reality	 has	 and	 can	 again	 serve	 to	 challenge	 forces	 and	
structures	 that	 oppress,	 marginalise,	 and	 devalue.	 	 Thus	 there	 is	 a	 correlation	 to	 be	
found	 here	 between	 liberationist	 proposals	 of	 praxis	 and	 my	 own	 eschatological	
concerns;	 the	 two	can	and	should	be	 concerned	with	one	another.	 	To	be	 sure,	 Isasi‐
Díaz’s	claims	are	relevant	to	my	own	as	they	highlight	that	any	vision	of	the	future	must	
contain	 within	 it	 the	 tools	 to	 make	 that	 vision	 a	 reality	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 it	 from	
becoming	a	pacifying	tool	of	oppression.	 	This	chapter,	then,	will	cohere	with	Chapter	
Two’s	 claim	 that	 creation	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 eschatological	 process	by	 specifying	how	
our	experiences	and	actions	can	shape	the	process	and	content	of	the	eschaton.		Tactile	
relationality	will	emerge	as	being	central	to	this,	in	such	a	way	that	is	both	informed	by	
and	develops	the	claims	made	in	Chapter	Two.			
	
Furthermore,	 this	 chapter	 coheres	 with	 Chapter	 Three	 by	 outlining	 the	 centrality	 of	
embodiment	 in	 this	 task,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 our	 bodies	 can	 be	 both	 signs	 and	
embodiments	of	 eschatological	 life.	 	 Indeed,	Elaine	Graham	(2009b,	83)	 explains	 that	
practical	theology	must	attend	to	experiences	of	embodiment,	for:	
a	practical	theology	that	tells	stories	of	embodiment	can	really	examine	what	it	
might	 mean	 for	 God	 to	 be	 revealed	 in	 a	 human	 body,	 broken	 and	 suffering,	
whose	resurrection	proclaims	that	love	is	stronger	than	death.				
This	is	precisely	the	God	for	whom	I	have	argued;	that	is,	a	God	who	authentically	and	
concretely	 feels	with	humanity	whilst	helping	humanity	into	embodied	experiences	of	
perpetual	and	dynamic	vitality.		Examining	the	practical	ways	in	which	our	bodies	can	
create	and	anticipate	the	eschatological	future	can	thus	further	reveal	what	it	means	for	
God,	and	for	us,	to	so	honour	and	cherish	our	bodies.		This	is	not,	however,	a	suggestion	
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that	the	eschaton	can	be	fully	realised	now.	 	The	eschaton	differs	from	the	present,	 in	
ways	presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	and	we	require	God’s	final	help	to	universally	
and	fully	experience	this,	as	Chapter	Two	argued.		As	such,	and	given	the	nature	of	my	
reconstructions,	the	eschaton	holds	the	power	not	to	delay	liberation	or	pacify	creation,	
but	rather	to	inform	and	direct	our	practices	in	a	way	that	is	infused	with	hope.		Thus,	
whilst	 our	 attempts	 to	 cultivate	 certain	 practices	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now	 may	 fail	 or	
flounder,	they	are	both	worth	the	effort	and	a	prophetic	sign	of	the	future.	
	
Touch	and	the	Eschaton	
It	 is	appropriate	that	the	discussions	in	this	chapter	hinge	on	an	exploration	of	touch,	
for	touch	bears	the	capacity	to	call	eschatology	out	of	its	lofty,	inaccessible	future	and	
make	it	tangible	in	and	amongst	our	bodies.		A	focus	on	touch	is	further	substantiated	
by	an	eschaton	that	is	characterised	by	God’s	embodied	perceptions	of	the	experiences	
of	creation,	and	by	God’s	tactile	responses	to	them.		Furthermore,	it	emerges	from	the	
fulfilment	 of	 such	 embodied	 relationality,	 wherein	 embodied	 processes	 abound	with	
dynamism.	 	 When	 combined,	 these	 two	 proposals	 suggest	 that	 both	 the	 relational	
process	 and	 the	embodied	 content	 of	 the	eschaton	are	 tactile;	 comprised	of	 touching	
(feeling)	beings	and	beings	who	are	touched	(affected	or	changed).	 	This	can	speak	to	
and	direct	our	moves	to	touch	in	the	present,	but	the	relationship	between	the	present	
and	the	future	is	much	more	dialogical	than	this.		The	practice	of	tactility	in	the	present	
can	 serve	 as	 a	 prophetic	 encounter	 which	 reveals	 something	 about,	 and	 can	 help	 to	
create,	what	the	future	will	be.		If	present	bodies	are	valued	and	can	be	used	to	rethink	
eschatology,	then	touch	can	be	upheld	as	a	significant	aspect	of	our	moves	to	create	and	
anticipate	 the	 eschatological	 future.	 	 Touch	 is	 itself,	 in	 this	 way,	 eschatological;	 an	
assertion	similarly	upheld	by	F.	Dean	Lueking	(1997,	337),	who	claims	that:	
[Touch]	 points	 us	 to	 the	 future.	 	 The	 risen	 Lord’s	 invitation	 to	 touch	 and	 see	
portends	what	 is	 yet	 to	 come	 for	 our	 bodies.	 	We	 long	 for	 that	 fulfilment,	 to	
embrace	the	Christ	and	those	long	gone	from	us.	
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By	 tangibly	 embracing	 our	 own	 and	 each	 other’s	 bodies,	 we	 can	 thus	 participate	 in	
touching	the	body	of	Christ	and	participate	in	the	body	of	God.139		An	eschatology	where	
all	 draw	 near	 and	 are	 drawn	 into	 the	 fullness	 of	 relationship,	 in	 all	 of	 the	 material	
fluidity	 of	 their	 embodiments,	 is	 yet‐to‐be	 in	 fullness,	 but	 also	 radically	 intimate	 and	
tangible.			
	
The	Meanings	of	Touch140	
Touch	and	Life	
Further	 to	 these	 appraisals	 of	 touch,	 touch	 also	 has	 value	 and	 even	 necessity	 in	 our	
present	 lives.	 	 Cristina	Traina	has	observed	 that	 “Evidence	 is	 growing	 that	humans	–	
especially	children	–	have	a	physical,	psychological,	and	spiritual	need	for	a	steady	diet	
of	 touch”	 (2005,	6‐7).	 	Touch,	 then,	 is	 a	developmental	necessity	 (the	 complexities	of	
which	 will	 shortly	 be	 explored)	 which	 can	 and	 should	 operate	 through	 and	 seek	 to	
cultivate	relational	embodiments.	 	 Indeed,	without	nurturing	and	nourishing	 touch	 in	
the	 early	 stages	 of	 a	 child’s	 life,	 growth	 and	 development	 are	 simply	 not	 possible.		
Gupta	 and	 Schork	 add	 to	 this	 that	 touch	 may	 be	 crucial	 in	 developing	 a	 sense	 of	
embodied	 self‐validation;	 that	 is,	 validation	 of	 one’s	 own	 embodied	 self	 and	 one’s	
bodily	self‐image.		From	studying	the	relationship	between	“perceived	tactile	nurturing	
during	childhood”	and	body‐dissatisfaction	(Gupta	and	Schork,	1995,	185),	Gupta	and	
Schork	 have	 observed	 that	 “physical	 modes	 of	 nurturing,	 that	 is,	 nurturance	 by	
touching	and	hugging,	are	of	importance	in	the	development	of	body	image,	especially	
among	females”	(1995,	188).		They	go	on	to	assert	(1995,	188)	that	this:	
																																																													
139	 Eiesland	and	Vanier	 both	name	 this	 participation	 in	 the	body	as	 freedom	 (Eiesland,	 1994,	
119;	Vanier,	1999,	133),	thus	corroborating	my	claims	in	Chapter	Two	that	the	eschaton	realises	
rather	than	compromises	freedom.		 
140	Touch	may	be	defined	as	having	both	physical	and	spiritual	elements;	however,	I	suggest	that	
feeling	 touched	 spiritually	 or	 emotionally	also	affects	 and	 is	 felt	 physically.	 	 As	 such	 I	 do	 not	
subscribe	to	a	dualistic	understanding	of	these	dimensions	of	touch	but	rather	speak	of	touching	
as	always	having	both	physical	and	psychological	aspects.	
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may	be	an	indication	that	a	certain	amount	of	physical	validation,	such	as	that	
offered	 by	 touching	 and	 hugging,	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	
healthy	sense	of	the	physical	self	or	a	healthy	body	image.		
Lovingly	touching	the	bodies	of	others,	then,	can	cultivate	both	physical	and	emotional	
health	 and	development.	 	This	has	particular	 significance	 for	women	given	 the	many	
ways	in	which	the	Christian	tradition	has	devalued	women’s	bodies;	sentiments	which	
have	consistently	been	challenged	throughout	this	thesis.		An	eschatological	future	that	
is	characterised	by	the	tangible	divine	caress	and	embrace	of	our	embodied	selves	can	
encourage	 us	 to	 live	 as	 body‐signs	 of	 such	 a	 future	 through	 lovingly	 touching	 one	
another.		In	so	doing,	we	can	literally	flesh	out	our	hope.			
	
It	is	not	only	the	case	that	touch	is	crucial	to	the	development	of	life;	even	before	this,	
we	may	claim	that	touch	is	crucial	to	the	very	creation	of	life.		Wirzba	even	goes	so	far	
as	 to	 say	 that	 “touch	 is	 inseparable	 from	 life	 itself:	 no	 animal	 is	 deprived	 of	 touch	
without	 also	 being	 deprived	 of	 life”	 (2008,	 232).	 	 Given	 my	 constructions	 of	 the	
eschaton	as	a	process	and	place	 that	 is	 relationally	embodied	and	dynamically	 full	of	
life,	 touch	must	also	be	an	 integral	aspect	of	our	dynamically	embodied	 futures.141	 	A	
focus	on	touch	here,	then,	is	appropriate	on	the	twofold	and	inseparable	bases	of	life	in	
the	present	 and	 life	 in	 the	eschaton.	 	 In	 further	development	of	 these	 claims,	both	F.	
Dean	Lueking	 and	Hugh	Thomson	Kerr	make	 reference	 to	Michelangelo’s	Creation	of	
Adam	 in	order	 to	highlight	 the	significance	of	 touch	 to	creation	 (Dean	Lueking,	1997,	
337;	Thomson	Kerr,	1954,	1).	 	Of	course,	the	image	referred	to	here	casts	two	men	in	
the	starring	roles,	and	so	we	must	cast	a	feminist	lens	on	this	in	order	to	challenge	any	
allusions	 to	normative	masculinity.	 	Mayra	Rivera	helps	us	do	this	as	she	re‐imagines	
																																																													
141	In	light	of	this	claim	it	may	seem	to	be	an	oversight	that	touch	was	not	a	central	focus	of	the	
previous	chapter;	however,	 time	needed	to	be	taken	there	to	affirm	bodily	processes,	as	these	
have	 been	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 banishment	 of	 female	 bodies	 from	 eschatological	 existence.	 	 By	
constructing	an	eschatology	 that	affirms	 these	processes	 I	 am	able,	 in	 this	chapter,	 to	explore	
how	these	embodiments	can	be	felt	and	lived	in	the	present	in	ways	that	both	reflect	and	shape	
the	future.		Furthermore,	tactility	and	tangibility	was	seen	in	Chapter	Two	to	be	a	central	feature	
of	God’s	relationships	with	creation,	thus	adding	explicit	support	for	my	focus	here. 
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the	 original	 touch	 in	 the	 context	 of	 birth.	 	 Rivera	 claims	 that	 “In	 the	 beginning	was	
touch”	and	that	“Touch	draws	our	attention	to	our	beginning	in	the	womb,	awakening	
us	to	the	memories	of	its	primordial	caress	inscribed	in	the	flesh”	(2007,	89).		Thus	the	
original	creative	touch	can	be	thought	of	not	as	the	instantaneous	and	barely	touching	
finger	 that	 (the	male)	God	 extends	 to	Adam,	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 involved	 and	 intimate	
maternal	 touch	 that	 caresses	 life	 into	 being.142	 	 Such	 an	 understanding	 suggests	 we	
practise	“touching	one	another	 into	 life”	(Heyward,	1989,	135).	 	Newness	and	vitality	
were	seen	to	be	integral	aspects	of	the	eschaton,	and	we	can	embody	such	a	future	now	
by	reaching	out	to	others	 in	ways	that	birth	new	experiences	of	 life.	 	This	 life	may	be	
literal,	or	it	may	pertain	to	enlivened	relationships.		The	practice	of	loving	touch,	then,	
can	draw	us	all	into	a	newness	that	is	both	a	sign	of	the	eschaton	and	a	reality	that	can	
be	lived	now.			
	
Touch	and	Female	Bodies	
We	 remember	 that	 female	 bodies	 have	 been	 characterised	 as	more	 embodied,	more	
material,	 than	 male	 bodies;	 attending	 to	 touch	 can	 assist	 in	 reclaiming	 the	
incontrovertible	 value	 of	 bodies	 as	 touch	 is	 necessarily	 embodied.	 	 It	 is	 a	 fleshy	 and	
material,	 rather	 than	 solely	 intellectual	 or	 symbolic	 act.	 	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	
prioritisation	of	the	latter	permeates	the	Christian	tradition,	and	this	has	been	to	such	a	
degree	that	the	power	of	touch	has	often	been	denied.		This	is	not	surprising	given	the	
Christian	 tradition’s	 consistent	 disavowal	 of	 anything	 associated	 with	 bodies	 and	
materiality.		Carter	Heyward	has	observed	that	traditionally,	feeling	has	been	paralleled	
with	 ignorance	 and	 has	 been	 deemed	 “an	 impediment	 to	 ‘objectivity’	 and	 thus	 to	
knowing	 what	 is	 either	 true	 or	 good”	 (Heyward,	 1989,	 6).	 	 Similarly,	 arguments	 for	
																																																													
142	Ann	Grifalconi	has	re‐imaged	Michaelangelo’s	depiction	in	her	piece	And	God	Created	Woman	
in	Her	Own	Image,	which	appropriately	features	as	the	cover	art	for	Carter	Heyward’s	Touching	
Our	Strength	(1989).		Less	helpful,	perhaps,	is	the	transposition	of	the	image	such	that	the	touch	
is	still	minimal;	whilst	providing	a	useful	re‐gendering	of	creative	touch,	then,	a	more	involved	
and	intimate	touch	is	needed,	as	I	attempt	to	articulate	here.		 
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God’s	 intangibility	 pervade	 and	 invade	 the	 Christian	 tradition.	 	 We	 saw	 earlier	 how	
God’s	 understanding	 of	 creation	 has	 commonly	 been	 constructed	 as	 immediate	 and	
complete;	 neither	 requiring	 nor	 being	 affected	 by	 relationships	 with	 creation.	 	 By	
presenting	 God	 as	 literally	 “out	 of	 touch”	 with	 the	 world,	 such	 views	 have	 claimed	
divine	 justification	 for	 either	 the	 disassociation	 of	 “feeling”	 from	 “knowing”	 or	 the	
discrediting	 of	 the	 kind	 of	 “knowing”	 that	 “feeling”	 enables.	 	 Lorde	 develops	 this	 by	
noting	the	gendered	associations	made	between	feeling	(named	by	Lorde	as	eros)	and	
femininity	and	the	subsequent	vilification	of	both	(1984,	53).	 	Thus,	tactility	has	been	
constructed	 as	 antithetical	 to	 divinity	 through	 its	 association	 with	 materiality	 and,	
accordingly,	with	the	female	body.143						
	
Sara	Wuthnow	adds	further	substance	to	these	claims	concerning	a	marked	suspicion	
of	 touch	 within	 the	 tradition,	 and	 notes	 how	 the	 early	 Christian	 church	 initially	
recognised	the	power	of	touch,	but	in	so	doing	sought	to	restrict	this	power	to	those	it	
deemed	worthy	 of	 possessing	 such	 power.	 	 	 Being	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 hierarchical	
“chain	 of	 command”,	 Wuthnow	 observes,	 meant	 that	 women	 and	 the	 body	 were	
excluded	 from	 the	practice	 of	 touch	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 the	practice	 of	 touch	became	
restricted	to	church	leaders	and	“focussed	upon	spiritual	rather	than	physical	healing”	
(1997,	 223).	 	 The	 power	 of	 touch	was,	 however,	 “too	 pervasive	 to	 be	 subdued”	 and	
Wuthnow	 observes	 the	 central	 role	 that	 women	 played	 and	 continue	 to	 play	 in	
reclaiming	and	practising	touch	(1997,	223).		It	is	thus	appropriate	to	speak	of	tactility	
as	a	means	of	revaluing	bodies	generally	and	female	bodies	specifically,	 for	touch	has	
long	 been	 employed	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 subversion	 by	 women	 but	 has	 been	 overlooked,	
devalued,	 and	 controlled	 by	 a	 patriarchal	 system	which	 sought	 to	 quell	 the	 presence	
and	practices	of	female	bodies.		Such	powerful	practises	of	tactility	must	be	given	space	
																																																													
143	Even	some	who	wish	 to	affirm	 the	power	of	 touch	nevertheless	 conclude	 that	 “there	 is	no	
getting	away	from	the	 fact	 that	we	cannot	 touch	God”	(Pavey,	2013,	5;	cf.	Wirzba,	2008,	241).		
This	seems	to	overlook	the	radical	tactility	of	Jesus,	which	will	shortly	be	explored. 
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to	speak,	and	it	 is	crucial	to	partake	 in	the	moves	(however	tentative	or	marginalised	
they	may,	 to	 this	 point,	 have	 been)	 toward	 reclaiming	 and	 revaluing	 both	 embodied	
relations	and	tactility.			
	
Touch	 is	 still	more	 relevant	 and	 appropriate	 as	 a	way	 by	which	 to	 revalue	 bodies	 in	
ways	that	harmonise	with	my	moves	thus	far,	as	it	also	bears	the	capacity	to	challenge	
and	reunite	the	previously	dichotomised	and	gendered	categories	of	the	body	and	the	
mind,	and	the	physical	and	the	spiritual.		Feeling	touched	spiritually	or	emotionally	can	
be	understood	to	be	inseparable	from	the	physical	location	in	and	on	which	this	occurs.		
The	physical	dimension	of	touch	is	thus	presented	as	more	than	just	the	transmitter	of	
the	 cognisant	 or	 intellectual;	 it	 is	 also	 the	 only	 location	we	 have	 for	what	 is	 felt	 and	
known.		As	such	I	do	not	subscribe	to	a	dualistic	understanding	of	these	dimensions	of	
touch	but	 rather	 speak	of	 touching	 as	 always	having	both	physical	 and	psychological	
aspects.	 	 Touch,	 then,	 can	 unite	 what	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 has	 often	 severed;	 the	
intellectual	and	the	emotional,	 the	spiritual	and	the	material,	 the	male	and	the	female	
and	 the	 future	 and	 the	 present.	 	 Touch,	 here,	 is	 a	 fleshy	 and	 thoroughly	 embodied	
language	which	can	communicate	the	eschatological	valuation	of	bodies.	 	The	practice	
of	 touch	can	 reclaim	and	 re‐sanctify	 that	which	has	been	gendered	and	subsequently	
delegitimised	 under	 patriarchal	 theological	 constructs	 of	 eschatology.	 	 It	 can	 be	
extracted	from	its	patriarchal	construction	as	a	spiritualised	practice	belonging	to	men	
alone	by	claiming	it	as	a	physical,	embodied	practice	for	all	of	creation.		In	short,	to	use	
Nelson’s	eloquent	phrasing,	we	can	live	as	“body	words	of	love”	(1992,	52)	by	making	
this	reparation	a	tangible	reality.			
	
The	Functions	of	Touch	
Communicating	the	Affirmation	of	Bodies	
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Attending	 to	 touch	 is	 thus	 an	 appropriate	 and	meaningful	 way	 in	which	 to	 consider	
living	the	eschaton.		Touch	can,	for	instance,	be	understood	as	a	way	of	reaching	out	to	
the	 other	 in	 a	 loving	 affirmation	 of	 their	 existence	 which	 makes	 present	 the	
eschatological	affirmation	of	bodies.	 	 In	order	to	consider	this	 in	more	depth,	we	may	
firstly	explore	the	suggestion	that	touch	has	the	ability	to	teach	or	communicate.	 	We	
saw	 a	moment	 ago	 how	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 has	 denied	 or	 sought	 to	 control	 this	
power,	particularly	in	relation	to	female	bodies.		The	abstraction	of	the	power	of	touch	
from	 bodies,	 and	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 power	 of	 such	 touch	 in	 creating	 wisdom	 or	
knowledge	 is,	 however,	 challenged	 by	 knowledge	 itself.	 	 Holler,	 explaining	 the	
developments	 within	 neurological	 research	 and	 evolutionary	 biology,	 asserts	 that	
“cognition	emerges	 in	 the	 totality	 that	 is	 the	 lived	body”	 (2002,	61).	 	We	know,	 then,	
because	we	feel,	and	our	knowledge	of	 the	world	and	of	each	other	can	only	 increase	
when	 we	 learn	 to	 be	 in	 touch	 with	 such	 feeling.	 	 Similarly,	 we	 can	 claim	 that	 such	
embodied	 engagements	 with	 sentience	 and	 tactility	 are	 also	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 God	
comes	to	know.		Indeed,	in	Chapter	Two	I	argued	that	God	must	be	relational	in	order	
to	 know	 creation.	 	 This	 framing	 of	 knowledge	 benefited	 from	 Grace	 Jantzen’s	
interpretation	 of	 God’s	 knowledge	 as	 understanding	 rather	 than	 data‐retrieval;	 such	
understanding	was	deemed	to	be	enabled	by	God’s	tangible	and	intimate	relationships	
with	creation.		
	
God	 knows,	 then,	 because	 God	 is	 touched	 by	 creation	 (Jantzen,	 1984a,	 83).	 	 This	
touching	 occurs	 when	 we	 touch	 one	 another;	 our	 touching	 can	 be	 empowering	 or	
abusive	(as	will	later	be	explored),	and	God	feels	the	effects	of	both.		It	is	clear	that	God	
intends	 the	 former,	 though,	 and	 this	 is	 no	more	 evident	 than	 in	 the	 stories	 of	 Jesus	
touching	 and	 being	 touched.	 	 Rather	 than	 subscribing	 to	 the	 typical	 vilification	 of	
Thomas	as	the	great	“doubter”,	for	example,	we	may	see	him	as	one	with	the	courage	to	
take	 up	 the	 invitation	 to	 touch.	 	 Epperly	 describes	 Thomas	 as	 “a	 model	 for	 faithful	
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wrestling	 with	 the	 mysteries	 of	 the	 resurrection	 life”	 (2001,	 218).	 	 Amy	 Hunter	
expounds	 this	 by	 claiming	 that	 Thomas	 was	 one	 who	 had	 the	 courage	 to	 come	 out	
about	 his	 doubt,	 born	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 understand	 the	 resurrected	 Jesus	 (2002,	 17).		
Whilst	Hunter	suggests	this	doubt	was	quashed	upon	merely	seeing	Jesus’	hands,	John	
20.25	 relays	Thomas’s	desire	 to	 touch,	with	20.27	displaying	 Jesus’	openness	 to	 such	
touch.	 	 This	 suggests	 that	 Jesus	 understood	 the	 power	 of	 touch	 in	 communicating	
understanding	and,	ultimately,	faith.		It	also	recalls	Morris’s	assertion	that	these	actions	
of	Jesus	signal	a	God	who	understands	and	relates	to	creation	in	a	tangible	and	personal	
manner	(see	Morris,	2008,	152‐153).	 	We	find	yet	more	useful	models	when	we	again	
look	to	the	woman	in	Mark	5.25‐34,	whose	courageous	touching	of	Jesus	resulted	in	the	
cessation	of	her	bleeding	and	the	elimination	of	her	disease.	 	In	this	passage,	we	read	
that	upon	touching	Jesus’	clothes,	the	woman	“immediately	[…]	felt	in	her	body	that	she	
was	healed	of	her	disease”	and	that	with	a	similar	immediacy,	Jesus	felt	“that	power	had	
gone	 forth	 from	 him”	 (Mark	 5.29‐30).	 	 This	 example	 also	 shows	 how	 touch	 enables	
power	to	be	shared	and	not	owned,	even	by	Jesus.	 	God’s	universal	receptiveness	and	
responsiveness	 to	 touch,	 as	manifest	 in	 these	 two	 examples	 and,	 indeed,	 throughout	
Jesus’	 ministry,	 signals	 to	 us	 a	 radical	 vision	 of	 an	 embodied	 eschatology,	 whereby	
those	who	are	hurting,	far	from	being	“untouchable”,	are	invited	to	touch	the	very	flesh	
of	God.			
	
This	vision	and	 this	practice	 is	 radical,	 for	 it	has	 the	 capacity	 to	draw	us	 close	 to	 the	
marginalised	 and	 excluded	 in	 a	 way	 that	 both	 makes	 the	 eschatological	 embrace	 of	
bodies	tangible	and	adds	character	to	the	nature	of	that	embrace.		Morris	(2008,	103)	
develops	this	by	highlighting	the	transformative	nature	of	such	touch.		He	writes	that:	
To	touch	certain	disabled	persons	would	have	meant	that	Jesus	himself	would	
have	become	ritually	impure	and	outcast	[…]	and	would	remain	so	until	he	was	
‘purified’	 again.	 	 However,	 each	 person	 he	 comes	 into	 contact	 with	 becomes	
part	of	 society	once	more	and	by	 touching	 them	 it	 is	 they	who	become	 ‘pure’	
rather	 than	 Jesus	 becoming	 ‘impure’,	 it	 is	 they	who	 are	 included	 rather	 than	
Jesus	becoming	excluded.				
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Jesus’	 touch	 can	 here	 be	 seen	 as	 not	 only	 including	 the	 marginalised	 but	 also	 as	
effectively	and	powerfully	touching	their	lives	in	a	transformative	manner.		The	sharing	
of	power	that	Jesus	practises	serves	to	transform	the	lives	of	the	marginalised,	and	this	
can	signal	to	us	a	way	in	which	we	too	can	use	the	power	of	touch	in	order	to	make	the	
full	 eschatological	 embrace	of	 bodies	 graspable.	 	 Indeed,	Thomson	Kerr	 explains	 that	
such	touching	assists	our	understanding	of	the	redemptive	love	of	God	(1954,	2),	and	
this	 is	 evident	 in	 Nancy	 Eiesland’s	 relaying	 of	 her	 own	 experiences	 of	 such	 touch.		
Whilst	 having	 experienced	 improper	 or	 inappropriate	 touch,	 Eiesland	 also	 speaks	 of	
being	present	at	a	meeting	wherein	a	group	of	nuns	touched	her	body	with	care	in	such	
a	way	that	“Their	touch	and	tears	were	the	body	practices	of	inclusion”.		She	goes	on	to	
name	 this	 experience	 as	 being	 one	 of	 “physical	 redemption”	 whereby	 her	 body	was	
redeemed	for	God”	(1994,	116).144		Again,	then,	we	see	the	power	of	physical	touch	in	
communicating	God’s	tangible	and	intimate	embrace	and	welcome	of	all.			
	
Envisioning	 the	 eschaton	 as	 a	 place	 of	 the	 full	 experience	 of	 this	 embodied	 embrace	
means	 that	we	 can	 be	 heartened	 in	 our	moves	 to	 practise	 such	 touch	 now.	 	 Indeed,	
Vanier	alludes	to	there	being	an	eschatological	dimension	to	such	inclusive,	embracing	
touch.	 	 Commenting	 on	 Jesus	 washing	 his	 disciples’	 feet,	 Vanier	 detects	 a	 particular	
significance	in	the	inference	that	Judas	would	have	been	present	in	this	group.		Vanier	
is	 certainly	not	 equating	 Judas	with	disabled	persons,	 but	 rather	 seeking	 to	highlight	
that	Jesus’	embodied	act	of	tactility	here	shows	that	“nothing	on	earth	is	so	unworthy	it	
cannot	 be	 included	 in	 the	 kingdom	 of	 love”	 (1988,	 48).	 	 Touch,	 then,	 can	 signify	
inclusion	into	the	universal	embrace	of	God,	which	may	also	consist	of	forgiveness	(as	
in	 the	 case	 of	 Judas,	 and	 as	 will	 be	 explored	 later	 on	 in	 this	 chapter),	 but	 which	 is	
																																																													
144	 This	 is	 all	 the	 more	 significant	 given	 Morris’s	 observations	 that	 “In	 the	 Judaeo‐Christian	
tradition,	God	 cannot	be	 seen	or	 touched	because	he	 is	holy.	 	 That	which	 is	holy	has	become	
untouchable	just	as	those	who,	at	the	opposite	extreme,	have	become	untouchable”	(2008,	153).		
This	 also	 speaks	 to	 the	 necessity	 of	 reconfiguring	 God	 as	 one	who	 is	 relational	 in	 a	 tangible,	
intimate	manner,	as	Chapter	Two	proposed. 
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primarily	 about	 embracing	 all	 bodies,	 and	 especially	 those	whom	 society	may	 deem	
“unworthy”.	 	 Fuelled	by	 the	 conviction	 that	all	 “are	held	 in	 the	arms	of	God”	 (Vanier,	
1999,	124),	our	touching	can	thus	be	understood	as	being	immensely	meaningful.		We	
can	craft	our	own	hands	into	the	very	hands	of	God	as	we	touch	those	God	welcomes	
and	embraces,	both	now	and	fully	in	the	eschaton.	
	
In	light	of	this,	it	can	be	claimed	that	touch	provides	us	with	the	power	to	embody	both	
the	 realisation	 and	 the	 particular	 content	 of	 the	 eschaton	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 offers	
specific	and	practical	affirmations	of	bodies.		We	remember	that	in	Chapter	Two	power	
was	located	in	relationality	and	as	such	was	understood	to	be	true	only	insomuch	as	it	
is	shared	between	God	and	creation.		According	to	Carter	Heyward,	this	is	the	essence	
of	eros:	the	sensual	sharing	of	power	in	which	we	“see,	hear,	touch,	smell,	and	taste	the	
divine”	 as	we	 strive	 to	 cultivate	 empowering	 relationships	 (1989,	 94).	 	We	 are	most	
powerful	when	we	are	sensuously	engaged	in	this	process	of	cultivating	relationships,	
and	 our	 moves	 to	 achieve	 this	 can	 indicate	 our	 power	 to	 embody	 the	 eschaton.	 	 In	
addition	to	this,	erotic	touch	empowers	us	to	join	with	others	in	this	task	and	thereby	
effect	genuine	change.145		This	passion	for	action,	for	“acutely	and	fully”	feeling	what	we	
do,	typifies	Audre	Lorde’s	reading	of	eros	(1984,	54)	and	is	fostered	by	being	“in	touch	
with	the	power	of	the	erotic	within	ourselves”	(Lorde,	1984,	58).		This,	she	claims,	can	
“give	us	the	energy	to	pursue	genuine	change	within	our	world”	(1984,	59).		Thus	there	
is	a	need	to	develop	a	practice	of	being	in	touch	with	others	and	ourselves	in	order	to	
embody	eros	and,	I	add,	a	relationally	embodied	eschaton.		Whilst	Heyward	and	Lorde,	
like	 many	 others	 I	 have	 engaged	 with,	 direct	 their	 attention	 primarily	 to	 present	
concerns,	Friedman	and	Irwin	(1990,	397)	propose	that	eros	necessarily	looks	forward.		
They	claim	that:	
																																																													
145	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 “erotic	 touch”	 is	 not	 simply	 sexual	 touch	 but	 encompasses	 all	
intimate,	relational	 touching,	 for	as	Friedman	and	Irwin	note,	eros	 is	not	“limited	to	–	or	even	
necessarily	connected	with	–	genital	sexuality”	(1990,	404). 
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eros	 teaches	 persons	 to	 rebel	 against	 oppressive	 structures	 and	 life‐denying	
values;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 helps	 them	 discover	 new	 values	 and	 modes	 of	
relationship	to	replace	the	old.		
These	“new	values	and	modes	of	relationship”	can	be	informed	by	the	eschaton	I	have	
constructed	as	 it	 speaks	of	 a	novel,	 transformed	existence.	 	Touch	 is,	 then,	 a	practice	
which	 embodies	 erotic	 power	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 helps	 creation	 to	 share	 not	 only	 the	
struggles	and	joys	of	present	life	but	also	the	task	and	hope	of	realising	eschatological	
life.	
	
Further	 to	 this,	 Audre	 Lorde	 notes	 the	 etymology	 of	 eros,	 asserting	 that	 it	
communicates	 “the	 personification	 of	 love	 in	 all	 its	 aspects	 –	 born	 of	 Chaos,	 and	
personifying	creative	power	and	harmony”.		It	is	for	this	reason	that	Lorde	claims	eros	
fills	 us	 with	 the	 power	 to	 live	 lives	 which	 embody	 a	 “creative	 energy	 empowered”	
(1984,	 55).	 	 Carter	Heyward	 adds	 to	 this	 that	 the	 erotic	 “is	 our	most	 fully	 embodied	
experience	of	the	love	of	God”	(1989,	99).		The	intensity	and	efficacy	of	literally	feeling	
our	own	and	each	other’s	embodiments	can	thus	affirm	the	very	bodies	that	we	are	by	
engaging	their	sensuality	and	embracing	their	tactility.	 	Tactile,	erotic	power	is	thus	a	
power	that	creates	and	connects	rather	than	a	power	that	dominates	and	destroys;	in	
this	way,	it	images	the	relational	God	I	argued	for	in	Chapter	Two.		Heyward	names	this	
connection	 as	 a	 power	 that	 calls	 us	 “into	 our	 most	 fully	 human	 possibilities,	 more	
deeply	into	the	joy	we	know	ourselves	capable	of	when	we	are	in	touch	with	who	we	
are	created	to	be”	(1993,	232).	 	It	is,	 in	short,	the	power	to	be	ourselves	which,	as	we	
have	seen,	can	be	said	to	typify	the	relational	freedom	of	eschatological	life.			
	
Given	this	understanding	of	touch	as	embodying	erotic	power,	we	can	also	affirm	with	
Heyward	 that	 “sensuality	 is	 a	 foundation	 for	 our	 authority”	 (1989,	 93)	 and	 thus	
reaffirm	 the	 communicative	 power	 of	 touch.	 	 We	 have	 seen	 how	 touch	 can	
communicate	and	make	present	God’s	embrace	of	all	bodies,	and	I	now	add	to	this	that	
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our	understanding	of	others	can	be	achieved	 through	 this	sensuality,	 this	 touch.	 	The	
eschatological	affirmation	of	bodies	can,	in	this	way,	encourage	us	to	live	as	beings	who	
are	 thoroughly	 embedded	 in	 our	 embodiments.	 	 Moreover,	 we	 can	 see	 such	
embeddedness	as	being	alive	with	meaning	and	intent	insomuch	as	it	holds	the	power	
to	make	manifest	the	future	and	embody	the	very	nature	of	the	future	that	it	touches.		
By	touching	and	being	touched	we	learn	to	be	in	touch	with	our	own	and	each	other’s	
bodies,	and	in	so	doing	make	manifest	God’s	eschatological	intentions	for	fully	intimate	
and	embodied	relations.	 	In	addition	to	cultivating	our	understanding	of	others,	touch	
can	also	help	us	to	communicate	this	understanding;	to	reveal	to	the	other	that	they	are	
understood.		Touch	can	therefore	be	practised	as	a	way	of	reaching	out	to	others	in	an	
empathetic	affirmation	of	their	existences.	 	In	reaching	out	and	touching	the	bodies	of	
others	 we	 are	 able	 to	 communicate	 a	 sense	 of	 community,	 that	 is,	 both	 a	 shared	
existence	 now	 and	 a	 shared	 future	 existence.	 	 This	 is	 communal,	 for	 the	 shared	
existence	we	experience	in	the	eschaton	is	not	merely	co‐existence,	but	is	a	dynamically	
relational	existence	typified	by	diversity.	 	Moreover,	the	erotic	power	by	which	this	is	
realised	 is	 passionate	 and	 engaged	with	 others;	 it	 feels	 the	 pains	 and	 joys	 of	 others	
through	tangibly	sharing	them.		As	such,	understanding	others	and	communicating	that	
understanding	through	touch	creates	erotic	power	which	embodies	in	the	present	the	
existences	that	we	anticipate	and	similarly	create	in	the	future.			
	
Thus,	alongside	being	empathetic,	 touch	can	also	be	prophetic;	 it	can	say	to	the	other	
that	 their	 existence	 is	 meaningful	 both	 now	 and	 in	 the	 future.	 	 An	 eschaton	 that	 is	
characterised	by	a	simultaneous	endurance	and	transformation	of	embodied	existences	
can	call	us	to	feel	another’s	pain	by	acknowledging	its	reality	and	its	impact	on	identity	
whilst	 also	 embodying	 a	 hope	 for	 the	 impermanence	 of	 such	 pain.	 	 Moreover,	 by	
sharing	 in	 joy	 we	 can	 touch	 the	 anticipation	 of	 an	 unmitigated	 experience	 of	 bodily	
dynamism.		We	remember	Elizabeth	Johnson’s	assertion	that	God’s	glory	is	manifest	in	
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women	being	fully	alive,	and	that	such	aliveness	anticipates	the	full	experience	of	that	
glory	(2002,	15).		A	tactile	acknowledgement	of	one	another’s	embodied	existences	can	
thus	also	image	and	communicate	God’s	glory	as	it	will	be	fully	realised	in	the	eschaton.		
Moreover,	 relating	 to	others	 in	such	a	way	has	 the	ability	 to	make	 the	relational	God	
both	tangible	and	present	to	the	other,	for	we	remember	that	God	encounters	temporal	
beings	 in	 order	 to	 impart	 empathy	 to	 us;	 a	 sense	 that	 our	 experiences	 are	 both	
understood	 and	 shared.	 	 In	 reaching	 out	 to	 the	 other	 we	 not	 only	 show	 that	 we	
empathise	with	them	but	also	that	God	empathises	with	them.		This	prophetic	empathy	
can	be	enabled	by	a	touch	which	is	erotic;	that	is,	a	touch	which	relationally	shares	in	
and	feels	the	experiences	of	others.	
	
Embracing	Different	Bodies146	
Still,	 touch	 is	 undoubtedly	 a	 complex	 practice,	 not	 only	 because	 of	 its	 capacity	 to	 be	
abused	(as	shall	later	be	explored)	but	even	prior	to	this,	it	calls	us	to	ask	questions	of	
how	we	relate	to	others.		As	Traina	(2005,	25)	notes:	
When	I	 touch,	 I	must	ask	not	only	[…]	 ‘Is	my	touch	good	for	the	human	race?’	
and	‘Is	my	touch	good	for	me?’	but	also	‘How	will	the	other	receive	my	touch?’	
and	‘is	my	touch	good	for	the	other	and	for	our	relationship?’		
There	is	clearly	a	dynamic	and	multifaceted	interplay	between	one’s	relationships	with	
oneself	and	one’s	relationship	with	others	here:	we	can	practise	a	touch	that	 is	“good	
for	the	other”	and	good	for	ourselves	in	our	relationships	with	others.		In	so	doing,	such	
touching	 can	 therefore	 be	 indicative	 of	 eschatological	 fullness	 of	 relationality.	 	 The	
notion	of	embrace	again	emerges	as	beneficial	here;	 that	 is,	embrace	understood	as	a	
tactile	 openness	 to	 relations	 with	 other	 embodied	 beings.	 	 Such	 embrace	 can	 make	
manifest	a	relational	affirmation	of	the	enduring	worth	of	all	bodies	which	both	images	
the	eschaton	and	helps	to	create	 it.	 	 I	earlier	proposed	a	model	of	divine	relationality	
																																																													
146	The	ways	in	which	touch	can	function	in	our	relationships	with	others	is	woven	throughout	
this	chapter	and	 is	 therefore	not	 limited	to	 this	section	alone.	 	Still,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	spend	time	
here	negotiating	some	of	the	complexities	of	tactile	relations	with	diverse	others. 
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which	 embraces	 both	 space	 and	 intimacy	 in	 ways	 which	 are	 respectful	 to	 and	
transformative	for	creation.		Practising	a	tactile	embrace	can	help	us	to	touch	and	be	in	
touch	with	the	space	around	and	within	us,	and	so	signal	and	add	character	to	the	final	
eschatological	embrace	of	God.	
	
This	tactile	embrace	should	pertain	to	much	more	than	tolerance	and	inclusion,	both	of	
which	can	be	used	to	suggest	admission	or	assimilation	into	systems	or	structures	that	
remain	 oppressive.	 	 Volf	 similarly	 notes	 that	 the	 practice	 of	 inclusion	 often	 and	
paradoxically	relies	on	a	more	subtle	practice	of	exclusion,	whereby	“taking	in”	merely	
seeks	to	neutralise	the	difference	of	the	other	(1996,	62‐63).		The	language	of	embrace,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 both	 welcome	 and	 alterity	 as	 it	
speaks	of	 creating	 spaces	 that	 simultaneously	 invite	others	 and	differentiates	oneself	
from	others.		This	challenges	exclusion	(Volf,	1996,	92)	whilst	claiming	that	“the	alterity	
of	 the	 other	 may	 not	 be	 neutralized	 by	 merging	 both	 into	 an	 undifferentiated	 ‘we’”	
(Volf,	1996,	144).			Embrace	can	thus	be	understood	as	making	space	for	the	bodies	of	
others.		The	divine	embrace	was	earlier	deemed	to	be	wide	enough	to	provide	space	for	
particular	experiences	and,	in	some	cases,	particular	choices.		This	is,	then,	made	more	
specific	here	as	we	 touch	 the	space	around	ourselves	and	others	 in	moves	 to	honour	
particularity	and	alterity.			
	
Embrace	 can	 certainly	 and	 also,	 though,	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 a	 tactile	 touching	 of	 the	
bodies	of	others,	as	we	may	embrace	others	through	reaching	out	and	touching	them.		
Likewise,	 Volf	 notes	 that	 an	 aspect	 of	 embracing	 others	 is	 opening	 one’s	 arms	 and	
reaching	 out	 for	 the	 other	 (1996,	 141).	 	Moreover,	 this	 tactile	 embrace	 can	 certainly	
cultivate	 the	 dynamic	 life	 that	 is	 typical	 of	 the	 eschaton	 by	 providing	 a	 concrete	
affirmation	of	the	other’s	embodied	existence,	in	all	of	its	alterity	to	our	own.		Indeed,	a	
welcome	 appreciation	 of	 difference	 is	 necessary	 if	 this	 embrace	 is	 to	 reflect	 God’s	
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eschatological	welcome.		That	such	appreciation	is	often	lacking	highlights	the	very	real	
need	 for	 eschatology	 to	 speak	 to	 the	 present.	 	 Commenting	 on	 the	 liturgical	 and	
practical	 overlooking	 of	 the	 “multiplicity	 of	 the	 Body	 of	 Christ”,	 Cornwall	 (2010,	 41)	
writes	that:		
Female	 sexuality,	 non‐maleness,	 and	 all	modes	 of	 bodily	 excess	 or	 ambiguity	
are	often	diminished,	and	the	bodies	in	which	they	exist	are	often	not	deemed	
suitable	to	minister	to	the	rest	of	the	community.	
Such	 perceptions,	 Cornwall	 continues,	 disregard	 the	 complexity	 of	 both	 God	 and	
creation.		In	response,	she	claims	that	a	monolithic	image	of	God	is,	in	reality,	“less	of	a	
God	 than	 is	 possible”,	 given	 the	 particular	 natures	 of	 vastly	 diverse	 creaturely	
embodiments	(2010,	43).	 	Similarly,	an	eschatological	 future	consisting	of	God’s	open	
embrace	 and	 affirmation	 of	 all	 bodies,	 in	 all	 of	 their	 difference	 and	particularity,	 can	
inspire	us	now	to	try	to	foster	communities	that	reflect	and	create	such	a	 future.	 	We	
remember	 Letty	 Russell’s	 claim	 that	 such	 diversity	 is	 indicative	 of	 God’s	 creative	
purposes	to	create	a	world	that	overflows	with	difference	(2009,	53).		An	authentic	and	
celebratory	appreciation	of	such	difference	can	inspire	us	to	seek	such	communities	in	
the	 here	 and	 now.	 	 Russell	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 such	 a	 belief	 in	 God’s	 intentions	 can	
encourage	us	to	appreciate	and	celebrate	difference	as	a	gift,	which	can	then	propel	us	
to	 nurture	 and	 develop	 diverse	 communities	 (2009,	 106).	 	 The	 cultivation	 of	
eschatological	 life	 in	 the	present	 thus	requires	 the	 tactile	 creation	of	 spaces	 in	which	
bodies	are	embraced	and	helped	 to	both	exist	 and	 flourish	 in	all	of	 their	alterity	and	
difference	to	our	own	bodies.	
	
A	key	aspect	of	 this	“making	space”	 is	 the	confidence	to	allow	the	other	to	be	a	being	
that	we	do	not	know.		That	we	relate	as	embodied	beings	means	that	we	must	recognise	
that	 there	 is	 always	 a	 hidden,	 inaccessible	 dimension	 which	 means	 that	 complete	
understanding	 of	 others	 is	 impossible.	 	 Although	 touch	 can	 generate	 and	 mediate	
understanding,	then,	this	is	not	an	understanding	that	continually	demands	to	possess	
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all	knowledge	about	 the	other.	 	However,	making	space	 for	 the	difference	and	partial	
unknowability	 of	 others	 in	 such	 a	 way	 should	 not	 mean	 exoticising	 or	 etherealizing	
them	 beyond	 all	 recognition,	 for	 this	 can	 be	 just	 as	 problematic	 as	 vilifying	 or	
denigrating	the	different	bodies	of	others.		Min	writes	that	placing	too	much	emphasis	
on	difference	obliterates	the	other	“by	elevating	and	etherealizing	the	other	beyond	all	
history	in	thought”	(2004,	14).		Whilst	there	must	be	a	sense	of	alterity	this	should	not	
be	absolute,	as	this	would	only	foster	an	attitude	of	distance:	a	sense	in	which	we	are	
most	welcoming	 to	 the	other	when	we	do	not	know	 the	other	 (cf.	Bennington,	2000,	
113).	 	Although	the	otherness	of	the	other	should	prevent	us	from	ever	possessing	or	
assimilating	 them	 (cf.	 Volf,	 1996,	 143),	 it	 should	 not	 result	 in	 our	 resignation	 to	 the	
deficiency	of	knowledge	we	have	about	them.		Rather,	this	knowledge	can	encourage	us	
to	strive	to	know.147		What	we	are	called	to	practise,	then,	is	wonder	in	the	face	of	the	
other.	 	 Irigaray	 is	 helpful	 here	 as	 she	 suggests	 that	 marvelling	 at	 the	 alterity	 of	 the	
other,	 far	from	making	our	attempts	to	move	towards	them	futile,	can	actually	propel	
such	movements.	 	She	writes	that	“Wonder	is	the	motivating	force	behind	mobility	 in	
all	 its	dimensions”	(1993a,	73).	 	This	suggests	that	an	awareness	of	the	alterity	of	the	
other	can	compel	us	to	move	towards	them;	to	seek	to	relate	with	them.		Wonder,	for	
Irigaray,	is	the	surprise	of	the	other;	she	claims	that	they	“should	surprise	us,	again	and	
again,	appear	to	us	as	new,	very	different	from	what	we	knew	or	what	we	thought	he	or	
she	 should	 be”	 (1993a,	 74).148	 	 Thus,	 wonder	 revels	 in	 the	 space	 it	 creates	 to	 be	
surprised	 at	 the	 ever‐emerging,	 ever‐changing	 other.	 	 Such	 dynamism	 was	 seen	 to	
typify	 eschatological	 life,	 and	 this	 can	 here	 help	 us	 to	 see	with	 Irigaray	 that	 such	 an	
existence	 means	 that	 other	 bodies	 are	 endlessly	 insurmountable	 and	 also	 endlessly	
																																																													
147	This	approach	coheres	with	my	perspective	on	speaking	with	specificity	about	the	eschaton,	
as	 I	 have	 claimed	 that	 speech	 and	 action	 concerning	 the	 eschaton	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	
experiences	 of	 our	 present	 lives.	 	 Resignation	 to	 agnosticism	 thus	meets	 a	 twofold	 challenge	
here;	both	with	regard	to	the	eschaton	and	to	the	bodies	that	will	exist	therein. 
148	 Quite	 fittingly	 for	 this	 discussion,	 relating	 to	 the	 other	 in	 wonder	 contains	 elements	 of	
surprise	 and	newness;	 two	 features	 I	 claim	 are	 also	 present	 in	 the	 eschaton	 insofar	 as	God’s	
relational	knowledge	means	that	God	can	be	surprised	by	our	actions	and	existences,	and	also	
that	dynamic	novelty	typifies	our	experiences	of	our	bodies	in	the	eschaton. 
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discoverable.	 	We	 can	wonder	 at	 their	 complexity	 and	 alterity	 and	 such	wonder	 can	
propel	 our	 desire	 to	 relate	 to	 them,	 for	 as	 Irigaray	 writes,	 wonder	 pertains	 to	 “the	
appetite	 for	 knowledge	 of	 who	 or	what	 awakens	 our	 appetite”	 (1993a,	 78;	 cf.	 1996,	
104).		In	actively	and	tangibly	making	spaces	for	the	differences	of	others,	then,	we	can	
embody	 an	 eschatology	 that	 embraces	 such	 difference	 without	 seeking	 to	 own	 or	
obliterate	it.149			
	
Alongside	this	understanding	of	embrace	as	making	space	for	difference	and	distance,	
such	embrace	also	has	 the	potential	 to	make	manifest	 the	celebratory	participation	 in	
such	 difference.	 	 It	 is	 not	 only	 that	 we	 should	 embrace	 difference	 but	 also	 that	 we	
should	share	spaces	where	we	are	all	welcomed	in	such	an	embrace	and	find	ourselves	
equally	 embraced.	 	 There	 should,	 again,	 also	 be	 an	 awareness	 of	 connectedness	 or	
sharedness.	 	 This	 does	 not	mean	 uniformity:	 though	 similarities	may	 reveal	 areas	 of	
connectedness,	 they	 should	 not	 be	 the	 conditions	 for	 it.	 	 Granted,	 the	 recognition	 of	
similar	 embodiments	 may	 highlight	 to	 us	 reasons	 for	 connecting	 and	 relating.	 	 This	
should	 not,	 however,	 be	 deemed	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	 all	 connectedness;	 such	 a	 stance	
could	 potentially	 exclude	 differently	 embodied	 persons.	 	 Rather,	 the	 basis	 of	
connectedness	should	be	our	shared	future;	that	is,	a	sense	that	each	and	every	one	of	
our	particular	embodiments	will	be	honoured	and	present	in	the	eschaton.150	 	Jantzen	
(1998,	 149)	 is	 helpful	 here,	 as	 she	 suggests	 that	 an	 affirmation	 of	 particularity	 and	
diversity	signifies	the	dynamism	and	vitality	of	unity,	as	she	writes:	
The	sameness	which	we	share	is	in	part	the	fact	that	we	are	not	the	same;	we	
are	 all	 unique,	 singular,	 irreplaceable.	 	 And	 that	 uniqueness	 occurs	 not	 in	
isolation	 from	 others,	 but	 is	 from	 the	 beginning	 contained	 in	 a	 web	 of	
relationships	and	in	a	shared	world.	
																																																													
149	 This	 distancing,	 this	 making	 space	 for	 the	 other,	 will	 inform	 this	 chapter’s	 later	
considerations	of	how	we	may	challenge	abuses	of	touch. 
150	 This	 sharedness	 also	 prevents	 making	 one	 embodiment	 paradigmatic	 of	 eschatological	
embrace. 
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Although	my	 starting	 point	 is	 eschatological	 and	 Jantzen’s	 is	 clearly	 protological,	 we	
share	a	conviction	that	the	simultaneous	appreciation	of	difference	and	similarity	is	the	
essence	 of	 embodied	 relationality	 and	 the	 connectedness	 established	 therein.	 	 This	
means,	 then,	 that	we	embrace	 the	other	not	because	we	perceive	 them	 to	be	 like	us;	
such	a	perspective	is	mere	solipsism	and	centralises	one’s	own	existence,	making	it	the	
yardstick	by	which	the	conditions	for	embracing	the	other	are	formulated.		Instead,	we	
can	engage	in	a	tactile	embrace	of	the	other	on	the	basis	of	solidarity;	a	conviction	that	
we	can	share	one	another’s	experiences	in	the	here	and	now	(whilst	appreciating	that	
these	experiences	are	different)	in	a	spirit	of	empathy,	and	that	we	will	share	the	same	
future	(where	our	differences	and	particularities	are	retained	and	celebrated).		This	is,	
in	short,	a	shared	celebration	of	all	of	our	differences,	both	now	and	in	the	future.			
	
Our	 starting	 point	 is	 decidedly	 eschatological,	 then;	 recognising	 our	 sharedness	 and	
moving	from	this	to	practise	and	cultivate	communities	of	such	sharedness.		Heyward,	
(though,	like	Jantzen,	does	not	propose	an	eschatological	vision),	makes	a	similar	point	
as	she	claims	that	relationality	does	not	begin	with	differentiating	ourselves	from	one	
another	 but	 rather	 in	 appreciating	 our	 connectedness,	 from	 which	 we	 are	 able	 to	
“recognize	and	value	our	difference”	(1989,	13;	cf.	21).	 	Thus,	 in	moving	from	trust	in	
our	 shared	 experience	 of	 the	 eschatological	 embrace	 of	 particularity	 we	 are	 able	 to	
connect	with	one	another	in	a	solidarity	that	makes	space	for	the	different	bodies	and	
experiences	of	others.	 	Thinking	back	 to	 the	reformulations	of	power	 in	Chapter	Two	
and	 this	 chapter’s	 note	 on	 the	 meaning	 and	 significance	 of	 eros	 for	 touch,	 the	 very	
nature	of	the	eschaton	emerges	here	as	being	indicative	of	erotic	power.		This	is	made	
manifest	 through	 shared	 experiences	 in	 the	 present	 which	 is	 enabled	 through	 the	
tactile	embrace	of	others.	
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It	should	be	noted	that	such	talk	of	openness	and	welcome,	especially	when	expressed	
in	relation	to	bodies,	and	women’s	bodies	in	particular,	has	a	problematic	history	and	
therefore	potentially	dangerous	results.	 	The	welcome	embrace	of	bodies	can	and	has	
been	articulated	in	terms	of	hospitality,	or	as	embodying	the	status	of	“host”,	and	this	
has	 been	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 domain	 of	 women.	 	 Aristarkhova	 observes	 that	 “The	
connection	between	femininity	and	hospitality	is	indeed	often	assumed	as	‘natural’	and	
‘given’	and	presented	as	such	in	many	traditions	and	texts”	(2012,	168;	cf.	Volf,	1996,	
25‐26;	 Diprose,	 2009,	 150).	 	Women’s	 bodies	 have,	 in	 this	way,	 been	 constructed	 as	
consummate	and	willing	hosts	to	the	bodies	of	others.		An	emphasis	on	embracing	the	
bodies	of	others	 cannot	 continue	 in	 this	vein.	 	 It	 should	not	be	used	 to	 infer	 that	 the	
practice	of	embodying	welcome	is	the	task	of	women	alone.	 	Nor	should	it	be	used	to	
promote	 the	 literal,	 maternal	 embrace	 of	 bodies	 as	 being	 indicative	 of	 femininity.151		
Such	 attitudes	 construct	 women’s	 bodies	 as	 existing	 for	 others,	 rather	 than	 for	 the	
flourishing	and	appreciation	of	and	for	women	themselves	(cf.	Moulaison,	2007,	359).		
Still,	some,	such	as	Derrida	and	Levinas,	have	suggested	that	this	welcome	interpreted	
as	 hospitality	 is	 rightly	 understood	 in	 such	 a	 selfless	 manner.	 	 Derrida	 argues	 that	
hospitality	 should	 be	 entirely	 for	 the	 other,	 with	 the	 host	 making	 no	 demands	 and	
constructing	 no	 conditions	 for	 this	 hospitality	 (Derrida,	 2000,	 7);	 whereas	 Levinas	
speaks	of	being	obedient	to	the	demands	of	the	other	and,	ultimately,	being	dominated	
by	 their	 exteriority	 to	 oneself	 (Levinas,	 1969,	 290).	 	 However,	 the	 eschatological	
affirmation	of	bodies	compels	us	to	resist	such	notions	as	they	can	surely	only	lead	to	
the	depletion	of	the	body	of	the	host.	 	This	is	a	body	expended	for	the	other	to	such	a	
degree	that	one’s	own	health,	vitality,	and	identity	are	compromised;	an	outcome	that	is	
most	definitely	challenged	by	the	eschatological	model	I	have	proposed.		Coupled	with	
the	 traditional	 association	 of	 women	 with	 such	 “hospitable”	 acts,	 the	 eschatological	
																																																													
151	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	ability	of	some	women’s	bodies	to	physically	embrace	the	bodies	of	
others	cannot	be	a	helpful	tool;	it	has	emerged	as	such	throughout	this	thesis	and	will	continue	
to	do	so.			 
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affirmation	 of	 bodies	 can	 propel	 us	 to	 challenge	 such	 damaging	 and	 dangerous	
interpretations	 of	 welcome	 and	 strive	 for	 ones	 that	 not	 only	 embrace	 the	 bodies	 of	
others	but	also	and	crucially	help	the	individual	to	embrace	their	own	embodiment.		
	
Unhelpful	 readings	 of	 embrace	 and	 hospitality	 can	 further	 be	 challenged	 by	 again	
reconfiguring	the	maternal	embrace	not	as	a	passive	surrender	to	the	other,	but	rather	
as	 an	 active	 opening	 up	 to	 the	 other,	 as	 Chapter	 Two	 similarly	 proposed.	 	 Thought	
through	cautiously	and	mindfully,	maternal	embrace	can	help	us	 to	consider	 “making	
space”	for	another	as	an	active	choice	that	not	only	enables	the	embrace	of	others	and	
one’s	 own	 body,	 but	 does	 so	 in	 a	 way	 that	 cultivates	 the	 flourishing	 of	 all	 involved.		
Although,	as	in	my	previous	chapter,	I	do	not	wish	to	normalise	any	one	experience	of	
women,	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 women	 do	 experience	 maternity	 means	 that	 we	 should	
appreciate	 it	 as	 a	 valuable	 aspect	 of	 embodied	 reality.	 	 Such	 embodied	 experiences	
provide	 a	 helpful	 (though,	 as	 emphasised,	 not	 exclusive)	 motif	 by	 which	 we	 can	
understand	 the	 embrace	 of	 bodies.	 	 This	 is	 also	 Aristarkhova’s	 intention,	 as	 she	
reconstructs	maternal	relations	to	mean	“requiring	‘work’	as	a	way	of	letting	the	other	
be,	become,	breathe”	(2012,	175;	cf.	Bostic,	2002,	608).		This	reiterates	the	notion	that	
embracing	the	bodies	of	others	entails	the	active	provision	of	space	to	let	them	be,	in	all	
of	 their	 difference	 and	 alterity.	 	What	 this	 also	has	 the	power	 to	 communicate	 is	 the	
interconnectedness	 of	 flourishing	 and	 embrace:	 the	 embodied	 welcoming	 of	 other	
bodies	not	only	makes	space	that	lets	the	other	be	but	creates	the	conditions	that	help	
the	other	to	become.		This	mirrors	the	ever‐changing	and	expanding	body	of	God	which	
continuously	 opens	 itself	 to	 welcoming	 new	 people	 (Vanier,	 1988,	 103);	 practising	
tactile	 embrace	 here	 not	 only	 expands	 the	 self	 but	 also	 enhances	 the	 self	 as	 one	
becomes	 comprised	 and	 celebratory	 of	 more	 and	 more	 life.	 	 Tactile	 embrace	 of	 the	
other	can	thus	be	envisioned	as	a	practice	which	lovingly	touches	the	other	and	which	
feels	 the	need	 for	 space	 in	 that	 touching.	 	This	makes	manifest	 the	anticipation	of	 an	
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eschaton	which	is	relational	and	full	of	 life	and	also	adds	shape	to	the	very	future	we	
anticipate	by	effecting	changes	now	which	will	endure	in	the	eschaton.	
	
Cultivating	Love	for	Our	Own	Bodies152	
Although	these	constructions	can	counteract	suggestions	that	maternity	is	prefixed	by	
or	practised	in	passivity,	we	are	still	here	speaking	only	of	what	the	mother’s	body	gives	
to	 the	 other.	 	 Hospitality	 as	 embrace	 must,	 then,	 be	 combined	 with	 the	 practice	 of	
mutuality	 if	 it	 is	 to	 reflect	 the	 eschatological	 affirmation	 of	 all	 bodies.	 	 In	 order	 to	
achieve	this,	it	is	crucial	that	we	incorporate	an	affirmation	of	loving	self‐touch	here.		In	
order	 for	 embrace	 to	 be	mutual	 and	 void	 of	 exploitation	 or	 depletion,	 the	 giving	 or	
making	of	space	must	be	balanced	with	having	a	space	of	one’s	own	(cf.	Rivera,	2007,	
97).		Alongside	feeling	the	other’s	need	to	have	their	own	space,	articulated	here	as	the	
difference	and	alterity	of	the	other,	we	must	also	affirm	the	self’s	own	space.		This	is	a	
space	of	self‐love,	and	it	is	only	when	such	self‐love	is	appreciated	as	a	legitimate	and	
necessary	 pursuit	 for	 women	 that	 an	 image	 of	 maternal	 embrace	 can	 be	 utilised	
effectively.	 	Contrary	 to	patriarchal	assumptions,	women’s	bodies	can	 thus	emerge	as	
worthy	in,	of,	and	for	themselves.		This	also	highlights	the	ability	of	bodies	to	cultivate	
and	empower	love	in	and	for	the	other.		Both	forms	of	love	are	enabled	by	relationship	
with	 the	divine	and	 relationships	with	others;	 this	 is	 truly	power‐in‐relation	 that	not	
only	reflects	the	nature	of	God	but	also	realises	the	future	that	God	intends	for	us.	
	
Alongside	this	attentiveness	to	the	tactile	embrace	of	other	bodies,	it	is	important	that	
self‐love	and	self‐touch	are	also	affirmed	on	account	of	the	self’s	connection	to	others	
																																																													
152	 As	 with	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 role	 of	 touch	 in	 cultivating	 self‐love	 will	 also	 resurface	
within	this	chapter	as	it	emerges	again	as	helpful	and	relevant	to	the	discussion	of	abusive	and	
hurtful	touch. 
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and	 the	proposed	simultaneity	of	 the	practice	of	 love	and	 touch.153	 	As	Traina	writes,	
“We	need	an	approach	that	recognizes	the	confluence	of	self‐	and	other‐love	and	also	
makes	us	aware	of	our	own	capacities	to	misread	and	abuse	these	loves	and	their	gods”	
(2005,	26).154	 	Self‐love	and	other‐love	are	thus	inextricably	connected	and	must	both	
be	explored	and	affirmed.	 	More	than	this,	 though,	such	affirmations	are	of	particular	
import	 for	 a	 practice	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 benefiting	women,	 as	 self‐love	 and	 self‐touch	
have	 suffered	 from	 scant	 attention	 at	 best,	 and	 vilification	 at	 worst	 in	 traditional	
thought.		Carter	Heyward	communicates	the	reasons	for	her	loss	of	attentiveness	to	her	
self,	explaining	that		“The	loss	of	my	sense	of	self	as	an	irreplaceable	participant	in	the	
relational	processes	of	creation	and	liberation	was	the	effect	of	female	socialization	in	
hetero/sexist,	 racist,	 classist	 patriarchy”	 (1993,	 55).	 	 There	 is,	 then,	 a	 necessity	 to	
promote	the	reclamation	of	senses	of	self	and	spaces	where	self‐love	can	be	cultivated	
particularly	 for	 women	 as	 this	 has	 been	 so	 abstracted	 from	 what	 is	 deemed	
appropriate.			
	
We	 can	 see	 this	with	 the	models	 of	 eschatology	 that	were	 critiqued	 in	 Chapter	 One;	
there,	it	was	deemed	that	loss	of	self	was	required	in	order	to	enable	women	to	partake	
in	the	eschaton.		Similarly,	Irigaray	cautions	against	using	such	a	framework	to	try	and	
cultivate	 female	self‐love	because,	she	claims,	“The	female	has	always	served	the	self‐
love	of	man”	and	has	been	deemed	to	achieve	her	own	self‐love	only	through	what	she	
produces	 or	 elicits	 (1993a,	 63).	 	 Irigaray	 perceives	 and	 appreciates	 the	 legacy	 that	
women	must	inherit	(though	not	adopt):	a	legacy	of	servitude	and	abasement.		We	see	
such	a	 legacy	being	experienced	by	many	of	 the	women	 in	Slee’s	 study	 (2004b,	 100‐
101)	for	whom,	Slee	observes:		
																																																													
153	There	are	arguments	to	be	acknowledged	here	that	pertain	to	considerations	of	who	is	who	
in	 this	 love	 and	 how	 such	 love	 is	 possible.	 	 Irigaray	 is	 seminal	 here	 (see	 1993a,	 60)	 and	 I	
appreciate	 the	 significance	of	 such	questions.	 	However,	 I	 am	 less	 concerned	with	 logical	 and	
philosophical	attempts	at	 self‐definition	and	more	 concerned	with	 theological	practicalities	of	
fostering	an	appreciation	of	one’s	own	embodied	existence. 
154	Such	abuses	are	thoroughly	explored	later	on	in	this	chapter. 
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the	 loss	 of	 self	 was	 a	 result	 of,	 or	 another	 side	 of,	 the	 experience	 of	 giving	
oneself	 away	 to,	 being	 absorbed	 in,	 becoming	 excessively	 identified	with	 and	
dependent	upon	the	male	other.		
Indeed,	Irigaray	goes	on	to	write	that	love	has	been	created	for	and	directed	to	“man,	
child,	housework,	cooking.		Not	by	the	woman	herself	for	herself”.	 	This	objectification	
of	women,	that	is,	the	making	of	the	woman	as	an	object	for	man’s	own	love,	has	meant	
that	 for	 women,	 “love	 of	 self	 is	 arrested	 in	 its	 development”	 (1993a,	 70).	 	 This	
expenditure	or	denial	of	the	female	sex	is	played	out	in	a	thoroughly	embodied	manner:	
women’s	 bodies	 have	 been	 constructed	 as	 mere	 mediators	 of	 male	 self‐love.		
Accordingly,	if	women	are	to	achieve	a	love	of	their	own	bodies,	this	must	and	can	only	
be	done	by	referring	to	and	by	being	in	touch	with	their	own	sex:	it	is	within	and	only	
within	a	woman’s	own	body	that	she	can	discover	true	self‐love.155	
	
Although	Irigaray’s	observations	are	legitimate	and	convincing	in	their	suggestions	that	
we	exercise	caution	 in	these	considerations,	what	 is	missing	 in	her	work	 is	any	sense	
that	God	may	exist	as	something	other	than	 the	projection	of	the	female	sex,	and	thus	
possess	 characteristics	 or	 abilities	 that	 women	 do	 not	 have.156	 	 The	 omission	 is	
intentional:	 Irigaray	mitigates	 any	 sense	 of	 the	 female	 sex’s	 self‐love	 being	mediated	
through	 or	 for	 a	male	 other	 by	 seeing	 the	 divine	 as	 an	 object	 of	 projection	 from	 the	
female	sex.	 	Bacon	observes	that	Irigaray	views	the	divine	as	“an	object	or	instrument	
through	 which	 the	 self‐love	 of	 the	 female	 is	 established”	 (2007,	 230),	 and	 Irigaray	
claims	that	women	must	do	this	by	mimicking	the	process	by	which	men	have	achieved	
self‐love	 in	 order	 to	 affirm	 their	 own	 self‐love	 and	 “thwart”	 the	 patriarchal	
procurement	 of	 male	 self‐love	 that	 has	 subordinated	 them	 (cf.	 Irigaray,	 1985,	 76).		
There	 may	 seem	 some	 correlation	 here	 with	 my	 own	 formulations;	 after	 all,	 I	 have	
																																																													
155	This	 is	not	 to	say	that	 Irigaray’s	approach	 is	solipsistic:	her	thoughts	on	relationships	with	
others	are	both	ethically	and	philosophically	beneficial	and	are,	 evidently,	utilised	 throughout	
my	response. 
156	My	 thinking	here	relates	 to	considering	God	as	a	being	who	has	 the	ability	 to	help	women	
realise	a	particular	type	of	self‐love,	rather	than	the	divine	being	a	mere	projection	of	the	female	
sex,	as	Irigaray	seems	to	suggest. 
 
 
~	247	~	
 
sought	to	imagine	the	future,	and	indeed	the	God	who	helps	us	to	create	and	experience	
such	 a	 future,	 from	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 qualities	 identified	 with	 women’s	 bodies.		
However,	there	exists	a	point	of	departure:	where	Irigaray	proposes	the	construction	of	
a	 transcendent	 horizon	 or	 divinity	 which	 is	 firmly	 rooted	 in	 female	 sexuality	 and	
subjectivity,	I	argue	that	more	space	is	needed	between	God	and	creation	lest	the	two	
become	entirely	 fused	and	God	become	 indistinguishable	 from	creation.	 	Given	 that	 I	
presented	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 a	 case	 for	 God	 being	 able	 to	 fully	 and	 finally	 help	 our	
attempts	 to	 realise	 the	 eschaton,	 it	 would	 be	 contradictory	 to	 fully	 subscribe	 to	
Irigaray’s	notion	of	a	divine	constructed	solely	from	female	subjectivity	and	sexuality.			
	
Irigaray	seems	to	suggest	that	such	constructions	are	the	only	way	that	women	can	be	
at	home	in	their	bodies	and	therefore	experience	self‐love.		More	helpful	is	a	God	who	is	
not	only	imaged	in	relation	to	what	it	means	for	women	to	love	themselves,	but	who	is	
also	able	to	equip	and	inform	us	as	to	how	to	cultivate	such	love	and,	crucially,	to	find	
us	 loveable	 and	 actively	 love	us	 even	when	we	 struggle	 to	 love	 ourselves.	 	 Given	my	
reconstruction	 of	 God	 as	 one	 who	 is	 intrinsically	 and	 intimately	 involved	 in	
relationships	with	 creation,	we	may,	 then,	 conceive	 of	 God	 as	 tangibly	 caressing	 and	
encouraging	the	development	of	women’s	self‐love,	but	doing	so	in	a	co‐operative	and	
personal	manner.		This	moves	beyond	imagining	a	God	who	is	constructed	solely	on	the	
basis	of	female	subjectivity	and	sexuality,	but	it	does	not	regress	into	imagining	God	as	
the	pinnacle	of	male	sexuality.	 	Rather,	what	is	proposed	here	is	a	relational	God	who	
exists	alongside	women	(and,	indeed,	all	of	creation),	feels	with	them,	and	is	intimately	
and	helpfully	 involved	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 lovingly	 be	 in	 touch	with,	 and	 to	 lovingly	
touch,	their	own	embodied	selves.			
	
Moreover,	such	a	God	is	both	able	to	enable	our	loving	and	is	also	genuinely	touched	by	
our	 loving.	 	 Such	mutuality	 affirms	 the	embodied	 cultivation	of	 self‐love	by	ascribing	
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divine	purpose	to	it:	claiming	that	God	not	only	intends	and	assists	the	development	of	
self‐love,	but	also	that	God	feels	loved	when	this	is	achieved.		This	ties	into	suggestions	
that	God	loves	us	not	in	spite	of	our	bodies	but	in	our	bodies,	integral	as	they	are	to	our	
very	 identities.	 	 Indeed,	Nicola	Slee	writes	 that	 “God	 is	 to	be	known,	worshipped	and	
adored,	 not	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 body	 and	 sensual	 knowing	 but	 precisely	 in	 and	 through	
them”	 (2004c,	 89),	 thus	 again	 highlighting	 the	 sensual	 nature	 of	 both	 knowing	 and	
relating.	 	 Sallie	 McFague	 articulates	 a	 similar	 perspective,	 questioning	 as	 she	 does	
whether	 “we	 want	 to	 be	 loved	 in	 spite	 of	 who	 we	 are	 or	 because	 of	 who	 we	 are?”.		
McFague	 goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 little	 to	 sustain	 or	 encourage	 us	 in	 our	 own	
loving	 if	 we	 continue	 to	 believe	 that	 we	 are	 loved	 in	 spite	 of	 our	 present	 existence	
(1987,	 133).	 	 Rather,	 we	 can	 utilise	 the	 divine	 and	 eschatological	 affirmation	 of	 our	
entire	embodied	selves	 in	order	 to	cultivate	 love	 for	ourselves.	 	Such	affirmation	can,	
McFague	claims,	be	 located	 in	the	metaphor	of	God	as	Lover.	 	This,	she	argues	(1987,	
127),	communicates	mutuality	in	finding	oneself	and	God	to	be	valuable.		She	writes:	
Lovers	love	each	other	for	no	reason	or	beyond	all	reason;	they	find	each	other	
valuable	just	because	the	other	person	is	who	he	or	she	is.		Being	found	valuable	
in	 this	way	 is	 the	most	 complete	 affirmation	possible.	 	 It	 says,	 I	 love	 you	 just	
because	 you	 are	 you,	 I	 delight	 in	 your	 presence,	 you	 are	 precious	 beyond	 all	
saying	to	me.157			
The	eschatological	valuation	of	embodied	existences,	fuelled	and	assured	as	it	is	by	God	
finding	 our	 embodied	 selves	 valuable,	 can	 thus	 propel	 us	 to	 accept	 God’s	 love	 for	
ourselves	and	so	touch	our	own	love	for	ourselves.		This	is	not	to	say	that	our	self‐love	
is	grounded	 in	 something	 external	 to	 ourselves,	 but	 rather	 that	 the	 reasons	 for	 us	 to	
love	 ourselves	 are	 illuminated	 by	 a	 God	who	 embraces	 the	 totality	 of	 our	 existences.		
Furthermore,	this	affirmation	comes	from	a	God	whose	transcendence	is	achieved	not	
by	being	aloof,	distant,	and	domineering	but	rather	by	being	completely	and	intimately	
involved	and	touched	by	loving	and	being	loved	by	embodied	beings.	
																																																													
157	 Irigaray’s	 notion	 of	 distance	 in	 such	 loving,	 articulated	 as	 wonder,	 offers	 an	 important	
dimension	to	considerations	of	such	love,	but	is	more	appropriately	discussed	in	the	subsequent	
section	of	this	chapter. 
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An	eschatology	that	is	typified	by	a	fullness	of	who	we	are,	in	all	of	our	embodied	and	
relational	complexities,	can	further	support	and	inform	the	practice	of	self‐love	which	
can	be	achieved	through	self‐touch.		I	use	self‐love	here	to	refer	to	the	appreciation	and	
celebration	 of	 one’s	 own	 materiality	 that	 can	 be	 made	 manifest	 through	 self‐touch.		
This	can	be	phrased	as	a	belief	that	“The	body	is	a	self’s	ownmost	place”	(Keller,	1996a,	
176),	 as	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 	 This	 means	 refusing	 to	 see	 our	 bodies	 as	
something	we	 possess	 but	 rather	 embracing	 them	 as	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 our	 being;	
asserting	 that	 “We	 are	 bodies”,	 as	 opposed	 to	 claiming	 that	 “we	 have	 a	 body”	
(Moltmann‐Wendel,	 1994,	 1).158	 	We	may	 even	 go	 so	 far	 as	 to	 say	we	 are	 inherently	
“touching”	bodies,	 as	our	 selves	 touch	 the	very	bodies	we	are,	 embodied	as	 they	are.		
This	 is	 propelled	 by	 the	 conviction	 that	 these	 bodies	 are	 our	 forever‐home,	 not	 our	
transient	and	temporary	one.159		There	is	a	need,	then,	for	us	to	effect	a	homecoming;	a	
sense	of	being	settled,	content,	and	in	touch	with	our	own	embodiments.	 	This	should	
not,	however,	be	read	as	mere	complacency.	 	That	the	future	we	look	to	also	contains	
within	 it	 an	 element	 of	 transformation	 means	 that	 our	 bodies	 will	 become	 more	
(though,	we	remember,	not	entirely	different)	than	they	presently	are.		As	such,	whilst	
we	must	be	reconciled	with	our	bodies	and	celebrate	their	sensuality	and	tactility,	we	
must	also	negotiate	the	limitations	with	which	we	must	presently	live.			
	
The	 limitations	 I	 refer	 to	 here	 are	 not	 those	 of	 traditional	 theological	 depictions	 of	
embodiment:	it	is	not	that	we	are	restricted	by	our	bodies	and	look	to	a	future	where	we	
are	 no	 longer	 embodied.	 	 Instead,	 the	 limitations	 that	 I	 speak	 of	 are	 the	 embodied	
																																																													
158	It	should	be	noted		that	Moltmann‐Wendel’s	affirmation	of	the	inseparability	of	the	self	from	
the	body	is	ambiguous;	elsewhere	in	her	text	she	maintains	some	sense	of	distinction	between	
the	self	and	the	body,	whether	in	terms	of	competing	desires	(1994,	3)	or	with	reference	to	the	
self	being	located	“in”	the	body	(1994,	22,	30). 
159	This	statement	is	made	in	contradistinction	to	Bouchard’s	assertion	that	“While	earth	is	our	
cradle,	it	cannot	be	forever	home”	(as	cited	by	Polkinghorne,	2002,	32),	and	in	agreement	with	
Isherwood’s	claim	that	 “our	Christological	 journey	 is	home,	 to	the	 fullness	of	our	 incarnation”	
(2010b,	21). 
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experiences	of	pain	and	suffering	that	limit	our	experiences	of	life.		It	is	not	enough	to	
simply	 say	 such	 limitations	will	be	 absent	 in	 the	 future,	 for	 this	does	not	assist	us	 in	
living	as	limited	bodies	in	the	here	and	now.		Rather,	a	future	that	transforms	embodied	
pains	 into	 embodied	 lives	 of	 dynamism	 and	 abundance,	 as	 I	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	can	teach	us	to	practise	a	loving	touch	of	our	bodies	in	ways	that	either	protest	
against	the	causes	of	pain	or,	when	this	is	not	possible,	struggle	for	survival	within	the	
experiences	of	pain.	 	Both	actions	embody	life,	 for	the	protest	 is	 for	 life	and,	recalling	
Isasi‐Díaz,	“the	struggle	is	life”	(1988,	99).		Delores	Williams,	develops	her	emphasis	on	
Jesus’	 life	 (as	opposed	 to	 focussing	primarily	on	his	death),	and	sees	 Jesus	as	helping	
provide	 the	 conditions	 for	 this	 survival.	 	 She	writes	 that	 black	women’s	 salvation	 is	
assured	 by	 “Jesus’	 life	 of	 resistance	 and	 by	 the	 survival	 strategies	 he	 used	 to	 help	
people	 survive”	 (1993,	 164).	 	Monica	 A.	 Coleman	 concurs	 and	 develops	 this,	writing	
that	“Salvation	is	not	a	divine	imposition	or	a	gift	to	creation.		Salvation	is	also	survival	
and	quality	of	life,	and	it	requires	the	co‐operation	of	the	world	in	which	we	live”	(2008,	
32).		Again,	there	are	allusions	to	the	critique	of	an	omnipotent	God	and	an	emphasis	on	
human	 responsibility.	 	 This	 is	 connected	 here	 to	 a	 prioritisation	 of	 survival	which	 is	
posited	in	concurrence	with	a	desire,	and	indeed	a	need,	for	life.		Struggling	for	survival,	
then,	emerges	as	the	primary	concern	for	oppressed	people.		Pursuing	life	and	creating	
conditions	for	liberation	in	this	life	are	paramount.		Such	experiences	comprise	part	of	
what	it	means	to	be	embodied	in	the	here	and	now	and,	as	such,	cannot	be	eradicated	in	
the	future;	in	fact,	they	affect	the	very	shape	of	the	future	as	they	add	character	to	the	
meaning	of	life.			
	
Furthermore,	 they	 create	 new	 spaces	 for	 making	 manifest	 the	 eschaton	 for	 they	
embody	the	radical	and	subversive	belief	that	the	pain	presently	being	experienced	is	
destined	to	be	transformed	into	life,	in	a	way	that	can	and	should	be	made	tangible	in	
the	present.		Indeed,	Slee	(2004b,	106)	observes	that:	
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Paradoxically,	 even	 images	 of	 deadness	 and	 lack	 of	 reality	 testify	 to	 an	
awareness	of	the	need	for	a	recovery	of	 life	and	of	 feeling,	and	can	generate	a	
powerful	longing	for	a	more	vital	self.	
Thus,	 expressing	 feelings	 of	 struggle	 and	 pain	 can	 signal	 a	 desire	 for	 transformation	
and	for	an	alternative	future,	and	a	protest	against	the	forces	that	quell	and	hinder	this.		
We	can	see	examples	of	 such	 transformation	 in	Susan	Shooter’s	 study	of	 some	of	 the	
ways	in	which	survivors	of	abuse	relate	to	God.		Citing	a	woman	named	Lydia’s	sexual	
abuse	by	an	uncle,	we	 read	 that	 things	 “still	hurt”	 for	Lydia,	but	 that	 “they	hurt	with	
[God]	 and	 not	 without	 him	 [sic.]”	 (2013,	 225).	 	 Shooter	 writes	 that	 this	 shows	 how	
“struggle	and	pain	are	survived	with	God,	transformed	because	of	the	active	presence	
of	the	divine”	(2013,	225).	 	Here,	loving	self‐touch	can	emerge	as	bearing	the	capacity	
to	make	manifest	the	transformative	creativity	of	the	eschaton	and	to	cultivate	hope	for	
such	 an	 eschaton.	 	 Indeed,	Audre	Lorde	 calls	 for	women	 to	 reclaim	 eros	by	 touching	
“the	power	of	the	erotic	within	ourselves”,	and	subsequently	acting	against	oppression	
(1984,	 58).	 	 Thus	 self‐loving	 touch	 can	 not	 only	 generate	 protestations	 against	
oppression	but	it	can,	in	itself,	contradict	oppressive	forces	that	would	tell	bodies	that	
they	are	undeserving	of	such	loving	tactility.			
	
Transforming	Bodies	in	Pain	
There	 are	 two	 paradoxes	 to	 be	 noted	 in	 these	 explorations	 of	 touch,	 particularly	
regarding	my	references	to	the	maternal	body.		Firstly,	it	is	very	often	the	case	that	the	
body	who	 initially	 touches	 us	 into	 life	 is	 the	 body	whose	 death	 touches	 us	 the	most	
profoundly.	 	May,	 for	example,	relays	her	experience	of	being	with	her	dying	mother;	
the	mother	whose	body,	 “vibrant	and	vigorous,	verbally	and	viscerally	–	was	the	 first	
body	 I	knew”	but	 is	now	the	body	who	embodies	dying	and,	 finally,	death	(1995,	13‐
14).		Soothing	and	comforting	touch	can	play	a	crucial	role	in	such	circumstances,	even	
or	especially	when	we	are	in	the	midst	of	grieving.		In	addition	to	practising	what	may	
be	called	“palliative	touch”,	we	can	also	consider	ways	in	which	touch	can	mediate	and	
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facilitate	 the	grieving	process.	 	Zach	Thomas,	 in	his	article	“The	 Intention	of	Touch	 in	
Pastoral	 Care”,	 relays	 his	 experience	 as	 a	 hospital	 chaplain	 and	 how	 his	 practice	 of	
appropriate,	considered	touch	allowed	him	to	communicate	his	presence	and	generate	
calm	for	a	mother	who	had	lost	her	son.		It	was	only	by	being	with	the	woman	in	such	a	
tangible	way,	Thomas	notes,	that	such	presence	and	calmness	could	be	achieved	(1999,	
25).		In	the	context	of	grief,	then,	touch	can	be	communicative	and	comforting	in	ways	
that	words	may	not	be.	 	Touch,	here,	has	the	power	to	comfort	the	grieving,	to	soothe	
the	one	who	will	eventually	be	grieved	for,	and	to	offer	hope	to	both.		This	hope	is	the	
very	revelation	of	the	resurrection	which,	Epperly	claims,	reveals	“the	touch	of	God	in	
the	midst	of	pain	and	helplessness	for	persons,	at	all	stages	of	 life”	(2001,	109).	 	That	
God	 is	 with	 us	 in,	 truly	 feels,	 and	 can	 ultimately	 transform	 such	 sufferings	 in	 the	
eschaton	means	we	can	see	them	as	important	parts	of	our	stories,	but	not	the	closing	
scene.	 	 That	 this	 transformation	 is	 finally	 and	 completely	 achieved	 in	 the	 eschaton	
means	we	can	sit	with	the	grieving,	the	(eventually)	grieved‐for,	and	our	own	grief,	in	
ways	that,	though	sorrowful,	can	be	tinged	with	hope	in	the	promise	of	a	future	full	of	
embodied	flourishing.	
	
The	other	paradox	 to	be	noted	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 tactile	maternal	bodies	 skirt	 the	
blurry	 boundaries	 between	 life	 and	 death	 by	 embodying	 the	 potentiality	 of	 both.160		
Traditional	 Christian	 theologies	 have	 framed	 this	 as	 a	 fearful	 union,	 as	 it	 has	 been	
understood	 to	make	explicit	 the	boundaries	 and	 limitations	of	 embodied	 life.	 	 Such	a	
fear	 has	 found	 alleviation	 in	 traditional	 Christian	models	 of	 eschatology,	which	 have	
been	 depicted	 as	 a	 life	without	material	 limitations,	 enabled	 by	 re‐birth	 through	 the	
Father	 God.	 	 Just	 as	 the	 protological	 creation	 has	 been	 accosted	 by	 images	 of	 the	
tentative	 and	 dispassionate	 male	 God	 touching	 Adam	 into	 life,	 so	 too	 has	 the	
																																																													
160	Moreover,	Molina	notes	that	many	women	describe	their	experiences	of	becoming	mothers	
as	 “facing	death”	 (2013,	211).	 	This	 is	 a	death	more	akin	 to	 the	death	or	 loss	of	 the	woman’s	
identity	or	control,	which	again	highlights	that	“death	has	many	faces”	(DeBorst,	2010,	44). 
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eschatological	creation	been	colonised	by	the	image	of	a	God	who	births	us	away	from	
our	 bodies	 and	 from	 the	 material.	 	 This	 can	 be	 challenged	 and	 remedied	 by	 an	
embodied	eschatology	which	both	utilises	and	affirms	the	value	of	maternal	bodies.		By	
seeing	maternal	bodies	as	metaphors	for	eschatological	life‐giving,	we	can	imagine	the	
new	 creation	 to	 be	 realised	 through	 the	 intimate	 caress	 of	 our	 bodies;	 it	 is	 by	 this	
caress	that	we	enter	new	life	in	the	eschaton	and	realise	such	life	in	the	present.	
	
An	embodied	eschatology,	wherein	bodies	flourish	fully,	is	also	beneficial	when	we	are	
confronted	with	 touch	 that	does	not	produce	or	sustain	 life.	 	Such	an	eschatology	can	
fuel	 the	 conviction	 that	 abuses	 of	 touch	 are	 contrary	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 life	 that	 is	
God’s	desire	and	intention	for	creation.		Traina	(2005,	19;	cf.	Heyward,	1989,	97,	150)	
adds	more	specificity	to	this,	providing	as	she	does	a	comprehensive	(though,	of	course,	
not	exhaustive)	list	of	such	abuses:	
touch	 that	 inevitably	 produces	 harmful	 biological	 consequences;	 touch	 that	
damages	 or	 threatens	 to	 damage	 physically	 or	 harms	 emotionally	 within	 the	
syntax	 of	 a	 culture	 or	 its	 relational	 history;	 and	 touch	 that	 transgresses	 the	
limits	of	appropriate	relationship	especially	between	unequals.	
It	should	be	acknowledged	that	by	referring	to	“unequals”	Traina	does	not	mean	beings	
who	 are	 ontologically	 unequal	 but	 rather	 relational	 structures	 wherein	 power	 or	
authority	are	unequal,	such	as	teachers	and	students	or	therapists	and	clients.161		There	
are	many	 circumstances	where	 touch	 has	 been	 abused	 in	 the	ways	 listed	 by	 Traina.		
That	 some	 of	 these	 have	 been	 in	 the	 Church	 itself,	 and	 have	 therein	 been	 of	 a	
particularly	sexual	nature,	makes	the	necessity	of	an	alternative	theological	perspective	
on	sensuality	and	eros	as	experienced	in	touch	even	more	crucial.		By	looking	forward	
to	 abundant	 and	dynamic	 embodied	 life	 in	 the	 eschaton,	we	 can	 embody	 a	 challenge	
and	resistance	to	abusive	touch	through	the	practice	of	“good	touch”	(Traina,	2005,	4).		
We	can	make	manifest	what	touch	should	not	be,	help	soothe	the	pains	of	touch	that	has	
																																																													
161	 Carter	 Heyward	 offers	 an	 examination	 of	 such	 constructions	 of	 power	 in	 her	
autobiographical	text,	When	Boundaries	Betray	Us:	Beyond	Illusions	of	What	is	Ethical	in	Therapy	
and	Life	(1993).			This	text	proves	illuminating	to	this	discussion,	as	will	later	be	shown. 
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been	what	 it	should	not	be,	and	create	new	ways	to	touch	that	are	empowering	rather	
than	destructive.		This	speaks	a	truth	that	is	not‐yet,	but	is	nevertheless	tangible	in	its	
hope	that	it	will	be.		May	expresses	a	similar	perspective	as	she	writes	that	such	truth‐
telling	means	“bearing	witness	in	one’s	body	to	the	Good	News	–	news	always	arriving	
from	another	shore	–	proclaiming	what	is	 is	not	what	will	be,	affirming	God	is	indeed	
the	God	of	radical	and	risky	reversals”	(1995,	22).		We	can,	then,	speak	and	act	against	
abusive	touch,	fuelled	by	the	conviction	that	God	loves	these	bodies	that	have	been	so	
touched,	and	intends	an	alternative	future	for	those	bodies.	
	
This	 is	 a	 far	 from	simple	or	 instantaneous	pursuit;	Rivera,	 speaking	 in	 the	 context	of	
maternal	relations,	notes	the	multiple	and	complex	ways	in	which	abuses	of	touch	are	
experienced	and	internalised.	 	Though	the	maternal	relation	can	certainly	be	a	site	of	
hopeful	and	helpful	meaning,	as	I	have	and	will	continue	to	argue,	it	can	also	be	a	site	of	
woundedness.	 	 Rivera	 observes	 that	 abuses	 of	 touch	 are	 so	 often	 inscribed	 on	 the	
bodies	of	women	to	such	a	degree	that	the	women’s	very	skin	manifests	memories	of	
“painful	and	guilt‐ridden	separation”	(2007,	96).		Rivera	presents	this	with	reference	to	
Cherríe	 Moraga’s	 work	 on	 racial	 conflict,	 noting	 that	 a	 mixed‐race	 woman	 may	 feel	
distanced	 from	her	 “brown	mother”	 and	 thus	 be	 reminded	 of	 her	 “complicity	with	 a	
racist	society”	(2007,	96).	 	The	suggestion	here	is	that	a	patriarchal	and	racist	society	
not	only	inscribes	but	also	causes	the	internalisation	of	an	embodied	dis‐ease.		Distance	
and	 separation	 are,	 then,	 realistic	 and	 often	 painful	 dimensions	 of	 some	 women’s	
experiences	 of	 both	 mothering	 and	 being	 mothered.	 	 Lovingly	 touching	 oneself	
resurfaces,	 and	 is	 framed	 here	 as	 a	 transformative	 process	 by	which	 this	 woman	 in	
particular	 was	 able	 to	 caress	 her	 own	 multiplicity	 (Rivera,	 2007,	 97);	 able	 to	 be	
reconciled	with	her	own	complex	and	perhaps	confusing	embodiment.			
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It	 is	 because	 of	 this	 complexity	 and	 confusion	 that	 Rivera	 notes	 such	 touching	 often	
strives	for	a	promise	that	 is	as	yet	unfulfilled	(2007,	96).	 	Touching	here	is	prophetic,	
then;	 it	 anticipates	 the	 eschaton	 by	 embodying	 its	 incompleteness	 and	 fragmentary	
nature.	 	 Though	 partial,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 practice	 of	 touch	 here	 is	 futile;	 the	
generation	of	such	touch	both	requires	and	can	foster	the	development	of	self‐love.		A	
woman’s	 body	 “lovingly	 touching	 itself”	 (Rivera,	 2007,	 97)	 can	 not	 only	 embody	 the	
eschatological	affirmation	of	bodies	but	can	do	so	in	a	way	that	radically	contradicts	the	
patriarchal	 defamation	 of	 non‐conforming	 bodies.	 	 An	 eschatology	 comprised	 of	
embodied	beings	can	encourage	us	to	practise	self‐love	through	touching	and	being	in	
touch	with	our	own	bodies,	and	so	embody	the	very	future	that	we	anticipate.	 	When	
such	 self‐love	 is	 our	 aim	 we	 become	 more	 capable	 of	 loving	 others.	 	 May	 makes	 a	
similar	 realisation:	 “I	 am	 not	 really	 able	 to	 love	 others	 unless	 I	 love	 myself	 (…)	 If	 I	
withhold	love	from	myself	I	withhold	love	from	others”	(1995,	48).		This	is	not	to	say,	
however,	 that	one	must	establish	self‐love	prior	 to	 loving	another;	 this	 is	unhelpfully	
and	 worryingly	 too	 akin	 to	 the	 Thatcherite	 notion	 that	 “we	 need	 to	 create	 wealth	
ourselves	before	we	can	think	of	helping	others”	(Davis,	1997,	587).				Such	a	sentiment,	
in	 the	context	of	 this	discussion,	 implies	 that	self‐love	must	be	established	 first,	upon	
which	one	is	then	able	to	love	others.	 	Not	only	does	this	limit	the	scope	of	love	itself,	
but	 also	 limits	 the	 individual’s	 ability	 to	 love.	 	As	Ricoeur	observes,	 this	 leads	one	 to	
question	“whether	one	must	be	one’s	own	friend	in	order	to	be	someone	else’s	friend”	
(1992,	184).		It	is	not,	then,	the	case	that		we	are	unable	to	love	others	if	we	do	not	love	
ourselves,	as	the	quotation	from	May	perhaps	infers,	but	rather	that	we	are	able	to	be	
most	effective	and	authentic	in	our	love	of	others	when	we	learn	to	love	ourselves.		Slee	
notes	the	power	of	this,	highlighting	how	some	women	in	her	study	“were	able	to	offer	
the	 self	 to	 the	 other	 in	 genuine	 connection	 because	 they	 had	 a	 real	 self	 to	 share”	
(2004b,	129).	 	Thus,	when	we	learn	to	love	our	bodies	by	practising	loving	self‐touch,	
 
 
~	256	~	
 
we	enable	a	connection	with	and	an	affirmation	of	not	only	our	own	bodies,	but	also	the	
bodies	of	others	as	we	become	more	open	and	able	to	love,	and	to	lovingly	touch,	them.	
	
However,	 even	 when	 touch	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 “good”	 and	 loving,	 it	 may	 not	 be	
experienced	 as	 such;	 there	 are	 some	 for	whom	 the	 very	 tactility	 of	 relationality	 and	
intimacy	 that	 I	 seek	 to	 affirm	 are	 intrinsically	 fraught	 with	 fear	 and	 anxiety.	 	 Linda	
Holler	 relays	 the	 experiences	 of	 two	 women	 with	 autism,	 one	 of	 whom	 (Donna	
Williams)	experienced	the	combination	of	touch	and	intersubjective	relations	as	a	form	
of	 “drowning,	 or	 being	 eaten,	 submerged	 into	 the	 other”	 (2002,	 21).	 	 Touch,	 in	 this	
instance,	 is	 inappropriate	and	in	fact	hinders	the	realisation	of	eschatological	 life	as	it	
contributes	to	pain	rather	than	anticipating	its	transformation.		Rather,	Holler	explains	
that	touch	must	function,	 in	such	cases,	to	enable	a	sense	of	“body	ownership”	(2002,	
23).	 	 This	 was	 achieved	 by	 Williams	 by	 practising	 “sensory	 integration”,	 which	
consisted	of	 “rubbing	her	 skin	with	brushes,	 trying	 to	make	 connection	 to	her	 torso”	
(Holler,	2002,	23).	 	Again,	Rivera’s	idea	of	female	bodies	lovingly	touching	themselves	
(2007,	97)	emerges	not	only	as	an	important	dimension	of	touch,	but	also	as,	for	some,	
the	only	appropriate	way	to	touch.		An	eschatology	that	embraces	particularity	means	
that	 not	 only	 inter‐creational	 relations	 but	 also	 internal	 relations	 can	 be	 sanctified.		
Such	an	eschaton	can	speak	back	 to	experiences	such	as	Williams’s	and	sanctify	such	
self‐loving	touch.	It	can	also	encourage	our	moves	to	create	this	in	the	present	in	ways	
that	add	shape	to	the	nature	of	the	eschaton.		The	eschaton	is,	in	this	way,	fleshed	out	as	
a	place	in	which	we	can	fully	love	our	diversely	embodied	selves.	
	
Whilst	 self‐touch	 can,	 in	 this	 way,	 be	 a	 journey	 towards	 self‐love,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 an	
obstruction	to	it.	 	Self‐touch	can	itself	embody	the	abuse	which	has	thus	far	only	been	
aligned	with	others.		Whilst	the	motivations	for	and	manifestations	of	this	are	too	vast	
to	be	afforded	the	explorations	they	deserve	here,	some	assertions	can	be	respectfully	
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woven	 with	 those	 already	 made.	 	 Jane	 Kilby	 (2001,	 126)	 has	 explained	 some	
dimensions	 of	 self‐abusive	 acts,	 one	 of	 which	 correlates	 with	 the	 already	 explored	
communicative	power	of	touch.		This	power	is	complexified	by	self‐abusive	touch.		With	
specific	reference	to	self‐cutting,	Kilby	observes	that:	
the	 ‘voice’	 of	 self‐cut	 skin	 is	 an	 extreme	 substitute	 for	 language.	 	 Skin	
deliberately	 wounded	 and	 cut	 thus	 speaks	 violently	 of	 the	 failed	 promise	 of	
language	to	communicate	trauma:	it	is	a	rupturing	force	that	tears	itself,	and	its	
significance,	apart	from	language.	
Self‐abusive	 touch	 appears	 here	 as	 a	 form	 of	 apocalyptic	 apophasis:	 revealing	 that	
which	 is	 unspeakable.162	 	 Whereas	 “good”	 touch	 can	 communicate	 empathy	 and	
affirmation	of	embodied	existences,	self‐abusive	touch	can	use	embodied	existences	to	
communicate	the	absence	of	empathy	and	affirmation.		The	body	is	here	constructed	as	
a	voice	for	those	who	feel	muted,	and	whilst	this	was	earlier	affirmed,	the	processes	by	
which	this	is	achieved	in	this	context	must,	without	pathologizing	them,	be	questioned.		
It	seems,	for	example,	that	the	self‐harming	individual,	whether	consciously	or	not,	sets	
up	a	distinction	between	their	“self”	and	their	“body”,	whereby	their	body	becomes	a	
communicator	for	the	self	rather	than	an	equal	and	integrated	aspect	of	the	whole	self.		
Although	Kilby	claims	that	touching	oneself	in	ways	such	as	self‐cutting	may	embody	a	
struggle	and	a	will	to	survive,	I	again	invite	us	to	cast	an	eschatological	eye	on	this.		An	
eschatology	that	touches	us	into	a	new	life	which	is	void	of	pain	and	characterised	by	
embodied	 vitality	 can	 encourage	 us	 to	 touch	 ourselves	 with	 love	 and	 care.	 	 This	
suggests	that	non‐abusive	self‐touch	is	both	a	possibility	and	a	reality.		Whilst	such	an	
eschatology	does	not	now	eradicate	 the	 reasons	 for	 or	manifestations	of	 self‐abusive	
touch,	 it	can	inform	us	that	even	in	the	midst	of	these	troubled	embodiments,	we	can	
retain	and	proclaim	a	different	reality.		Even	when	self‐abusive	touch	may	be	felt	to	be	
the	only	way	to	be	heard	and	 loved,	we	can	embody	a	prophetic	hope	that	 it	will	not	
ultimately	 be	 the	 only	way.	 	Not	 only	 this,	 though;	we	 can	 also	 be	 encouraged	by	 an	
																																																													
162	This	 interpretation	benefits	 from	Catherine	Keller’s	definition	of	 apocalypse	as	 “unveiling”	
(1996a,	xii). 
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eschatology	 comprised	 of	 flourishing	 bodies	 to	 protest	 against	 whatever	 it	 is	 that	
causes	us	to	touch	our	bodies	in	harmful	ways,	and	so	try	to	touch	our	bodies	in	more	
efficacious	and	life‐affirming	ways.		Moreover,	an	eschatology	of	embodied	relationality	
can	encourage	us	to	open	ourselves	to	the	loving,	tender,	and	caressing	touch	of	others,	
which	can	help	to	transform	the	pain	that	so	often	evokes	the	need	to	engage	in	harmful	
self‐touch.	 	 This	 can	 draw	 us	 into	 experiencing	 the	 eschatological	 transformation	 of	
pain	 in	 the	 here	 and	 now,	 and	 it	 can	 help	 us	 to	 embody	 the	 anticipation	 of	 the	 full	
transformation	of	pain	in	the	future.	
	
A	Tender	Touch	
Given	that	an	embodied	eschatology	was	earlier	said	to	consist	of	both	continuity	and	
discontinuity,	 it	 is	 feasible	 to	 assert	here	 that	 the	marks	of	 abusive	 touch	will	 not	be	
obliterated	 in	 the	 eschaton	 but	 rather	 will	 be	 experienced	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
eschatologically	transformed	existences	where	they	can	no	 longer	hurt.	 	Recalling	the	
previous	 chapter’s	 claims,	 we	 may	 say	 that	 the	 pain	 that	 has	 been	 and	 currently	 is	
experienced	 is	not	denied	 in	the	eschaton,	but	 it	 is	no	 longer	experienced	as	pain.	 	 In	
learning	to	lovingly	touch	those	parts	of	us	that	presently	hurt,	and	in	allowing	them	to	
be	carefully	caressed	by	ourselves	and	by	others,	we	take	seriously	and	make	a	reality	
of	 this	 hope	 for	 resurrected	 life.	 	 We	 also	 honour	 the	 integrity	 and	 contingency	 of	
bodies	 in	 the	 eschaton,	 for	we	 remember	 that	 such	wounds	 have	 touched	 us	 deeply.		
This	calls	for	our	practice	of	touch	to	be	as	tender	as	it	is	hopeful.		Heyward	calls	us	to	
live	authentically	as	people	who	believe	 in	 the	power	of	 touch	and	sensuality,	and	so	
practise	“anointing	one	another’s	wounds	as	healers”	(1989,	93).		For	Heyward,	this	is	
another	key	feature	of	“sharing	this	 life	together”	(1989,	92);	a	practice	which,	 I	have	
claimed,	typifies	both	the	power	of	and	our	power	to	realise	the	eschaton.		By	practising	
the	 tenderly	 tactile	 care	 and	 caress	 of	 one	 another’s	 wounds,	 we	 take	 seriously	 the	
often	painful	realities	of	experiences	of	embodiment.		In	so	doing,	we	also	live	in	ways	
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that	signify	our	commitment	to	being	truly	present	to	the	experiences	of	such	pain	and,	
crucially,	embody	the	anticipation	of	the	full	transformation	of	such	pain.			
	
Although	the	experiences	explored	here	are	not	exhaustive	descriptions	of	problematic	
or	 abusive	 touching,	 we	 can	 use	 such	 considerations	 to	 emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 be	
sensitive	and	attuned	to	the	ways	in	which	touch	has	damaged	others.		Although	touch	
certainly	has	the	ability	to	communicate	that	‘‘‘I	accept	you’	or	‘I	affirm	you’’’,	we	must	
also	recognise	that	the	depths	of	the	wounds	caused	by	abuses	of	touch	may	make	such	
touching	painful,	 even	 terrifying	 (Traina,	2005,	11).	 	As	 such,	we	may	wish	 to	appeal	
again	 to	 Irigaray	 in	 order	 to	 incorporate	 an	 element	 of	 space	 in	 our	 relating	 to	 one	
another.	 	 Irigaray	 (1996,	103)	 suggests	 that	we	 exclaim	 “I	 love	 to	you”	 rather	 than	 “I	
love	you”,	and	that	recognition	of	the	other	on	this	basis:		
means	or	implies	respecting	you	as	other,	accepting	that	I	draw	myself	to	a	halt	
before	you	as	before	something	insurmountable,	a	mystery,	a	freedom	that	will	
never	be	mine,	a	subjectivity	that	will	never	be	mine,	a	mine	that	will	never	be	
mine.			
For	Irigaray,	this	means	that	the	other	can	never	be	completely	identified,	accessed,	or	
known.	 	 Fidelity	 to	 such	 recognition	 means	 respecting	 the	 other’s	 borders	 and	
boundaries;	 the	 place	 at	which	 their	 subjectivity	 and	 particularity	 requires	 space.	 	 A	
tactile	 response	 to	 this	 means	 being	 in	 touch	 with	 the	 need	 for	 such	 space,	 as	 was	
earlier	 proposed.	 	 Furthermore,	 such	 an	 attitude,	 understood	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	
discussion,	 would	 recognise	 the	 particularity	 of	 the	 other’s	 pain	 and	 never	 seek	 to	
possess	 it	 as	 one’s	 own	 or	 to	 force	 an	 overcoming	 of	 the	 pain.	 	 Coupling	 this	 with	
Irigaray’s	earlier	noted	contention	that	inaccessibility	need	not	be	feared	but	rather	can	
fuel	our	moves	towards	the	other,	we	can	combine	this	practice	of	respectful	distance	
with	a	willingness	to	reach	out	to	the	other.		This	means	reaching	out	to	the	other	only	
if	they	desire	to	be	reached,	and	if	they	do,	only	in	ways	that	empower	and	affirm	them.	
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This	 also,	 and	 again,	 highlights	 the	 need	 for	 understanding;	 Jantzen’s	 proposal	
concerning	 the	 understanding	 of	 God	 resurfaces	 here	 and	 helps	 us	 to	 see	 that	 our	
knowledge	of	the	other	should	be	an	“intimate	personal	knowledge”	predicated	by	our	
“intimate	 sharing	 of	 […]	 joys	 and	 sorrows”	 (Jantzen,	 1984a,	 83).	 	 Such	 intimate	
understanding	is	itself	tender,	and	tells	us	that	our	touching	should	be	tender;	that	is,	
sensitive	both	to	the	feelings	and	experiences	of	the	other	and	to	our	own	responses	to	
those	 feelings	 and	 experiences.	 	 This	 combination	 of	 mystery	 and	 understanding	 is	
expressed	 by	 one	 of	 the	 participants	 in	 Nicola	 Slee’s	 study;	 Stella	 highlights	 the	
importance	 of	 “allowing	myself…to	 be	 touched	by	 that	mystery”	 of	 the	 other	 person,	
and	 Slee	 also	 notes	 her	 emphasis	 on	 the	 significance	 of	 keeping	 “in	 touch	with	 your	
own	centre	in	order	to	maintain	that	commitment	to	others”	(Slee,	2004b,	145).		Thus,	
sensing	and	being	sensitive	to	oneself	resurfaces	as	essential	not	only	to	understanding	
one’s	tactile	relationship	with	oneself,	but	also	to	understanding	the	tactile	needs	and	
desires	of	others.				
	
However,	understanding	and	perceiving	such	desires	is,	again,	complex.	 	In	order	that	
our	 touching	not	be	abusive,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	explore	how	 to	perceive	 the	 correct	 time	
and	place	 to	 touch.	 	Audre	Lorde	asserts	 that	 “use	 [of	 feeling]	without	consent	of	 the	
used	is	abuse”,	thus	emphasising	the	need	for	touch	to	be	attentive	to	the	desires	of	the	
other	(1984,	58).	 	There	are	certain	circumstances	where	this	emphasis	on	consent	is	
particularly	 relevant,	 such	 as	 relationships	 between	 “unequals”,	 as	 earlier	 noted	 by	
Traina	(2005,	19).	 	 In	such	situations,	the	negotiation	of	consent,	 if	 it	 is	 informed	and	
void	of	manipulation,	can	protect	the	more	vulnerable	from	being	touched	in	ways	that	
are	harmful	and	abusive.	However,	we	may	wish	 to	 think	more	about	 the	meaning	of	
consent	here,	for	there	may	be	circumstances	where	touch	is	spontaneous:	this	lack	of	
verbally	 negotiated	 consent	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	 touch	 is	 abusive.		
Indeed,	 Vanier	 notes	 that	 “in	 the	 world	 of	 friendship	 and	 relationship,	 gestures	
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normally	precede	 the	word.	 	The	word	 is	 there	 to	 confirm	 the	gesture	and	give	 it	 its	
signification”	(1999,	99).		In	light	of	this,	I	am	wary	of	making	spoken	consent	the	base	
criteria	 for	 touch.	 	 I	 am	 also	 conscious	 of	 the	 unilateral	 relationship	 implied	by	 such	
language;	consent	seems	to	suggest	a	structure	where	one	who	is	more	authoritative	or	
powerful	desires	 to	 touch	one	who	 is	more	 vulnerable,	with	 the	 latter’s	 power	being	
only	 in	assenting	 to	or	 refusing	such	 touch.	 	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 see	how	this	 is	a	mutual	
arrangement.	 	 Thus,	 whilst	 consent	 is	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 touching,	 it	 is	 not	 the	
foundational	condition	for	good	touch,	nor	is	it	always	the	context	for	the	best	touch.			
	
Alongside	 attending	 to	 consent,	 we	 should	 examine	 intent.	 	Thomas	makes	 a	 similar	
assertion,	claiming	that	our	embodied	reactions	to	situations	can	help	us	perceive	our	
own	intent	in	touching,	and	whether	such	touching	is	appropriate	in	any	given	situation	
(1999,	 26).	 	 	 Though	 Thomas	 provides	 some	 helpful	 suggestions	 for	 defining	
appropriate	 and	 proper	 intentionality	 in	 touching,	 I	 suggest	 we	 define	 this	 intent	 in	
terms	 of	 mutuality	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 mutual	 empowerment.	 	 Carter	 Heyward’s	
work	 is	 indispensible	 in	helping	 to	 clarify	 this	point.	 	Heyward	has	 consistently	been	
committed	to	valuing	both	mutuality	and	tactility	and	the	dangers	of	fearing	them.		She	
illustrates,	 with	 a	 refreshing	 openness	 about	 her	 own	 experiences,	 how	 the	
commitment	 to	 rigid	 boundaries	 of	 “care”	 can	 actually	 serve	 to	 thwart	 that	 very	
commitment	(1993,	113).		When	mutuality	is	desired	and	when	intimacy	is	sought,	the	
refusal	 to	 be	 open	 to	 touching	 and	 being	 touched	 by	 another	 is,	 itself,	 abusive.		
Heyward	writes	 that	 ‘‘‘abuse’	 is	not	 simply	a	matter	of	 touching	people	wrongly;	 it	 is	
also	 a	 failure	 to	 make	 right‐relation,	 a	 refusal	 to	 touch	 people	 rightly”	 (1993,	 10).		
Boundaries	 do	 not	 always	 prevent	 abuse	 and,	 as	 seen	 here,	 may	 even	 cause	 it.	 	 In	
seeking	 to	 do	 no	 harm,	 more	 harm	 is	 often	 done.	 	 Caution	 vetoes	 risk	 and	 abuse	
potentially	 ensues.	 	 Such	 harm	 is	 evident	 in	 Shooter’s	 engagement	with	 survivors	 of	
abuse;	one	of	the	respondents,	Miriam,	relays	her	experience	of	“ministers	who	use	red	
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tape	 to	 keep	 people	 at	 arm’s	 length”	 and	 how,	 for	 Miriam,	 this	 contradicted	 Jesus’	
intimate	 encounter	 with	 the	 Samaritan	 woman	 at	 the	 well	 in	 John	 4.7‐30	 (Shooter,	
2013,	231).		In	situations	where	abuse	has	already	been	experienced,	then,	the	“refusal	
to	 touch	 people	 rightly”	 only	 serves	 to	 further	 withhold	 intimacy	 and,	 thus,	 to	
perpetuate	harm.				
	
This	 may	 seem	 an	 over‐simplified,	 even	 dangerous,	 appraisal	 of	 touch;	 given	 our	
awareness	of	abusive	 touch,	we	should	certainly	be	sensitive	here.	 	Thomas	similarly	
notes	that	“in	a	culture	where	touch	has	gone	wrong	and	intentions	are	suspect”	we	are	
left	with	 legitimate	 questions	 concerning	whether	we	 should	 touch	 at	 all	 (1999,	 23).		
However,	when	intent	is	examined	for	its	alignment	with	mutuality,	our	assessment	of	
knowing	how	and	when	to	touch	can	progress.		Heyward	(1993,	69)	defines	mutuality	
as:	
a	way	of	being	connected	with	one	another	in	such	a	way	that	both,	or	all,	of	us	
are	 empowered	 –	 that	 is,	 spiritually	 called	 forth;	 emotionally	 feel	 able;	
politically	are	able	 to	be	ourselves	at	our	best,	as	we	can	be	when	we	are	not	
blocked	 by	 structures	 and	 acts	 of	 violence	 and	 injustice	 or	 by	 attitudes	 and	
feelings	of	fear	and	hatred.	
We	 may	 say,	 then,	 that	 alongside	 being	 a	 product	 of	 good	 touch,	 the	 criteria	 for	
negotiating	touch	relies	on	communicative	relationships:	both	or	all	parties	must	desire	
to	touch.	 	 In	the	very	least,	then,	touch	should	be	mutually	consensual,	but	more	than	
this	 it	 can,	 at	 its	 very	best,	 be	mutually	empowering.	 	When	 this	 occurs	 it	 provides	 a	
tangible	foretaste	of	the	life	God	intends	for	us	and	towards	which	God	will	fully	draw	
us	in	the	eschaton.	
	
Just	as	self‐love	is	cultivated	alongside	and	also	enables	other‐love,	as	previously	noted,	
the	 challenges	 to	 abuses	 of	 touch	 compel	 us	 to	 think	 more	 about	 interconnectivity,	
specifically	 in	 terms	of	mutuality.	 	Heyward’s	notion	 that	 touch	 should	be	 concerned	
with	fostering	such	mutuality	is	developed	by	her	framing	of	this	as	erotic	(which	she	
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uses	to	mean	an	embodied,	sexual,	and	sensual	relationality).		She	reflects	on	the	erotic	
as	 “our	 embodied	 yearning	 for	 mutuality”	 (1989,	 3).	 	 “Good	 touch”,	 then,	 seeks	 and	
nurtures	mutuality.	 	That	which	abuses	is	neither	founded	on	nor	is	it	able	to	develop	
mutually	affirmative	relationships.		The	relationality	we	perceive	to	be	characteristic	of	
creation’s	 future	 is	 certainly	mutual,	 and	 such	 an	 eschatological	 vision	 can	 challenge	
abuses	 of	 touch.	 	 Nevertheless,	 the	 sad	 reality	 that	 such	 abuses	 do	 presently	 exist	
means	 that	moves	 to	 practise	 “good	 touch”	 are	 risky.	 	 As	 such,	we	must	 not	 only	 be	
sensitive	and	attuned	to	the	ways	in	which	touch	has	damaged	others	and/or	ourselves,	
but	 we	 must	 also	 be	 willing	 to	 suffer	 the	 rejection	 or	 failure	 of	 our	 sensual	 moves	
towards	the	other.	 	 Indeed,	Heyward	later	writes	that	touch	is	comprised	of	“not	only	
reaching	 out	 to	 others	 but	 also	 allowing	 ourselves	 to	 be	 touched	 deeply	 by	 them”	
(1989,	100),	and	that	such	moves	do	not	always	work	in	the	ways	we	intend	them	to	
(2010,	21).		Though	a	realistic	view	of	the	present,	Heyward’s	realism	is	conclusive	as	it	
is	 rooted	 in	her	 conviction	 that	mutuality	 is	 empowered	by	 “a	vulnerable	and	 loving,	
but	 not	 omnipotent,	 God”	 (2010,	 21).	 	 Whilst	 I	 similarly	 reject	 the	 notion	 of	 an	
omnipotent	God,	I	have	proposed	a	model	of	eschatology	where	God	is	more	powerful	
than	creation,	 insomuch	as	God	is	able	finally	to	help	creation	to	realise	the	eschaton.		
As	such,	an	eschatological	perspective	that	sees	God	as	both	vulnerable	and	loving	and	
able	to	effect	new	and	transformed	existences	for	us	means	that	we	are	helped	in	our	
risks	at	reaching	out	to	the	other.			
	
Still,	 even	 when	 consent	 has	 been	 achieved,	 intent	 has	 been	 examined,	 and	 mutual	
empowerment	 is	 sought,	 our	 touching	 may	 still	 fail,	 be	 rejected,	 or	 even	 hurt.		
Nevertheless,	 our	 sensitive	 and	 considered	moves	 to	 touch	 can	 be	 energized	 by	 the	
conviction	 that	 the	other’s	and	our	own	pains	will	be	 transformed	by	 the	God	whose	
loving	and	empathetic	touch	cannot	fail.	 	This	does	not	mean	that	we	are	at	 liberty	to	
touch	 the	 other	 or	 ourselves	 without	 regard	 for	 the	 potential	 pain	 we	 may	 cause;	
 
 
~	264	~	
 
rather,	it	shows	that	such	pain	is	felt	by	God	and	is	challenged	by	its	transformation	in	
and	through	the	divine	touch	which	is	wholly	loving.		When	unsuccessful,	the	very	least	
that	our	attempts	to	reach	out	to	the	other	can	do	is	provide	anticipatory	signs	of	such	a	
future.		When	successful,	though,	healthy,	loving,	and	appropriate	touch	can	embody	a	
revolutionary	 challenge	 to	 abuses	 of	 touch	 and	 a	 wonder‐full	 realisation	 of	 a	
relationally	embodied	eschaton.	
	
Hoping	for	Bodies	that	Hurt163	
When	the	chance	to	offer	such	touch	has	passed	us	by	though,	such	as	when	those	who	
have	 experienced	 violent	 and	 abusive	 touch	 have	 died,	 we	 can	 again	 engage	 in	 the	
tactile	creation	of	spaces	that	resist	such	violence.	 	 In	this	context,	such	“spacing”	can	
help	 us	 to	 practise	 an	 embodied	 mourning,	 wherein	 immense	 suffering	 can	 be	
countered	by	an	immense	hope.		This	can,	as	Vento	argues,	call	us	to	“continue	to	decry	
and	 mourn	 whatever	 is	 and	 has	 been	 that	 deviates	 from	 God’s	 final	 future	 justice”	
(2002,	 20).	 	 This	 justice	 is	 not	 punitive	 or	 retributive,	 as	 this	 can	 only	 ever	 foster	
resistance	 to	 the	 complete	 and	 final	 transformation	 of	 all	 into	 a	 relational	 and	
embodied	existence.	 	Rather,	 loving	 and	 relational	 justice	 calls	us	 to	 resist	 structures	
and	systems	that	create	both	oppressors	and	oppressed.		Although	our	priority	should	
be	 remembering	 and	 protesting	 the	 oppression	 and	 violence	 committed	 against	 the	
oppressed,	by	remembering	God’s	open	embrace	we	are	prevented	 from	reproducing	
that	 violence	 by	 redirecting	 it	 to	 the	 oppressors.	 	 Again,	 the	 proclamation	 of	 “never	
again”	 resurfaces,	 and	 illuminates	 our	 moves	 to	 make	 manifest	 the	 eschaton	 as	 we	
challenge	the	conditions	that	create	and	perpetuate	suffering	in	all	its	forms.	
	
Given	the	universally	inclusive	eschaton	I	have	proposed,	and	the	eschaton’s	formation	
by	and	utility	 for	practising	 loving	 touch	 in	 the	present,	 it	may	seem	 logical	 to	assert	
																																																													
163	This	pertains	both	to	bodies	that	have	been	hurt	and	bodies	that	have	caused	hurt. 
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that	loving	touch	should	similarly	be	shared	amongst	the	abused	and	abusers.	 	This	is	
not,	however,	the	case:	such	a	claim	could	very	easily	perpetuate	rather	than	remediate	
the	abuse.		It	may	be	that	physical	distance	is	what	is	required	in	order	for	the	abused	
to	be	able	to	cultivate	self‐love.		This	is	exemplified	by	Reid	(2007,	123),	who	cites	the	
story	of	 a	woman’s	 experience	of	 the	obligation	 and	 responsibility	 she	 felt	 to	 forgive	
her	abusive	partner:	
I	 believed	 I	 had	 to	 imitate	 Jesus’	 final	 act	 of	 love	 during	 his	 crucifixion.	 	 I	
worried	that	rather	than	feeling	forgiveness,	I	might	feel	hatred	in	my	heart	[…]	
I	feared	that	if	I	failed	to	forgive	him	completely	before	I	died,	then	I	might	end	
up	in	hell	myself.	
This	 woman	 received	 a	 model	 of	 forgiveness	 which,	 far	 from	 releasing	 her	 from	
violence,	immersed	her	further	into	it,	as	it	placed	forgiveness	over	and	above	her	self‐
love.		The	belief	that	she	should	forgive	her	abuser,	even	in	the	midst	of	the	abuse	she	
was	experiencing,	enmeshed	her	in	an	impossible	situation	whereby	she	felt	obliged	to	
forgive,	but	could	not,	and	so	felt	additional	guilt	on	top	of	her	suffering.		When	touch	
has	been	so	destructive	and	abusive,	the	proposal	that	one	should	nevertheless	seek	to	
cultivate	 loving	 touch	 of	 the	 other	 is,	 here,	 inappropriate.	 	 Again,	 touching	 the	 space	
around	others	rather	than	directly	touching	others	can	emerge	as	an	appropriate,	and	
no	less	significant,	realisation	of	the	eschaton.			
	
Moreover,	whilst	 Jesus’	 forgiveness	of	others	has	been	used	 in	such	a	damaging	way,	
Keene	(1995,	128)	offers	an	alternative	reading	and	challenges	the	very	attribution	of	
forgiveness	 to	 Jesus	 in	 the	 crucifixion	account.	 	 Jesus	does	not,	Keene	 argues,	 forgive	
those	causing	his	suffering:	
Instead	he	asks	his	Father,	he	asks	God,	to	forgive	them…This	is	the	one	place	
where,	if	Jesus	wanted	the	weak	to	forgive	the	strong,	he	could	have	indicated	
it.		He	did	not.	
For	those	who	have	suffered	from	abusive	touch,	then,	proposing	a	model	whereby	the	
abused	practise	forgiveness	of	their	abuser(s)	 is	not	necessarily	the	most	appropriate	
response;	there	may,	 indeed,	be	times	when	it	 is	most	beneficial	 for	us	not	to	forgive.		
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God’s	 loving	 and	 respectful	 embrace	 in	 the	 eschaton	 means	 that	 such	 feelings	 and	
responses	are	given	a	gracious	wide	space	 to	be	experienced	and	appreciated.	 	Given	
the	model	of	God	as	a	God	who	both	feels	with	us	and	acts	for	us,	though,	we	can	hope	
and	trust	in	God’s	love	for	and	loyalty	to	all	of	creation	even	when	we	ourselves	have	
been	made	unable	to	make	this	a	reality.	
	
Still,	it	may	be	feasible	to	claim	that	there	are	some	situations	where	forgiveness	is	both	
possible	and	beneficial.		It	is	crucial	to	note	here	that	any	forgiveness	of	abusive	touch	
should	not	be	confused	with	 forgetting	such	actions	and	 the	 subsequent	hurt	or	pain	
experienced.		As	I	have	claimed	throughout	this	thesis,	eschatological	existence	consists	
of	 the	remembrance	of	 such	pains	even	 though	 they	can	no	 longer	hurt	us.	 	Suchocki	
even	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 assert	 that	 forgetting	 “has	 no	 place	 in	 the	 hard	 reality	 of	
forgiveness”	(1995,	150).		Forgiveness	is	necessarily	preceded	by	hurt,	by	a	lack	of	love,	
and	often	by	a	misuse	or	abuse	of	 touch,	 so	 the	 reality	of	 it	 is	 indeed	hard.	 	And	yet,	
whilst	 the	 lack	 of	 love	 that	 precedes	 forgiveness	 certainly	 makes	 the	 practice	 of	
forgiveness	difficult,	forgiveness	bears	the	capacity	to	embody	a	radical	challenge	to	the	
abuses	of	 touch	that	have	been	noted,	and	to	make	present,	or	at	 least	anticipate,	 the	
eschatological	 embrace	 of	 all	 bodies	 in	 fulfilled	 relationships	 of	 love.	 	 Forgiveness	
should	not	be	understood	as	inaction	or	non‐resistance,	nor	should	it	be	self‐denial	or	
self‐negation.		Likewise	it	is	not	to	be	confused	with	hatred	or	violence.		Instead,	it	can	
be	an	acknowledgement	of	the	reality	of	the	hurt	and	abuse	caused,	but	also	a	refusal	to	
be	tied	to	this	hurt;	a	choice	to	let	go	of	the	immediacy	of	the	pain	in	love	both	for	the	
other	 and	 for	 oneself.	 	 Forgiveness	 is	 certainly	 as	 much	 for	 oneself	 as	 it	 is	 for	 the	
abuser.	 	 As	 Heyward	 explains,	 “[Forgiveness]	 has	 at	 least	 as	 much	 to	 do	 with	 the	
capacity	 of	 those	who	have	been	wounded	 to	move	 forward	 as	with	 those	who	have	
inflicted	the	injury”	(1999,	183).		Forgiveness	practised	through	lovingly	embracing	the	
bodies	 of	 those	who	 have	 hurt	 us,	when	 this	 is	 appropriate,	 safe,	 and	 beneficial,	 can	
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thus	be	a	sign	of	the	eschatological	embrace	of	bodies	and	the	relational	future	which	
God	intends	for	all.		Similarly,	though,	when	space	is	what	is	needed,	this	can	be	sought	
in	the	confidence	that	such	spacing	is	also	a	sign	of	authentic	relational	embodiments,	
and	is	not	a	hindrance	to	God’s	unfailing	love	for	all	bodies.			
	
This	double‐effect	of	 forgiveness	can	release	both	oneself	and	the	other	to	experience	
the	 process	 of	 relationality	 that	 typifies	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 eschaton.	 	 As	 Peters	
explains:	 “The	 divine	 enemy	 is	 not	 destroyed	 but	 reconciled.	 	 Using	 forgiveness	 as	 a	
means	of	 reconciliation	 is	 the	divine	agenda”	 (1994,	189).	 	 	Although	 the	 forgiveness	
that	one	offers	need	not	be	accepted	in	order	for	one	to	experience	a	restored	sense	of	
self‐love,	 there	 is	 certainly	 a	 hope	 for	 reciprocity	 to	 further	 add	 to	 the	 restorative	
process	 (cf.	Keene,	1995,	131).	 	 Still,	 some	may	 feel	unable	 to	 forgive	 if	 reciprocity	 is	
absent,	or	if	the	hurt	is	too	severe,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	case	of	a	woman	who	could	not	
forgive	her	son’s	murderers:	“In	my	life	nothing,	not	a	single	thing,	has	changed	since	
my	son	was	burnt	by	barbarians…Therefore	I	cannot	forgive”	(as	cited	by	Carmichael,	
2003,	131).		Where	forgiveness	is	not	possible,	then,	we	can	return	to	the	earlier	claim	
that	we	can	place	our	trust	and	our	hope	in	the	God	who	is	eternally	and	fully	capable	
of	loving	others	whilst	never	ignoring	or	diminishing	the	reality	of	suffering	but	instead	
transforming	it	through	loving	relationality.	
	
Conclusion		
Negotiating	and	making	space	for	the	loving	touch,	of	ourselves	and	of	others,	has	here	
been	constructed	as	being	connected	to	creating	the	conditions	 for	bodies	 to	embody	
the	eschaton.		In	addition	to	this,	I	have	claimed	that	our	moves	to	touch	can	be	fuelled	
by	the	conviction	that	one	another’s	and	our	own	pains	will	be	transformed	by	the	God	
whose	loving	and	empathetic	touch	cannot	hurt,	frighten,	or	fail.	 	This	means	that	our	
fumbling	attempts	at	“good”	touch	can,	 in	the	very	least,	provide	anticipatory	signs	of	
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the	future.		There	is	also	potential,	though,	for	healthy,	loving,	and	appropriate	touch	to	
embody	a	revolutionary	contradiction	of	abuses	of	touch	and	a	wonder‐full	creation	of	
future	lifefulness.		An	embodied	eschatology	does	not	only	say	that	bodies	matter,	then;	
it	also	offers	specific	ways	to	live	this	conviction.		Furthermore,	it	sees	female	bodies	as	
having	 the	 ability	 to	 communicate	 some	 elements	 of	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	
eschatological	existence	and	some	ways	in	which	this	existence	can	be	lived	now.		Such	
an	 eschatology	 is	 hopeful	 and	 humble.	 	 It	 is	 hopeful	 for	 it	 imagines	 that	 a	 life	 full	 of	
fluidity	and	vitality	will	be.	 	This	gives	content	to	our	tactile	practices,	and	infuses	our	
touching	with	confidence.		It	is	humble	for	it	accepts	that	we	are	limited	in	our	capacity	
to	touch,	 that	our	attempts	to	practise	good	touch	may	be	flawed,	and	that	tactility	 is	
risky.		This	infuses	our	practice	with	trust	that	God’s	touch	cannot	fail,	and	that	the	risk	
is	both	worthwhile	and	prophetic.	 	Ultimately,	 this	hope	and	this	 trust	can	mean	that	
the	 final	 sounding	 of	 the	 trumpet	 depicted	 in	 1	 Cor.	 15.52	 will	 be	 a	 fanfare	 of	 such	
magnitude	that	its	reverberations	touch	our	bodies	into	an	abundance	of	dynamic	life.	
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Conclusion	
Introduction	
My	explorations	in	this	thesis	arose	out	of	an	engagement	with	and	an	examination	of	
feminist	theological	challenges	to	traditional	Christian	constructions	of	eschatology		in	
relation	to	characterisations	of	female	bodies.		This	was	presented	as	the	starting	point	
for	my	explorations	on	account	of	my	desire	to	both	engage	with	and	contribute	to	the	
field	 of	 feminist	 theology.	 	 Traditional	 Christian	 constructions	 of	 eschatology	 were	
problematized	 by	 feminist	 theologians	 on	 account	 of	 their	 promotion	 of	 patriarchal	
notions	of	God,	their	androcentric	constructions	of	creation,	and	their	dislocation	from	
lived	realities.		Such	critiques	appeared	to	be	aligned	with	specific	themes;	namely	the	
eschatological	 process,	 content,	 and	 time.	 	 It	 was	 detected	 that	 feminist	 theologians	
deemed	traditional	models	of	eschatology	to	present	the	process	as	one	that	is	realised	
by	 an	 omnipotent	 God;	 the	 content	 as	 one	 modelled	 on	 masculinised	 ideals	 of	 a	
fleshless,	static	existence;	and	the	time	as	being	locked	and	isolated	in	the	future.		These	
notions	were	perceived	to	privilege	qualities	associated	with	male	bodies,	with	female	
bodies	 being	 constructed	 as	 oppositional	 to	 divine	 and	 redeemed	 life.	 	 Feminist	
theologians	exposed	how	women’s	bodies	have,	on	the	basis	of	such	assignations,	been	
excluded	 from	 and	 devalued	 by	 eschatology.	 	 Moves	 to	 remedy	 this	 were	 seen	 to	
revalue	traits	that	have	been	aligned	with	women	in	order	to	highlight	their	presence	in	
and	meaning	 for	 all	 existences.	 	Most	prominent	here	were	 the	 traits	of	 relationality,	
fluidity,	 and	 sensuality.	 	 In	 engaging	with	 these	 responses,	 I	 detected	both	potentials	
and	 problems.	 	 I	 felt	 that	 their	 affirmation	 of	 previously	 marginalised	 and	 devalued	
qualities	 posed	 a	 much‐needed	 and	 substantial	 challenge	 to	 damaging	 notions	 of	
eschatology.	 	 I	 also,	 however,	 felt	 that	 their	 focus	 on	 how	 these	 aspects	 were	
experienced	predominantly	in	the	present	was	ultimately	limited	in	scope	and	hope.		I	
argued	 that	 abandoning	 eschatology’s	 sense	 of	 ultimacy	 and	 finality,	 whilst	
understandable,	may	not	be	the	most	beneficial	option	for	feminist	theology.			
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A	 primarily	 presentist	 stance	 was	 seen	 to	 present	 a	 limited	 hope,	 for	 embodied	
relationality,	fluidity,	and	sensuality	were	never	able	to	be	experienced	in	their	fullness.		
An	 alternative	 response	 was	 therefore	 deemed	 necessary;	 a	 response	 in	 which	 the	
concerns	 of	 feminist	 theologians	 could	 not	 only	 be	 affirmed	 but	 also	 used	 to	
significantly	 rethink	 eschatology.	 	 I	 thus	 sought	 to	 contribute	 a	 new	 perspective	
whereby	traits	associated	with	women’s	embodied	existences	emerged	as	inseparable	
from,	abundant	in,	and	revelatory	of	the	eschatological	future	for	all.	 	Having	used	my	
previous	 chapters	 firstly	 to	 locate	 my	 thesis	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 feminist	 theology,	 and	
subsequently	 to	present	a	new	model	of	 eschatology,	 this	 chapter	will	draw	 together	
various	 aspects	 of	 the	 reconstruction	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 provide.	 	 Discussions	 of	
method,	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	 tactility	will	be	woven	 together	 in	 relation	both	 to	
specific	chapters	and	to	my	thesis	as	a	whole.		Quite	fittingly	for	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	
I	will	 then	move	 to	 thinking	 toward	 the	 future	 by	 outlining	 some	 implications	 of	my	
thesis	in	order	to	anticipate	some	potential	areas	for	further	research.						
	
Rethinking	Eschatology	
Method	
The	 central	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 been	 to	 construct	 a	 feminist	 theology	 of	
eschatological	bodies.		I	have	responded	and	added	to	feminist	theological	concerns	by	
showing	 how	 reclaiming	 qualities	 that	 patriarchal	 theology	 has	 aligned	 with	 female	
bodies	can	enable	a	rethinking	of	the	eschaton	that	benefits	all	of	creation.		In	this	way,	
I	noted	that	 I	engaged	in	a	 form	of	strategic	essentialism	whereby	I	valued	traits	 that	
have	exclusively	been	associated	with	female	bodies	for	the	benefit	of	all	bodies.	 	This	
starting	point	informed	the	way	that	this	thesis	engaged	with	both	feminist	literature,	
and	with	the	Bible	and	the	Christian	tradition.		My	concern	was	not	to	revisit,	reform,	or	
rescue	traditional	constructions	of	eschatology;	I	thus	distinguished	my	approach	from	
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that	of	thinkers	such	as	Sarah	Coakley,	Valerie	Karras,	Susan	Frank	Parsons,	and	Janet	
Martin	Soskice.		Instead,	I	sought	to	create	a	new	model	of	the	eschatological	future	on	
the	basis	of	feminist	perspectives	on,	and	some	women’s	experiences	of,	embodiment.		
Furthermore,	certain	doctrines	that	are	connected	to	eschatology,	such	as	Christology,	
Incarnation,	final	judgement,	and	the	parousia	were	not	explicitly	addressed	or	utilised.		
This	 was	 out	 of	 a	 concern	 to	 speak	 directly	 and	 pointedly	 to	 the	 problems	 and	
potentials	 I	detected	within	 the	eschatological	 future.	 	Nevertheless,	values	reclaimed	
and	 upheld	 by	 feminist	 rethinkings	 of	 these	 doctrines,	 such	 as	 eros,	 dunamis,	
interconnectivity,	and	divine‐creation	indwelling,	were	seen	to	be	beneficial	and	were	
thus	made	central	in	my	constructions.	
	
Along	 these	 lines,	 the	 values	 of	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	 tactility	 were	 seen	 to	 be	
elements	 of	 all	 existences	 and	 to	 be	 more	 life‐affirming	 than	 traits	 that	 have	 been	
assigned	with	male	bodies.		Their	exclusive	assignation	to	female	bodies,	though,	meant	
that	 an	 appreciation	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 some	 women	 have	 experienced	 these	 was	
necessary,	 in	 order	 to	 further	 remedy	 the	 devaluation	 of	 such	 experiences.	 	 I	 have	
attempted	to	read	these	particular	experiences	as	being	indicative	of	the	ways	in	which	
all	bodies	can	be	honoured	for	their	capacity	to	reveal	both	the	nature	of	eschatological	
existences	and	also	some	ways	in	which	those	eschatological	existences	may	be	shaped	
and	 created	 in	 the	 present.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 our	 bodies	 can	 be	
prophetic	 bodies;	 capable	 of	 saying	 something	 meaningful	 about,	 and	 realising	 the	
possibility	 of,	 eschatological	 existences.	 	 Their	 power	 and	 authority	 to	 do	 so	 was	
located	 in	both	 the	 affirmation	of	 our	bodies	 as	our	 very	 selves,	 and	 in	 the	 assertion	
that	God	takes	such	bodies	seriously	and	is	endlessly	loving	and	loyal	towards	them.			
	
This	is	not	to	say,	however,	that	I	have	presented	certain	women’s	experiences	of	their	
bodies	as	providing	a	singular	or	exclusive	image	of	the	future.		Instead,	I	have	claimed	
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that	attending	 to	particular	qualities	assigned	 to	women’s	bodies,	and	some	women’s	
experiences	 of	 these,	 can	 reveal	 some	 features	 of	 eschatological	 life	 that	 have	 been	
largely	 ignored	 or	 devalued,	 or	 even	made	 entirely	 absent	 from	 the	 eschaton.	 	 In	 so	
doing,	 I	 proposed	 a	 “modest	 universal”	 (Mount	 Shoop,	 2010,	 26)	 comprised	 of	
particular	experiences	of	embodiment.	 	We	remember,	though,	that	this	was	not	used	
to	 suggest	 that	 one	 experience	 speaks	 a	 universal	 truth	 concerning	 all	 existences.		
Indeed,	 I	 have	 appreciated	 that	 women,	 and	 indeed	 all	 of	 creation,	 experience	 their	
bodies	 in	a	 cacophony	of	different	ways.	 	Accordingly,	 I	have	not	avoided	difficult,	or	
even	non‐experiences,	of	these	qualities	but	rather	engaged	with	them	and	valued	their	
equal	capacity	to	speak	truths	about	the	eschaton.		Each	of	these	experiences,	and	the	
many	 more	 that	 are	 not	 named	 here,	 have	 been	 presented	 as	 experiences	 that	 can	
assist	us	in	radically	rethinking	the	eschaton	in	such	a	way	that	it	becomes	dynamic	and	
enlivened,	both	in	terms	of	the	future	it	anticipates	and	the	life	it	helps	us	to	live	now.		
As	such,	I	have	challenged	both	the	alienated	universals	of	patriarchal	theology	and	also	
the	 agnosticism	 of	 some	 feminist	 theologians	 by	 acknowledging	 that	 whilst	 the	
experiences	 I	have	attended	 to	cannot	say	everything,	 they	can	and	should	be	valued	
and	 explored	 for	 their	 capacities	 to	 say	 something	 of	meaning	 and	 import	 about	 the	
eschatological	future.	
	
Although	Letty	Russell	was	seen	to	be	one	who	advocated	an	acceptance	of	a	“poverty	
of	knowledge	about	our	future”	(1979a,	53),	I	also	found	in	her	work	a	helpful	tool	with	
which	to	speak	specifically	about	the	future.		Pertaining	primarily	to	Chapter	Three	but	
infusing	 many	 of	 my	 constructive	 efforts,	 I	 engaged	 in	 a	 process	 of	 affirmation	 and	
contradiction,	whereby	the	affirmation	of	traits	aligned	with	female	bodies	qualified	the	
contradiction	 of	 anything	 that	 hindered	 this.	 	 I	 claimed	 that	 eschatology	 helps	 these	
affirmations	 and	 contradictions	 to	 move	 towards	 constructions	 which	 not	 only	 add	
weight	 to	 their	claims	but	also	enable	 the	envisioning	of	a	 future	wherein	 that	which	
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was	affirmed	and	that	which	was	contradicted	will	be	transformed	in	the	newness	and	
dynamism	of	the	eschaton.		Such	constructive	efforts	were	said	to	be	cyclical	insomuch	
as	they	were	shaped	by	qualities	associated	with	present	bodies,	and	women’s	bodies	
in	 particular,	 and	 returned	 to	 these	 bodies	 to	 both	 inform	 how	 we	 may	 live	 in	 the	
present	and	also	to	specify	how	such	living	can	shape	the	future	we	hope	for.164			
	
Relationality	
In	engaging	with	 feminist	 theological	 critiques	of	eschatology,	 I	observed	 that	divine‐
creation	 relations	 were	 understood	 to	 be	 hindered	 by	 traditional	 constructions	 of	
eschatological	 finality.	 	Noting	 that	 the	responses	subsequently	prioritised	 the	nature	
and	function	of	divine‐creation	relations	in	the	present,	I	posed	an	appreciation	of	the	
reasons	for	this	whilst	also	arguing	that	God’s	relations	with	creation	had	not	been,	but	
could	be	used	to	significantly	rethink	eschatology.		I	framed	my	constructive	response	
firstly	in	terms	of	the	process	of	eschatology,	as	this	was	understood	to	underpin	claims	
made	 concerning	 the	 content	 and	 the	 time	 of	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Building	 on	 feminist	
reconstructions	of	divine	relationality	as	erotic,	that	is,	powerful	in	the	ways	that	it	 is	
felt	and	shared	between	God	and	creation,	I	argued	that	such	power	need	not	be	averse	
to	a	God	who	can	exercise	a	power	that	helps	us	to	realise	the	eschaton.		This	power	too	
was	presented	as	relational,	as	it	signified	the	authenticity	and	intensity	of	God	feeling	
with	and	responding	to	creation.			
	
Reading	 some	 framings	 and	 experiences	 of	 maternal	 bodies	 as	 informative	 and	
prophetic,	 I	 argued	 that	 they	 can	 express	 relational	 presence	 as	 a	 deliberate	 and	
practical	perception	of	and	response	to	 the	needs	and	experiences	of	creation.	 	Given	
this	 embodied	 and	 tactile	 perception	 and	 response,	 I	 affirmed	 the	 particularity	 of	
																																																													
164	 This	 further	 illustrates	 how	 my	 thesis	 harmonises	 feminist	 approaches	 with	 a	 sense	 of	
eschatological	finality,	for	the	methodological	process	is	cyclical	even	as	it	speaks	of	something	
ultimate. 
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relationality	 and	 used	 this	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 eschaton	 must,	 accordingly,	 be	
characterised	 by	 God’s	 spacious	 embrace	 which	 is	 open	 both	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	
experiences	and	existences,	and	also	to	the	actions	and	effects	of	creation.	 	As	such,	 it	
was	claimed	that	a	relational	eschaton	is	one	wherein	God	honours	creaturely	freedom	
by	 opening	 Godself	 and	 the	 eschaton	 to	 being	 authentically	 affected	 by	 creation,	 for	
good	or	for	ill.			
	
However,	I	also	claimed	that	a	God	who	loves	creation	to	the	degree	that	God	fully	feels	
and	 desires	 relations	with	 them	must	 also	 be	 a	 God	who	 is	 pained	 by	 anything	 that	
compromises	 this.	 	 Having	 built	 a	 case	 for	 God’s	 ability	 to	 be	 both	 transcendent	 and	
immanent,	 both	with	 and	 for	 creation,	 I	 proposed	 that	 God’s	 love	 for	 creation	 is	 co‐
existent	with	God’s	loyalty	to	creation.		Subsequently,	and	consistently	throughout	my	
thesis,	 I	 argued	 that	 God	 can	 and	 will	 contradict	 anything	 that	 hinders	 the	 full	
experience	of	embodied	relations;	namely	pain,	suffering,	and	death.		This,	coupled	with	
the	relational	 reading	of	 freedom	offered	by	Russell,	which	claims	 that	 “none	of	us	 is	
completely	free	until	all	are	free”	(1982a,	92),	led	me	to	claim	that	true	freedom	is	only	
possible	when	all	of	creation	are	helped	by	God,	are	tangibly	caressed	by	God,	to	fully	
feel	 unhindered	 relations	 that	 are	 abundantly	 dynamic	 in	 their	 embodiments.		
Individual	 choices,	actions,	and	experiences	were	honoured	by	claiming	 that	 they	are	
crucial	to	realising	the	process	of	the	eschaton	and,	furthermore,	that	they	significantly	
and	 lastingly	 affect	 God,	 creation,	 and	 the	 eschaton.	 	 Still,	 this	was	measured	with	 a	
hope	that	pains	will	not	endure,	deaths	will	not	obtain,	and	refusals	will	be	transformed	
by	 the	 relentless	 relational	 love	 and	 loyalty	 of	 God.	 	 In	 summary,	 this	 rethinking	 of	
eschatology	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 relationality	 posited	 that	 a	 God	 who	 is	 as	 relational	 as	
feminist	theologians	have	claimed	would	similarly	be	a	God	who	desires,	 intends,	and	
helps	that	relationality	to	be	experienced	in	its	fullest	and	most	resplendent	capacity.		
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Fluidity	
My	purpose	in	moving	on	to	an	appreciation	of	fluidity	and	an	exploration	of	its	place	in	
the	eschaton	shared	a	similar	reasoning	to	my	appraisal	of	relationality.	 	 It	was	noted	
that	 feminist	 theologians	 attributed	 worth	 to	 the	 seasonality	 and	 temporality	 of	
changing	 embodiments	 but	 rarely	 perceived	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	 changes	 not	 only	
enduring	but	 abounding	 in	 the	eschatological	 future.	 	 I	 argued	 that	 such	an	omission	
failed	to	be	of	benefit	to	those	whom	rarely	or	never	experience	embodied	life	in	these	
creative	 and	 efficacious	ways.	 	 Alongside	 this,	 and	 buttressed	 by	my	 affirmation	 of	 a	
relational	God,	I	claimed	that	if	God	is	truly	to	be	the	relational	God	who	intensely	feels	
and	responds	to	our	joys	and	pains,	and	loves	and	is	loyal	to	our	embodied	existences,	
then	there	must	be	an	alternative	 future	wherein	bodies	can	abound	with	dynamism.		
Thus,	I	attempted	both	to	affirm	the	feminist	theological	challenges	to	a	disembodied,	
static	 eschaton	 and	 to	 invite	 feminist	 theologians	 to	 not	 therefore	 reject	 eschatology	
but	 rather	 to	 rethink	 it	 in	 relation	 to	 those	 characteristics	 they	 have	 successfully	
revalued.165	
	
Accordingly,	 I	 posited	 a	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 content	 of	 eschatology	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
framings	and	some	women’s	experiences	of	their	bodies	as	changing	and	fluid.		As	with	
maternity,	 but	 wider	 in	 its	 scope	 here,	 I	 valued	 such	 bodies	 as	 being	 powerful	 and	
prophetic	in	enabling	this	rethinking.		I	sought	to	affirm	embodied	changes	by	arguing	
for	their	simultaneous	endurance	and	transformation	in	the	eschaton.		In	short,	change	
was	 said	 to	 endure	 within	 the	 dynamism	 of	 transformed	 eschatological	 bodies.		
Speaking	of	endurance	was	deemed	to	be	important	in	order	that	particular	identities	
and	experiences	were	honoured	and	not	lost	in	the	eschaton.		Transformation	likewise	
honoured	these	particularities	but	also	allowed	me	to	speak	of	them	being	experienced	
																																																													
165	My	 response	 here	 confirmed	 the	 claims	made	 in	my	 Introduction;	 that	 is,	 if	we	 are	 to	 be	
effective	in	our	challenges	to	and	our	moves	away	from	patriarchal	theology,	we	must	not	only	
offer	 new	 affirmations	 and	 contradictions	 but	 also	 specific	 constructions	 based	 on	 qualities	
associated	with	female	bodies,	and	some	women’s	experiences	of	these	qualities. 
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in	novel	and	surprising	ways.		An	integral	aspect	of	this	novelty	was	the	contradiction	
of	 death	 through	 its	 eschatological	 transformation	 in	 and	with	 the	 lifeful	 embrace	 of	
God.		Instead	of	seeing	change	as	synonymous	with	death,	I	claimed	that	change	typifies	
life	and	as	such	can	unproblematically	endure	in	the	eschaton,	albeit	in	the	transformed	
manner	I	have	noted.		Furthermore,	this	allowed	me	to	return	to	present	concerns	and	
outline	how	the	eschatological	contradiction	of	death	can	assist	us	in	challenging	death‐
dealing	notions,	 actions,	 and	experiences	 in	 the	here	and	now.166	 	Dynamic	 relational	
embodiments	were	seen	not	only	 to	 typify	but	also	 to	 teem	 in	 the	eschaton	 in	such	a	
way	that	both	affirmed	and	informed	the	way	these	embodiments	are	lived	now.	
	
Tactility	
In	the	ways	noted	above,	my	reconstructions	of	eschatology	are	significantly	different	
from	traditional	approaches	as	they	are	not	severed	from	the	concerns	and	existences	
of	present	embodied	lives.		Instead,	my	remodelling	has	shown	how	eschatology	can	be	
thought	of	as	being	considerably	and	indispensably	touched	by	present	lives	and	can,	in	
turn,	 significantly	 touch	 them.167	 	 Continuing	with	 this	 conviction,	 and	 also	 with	 the	
informative	 role	 that	 feminist	 perspectives	 have	 played	 in	 my	 thesis,	 I	 moved	 to	
consider	how	such	an	eschatology	can	touch	the	present	through	the	practice	of	“good”	
and	 loving	 touch.	 	 I	 acknowledge	 that	 such	 a	 practise	 can	 be	 cultivated	 without	
recourse	to	the	eschaton,	but	I	argued	that	the	eschaton	can	provide	a	specific	way	for	
us	 to	 practise	 such	 tactile	 relating	 with	 our	 own	 and	 each	 other’s	 bodies.168	 	 Such	
specificity	 was	 presented	 with	 reference	 to	 practising	 a	 tactile	 embrace	 and	 caress,		
																																																													
166	One	aspect	of	this	was	considering	how	we	can	mourn	for	bodies	who	have	ceased	to	exist	in	
a	way	that	honours	embodiment;	a	practice	that	was	further	elucidated	in	Chapter	Four.		 
167	As	noted	in	Chapter	Four,	touching	here	can	relate	both	to	being	affected	by	creation	(that	is,	
to	 being	 changing,	 fluid	 beings),	 and	 to	 feeling	 creation	 (that	 is,	 relating	 to	 one	 another,	 to	
ourselves,	 and	 to	 God).	 	 Thus,	 the	 attention	 to	 tactility,	 in	 addition	 to	 being	 a	 vital	 aspect	 of	
embodied	relations,	also	synthesises	my	previous	chapters’	claims. 
168	This	was	seen	to	further	address	models	of	God	as	distant	and	domineering	as	it	emphasised	
the	relationality	of	the	eschatological	process	and	the	significance	of	how	we	exist	and	what	we	
do	within	that	process. 
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which	 was	 understood	 to	 bear	 the	 capacity	 to	 communicate	 the	 universality	 of	 the	
eschaton;	 to	create	(however	partially)	 the	dynamic	and	diverse	new	lives	 that	 typify	
the	 eschaton;	 and	 to	 challenge	 difficult	 experiences	 of	 embodiment	 which	 are	
contradicted	in	the	eschaton.		Making	space	was	also	deemed	to	be	important	here.		Just	
as	 time	 was	 said	 to	 be	 needed	 in	 realising	 the	 process	 of	 the	 eschaton	 and	 the	
transformation	of	particular	embodiments,	so	too	was	the	time	of	creating	space	for	the	
other	 and	oneself	 affirmed	as	 an	 appropriate	practise.	 	 This	 approach	 allowed	me	 to	
appreciate	and	negotiate	some	ways	 in	which	we	can	respond	both	to	abusive	bodies	
and	 to	 bodies	 hurt	 by	 abuse,	 through	 cultivating	 tactile	 practises	 of	 forgiveness	 and	
self‐love.	 	 This	 was	 buttressed	 by	 a	 conviction	 that	 God	 in	 the	 eschaton	 offers	 the	
ultimate	affirmation	and	embrace	of	all	bodies,	such	that	when	our	moves	to	 lovingly	
touch	ourselves	and	each	other	fail,	we	are	heartened	by	the	promise	that	God’s	loving	
touch	will	not.		
	
Moving	Forward	
Implications	and	Further	Research	
Whilst	my	thesis	has	engaged	in	a	thorough	reconstruction	of	eschatology	on	the	basis	
of	 qualities	 associated	 with	 female	 bodies,	 and	 some	 women’s	 experiences	 of	 these,	
there	are	certain	areas	which	I	feel	bear	the	capacity	for	further	exploration	and	inspire	
my	perception	of	and	desire	for	potential	further	research.		These	pertain	both	to	some	
implications	 of	 the	 research	 conducted	 in	 this	 thesis	 which	 I	 feel	 may	 be	mined	 for	
further	 significance	 and	 relevance,	 and	 also	 to	 areas	 not	 covered	 here	 that	 would	
benefit	from	greater	exploration.		Within	my	constructive	chapters,	there	were	certain	
facets	 that	 I	 have	 purposefully	 chosen	 not	 to	 explore	 in	 greater	 depth.	 	 Numerous	
arguments	came	to	light	over	the	course	of	my	research,	and	my	omission	of	them	does	
not	 signify	 a	 lack	of	 appreciation	but	 rather	 an	awareness	of	 and	commitment	 to	 the	
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intended	trajectory	of	my	own	response.	 	 I	note	them	here	in	order	to	further	qualify	
the	focus	of	my	response	and	to	consider	some	potential	avenues	for	further	research.			
	
In	 relation	 to	 discussions	 of	 embodied	 change	 and	 fluidity	 in	 the	 eschaton,	 scientific	
and	 philosophical	 thought	 on	 entropy	 theory	 and	 the	 “arrow	 of	 time”	 engaged	 my	
interest	for	their	understandings	of	order	and	disorder,	and	the	realities	of	these	both	
in	present	existence	and	in	anticipations	of	the	cosmological	future	(see	Davies,	2003,	
72‐92).	 	 Despite	 this	 interest,	 my	 concern	 in	 this	 thesis	 was	 neither	 rooted	 in	 nor	
directed	to	scientific	formulas	about	time	and	the	future.		Rather	I	sought	to	challenge	
concepts	that	remove	God	and	the	eschaton	from	the	material	realities	of	present	life,	
on	account	of	the	problematic	implications	of	this	for	relationality	and	embodiment.		It	
may	 be	 possible,	 however,	 to	 connect	 these	 two	 areas	 in	 future	 research,	 perhaps	
exploring	 whether	 disorder	 is	 inherent	 in	 life,	 and	 what	 this	 may	 mean	 for	 future	
eschatological	 life.	 	 This	 was	 partially	 explored	 in	 Chapter	 Three	 as	 I	 sought	 to	
negotiate	and	affirm	the	presence	of	 fluidity	and	 flux	 in	 the	 future.	 	Moves	have	been	
made	 along	 a	 more	 scientific	 (though	 no	 less	 theological	 and	 philosophical)	 line	 by	
thinkers	 such	 as	 Catherine	Keller	 in	 her	 appraisal	 of	 a	 “chaosmic	 Christ”	 and	 chaotic	
creation	(2003a,	19).	 	Keller’s	appreciation	of	chaos	is	more	substantial	than	my	own,	
but	this	is	in	accordance	with	my	own	desire	to	suggest	the	possibility	of	a	specific	type	
of	future	existence,	rather	than	a	future	that	is	entirely	and	eternally	undetermined	and	
indeterminable.		Still,	assessing	further	whether	not	only	change	but	chaotic	change	can	
and	 should	 feature	 in	 the	 eschaton,	 and	 how	 this	 may	 be	 possible,	 would	 be	 an	
interesting	step	in	further	specifying	the	nature	of	eschatological	life.			
	
This	draws	me	to	 the	second	aspect	 that	 I	chose	not	 to	 fully	explore	here;	 that	of	 the	
creation	 of	 the	 world.	 	 This	 may	 seem	 an	 odd	 choice,	 as	 doctrines	 of	 creation	 and	
eschatology	both	seem	to	suffer	equally,	albeit	differently,	under	patriarchal	theological	
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constructions.		Catherine	Keller,	again,	has	simultaneously	devoted	time	to	challenging	
inaccurate	and	unhelpful	accounts	of	both	creation	(in	Face	of	the	Deep:	A	Theology	of	
Becoming,	2003a)	and	apocalypse	(in	Apocalypse	Now	and	Then:	A	Feminist	Guide	to	the	
End	 of	 the	 World,	 1996a).	 	 Thus	 paying	 attention	 to	 both	 seems	 a	 conjoined	 and	
mutually‐important	 pursuit.	 	 However,	 I	 have	 consistently	 acknowledged	 and	
developed	my	 agreement	with	Letty	Russell	 throughout	 this	 response;	 that	 is,	 I	 have	
utilised	a	hermeneutical	approach	to	existence	that	begins	with	the	end.	 	Whilst	I	have	
clearly	aligned	my	own	thoughts	with	many	of	those	noted,	and	certainly	appreciate	the	
need	 to	 reconfigure	 the	meaning	 and	 significance	 of	 the	 past,	 I	 deemed	 the	 need	 to	
reconsider	 and	 reconstruct	 the	 future	 to	 be	more	 substantially	 neglected	by	 feminist	
theologians,	 and	 thus	 presented	 it	 as	 a	 more	 pertinent	 need.	 	 Having	 said	 this,	 an	
appreciation	of	beginnings	is	not	absent	in	my	thesis:	the	beginning	that	we	all	have	in	
a	female	body,	and	the	new	beginning	that	is	facilitated	by	the	eschatological	future,	are	
both	key	aspects	of	my	response.		Whilst	I	did	not	substantially	explore	dimensions	of	
the	 origins	 of	 cosmological	 creation,	 then,	 I	 displayed	 a	 consistent	 appreciation	 of	
embodied	and	eschatological	creation.		Still,	it	would	be	interesting	to	examine	whether	
a	reconstruction	of	 the	eschaton	can	offer	anything	of	benefit	 to	 feminist	 theologians’	
engagements	 with	 considerations	 of	 creation,	 and	 also	 whether	 rethinking	 creation	
may	further	assist	reconfigurations	of	the	eschatological	future.	
	
Still,	more	qualification	is	needed	to	account	for	my	divergence	from	more	cosmological	
perspectives.	 	 Many	 such	 perspectives	 cast	 a	 much	 more	 macroscopic	 lens	 over	
creation	than	I	have	done	here.	 	This	means,	somewhat	paradoxically,	 that	 they	often	
attend	 to	 the	 existence	 and	 meaning	 of	 even	 the	 most	 microscopic	 members	 of	
creation;	that	is,	they	explicitly	affirm	and	value	“all	species	of	flora	and	fauna”,	seeing	
God	 as	 finding	 “the	 entire,	 intricate	 evolutionary	 complex	 infinitely	 precious	 and	
wondrous”	 (McFague,	 1997,	 135).	 	 Far	 from	denying	 this,	my	 response	 has	 shown	 a	
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similar	appreciation	and	has	suggested	some	ways	in	which	a	revaluation	of	the	earth	
may	be	achieved.		My	concern	has,	however,	predominantly	been	with	challenging	and	
revaluing	the	ways	in	which	patriarchal	theology	has	framed	female	bodies.		Within	this	
it	has	been	assumed,	 to	paraphrase	Anne	Primavesi,	 that	what	 is	 claimed	 for	women	
will	be	claimed	for	nature	also	(1991,	143).		Thus,	where	explicit	reference	to	the	earth	
is	 lacking,	 the	 inference	 is	 made	 by	 reference	 to	 female	 bodies	 on	 account	 of	 their	
traditional	 association	 and	 simultaneous	 defamation.	 	 It	 is,	 however,	 helpful	 to	 alter	
Primavesi’s	 sentiment	 slightly	 in	 order	 to	 allow	more	 space	 for	 particularity.	 	Whilst	
speaking	affirmatively	of	female	bodies	in	conjunction	with	the	earth	body	can	remedy	
the	 devaluation	 of	 both,	 I	 have	 here	 claimed	 that	 this	 should	 be	 expanded	 to	
appreciating	the	changing	and	fluid	natures	of	all	bodies,	in	conjunction	with	the	earth	
body.	 	We	 should	 note,	 though,	 that	 just	 as	 experiences	 of	 change	 and	 fluidity	 differ	
amongst	human	bodies,	so	too	are	change	and	fluidity	manifest	differently	in	the	earth	
body.		Furthermore,	what	is	claimed	for	bodies	may	be	inapplicable	to	the	earth	body;	
speaking	of	 self‐love,	 for	 example,	 is	 appropriate	 and	necessary	 in	 relation	 to	human	
bodies,	 and	 female	 bodies	 in	 particular,	 but	may	make	 little	 sense	when	 considering	
how	 to	 cultivate	 the	 affirmation,	 appreciation,	 and	 flourishing	 of	 a	 flower	 or	 a	 tree.		
That	 these	 differences	 have	 not	 been	 explored	 here	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 my	 particular	
concern	 for	 revaluing	 female	 bodies;	 however,	 the	 specific	 impact	 that	 an	 embodied	
eschatology	can	have	 for	 the	earth	 is	another	avenue	that	would	benefit	 from	further	
investigation.		I	believe	that	my	efforts	in	this	thesis	may	provide	a	useful	starting	point	
to	explore	such	questions.	
	
The	last	dimension	of	thought	that	I	consciously	chose	not	to	develop	more	thoroughly	
was	 philosophical	 considerations	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 otherness.	 	 This	 pertains	 to	 my	
suggestions	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 a	 relationally	 embodied	 eschatological	 existence	 in	
Chapter	Four.		Rather	than	exploring	the	theoretical	meaning	of	otherness,	this	chapter	
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was	 concerned	with	 constructing	 a	 practical	model	 for	 relating	 to	 others.169	 	 Here,	 I	
intended	 to	 explore	 relational	 values	 that	 were	 both	 beneficial	 to	 practising	 the	
creation	 and	 anticipation	 of	 the	 eschatological	 future	 in	 the	 present,	 and	 also	
underdeveloped	 or	 overlooked	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 eschaton.	 	 The	 omission	 of	 a	
philosophical	discussion	of	otherness	was	thus	purposeful;	 I	 intended	to	 focus	on	the	
practicality	of	relating	to	others	and	the	reality	of	relationships	with	others	whom	we	
love	and	also	who	hurt	us.170	 	Thus,	whilst	questions	of	who	the	other	 is	and,	 indeed,	
who	the	self	is	in	such	relating	are	significant	and	were	acknowledged	in	Chapter	Four,	
a	 substantial	 philosophical	 discussion	 of	 otherness	 would	 have	 distracted	 from	 my	
desire	to	speak	practically	and	realistically	of	the	ways	in	which	my	reconstruction	of	
eschatology	can	both	inform	and	be	informed	by	present	lives.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 areas	 noted	 above	 that	 could	 potentially	 birth	 interesting	 avenues	
into	further	research,	I	feel	that	birthing	itself	may	also	hold	even	more	potential	than	it	
has	 evidently	 shown	 in	my	 thesis.	 	 Indeed,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 eschatological	 endings	
signify	new	beginnings,	and	this	is	also	the	hope	I	hold	for	my	research.	 	Whilst	there	
are	 certainly	 areas	of	 thought	 in	my	 thesis	 that	 could	have	been	developed	but	have	
not,	for	reasons	noted,	I	feel	that	the	appraisal	of	some	experiences	of	motherhood,	and	
the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 interpretive	 significance	 of	 its	 practical	 complexities	 and	
potentials	can	be	yet	more	beneficial	to	theology.		Experiences	of	birthing,	motherhood,	
and	the	various	other	experiences	of	embodiment	that	are	located	on	these	spectrums	
																																																													
169	 I	 previously	 explored	 the	 notion	 of	 otherness	 in	 my	 Master’s	 thesis,	 entitled	 Journeying	
through	 Otherness:	 Exploring	 Understandings	 of	 Otherness	 in	 Relation	 to	 Love	 of	 Neighbour,	
Enemy,	Self,	and	God	(2010).		Here,	I	attended	to	the	perspectives	of	Buber,	Sartre,	and	Levinas	
(among	others).	 	This	provided	a	basis	 for	my	considerations	 in	Chapter	Four,	as	my	Master’s	
thesis	sought	to	develop	a	model	for	relating	lovingly	to	others	that	appreciated	the	alterity	of	
the	other	and	the	potential	for	harm	in	relationships	with	others.	
170	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 philosophical	 concerns	 are	 necessarily	 severed	 from	 practice;	
indeed,	Hadot	notes	that	historically,	philosophy	was	concerned	with	“a	style	of	life	and	a	mode	
of	 being”	 (2002,	 240)	 whilst	 Bonsor	 argues	 that	 philosophy	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 “the	 practice	 of	
theology”	 (1993,	 3).	 	 Whilst	 certainly	 not	 true	 of	 all	 modes	 of	 philosophical	 enquiry,	 these	
examples	speak	to	the	ways	in	which	my	constructive	theories	in	Chapters	Two	and	Three	are	
intrinsically	linked	to	my	considerations	of	practise	in	Chapter	Four.			 
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may,	I	feel,	prove	to	have	wider	possibilities	for	application;	wider	than	indicated	here	
and	wider	 than	are	acknowledged	 in	 the	 theological	sphere.	 	 I	would	be	 interested	 in	
exploring,	and	engaging	with	others	who	have	explored,	whether	 the	diverse	ways	 in	
which	 some	 women	 experience	 their	 bodies	 as	 birthing	 bodies	 (both	 literally	 and	
metaphorically)	have	merits	for	thinking	differently	about	other	areas	of	theology	and	
doctrine,	as	they	have	with	eschatology.	 	Whilst	the	multiplicity	and	intricacy	of	these	
experiences	means	that	a	comprehensive	exploration	of	them	may	forever	be	elusive,	it	
is	precisely	because	of	their	multiplicity	and	intricacy	that	I	feel	they	hold	such	power	
and	significance.	
	
I	have	also	been	encouraged	and	inspired	by	the	rethinking	of	touch	that	those	named	
in	Chapter	Four	have	engaged	in,	and	that	has	emerged	as	crucial	to	my	reconstruction	
of	the	practical	significance	of	eschatology.		I	noted	that	attending	to	and	affirming	the	
sensuousness	 and	 tactility	 of	 embodied	 relations	 has	 long	 been	 neglected	 and	
trivialised	in	theology,	primarily	because	of	its	association	with	female	bodies.		As	such,	
whilst	I	have	begun	to	appreciate	the	creative,	communicative,	and	hopeful	capacity	of	
good	and	loving	touch	here,	I	have	also	been	inspired	by	this	to	ponder	its	significance	
further.		I	feel	that	the	practice	of	touch	I	have	presented	here	signifies	a	powerful	and	
novel	way	to	rethink	the	place	of	eschatology	in	negotiating	and	informing	our	relations	
with	 one	 another,	 and	 I	would	 be	 interested	 in	 exploring	more	 comprehensively	 the	
justifications	for,	and	dimensions	and	implications	of,	bodies	who	strive	to	be	in	touch	
with	themselves	and	with	one	another.	
	
Lastly,	and	inspired	by	the	evident	relational	and	interpretive	power	of	particular	and	
diverse	 bodies	 that	 has	 consistently	 been	 upheld	 in	 both	 feminist	 theology	 and	 this	
thesis,	I	am	interested	in	further	exploring	the	location	of	bodies	in	theology.		Similarly	
influenced	by	 the	practical	 focus	of	my	 final	 chapter,	 I	would	 like	 to	 engage	not	only	
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with	 thinking	 about	 bodies	 but	 also	 with	 practically	 exploring	 how	 bodies	 can	 be	
embraced	and	engaged	with	in	the	doing	of	theology.	 	 I	have	also	been	encouraged	to	
think	in	this	direction	by	some	recent	engagements	with	the	use	of	dance	in	theology.		
Henriëtte	Beurmanjer,	for	instance,	engages	in	a	practice	entitled	Bibliodance,	wherein	
dance	is	used	as	a	form	of	“spiritual	learning”	which	engages	the	Bible,	the	dancer,	and	
the	Divine	(2013),	whilst	Amy	Wright	Glenn	(2013,	8)	presents	a	theology	of	dance	as	
something	 that	 is	 powerfully	 therapeutic.	 	 Citing	 her	 engagement	 with	 Hari	 Krishna	
worship	services,	she	writes:	
Watching	bodies	 express	 the	heart’s	 deepest	 longing	 for	 communion	 changed	
me.		One	could	dance	and	pray	at	the	same	time?		Prayer	merged	with	music.		I	
danced	 sadness,	 strength,	 friendship,	 peace,	 and	 joy.	 	 As	 the	 Muslim	 mystic	
Rumi	wrote,	‘He	who	knoweth	the	dance;	dwelleth	in	God’.	
I	 feel	 that	 reflecting	on	 the	many	 creative	 and	 expressive	ways	we	 live	 and	 relate	 as	
embodied	beings	would	be	an	exciting	and	illuminating	avenue	for	future	research,	and	
one	that	could	further	add	“flesh	to	the	bones”	of	what	it	means	to	theologise	as	beings	
who	are	embedded	in	our	embodiments.	
	
Conclusion	
My	attempts	to	reconstruct	eschatology	in	a	way	that	is	firmly	rooted	in	framings	and	
experiences	of	 female	bodies	has	signified	a	novel	and	necessary	contribution	to	both	
traditional	eschatological	thought	and	feminist	theological	critiques	of	such	thought.		I	
have	 sought	 to	 challenge	 the	 patriarchal,	 androcentric,	 and	 dislocated	 models	 of	
eschatology	provided	by	 the	Christian	 tradition	by	revaluing	 female	bodies.	 	This	has	
meant	affirming	qualities	assigned	to	all	and	experienced	by	some	women,	and	naming	
them	 as	 inseparable	 from	 and	 crucial	 to	 all	 of	 creation’s	 existences	 both	 now	 and,	
particularly,	in	the	eschatological	future.		In	so	doing,	I	have	also	attempted	to	provide	a	
model	 of	 eschatology	 for	 feminist	 theology	which	 celebrates	 and	hopes	 for	 all	 of	 our	
bodies,	 in	 order	 to	 show	 that	 the	 ultimacy	 of	 the	 eschaton	 need	 not	 be	 averse	 to	
feminist	 theological	 concerns	 but	 can,	 in	 fact,	 affirm	 them.	 	 I	 have	 also	 envisioned	 a	
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transformed	 existence	 in	 the	 eschaton	whereby	 those	 aspects	 of	 existence	 that	 have	
been	 so	 valued	 are	 brought	 to	 their	 fullest	 fruition.	 	 Thus,	 relationality,	 fluidity,	 and	
tactility	are	afforded	additional	and	specific	affirmations,	and	in	such	a	way	that	speaks	
back	to	the	present	and	helps	us	to	 live	 in	ways	that	are	more	 fully	embedded	in	our	
relational,	 dynamic,	 and	 sensuous	 embodiments.	 	 My	 research	 has	 solidified	 my	
conviction	that	theology	must	reconsider	and	reconfigure	its	doctrines	in	light	of,	and	
no	 longer	 in	 spite	 of,	 experiences	 of	 embodiment.	 	 Theology	 is	 all	 the	more	 rich	 and	
relevant	when	it	does	so.	 	Only	then	can	the	house	that	we	build	truly	be	one	of	open	
embrace	that	makes	space	for	and	celebrates	the	fluid	and	tangible	bodies	to	whom	we	
relate	and	who	we,	indeed,	are.	
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